Land or Peace

Whither Israel?

YAEL YISHAI

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The Six-Day War exploded between the Arab States and Israel in June 1967. When the battle was over Israel was firmly in control of the Golan Heights, Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip, the Jordan Valley, and the Sinai Peninsula. These lands were more than simply conquered territory to Israel; they held deep significance for Jews everywhere who regard them as the birthplace of their culture, their nation, and their religion.

The conflict with the Arab world over Israel's disposition of the territories has been a subject of intense international concern since 1967. Rarely has the choice between peace or land seemed so clear-cut. Yael Yishai presents the Israeli aspect of the debate, focusing on the domestic political climate that alternately fostered and hindered the formulation of policy for disposition of the territories. The discussion traces the evolution of territorial policy and follows the attempts to implement this policy by establishing settlements on the occupied lands. The major portion of the book is devoted to the domestic influence on territorial policy, namely the efforts of major political parties and interest groups to sway decisionmakers. Fluctuation in public opinion regarding the retention of territories is also considered.

Yishai highlights the deep fissure that cuts

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

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Yael Yishai

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

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Take council together, and it shall be brought to nought,
Speak the word, and it shall not stand,
For God is with us

Gush Emunim motto

Better a Land of Peace than a Piece of Land

Peace Now Motto

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ABBREVIATIONS

DMC	Democratic Movement for Change
GSC	Golan Settlement Committee
IIASR	Israel Institute for Applied Social Research
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
ISA	Israel Statistical Abstract
KM	Knesset Minutes
LIM	Land of Israel Movement
LP	Labor Party
MK	Member of Knesset
NRP	National Religious Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
WZO	World Zionist Organization

PREFACE

Rarely have people and nations fought so bitterly over lands—or has the choice between peace and possession of these lands been so intense. Since 1967 the problem of the territories captured by Israel in the Six-Day War has dominated the middle-eastern scene, with accompanying repercussions on world politics. This book presents the Israeli side of the problem, focusing mainly on the domestic constraints and supports that have either facilitated or hindered the implementation of measures for the future disposition of these territories.

Delimitation of this subject has not been an easy task. Focusing on the domestic factors that have contributed to the formulation of Israel's territorial policy naturally results in some evasion of the external factors that have influenced both policymakers and public opinion. Chief among these factors is Arab intransigence and the protracted unwillingness of many Arab states to acknowledge Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. The continual terrorist activities of the PLO and other Palestinian groups are also contributing forces that help to shape the issue. In short, Israel's stance is not based on paranoia but on the need to confront genuine enemies.

An understanding of the domestic factors that affect Israel's territorial policy is, however, important for two reasons: First, as leaders of a democratic state, Israeli decisionmakers need to take the forces operating in the Israeli polity into account to secure accommodation to their policy choices. Second, the territorial issue encapsulates most aspects of political life. It reflects the traditional divisions within the Labor movement and those between Labor and its rivals, the right-wing parties. The territorial issue also reflects the deep rifts between the religious and the nonreligious sectors of Israeli society and the social divisions between

Jews of different ethnic origins. In short, an analysis of the territorial issue provides an illuminating glimpse into the intricacies of the Israeli sociopolitical web. Nevertheless, this book was written with complete awareness that what goes on within Israel only partly shapes Israeli perceptions of the territorial issue.

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

ISRAEL AND THE LEVANT

INTRODUCTION

Out of the smoke and debris of the Six-Day War emerged a new reality: Israel gained control of a territory 3.6 times larger than its own area. The excitement that swept the country, however, emanated not from the sheer size of the land, but from its historical associations. The territories captured in the 1967 war—the Golan Heights, Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip, the Jordan Valley, and the Sinai Peninsula—were replete with sites evocative of national and religious memories. These were sites where the biblical Israelites took their first steps toward nationhood—sites Jews had yearned for throughout their protracted exile. It was not until 1967 that Israelis began to express a deep concern for these lands. Prior to this time, they had accepted existing (prewar) boundaries, provided they could live in relative peace and tranquility. Reference was seldom made to the "entire holy land" and there were no calls for its conquest. Israel's capture of the territories may have been envisaged, and perhaps even planned, by a few senior officers in Israel's military headquarters. But prior to the war, the territories were rarely placed on the national agenda; despite their geographic proximity, they remained remote and elusive. The 1967 war abruptly changed all that. Even before the firing stopped Israelis could not make up their minds whether the lands had been conquered, liberated, or merely captured for temporary administration. This confusion marked an emerging and growing dissent over the future of the territories. The issue was paramount on the state's domestic and international agenda and constituted a microcosm of its politics and values. At stake were vital issues involving the allocation of national resources and ideological priorities.

The territorial issue affects Israel in three main arenas. The first is the world arena. Since 1967 many countries have admonished and censured Israel for its domination of the territories and for the administrative and political repercussions of that domination. The second is the regional arena, where the territories have become the main bone of con-

tention between Israel and its neighbors. Arab leaders have regarded the return of their lands as the essential condition for any progress toward resolution, or even mitigation, of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third is Israel's domestic arena. One concern is the administration of the territories, which involves the relationship between Israelis and Arabs living within their boundaries. There have been many accounts and analyses of the administrative, economic, and political aspects of Israel's government of the territories.[1] This study deals with another concern—the domestic factors involved in the formulation and implementation of territorial policy. The questions raised here concern the future disposition of the territories rather than their current administration.[2]

This study will trace the evolution of territorial policy between 1967 and 1982. Territorial policy comprises the decisions of the Israeli government and the Knesset (parliament), the two bodies lawfully empowered to decide the state's official policy—including the form and conditions of Israel's domination of, or withdrawal from, the territories. Over the years, changes in these policies have been marked. All Israeli governments— Labor or Likud— have steadfastly rejected a political solution in which all the territories would be relinquished. In the fifteen years following the occupation, however, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were annexed to Israel, and the Sinai Peninsula and part of the Golan Heights were returned. There have also been changes in the conditions Israel has considered acceptable for negotiations to change the territorial status quo.

Over the years the Israeli government was not content merely to declare policy, but took the appropriate measures to carry out its decisions. Accordingly, Jewish settlements were founded throughout the administered areas, with a consequent diversion of human and economic resources. Settlements were perceived to be the prime instrument for reinforcing Israel's hold on the territories. Since their minuscule beginnings in 1967, Jewish installations in the territories have expanded dramatically—to either the delight or agitation of many people outside and inside Israel.

The domestic influences on the formulation of Israeli territorial policy are so intricate that an effective examination is nearly impossible. The collective memories, latent sensitivities of the new—yet ancient—nation, and the undercurrents of an emerging society may all be considered forms of domestic input. Out of this tangle I have focused on three factors: those political parties that have been exceptionally influential in formulating Israel's policy; interest groups that have been organized to promote a particular policy; and the views of the general public as re-

corded in opinion polls. My exploration of the input of these three factors follows the classic definition offered by David Easton for the process of input, namely, the sum of the demands presented to and supports of a political system regarding a specific policy issue.[3]

The ultimate focus of this examination is the effect of the three above factors on territorial policy. To what extent has involvement in the policy process been converted into influence? In other words, have the voices of the general public or organized groups really mattered? The conceptual framework used to probe this question is composed of three variables: policy, behavior, and capacity.

Policy constitutes the formulations of the authoritative decisionmaking bodies. For territorial policy, these bodies consist of the government and the Knesset. Behavior refers to the activities pursued to implement policy—in this case, primarily the founding of Jewish settlements in the territories. Capacity denotes the ability of decisionmakers to carry out their policy schemes. The relationships between policy, behavior, and capacity are probably reciprocal, because both policy and behavior determine and affect the quantity and quality of capacity. This interaction may be manifested by the distribution of valuable resources, which flow from the political leaders to those on whom they depend for their ability to act. Even in light of this cyclical relationship, capacity is still determined by the sum total of resources available to decisionmakers.

The term "resources" is not of much help in explaining behavior, since by definition an actor can only employ resources that are within reach. Furthermore, as pointed out by Robert Dahl, the amount of available resources is only partially responsible for determining results, because "given the resources at their disposal some actors use more of them . . . [or] use them more skillfully or effectively than others do."[4] I did not consider all available resources or examine how efficiently they were used. For instance, the study does not evaluate economic resources, whose scarcity is probably a critical obstacle to policy implementation. Further, it mainly ignores the input of the international community, whose attitudes may seriously impinge on decisionmaking in a small country like Israel that is so dependent on external resources. The study also does not consider the effects of social unrest caused by economic inequalities, which may inhibit decisionmakers in carrying out their decisions. It does, however, focus on the input of actors in the political arena and is guided by three main theoretical assumptions.

1. Political input consists of supports and constraints.

"Supports" refer to those inputs that provide leaders with the resources and legitimacy essential for their continued rule. The term "constraint" is preferred to "demand" because it includes those antagonistic activities that neither call for explicit action nor present a clear alternative to official policy.

2. The equilibrium between supports and constraints determines the ability of decisionmakers to legislate and act. Although this equilibrium is constantly changing according to the dynamics of individual and group capacities, more constant processes can nevertheless be discerned.

3. In general, equilibrium is determined by the amount of influence exerted by the actors involved in the input process. Much has been written about the nature of influence—how to define it, where to go in search of its empirical indicators, and how to measure it once it is located. A fair amount of confusion results, however, from the interchangeable use of such terms as influence, persuasion, inducement, and so on.[5] The distinction between the possession of influence and its exercise is also blurred. Although some difficulties remain intractable, the present study concentrates on those attributes whose possession creates favorable conditions for exerting influence. Although no linear causal relationship can be established between possession of these attributes and the exercise of influence, there is a high probability of such a relationship. Three types of variables are suggested as criteria for potential influence: organizational, political, and ideological.

Organizational variables include actors' resources such as leadership, cohesion, strategies, and institutions. The more reputable the leadership, the more cohesive the group, the more compelling the strategies, and the more structured the institutions, the greater is an actor's influence.

Political variables depend on the input actor's proximity to the locus of decisionmaking. The extent of this proximity is determined by (1) the input actor's direct or indirect representation in institutions of authoritative decisionmaking; (2) the input actor's access to these institutions, denoting the channels available to meet with decisionmakers, make opinions known, and present demands;[6] and (3) the legitimation, or acceptance, of the input actor by decisionmakers.[7] Influence is not determined by approval of the actor's policies, but rather by the actor's

acceptance by decisionmakers as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests. The greater the proximity, the more influential the actor.

Ideological variables denote the input actors' aspirations and the rationale for their objectives. Presumably, the actor does not present his demands boldly but couches them in values that have a chance of wide acceptance. Expansion of these values is two-pronged, having both tangible and intangible manifestations. Values may expand intangibly in the sense that they are shared and acclaimed by a large proportion of the public. When those in agreement with the actor's principles participate in their activities, sharing of values is tangibly manifested as mobilization. Both types of expansion are crucial to achieving influence. The expandability of values reflects the congruity between the actor's principles and the norms of society, on the one hand, and the dissemination of those norms among specific groups, on the other. A societal and political configuration that allows the juxtaposition of general norms and particular needs is conducive to expansion.

Examination of these variables over time casts further light on the process of influence and its outcome, or impact. A noticeable decline in the variables enumerated above indicates that the actor is becoming less influential and that the potential for future influence will be reduced. Not all actors play a similar role in the process of support or constraint. For instance, the influence of the public cannot be evaluated on the basis of the criteria outlined above, which apply only to actors possessing organizational variables. Interest groups pass the organizational test, but they are not likely to be formed in support of a given policy. According to Almond and Powell, interest groups consist of those individuals who make demands upon the political decisionmaker.[8] Only political parties both demonstrate organizational attributes and affect policy either as a support or a constraint.

Many Israelis regard the territorial issue, perhaps justifiably, as a purely domestic matter. The myriad of domestic actors involved in the issue and the high-pitched emotions attached to it give the impression that the problem of the territories has been strikingly domesticated. But because the territories are located outside the internationally recognized boundaries of the Israeli state, the issue also belongs in the realm of foreign policy. It may therefore be appropriate to examine the issue through the prism of domestic inputs into foreign policy. In his investigation of Israel's foreign policy system, Michael Brecher includes in his model references to actors like political parties and interest groups.[9] His main emphasis, however, is on the psychological environment of those responsible for foreign policy decisions. The present study centers not

on the motivations of Israel's political leaders, but on the motivations of those who attempt to influence these leaders—in other words, those actors whose interest and activity in connection with the territorial issue has both prompted and hindered authoritative policy and actions. These forces of support and constraint have shaped Israel's capacity to hold on to the territories. An understanding of this capacity may aid in predicting the government's willingness, or ability, to withdraw from the territories in the framework of some future political settlement.

ONE

The Authoritative Policy

When the dust of the 1967 war had settled, the Israeli government turned its attention to the most tangible outcome of the war: the captured territories. At stake were the state's future borders, the conditions under which the borders would be determined, and the procedures for this determination.

At the time, the government had three options: (1) to withdraw from all the territories captured in 1967 and return to the 1949 armistice lines; (2) to withdraw from some of the territories; or (3) to retain them all. These options could be either evaluated according to Israeli priorities alone or weighed in conjunction with non-Israeli factors. Outside factors included various foreign powers who might exert pressure on Israel to adopt a particular policy and Israel's direct adversaries, the Arab states. There might be an option to relinquish a part of the territories in return for some sort of conciliation—extending from a cease-fire to an all-embracing peace treaty. The procedures for determining these options were an integral part of the considerations that influenced the government's choice. These procedures included direct negotiations and mediating mechanisms.

The sources used in this analysis of Israeli decisions about the territories are Knesset minutes and government resolutions, which are both official state documents. This method leaves a few lacunae. First,

not all government resolutions have been published. The published memoirs of many government members who took part in making the choices and scholarly accounts of the events can, however, be an adequate substitute. Second decisionmakers have often preferred to announce their decisions in interviews or other pronouncements that were published (or televised) in the mass media rather than in formal documents. Such pronouncements, however, have not always reflected the government's official policy. As suggested by Yitzhak Rabin, "The government's statements in the Knesset are the authoritative definitions of our policy. With all due respect to pronouncements, conversations and press articles I recommend to the members of the Knesset to relate to the government's policy according to its authoritative statements in the Knesset."[1]

A third element that cannot be ignored in the process of making choices is the voice of the opposition. Rejections of government policy cannot be found in official government resolutions. Opponents' opinions can only be traced in Knesset reports. In Israel the opposition rarely topples the government; it can, however, inhibit its decisions. The scope and intensity of parliamentary dissent is a constraint that narrows the government's freedom of choice. Attention will therefore focus not only on official policy but also on parliamentary objection to it.

Forging the Principles of Nonwithdrawal, 1967–1970

The Israeli premier made the first policy statement on the territories only one day after the guns fell silent. His speech in the Knesset reflected the mood of elation—almost intoxication—that was sweeping through the country. Supported by an overwhelming majority of Knesset members (111 out of 120), Levi Eshkol laid down the foundations of the government's attitude toward the territorial issue. Eleven years earlier Israel had been compelled to succumb to international pressure and return lands captured in the Sinai campaign.[2] In 1967 Israel's government was determined not to let this happen again.

Eshkol appealed to the international community. "Do not deceive yourself that the state of Israel is ready to return to the plight it experienced a week ago. Israel was founded by right, yet it has been forced to struggle and struggle again to defend this right. We alone fought for our survival and security and we are to determine what are our genuine and vital national interests, and how to secure our future."

In this short statement the premier forestalled any attempt to repeat the events of 1956, when Israel's dependence on outsiders caused the government to withdraw. He made it clear that the territories were a vital national interest and that their fate would be determined by Israel alone. Eshkol, a member of a pragmatic party and a known dove, displayed the joy and exhilaration shared by the majority of Knesset members. In a voice charged with emotion, the premier described the bond between the Israeli people and the land captured a day earlier.

> The roots of the Israeli people are in this land, as deep as ancient days. Throughout the generations the People of Israel maintained their spiritual and material bonds with this land which were never cut off even when they were driven into exile. Simultaneously the land has been faithful to us and did not give herself to an alien nation. She remained waiting for the return of her sons and for the ingathering of her exiles. Today the whole world has become aware of the fact that there is no power capable of uprooting us from this land.[3]

The sentiments expressed in this quotation form the bedrock of arguments to retain the territories.

In the summer of 1967 two policies on the territories were adopted. The first was a government resolution, adopted on June 27, 1967, proclaiming authorization to extend "the Law, Jurisdiction and Administration of the State of Israel to any area of Eretz Israel designated by the government by order." In the Knesset, Justice Minister Yaacov Shimshon Shapira justified the resolution on grounds that Israel could not view itself as a military occupant in a territory that it had liberated from foreigners.[4] The second policy was adopted by the Knesset as follows:

> The Knesset confirms the government's stand that by means of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries the conclusion of peace treaties should be brought about; and that until peace is achieved, Israel will continue to maintain fully the present situation as created by the cease-fire which the Israel Defence Forces' successful repulsion of aggression effected.[5]

Opposition to these postures was almost negligible. Immediately after the war Eshkol reflected the spirit of unity. "I feel not as a party member, even though my party is the largest in the Knesset, but as a head of a government that took command of the war and emerged victorious."[6]

The only rejection of the authoritative policy came from the extreme ends of the political spectrum: the "anti-system" Communist Party (represented by four members of the Knesset [MKs]) and the right-wing

Free Center (consisting of two MKs).[7] The Free Center's spokesman, Shmuel Tamir, demanded outright that Israel extend its legal and monetary systems over what he considered "liberated lands," implying full-fledged annexation.[8]

The positions taken by Gahal, the parliamentary bloc of the Liberal Party and Herut formed in 1965, were very similar to those of its right-wing counterpart (and former partner), the Free Center. As a member of the national unity coalition, Gahal did not join the drive for annexation. But it demanded that, peace or no peace, Israel should announce that its military forces would remain in the occupied areas. As a Gahal spokesman asserted, "Regarding a homeland there is one and only one policy: The whole homeland is ours. Our rights to Eretz Israel our homeland is the right of every nation to its homeland, and this right determines the new territorial reality."[9] Gahal dissented from the official line by regarding the territories not as a deposit to be returned in exchange for peace, but as an asset to be held unconditionally. The temporary lack of a claimant for the deposit reduced, but did not obliterate, the gap between the ruling coalition partners.

The divisions within the national coalition were nevertheless overshadowed by the consensus that no retreat would be considered before a peace treaty was signed. The designation of peace as a prime policy objective enabled Israel to achieve two things. First, by demonstrating its conciliatory attitudes, it earned praise from the international community. Second, the low prospects for a peace treaty obviated the need for a detailed account of the territorial concessions the government would be willing to pay for it. Eshkol and others indicated on several occasions that there was no sense in discussing the terms of settlement outside the framework of direct peace negotiations.[10]

That no negotiations were imminent was obvious from the content of the Khartoum resolutions, which left no doubt about the Arab states' intransigent posture toward Israel. At the Khartoum summit (August 20–September 1, 1967), Arab heads of state met to reassess the Arab position in the wake of the Six-Day War. The Khartoum resolutions pledged no negotiation, no recognition, and no peace with Israel. Two days after the resolution Eshkol issued a statement saying that since the prospect of peace in the region had been made more remote, Israel would "stand firm in the positions in the territories vital to the security and undisturbed development of Israel."[11] The government's official position was expressed in a resolution adopted on October 17, 1967, which reiterated Israel's determination to hold fast to its positions along the cease-fire lines.[12]

Eshkol's death in February 1969 had no effect on government policy. His successor, Golda Meir, steadfastly adhered to the policy of procrastination. In the Knesset Meir quoted the gist of Israel's territorial policy from the governments' guidelines. "Israel will persist in its willingness to negotiate without pre-conditions with each of its neighboring states for signing a peace treaty. In the absence of peace treaties Israel would firmly retain the status determined by the cease-fire and would ameliorate its position with regard to the fundamental needs of its security and development."[13]

Israel was determined to draw no map for future borders until Arab leaders were willing to sit down and talk. Nevertheless, all of the territories were not open for negotiation, even in the event of peace. Although all territories were important, some gradually acquired a higher profile. The distinctions among the various captured regions surfaced as early as the first government debate on the issue, held on June 19, 1967. The cabinet unanimously adopted a resolution proclaiming its readiness to conclude peace with Syria and Egypt on the basis of its withdrawal to the international border, with Gaza remaining within Israel's borders. The resolution provided that Israel would receive assurances that (1) it would have free navigation by sea and air of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal; (2) the waters flowing into Israel from three sources of the Jordan River would not be interrupted; and (3) the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights would be demilitarized.[14] In his diary Rabin noted that the June 19 decision had been made in a mood of ebullience, and that its generosity reflected the cabinet's certainty that at any moment President Nasser would be expressing his readiness to sit down and discuss peace.[15] The government maintained, however, a deafening silence with regard to King Hussein of Jordan, whose former territory was to become the area to which Israel would cling most tenaciously. Israel could contemplate returning territory in Sinai and the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, but it was widely believed that Israel had a strong claim to the West Bank of the Jordan that would not be relinquished.

As time passed it became evident that there were also other areas that were completely excluded from negotiations. The first was Sharm el-Sheikh, the strategically important location at Sinai's southern tip facing the Tiran Straits on the Red Sea. Dayan's famous statement, "I prefer to remain in Sharm-a-Sheikh without peace than to give back Sharm and have peace," was not official policy but was nonetheless operative.[16] In October 1968 the government rescinded its 1967 decision and resolved not to return to the June 1967 boundaries but to opt for permanent ter-

ritorial changes.[17] It thus became crystal clear that certain areas were, in effect, nonnegotiable.

The first period of Israel's control over the territories ended with the government's decision to keep the assets gained in war until direct negotiations replaced nonrecognition and the state of war ended. That these events were not imminent did not greatly concern Israeli decision-makers, who had declared some territories unreturnable under any circumstances.

Withdrawal from Principles, Nonwithdrawal from Lands, 1970–1973

The U.S. peace initiative of 1970–72 weakened Israel's adherence to the principles of no withdrawal, no mediation, and no partial arrangements. On June 19, 1970, in what became known as the Rogers Initiative, the United States proposed that Egypt, Jordan, and Israel accept a limited cease-fire in the war of attrition for three months and resume discussions under Jarring's auspices on the basis of UN Resolution 242. This was not the first time Israel had confronted a U.S. initiative. In October–November 1969 the United States submitted an outline of an Egyptian-Israeli settlement (later known as the Rogers Plan). The settlement envisaged a binding peace agreement and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries, except for the Gaza Strip. Gaza was to be subject to discussions between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Similar principles were applied to a Jordanian-Israeli settlement, but there was a reference to "insubstantial" boundary alterations that might be required for mutual security and provisions for separate treatment of the Jerusalem question. The Israeli government outrightly rejected this plan, which called for far-reaching territorial concessions. Israel's initial response to the Rogers Initiative of 1970 was also negative. In a speech to the Knesset on June 29, 1970, Meir rejected the American proposal for a cease-fire out of fear that it would facilitate Arab preparations for renewed hostilities. The provisions calling for withdrawal before the beginning of negotiations and for indirect talks rather than face-to-face discussions were also unacceptable.

But the increased Soviet involvement in the area and the escalation of the war of attrition persuaded the cabinet to change its decision. On July 31, 1970 the government issued the following communiqué.

> Having considered the appeals of the President of the U.S, and without abandoning its commitment to its basic policy guidelines and authorized statements, the cabinet has decided to endorse the latest peace initiative of the U.S. Government and to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative for peace negotiations without prior conditions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring within the framework of the Security Council Resolution 242, and with the aim of reaching a binding contractual peace agreement between the parties.[18]

This reversal significantly altered the government's structure and caused Gahal to withdraw from the coalition. It also had equivocal repercussions. Israel's acceptance of the Jarring mission reflected two changes in its territorial policy. First, the demand for direct negotiations was dropped and mediation was accepted; second, the possibility of partial withdrawal on all fronts was considered.

In her response to the U.S. proposal the premier explicitly declared that Israel was willing to enter indirect talks if that might precipitate peace discussions between the parties themselves.[19] It has been suggested that, initially, the acceptance of Jarring as a possible mediator between Israel and the Arab states did not imply a total retreat from the demand for direct negotiations. It was understood that the separate talks conducted by Jarring would lead to direct contacts between the parties.[20]

The policy change indicating possible withdrawal on all fronts based on Security Council Resolution 242 was more striking. By May 26, 1970 Meir had announced Israel's acceptance of the resolution in the Knesset.[21] This statement constituted a significant innovation in policy, because it indirectly entailed an agreement to withdraw from all fronts, including the West Bank. Gahal bitterly opposed this statement. The government's unity was maintained by permitting Gahal to abstain in the Knesset vote on Meir's announcement. In August 1970 no such measure was taken. The premier stated that Israel accepted the principle of "withdrawal of its armed forces from the territories . . . to secure, recognized and agreed borders to be determined in peace treaties." Meir added that in accepting the American government's peace initiative, Israel was not making any territorial commitments. On the contrary, the Israeli government won support for its position that not a single Israeli soldier would be withdrawn from the cease-fire lines until a binding contractual peace agreement was obtained.[22]

This explanation did not pacify Gahal, which opposed withdrawal from any territory and was inflexible about the West Bank. The breakup

of the coalition was caused by substantial differences in attitude about the future of the territories; it also served to accentuate them. As Golda Meir put it to the Knesset,

> There are fundamental issues over which all of us are united. That is, no withdrawal from the armistice lines until peace arrives and no Israeli return to the 1967 borders. But contrary to Gahal, the other parts of the government do not view the secure and agreed borders, achieved within the framework of a peace treaty as necessarily identical with the present armistice borders in all the fronts.[23]

It was the insertion of the term "all" that precipitated Gahal's secession. As noted above, official policy avoided dealing with the acutely sensitive eastern front. Acceptance of Jarring's mission implied that one of the principles agreed to by the national unity government—that some territories were nonnegotiable—had been renounced. Many hurdles obstructed the path to withdrawal. A principle had been relinquished, but no actual land. Nevertheless, in Begin's eyes the government had committed "the gravest sin."[24] Gahal's withdrawal from the National Unity Government constrained the authoritative choice; the 1969 elections reduced the Labor Alignment's majority in the Knesset from 63 to 56 seats. This constraint was enhanced by the National Religious Party's (NRP) opposition to the possibility of withdrawal from the West Bank. NRP spokesman Yisrael Ben-Meir stated in the Knesset, "According to its platform and beliefs based on the Torah of Israel, [the NRP] cannot agree to concessions in any part of the homeland, on Judea and Samaria in particular, that compromise part of God's promise which has been secured in our generation."[25] The NRP, however, did not join its recalcitrant counterpart, Gahal, but remained in the coalition. The threat of a breakup nonetheless hovered over the government, which had to choose between the integrity of the land and the unity of the coalition.

As time elapsed it became evident that Israel's willingness to withdraw from all fronts was more in the spirit than in the letter of the law. The government's pronouncements made it clear that the united city of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Sharm el-Sheikh would not be relinquished under any foreseeable circumstances.[26] The Gaza Strip was added to the category of nonnegotiable and nonreturnable zones in 1972, when Yisrael Galili, a minister without portfolio, spoke of Gaza as an area that would never be relinquished.[27] As for the West Bank, demilitarization was a precondition for any withdrawal. In Meir's words, "The Jordan River will not be open to trespass by Arab soldiers."[28] Only

Sinai (with the exclusion of Sharm el-Sheikh and the corridor linking it to northern Sinai) was open to negotiations without preconditions.

The Egyptian front was the territory most amenable to compromise. The interim agreement negotiations held in 1971–72 highlighted Israel's readiness to make territorial concessions in this area that were inconceivable elsewhere. The proposal for an interim agreement with Egypt came from Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. The idea was to stabilize the fragile cease-fire by a disengagement of forces. Dayan had in mind a limited Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal and the demilitarization of the evacuated area and a zone on the west bank of the canal. Further stability would result from the reopening of the canal to all shipping, including Israel's. Dayan's proposal for an interim agreement was another clear departure from the principle adhered to since 1967—that no provisional arrangements were acceptable.

Israel's partial withdrawal from territories captured in the Six-Day War would constitute a significant deviation from the government's insistence on a full and permanent settlement in the form of a peace treaty as a precondition for such a move. Yet the government accepted Dayan's proposal and agreed to withdraw Israel's military forces from the Suez Canal, on two conditions. The first was that an interim agreement would declare an end to belligerency between Israel and Egypt: "Fighting will not be renewed." The second was that the interim agreement would not be formally linked to a comprehensive settlement and would not supersede the Jarring mission. Meir explained that "the new IDF [Israel Defense Forces] line is not bound to be the permanent border. The final border will be determined in the peace treaty concluded between us and Egypt. To this line Israel will withdraw."[29]

Unsurprisingly, Israel's consent to a partial withdrawal did not meet with the opposition's approval. Begin reminded the government of its commitment not to withdraw under any circumstances until peace was concluded. He added that the commitment was not only moral, but was also grounded in legally binding resolutions. Begin claimed that by breaking the pledge specified in the government's basic principles and reaffirmed by the Knesset on June 30, 1969, the government had violated one of the fundamental procedures of a parliamentary democracy.[30] He also dealt with the substantive issue by arguing that Israel would gain nothing from the reopening of the Suez Canal, since the only beneficiary would be Soviet Russia. He argued further that the canal could be reopened for free navigation without Israel's withdrawal.

The opposition's criticisms did not fall on deaf ears. Israel's negotiators dragged their feet in the negotiations that were then only being

conducted with the United States and not Egypt. The long course of the deliberations—from January 1971 to July 1972—was accompanied by many ups and downs, achievements and frustrations, all of which have been amply described by participants and commentators.[31] The pertinent question is whether the Israeli readiness for a partial retreat from the Suez Canal, as expressed by the government and endorsed by the Knesset, signified a real change in its territorial policy. Until further documents become available, the answer to this question remains ambiguous. On the face of it, Israel did express its willingness to withdraw without insisting on an immediate contractual peace. According to some commentators, however, the very nature of the conditions imposed by Israel for such a withdrawal virtually ensured Egypt's rejection. Dayan maintained that the government's refusal to regard the retreat as final and its insistence on keeping maintenance forces in the Israeli fortified positions near the canal caused the talks to fail.[32] It is reasonable to infer that the government was not sincere in expressing its willingness to withdraw. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel's ambassador to the United States, joined Dayan in criticizing the government. At one stage of the negotiations he described the Israeli proposals as a "fiasco."[33] But Mordechai Gazit, director-general of the prime minister's office and Meir's close advisor, has claimed that it was Anwar Sadat's obstinacy, coupled with the inefficiency of the American mediation effort, that prevented a settlement.[34] Gideon Rafael, then director-general of the foreign office, also blamed the Americans.[35] Abba Eban, however, attributed the breakdown of the negotiations to the internal discord in Israel's government, which prevented those who supported withdrawal from prevailing.[36] Whatever the cause of the failure, it is evident that at this stage Israel's willingness to retreat from the "not one inch" principle was much stronger than its readiness to withdraw its soldiers and control from the territories. The government seems to have been reluctant to forfeit its assets, which are somewhat more tangible than principles.

The government's unyielding mood was reflected in another decision approved by the Knesset in March 1972. In response to King Hussein of Jordan's speech declaring his intention to set up a united Arab kingdom comprising Jordan and Palestine, the Knesset resolved that "the historical rights of the Jewish People in Eretz Israel are inalienable."[37] This phrasing accommodated the divergent needs of both Labor and Gahal. Labor took the opportunity created by Hussein's speech to paper over the disagreements in the coalition; Gahal enthusiastically welcomed the wording of the resolution because it was totally compat-

ible with the party's own ideology. Even so, the Knesset vote was not unanimous, because Gahal refused to vote for any motion submitted by its rival. Nevertheless, at the end of the second policy phase the Knesset stood firmly behind the government in adhering to its nonwithdrawal positions.

Partial Withdrawal from Principles and Territories, 1973–1976

The October War not only shattered the myth of the invincible almighty IDF, but also the belief in the deterrent value of the 1967 cease-fire borders. Knesset members often described these borders as Israel's cast-iron guarantee against armed Arab aggression. As such, they were considered unalterable even by arrangements involving international guarantees or UN peacekeeping forces.[38] One of Israel's main interests was to acquire permanent "defensible borders," but successive governments indicated that those fixed at the end of the 1967 war were adequate. When Israel was caught by surprise in October 1973, and huge Arab military forces broke through two of the state's three land borders, doubts arose about the utility of the expanded frontiers as a deterrent to attack. Was this doubt reflected in the choice of official policy regarding the territories? Were Israeli decisionmakers influenced by the vulnerability and permeability of these borders? The equivocal answers to these questions illustrate the quandary experienced by Israel's political leaders. On the one hand, they believed that Israel had won a military victory but had been denied its full fruits by the October 22 cease-fire imposed by the two superpowers. Accordingly, Israel's strategic concepts about the territories had been vindicated. As one commentator on the war has observed, "In the final analysis, the criticism that has been expressed on the various aspects of the war cannot be allowed to cloud the fact that the Israeli armed forces won the most striking victory in their history."[39] On the other hand, as noted by Bernard Reich,

> the war provided a strong corrective to prewar attitudes (particularly self-assurance), and, to some extent, an overreaction to developments. A more sobering realism concerning Israel's dependence on outside force (especially on the United States) and a good deal of questioning of government policy and more criticism of the system and its major decision makers was a result. The complacency and positivism of the prewar period were replaced by some dismay and concern about the situation and the direction in which it might move.[40]

Confronted with new problems concerning the captured territories, Israel's leaders had to consider new options. In her last Knesset speech before the October War, Meir reiterated Israel's fundamental position regarding the territories as follows: "With Knesset approval we stated that we shall not return to the June 1967 lines, but the status quo is valid on all fronts not because of our wishes, but owing to the stubborn refusal of the Arab leaders to discuss peace."[41] The premier added that the desired peace would be reached in one great leap—not by step-by-step provisional arrangements. Meir did not specify Israel's priorities. She hinted, however, at a Jordanian orientation, which her successor emphatically endorsed.

A close examination of Meir's first speech after the war indicates that her government had not altered its basic perception of the territories' value as a major source of security. "Mistaken he who supposes that our lesson of the war is that under conditions of modern warfare depth and defensible borders are valueless." Moreover, the principle of no return to the June 4, 1967 borders was reiterated. The only change in thinking was that peace might be obtained in stages rather than in one fell swoop.[42] The notion of stages had been introduced previously when partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal was being considered.[43] The concept gained momentum in the wake of the October War. In her postwar speech Meir conceded candidly that "we know. . . it is impossible to arrive at this objective [peace] in a leap forward, but it is certainly possible to advance toward it in safe steps, in as much as our neighbors are ready for them."[44]

Israel's presence at the Geneva Middle East peace conference on December 21, 1973 did not constitute a deviation from previous policies. Although Gahal vehemently charged the government with jeopardizing the national interest, Eban's speech in Geneva adhered to prewar attitudes.[45] The foreign minister noted that Israel's target was a peace treaty, not a cease-fire or armistice, and that the government sought permanent boundaries and would not agree to return to the 1967 cease-fire lines. But he also explicated Israel's first priority, which was a disengagement-of-forces agreement along the Suez Canal. This was, in effect, an expression of Israel's willingness to withdraw without full peace. Because these principles had been stated before, his declaration did not herald a radical policy change. In fact, the elections to the 8th Knesset, held in the wake of the war, returned the Labor Alignment to form and lead the coalition government.

More striking is the lack of any indication of a policy change in the premier's speech. A comparison of Meir's first speech as premier in 1974

and her first speech after assuming office on June 30, 1969 shows an astounding resemblance. She reiterated that "Israel will adhere to its rejection of the demand for withdrawal to the 4th June lines, that were never recognized and are not defensible . . . Our policy will be targeted at precipitating the transfer from a cease-fire and separation of forces to the peace we clamor for." There were, however, two differences between the speeches. In 1974 Meir pledged that there would be no withdrawal from Judea and Samaria before the issue was put to the public by holding elections.[46] This undertaking was prompted by the government's grudging dependence on its coalition partner, the NRP, without whose support the government would be unstable. The need to expand the coalition precipitated Meir's pledge and tied the hands of the government. For the first time since the Six-Day War, the NRP linked its participation in the coalition to the government's territorial policy. This linkage reflected the increasing militancy of the NRP, a tendency that had to be reckoned with by the Labor government. The acceptance of interim provisions prior to a final peace was the second difference between Meir's 1969 and 1974 speeches. Two agreements with Egypt and Syria were signed during Meir's post-October 1973 incumbency, both involving Israel's withdrawal from territories without peace or any other form of conciliation. Israeli forces were pulled back because of strategic exigencies. The opposition's furious objection could not obliterate the fact that Israel had much less room to maneuver than in the prewar era. On January 22, 1974 the ruling coalition easily mustered a majority of 76 to 43 in support of a separation of-forces-agreement with Egypt entailing Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. The separation-of-forces agreement with Syria, on May 30, 1974, which also entailed retreat, was endorsed by a similar majority (76 to 36).

When Rabin became prime minister it became clear that the dream of instantaneous peace had been replaced by a stage-by-stage process. Rabin hesitated to appear innovative. As the first successor to Israel's founders, he wanted to protray an image of a "government of continuity." He therefore specifically reminded the Knesset of the precedents for a policy of step-by-step arrangements. This was his main theme when he introduced the government's decision to conclude an interim agreement with Egypt regarding the Suez Canal. Although Rabin reiterated that "Israel would be persistent in the desire for a true peace," he expressed doubt that such a peace was obtainable by an abrupt shift away from war. The alternative was to form interim agreements, dubbed "peace in stages," which were not only feasible but would bring their own benefits and rewards. Interim agreements would have two clear

advantages. First, they would have strategic value because they would create conditions that would test the intentions of Israel's adversaries. Evidence of Egyptian inclinations toward peace would be discernible from its adherence to agreements to keep the cease-fire on land, sea, and in the air; to thin out its forces; and to rebuild towns along the Suez Canal. The second advantage of interim agreements would lie in their simple practicality. Rabin's government descended from the lofty clouds of prophetic peace to the solid ground of ineradicable suspicions and animosities. In the years following the shock of October 1973, the Israelis finally realized that their clamor for peace might well remain a fantasy unless a way could be paved by substantial territorial concessions. A willingness to pay a territorial price did not spring up in the wake of the war. At the same time, however, Rabin's government was perfectly prepared to trade some territory for conditions less than total peace. Without fanfare, Rabin announced his famous dictum, "A piece of territory for a piece of peace." Israel did not abandon its desire for peace in 1974 but it was prepared to be temporarily content with security measures and a reduction in hostility.

A realistic option based on this new dictum was introduced at the end of 1974, when the Jordanian orientation was officially presented. What had only been hinted at by Meir on the eve of the end of her incumbency became a hallmark of her successor's cabinet. The seeds of a Jordanian orientation had been sown in the wake of the 1967 war, when Deputy Premier Yigal Allon had presented a scheme to the government that became known as the Allon Plan. Although the Allon Plan (discussed below) was never officially endorsed by the cabinet (and therefore cannot be considered an authoritative choice), the Alignment government adopted it in all but name. The inescapable implication of the Allon Plan was that Jordan would be included in the list of potential negotiation partners. Rabin's cabinet hinted to Hussein that Israel would be willing to talk and that negotiations would not be doomed to fail because of Israeli inflexibility. Nothing could have fueled the flame of the opposition more than the possibility, however remote, of negotiations leading to an Israeli withdrawal from any part of Judea and Samaria. Just a few months earlier Israel had been shaken by the news of Meir's meeting with King Hussein in her last days in office. In this meeting she had allegedly promised to give up Jericho in order to advance the peace process with Jordan. Whether or not this information was accurate, there is no doubt that at this time Israeli leaders were looking for ways to reach an agreement with Jordan—that they were perhaps prepared to make territorial concessions to involve King Hussein. Rabin

asserted in the Knesset that "we have no reason to reject negotiations with Jordan, provided they are not conducted with the PLO or their representatives, the terrorist organizations. The justification for these negotiations, and their hopefully concomitant separation of forces . . . lies in their value as partial arrangements which may lead to peace . . . Working toward defensible borders on the basis of a territorial compromise is the touchstone of our policy."[47]

The opposition's reaction was forthright. Begin attacked the government fiercely, charging it with reckless leniency. His criticism was twofold. He accused the government of substituting intermediary arrangements perilous to Israel's security for real peace. His second allegation was even more serious, because it was at the heart of the opposition's rejection of Rabin's policy. Begin said that in offering a Jordanian option—an Arab state composed of the eastern, and some parts of the western, bank of the Jordan River—Israel's leaders were ignoring that area's dominant, if not exclusive, control by "Arafat's murderers." The opposition stuck to the pre-1973 notion that peace was not a realistic option, and therefore any withdrawal for the purpose of peace would be ineffective and counterproductive. Rather, withdrawal would tempt the Arabs to renew hostilities and confirm their intransigence. The major obstacle to peace, argued Begin, was Israel's desire to exist and its insistence on the retention of at least some of the territories. "Since you claim Jerusalem is all ours, we shall remain in Sharm-a-Sheikh; to the June 4, 1967 lines we shall not return; you have no chance whatsoever of obtaining a peace treaty from the Arab states."[48]

What the opposition feared most was any change in the status quo on the eastern front. Once again, however, there was some disparity between words and deeds. In introducing a Jordanian orientation Rabin showed a willingness to consider withdrawal from some part of the West Bank. In January 1974, when Hussein presented U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a map depicting a proposed Jordanian-Israeli disengagement that envisaged a phased Israeli withdrawal of eight to ten kilometers from the Jordan River, Israel's government was not ready to strike a deal with the Jordanian king.[49] The idea of an interim agreement with Jordan gained momentum in the summer of 1974 when Kissinger suggested a deal to Allon in which Israel would concede a limited area of the West Bank (Jericho and its vicinity). Rabin, however, was unprepared to discuss the Jericho plan because it would have necessitated general elections.[50] Although the NRP was not a coalition member, the premier sought to widen his government's narrow parliamentary base of 61 MKs by inducing the NRP to join the government. To do this,

Rabin reaffirmed Meir's pledge to call a general election before any agreement on the West Bank would be concluded. Negotiations with Jordan were thus ruled out. Rabin's declaration in the Knesset, as well as the cabinet's decision on July 21, 1974 to "act for negotiations for a peace agreement with Jordan," were stillborn. It has been suggested that, from many meetings with Hussein over the years, Israeli politicians knew well that the king was not ready to concede to Israel's minimal demands. Therefore, the Israeli government was not risking much by uttering conciliatory words.

A different picture emerged on Israel's southern front, where the government's agreement to territorial concessions was about to become a reality. The story of the interim agreements concluded between Israel and Egypt has been described at length.[51] For this discussion it is significant that in 1975 Israel's decisionmakers substantially increased the amount of territory they were willing to concede while simultaneously raising the price of the concession by demanding "nonbelligerency." In the Knesset Rabin attempted to clarify the vagueness of this expression. He explained that nonbelligerency was a temporal provision, but that it was not expected to expire every few months. Furthermore, it was not to be confined to the military arena alone; it also necessitated a change in the political and economic climates and implied mutuality. The reciprocal nature of the arrangement would be bound to bolster its effectiveness and enhance the prospects for its endurance. This arrangement applied only to relations with Egypt, and it justified territorial concessions on the southern front only.[52] Nonbelligerency included elements of stabilization and obligation but lacked the strength and binding force of a peace treaty. It was therefore less onerous to the parties involved. Although nonbelligerency reflected a state of lingering mutual fears and hostility it could nevertheless legitimize and facilitate Israel's withdrawal from the territories.

The opposition restrained its criticism during the first stage of the negotiations, which ended in March 1975 when Kissinger's mission failed to bring the parties to agreement. The government had, after all, withstood American pressures and surrendered no territory. "The Prime Minister responsible for taking that stand, hitherto viewed as a dullard and a fumbler, became a national hero overnight."[53] Rabin's domestic popularity was short-lived, however, because on September 3, 1975 he announced in the Knesset that an agreement with Egypt had been concluded and that it included extensive Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Although the premier insisted that the government had not departed from the basic principles presented by Meir on March 10, 1974,

and that Israel had achieved its predetermined policy goals, this agreement marked a substantial change in policy. The agreement provided that the conflict between Israel and Egypt "shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means," which was in itself "a significant step toward a just and lasting peace." It was also agreed that the parties could not resort to the threat or use of military force or blockade against each other and would observe the cease-fire on land, sea, and in the air. Rabin's government was proud to announce that for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an Arab government had categorically and publicly (without reference to UN resolutions) stated that the conflict with Israel would not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means. Rabin told the Knesset that

> the agreement with Egypt which we have initialed is a very hopeful event. Its principal significance is basically political. Its basic content is that it has been agreed that force and fighting will not be characteristic of Israeli-Egyptian relations, that neither side will resort to the use of force against the other. A contractual and public agreement has been achieved that both states are firmly resolved to reach a final and just peace agreement through negotiations.[54]

Although the thread of political continuity was visible, a change had taken place. The notion that the territories, or parts of them, were only temporarily in Israeli hands, pending conciliation, was enshrined in legally binding documents. Despite the government's claim that it had made no political innovation, the post-1967 boundaries on the Egyptian front had conspicuously contracted. The opposition reverted to its critical role. Begin denigrated the government's achievement on both procedural and substantive grounds. The government was blamed for giving in to American pressure rather than conducting its own negotiations freely. It was also charged with failing to obtain its most fundamental objective—an end to the state of war.[55] Even though the territorial concession on the southern front was less controversial domestically, it created a gap between the government and the opposition.

After the conclusion of the interim agreements, there was a hiatus in the diplomatic activity triggered by the October War. It was, however, obvious that despite the relative tranquillity, territorial policy could not be frozen for long. The tranquillity was disrupted by President Carter's remark on March 6, 1977 that Israel would probably withdraw to the pre-1967 borders with minor modifications. It became quite apparent that the era of stagnation had ended and that the government would have to make new decisions.

Full Withdrawal on One Front: Back to First Principles, 1977–1979

The Likud government was formed on June 20, 1977. Its territorial policy was not obscured in ambiguous phrases. The newly elected premier, Menachem Begin, spelled out the party's three major principles. First, the Jewish nation has an eternal and inalienable historical right to Eretz Israel, the land of its ancestors. In rhetoric imbued with reverence, Begin expressed the mystical bond between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. "Eretz Israel, the heart of our forefathers, our one and only land, we clung to her over the generations. We never cut off our bond with her, we prayed for her, yearned for her, loved her with all our heart and soul. We had not forgotten her even one day when we were driven into exile."[56]

Second, the party insisted on direct peace negotiations with King Hussein, President Sadat of Egypt, and President Assad of Syria—to be convened jointly and separately, directly or through a friendly state, "whether in our capitals or on neutral land, whether publicly or outside the limelight of publicity."[57] Begin noted that this requirement did not constitute a policy change. All his predecessors, whom he named one by one, had also urged the Arab leaders to talk peace. The Likud proposed that the Geneva conference be reconvened to bolster the prospects for direct negotiations. He suggested that three joint committees—Israel-Jordan, Israel-Egypt, and Israel-Syria—be established under the auspices of the conference.[58] The purpose of these committees would be to negotiate peace.

Third, nonbelligerency, the term introduced by Rabin's cabinet, was considered a dead letter. Instead, Begin insisted that "for the first time since the Six-Day War, it has been accepted by both governments, the U.S. government and the Israeli government, that the objective[s] of the negotiations in Geneva, or for that matter any negotiations taking place between us and our neighbors, [are] peace treaties."[59] The desired provisions of these were clearly stated: an end to the state of war, the fixing of borders, and the establishment of full diplomatic and economic relations. The Likud was not willing to embark on negotiations for anything less than this.

Underneath this certainty, however, there were streaks of ambiguity. Begin vowed allegiance to Eretz Israel, but he made no reference to its precise borders. Also, in his inauguration speech in the Knesset, Begin

did not mention extending Israeli sovereignty to the territories.[60] (He did, however, broach the possibility that the government might take future steps to extend Israeli "law, jurisdiction and administration over the entire area of Greater Israel."[61]) Although he adamantly rejected the term "occupied territories," he made no explicit commitment to annexation. The most striking ambiguity was evident in the interpretation of two UN resolutions. In proposing the reconvening of the Geneva conference, the Likud government tacitly accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which contained the principles for a just and lasting peace and a call for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in conflict. In his inaugural speech Begin stated, "The government declares its readiness to participate in the Geneva conference, if it will be invited by the U.S. and the USSR, on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338." It was unclear from Begin's explicit reference to these resolutions whether the Likud had, in effect, rescinded its habitual rejection of them or whether Begin's reference was for tactical purposes only.

The Labor Alignment, now in an oppositionary role, challenged the Likud. The issue at stake was more than which tactics should be used in the search for peace, or even the salience of Eretz Israel in the nation's history or in contemporary politics. It was the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Likud had reverted to the "one leap" attitude held by Meir. It advocated a full peace without, however, mentioning what price Israel would be willing to pay for it. Shimon Peres, the head of the opposition, articulated the Labor Alignment's alternative. "Between war and peace there is a wide variety of possible arrangements for territories and timetables, and Israel's real interest is to harness all these possibilities to the wagon of rejection of war, prevention of war, termination of war and true peace."[62] The Likud's posture was diametrically opposed to the Alignment's. Instead of looking to peace as a last stage in a process—a summit to be conquered after an arduous climb—peace was to be the first step on the long road leading to fraternity and cooperation. Peace was the magic spell that would open the tightly closed gates guarding (at least some of) the territorial assets.

The presentation of the Likud's policies at the beginning of its first term in office was only the overture to the most dramatic event of the era—the opening of the peace process with Egypt. The differences between the government and the opposition were virtually obliterated when exuberant Israelis welcomed Anwar Sadat on his first visit to Israel. The peace plan that was submitted following the historical visit, however, reactivated the discord between the Likud and the opposition.

The plan entailed far-reaching modifications to the government's territorial options.

As the years went by, two of the three Israeli principles enunciated after the Six-Day War—no retreat without peace and direct negotiations only—had been eroded. These principles were restored in 1977 when Sadat's visit to Jerusalem shattered Israel's ostracization by all the Arab states and enabled face-to-face negotiations to take place. Evidently, the purpose of the negotiations was "no more war, no more bloodshed." Everyone involved understood that only a full peace was on the agenda, not intermediary arrangements such had been conducted by the Alignment. The term "nonbelligerency" was anathema to Begin, who commented that it was "a concept bearing no standing in international law."[63] As for the remaining principle, the Likud was not content with "no return to the pre-1967 borders," but insisted that Eretz Israel was not open to negotiation. This attitude constituted a major hurdle for the negotiations, but it was overcome by a compromise. In presenting the peace proposal to the Knesset, Begin proclaimed that "Israel insists on its right and claim to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip; however, knowing there are other claims, it proposes for the sake of peace, to leave open the problem of sovereignty in these areas."[64]

By shrouding the issue in uncertainty, the Likud was able to both remain faithful to its commitment to keep Eretz Israel and keep open its option for negotiations. As an interim arrangement, pending the final determination of sovereignty over the territories, Israel offered the Arab residents an administrative autonomy. According to Moshe Dayan, the goal of this plan was "to free ourselves from a situation in which we dominate a population of over a million that does not want us, and at the same time to ensure the security of Israel and our ties to our homeland of Judea and Samaria."[65] Israel never gave up its control over the disputed area. The autonomy plan allowed the Palestinian Arabs to exercise self-rule. But Israeli forces were to remain responsible for security and public order even in the five-year transition period. According to the proposal, the Israeli army would be redeployed to "security areas" in the Jordan Valley, along main roads, on the Samarian hilltops, and at other strategic locations. The army would withdraw from all urban centers, but it would remain on the outskirts of large Arab towns so it could move swiftly in the event of threats to Israel's security.[66]

It is therefore evident that Israel did not intend to rescind its claim to control over the West Bank, but merely to bring an end to the military government. The Labor Alignment, aware of this position, was reluctant to either support or oppose the Likud's peace plan. It did not want

to obstruct the first realistic chance for peace, but it also could not support the intention to hold fast to Eretz Israel. The Knesset vote on the peace plan reflected Labor's ambivalence; all its representatives chose to abstain, which left 8 noes against 64 ayes.[67]

The final version of the peace agreement (known as the Camp David Accords) had two parts. The first part included Israel's promise to withdraw from all of Sinai in return for peace and normalization of relations. Although Egypt was to exercise its sovereignty over the relinquished areas, it agreed to certain security arrangements. The second part contained a self-rule, or autonomy, plan for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The first part of the contract was clear and explicit, but the second part was ambiguous and, in places, even obscure. Its main feature was the five-year transition period, at the end of which the "final status" of the remaining territories was to be determined. There was a tacit acknowledgment of Israel's special position in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which granted her a veto on issues such as the setting up of a Palestinian state, a strong role in internal security, and a substantial say in the determination of the specific powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority. These provisions made the Israeli territorial concessions in Sinai more bearable and less costly. In its reaction to the final version of the peace contract, the opposition was once again torn between supporting peace and rejecting tacit territorial expansion in the West Bank. There were three major points of controversy between the opposition and the government: (1) the fate of Israeli settlements; (2) the effect on UN resolution 242, and (3) the autonomy plan.

According to Begin's original plan, the eighteen Jewish settlements in Sinai—excluding those in the Gaza Strip—were to remain under Israeli protection and subject to Israeli law. As negotiations proceeded, it became evident that this provision was totally unacceptable to Egypt. Sadat made it clear that the removal of the Sinai settlements was a condition for signing and putting into effect the Camp David agreements. The Alignment was divided on the issue, but, in the Knesset, it presented a united front against the removal of settlements.[68] Given Egypt's position, this implied no peace agreement.

A major concern for Labor was the lack of a rapprochement with Jordan following Israel's conciliation with Egypt. In accordance with its Jordanian orientation, Labor disputed the Likud's interpretation of UN Resolution 242, which virtually excluded any fruitful negotiations with Jordan. In its apparent adoption of Resolution 242, the Likud had accepted the very principle that had prompted its secession from the gov-

ernment coalition eight years earlier. It soon became apparent, however, that the government had its own version of 242, a version that was totally at odds with the international, as well as the Alignment interpretation. The Likud's interpretation of UN 242 did not stress its operational clauses, but rather its preamble, which denied the right of acquisition of land resulting from an act of aggression. Because the 1967 war was a defensive action, the Likud considered the demand for Israeli withdrawal to be groundless. According to this interpretation, Israel's temporary consent to refrain from extending Israeli law to the inhabitants of the disputed lands was a genuine implementation of 242. This was the ultimate concession that the Likud was willing to make on the eastern front. In contrast, the Alignment accepted the principles of UN Resolution 242 at their face value: withdrawal from territories in all fronts.[69] Abba Eban stated that unless the principles of territorial concessions were applied to all fronts, the peace process was sure to fail.[70] By 1978 Labor's Jordanian orientation was well established, and an agreement with Israel's eastern neighbor was perceived to offer a solution to Israel's most immediate security needs.[71]

The autonomy plan that was to determine the territories' future fate was another source of interparty controversy. The government stuck to its view that autonomy was the only feasible means of ensuring Israel's retention of the territories. Labor rejected autonomy for two reasons. One (expressed by Allon) involved the realization that autonomy was a device to perpetuate Israeli control in Greater Israel.[72] The other was Labor's assessment that the autonomy plan would "prompt the birth of a Palestinian entity, to become thereafter a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries."[73] The Alignment, however, could present no alternative except a partial withdrawal from the West Bank, which was totally unacceptable to those who were authorized to decide official policy.

Although there was much expression of vocal disagreement with the government, consensus prevailed when it came to voting. Contrary to Peres' assertion that the "national consensus has sunk into the sands of Sinai,"[74] Knesset unity over the peace proposals was impressive. The Alignment's leader said that although his party was not enthusiastic about the peace agreement (given the concession Israel made in Sinai and the problems involved in the autonomy plan), it would support the government to give peace a chance.[75] On September 27, 1978 the Camp David Accords were supported by 24 out of 31 Alignment MKs, with only four of the remaining seven voting against it. On March 20, 1979 the peace agreements were overwhelmingly supported—95 in favor, 12 against. Only two of the objectors were Alignment members. Despite

the deviations from Israel's original policies that were incorporated in the accords, the government encountered no serious constraints in its move toward peace.

Reaffirming the Principle of Nonwithdrawal: Annexation of Territories, 1980–1982

After the conclusion of the peace treaty, Israel's government took stock of the remaining territorial assets, Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—all considered nonreturnable and nonnegotiable. The government did not rush into the autonomy talks. In fact, it tried hard to hinder them. Although the team negotiating the autonomy plan convened intensively for about a year and a half, the deliberations came to naught. The autonomy talks did not provide an adequate opportunity to narrow the gap between the parties, despite substantial efforts made by the American representatives, Robert Strauss and Saul Linowitz. In May 1980 Sadat suspended Egyptian participation in the talks, ostensibly because of the Knesset's discussion of the Jerusalem Law (see below). The talks resumed in July but were suspended in early August upon the final adoption of this law. They were again resumed in November 1981, but terminated with the eruption of the Lebanon war. The inability of the parties to reach an agreement on autonomy reflected the widely diverging positions of Israel and Egypt and the failure to involve other parties—chiefly Jordan—in the deliberations.

The Likud was not displeased with the accumulating obstacles. It parried the issue, anticipating that Israel would ultimately maintain control over the area. This approach was rejected by two senior ministers: Moshe Dayan, minister of foreign affairs, who resigned in October 1979, and Ezer Weizman, minister of defense, who followed suit in May 1980. The government's incumbency, however, was not interrupted. Surprisingly, the stalling of the autonomy talks did not impede Israel's new friendly relationship with Egypt.

The government took several measures to emphasize its determination to retain control of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel informed American and Egyptian delegations to the peace talks that the evacuation from Sinai should not be regarded as a precedent for future actions on the eastern or northern fronts. Israel would remove neither its settlements nor its military presence in those areas. Autonomy for the Arab population in those territories would be accompanied by a continued Israeli presence.[76] Israel thus appeared to be having its cake and eating

it too; it concluded a peace treaty while retaining the most cherished territory of the West Bank.

The Israeli government honored its commitments. It withdrew its armed forces from Sinai and started to uproot, with great pain and anguish, the Jewish settlements in northern Sinai. Meanwhile, it diverted attention to other areas—East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Jerusalem, the most complex and emotion-laden aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict, was avoided by those who drafted the Camp David Accords. Successive Israeli governments had regarded the city as the living symbol of the Jews' return to the cradle of their nationhood, and they were relentlessly determined to retain control over it. The bill, submitted on May 14, 1980, to annex the eastern part of Jerusalem, was introduced not by the government or a member of the coalition, but by MK Geula Cohen of the Hatehiya (Revival) Party. Cohen had left Herut because she opposed the peace process. The Jerusalem bill submitted to the Knesset by Cohen succinctly outlines Israel's policy:

- Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.
- The integrity and unity of Greater Jerusalem, as bounded following the Six-Day War, shall not be violated.
- The permanent seat of the president, the Knesset, the government, and the supreme court shall be in Jerusalem.

Cohen's bill sparked an international controversy, but it was strongly supported by the Knesset (69 to 15). Because Israel already controlled united Jerusalem by virtue of a law enacted in 1967, the bill did not introduce any practical changes.[77] Nevertheless, the opposition predicted fierce international objection and was apprehensive about its outcome. But for its own internal reasons it did not seriously obstruct the government.[78]

The next bill of annexation, which dealt with the Golan Heights, provoked more opposition. Once again Cohen submitted a private member's bill, which was referred to the government "for study and opinion" in accordance with Israeli legal procedures. When it was brought to the Knesset for approval, however, the bill was defeated by a 45 to 13 vote, with 5 abstentions. The government refused to let Cohen reap the fruits of what seemed to be an effective electoral ploy.[79] The proposal to annex the Golan Heights was resubmitted by Begin himself on December 14, 1981. The bill was adopted very hastily, the cabinet approved it at midday, and by midnight the Knesset had passed the resolution and announced the immediate application of Israeli law, ju-

TABLE 1
SELECTED KNESSET REGULATIONS REGARDING THE TERRITORIES

	Distribution of Vote		
Date	*For*	*Against*	*Resolution*
June 12, 1967	no vote[a]		Direct negotiations toward peace pact
Aug. 4, 1970	80		Acceptance of Jarring Mission
June 9, 1971	majority		Readiness for partial retreat from Suez Canal
Jan. 22, 1974	76	35	Separation of forces with Egypt
May 30, 1974	76	36	Separation of forces with Syria
Sept. 3, 1975	70	43	Interim agreement with Egypt
Dec. 28, 1977	64	8	Israel's peace plan
Sept. 27, 1978	84	19	Camp David Accords
March 21, 1979	95	18	Peace agreement
July 30, 1980	69	15	Annexation of Jerusalem
Dec. 14, 1981	63	21	Annexation of Golan Heights

SOURCES: KM 49: 2331; 58: 2798; 61: 2708; 69: 61; 70: 1509; 74: 4136; 81: 997; 83: 4194; 85: 2088; 89: 4325.

[a]Premier's statement on the military and political battle approved unanimously by the Knesset.

risdiction, and administration to the Golan Heights. The Alignment decided to boycott the Knesset proceedings in protest against their unprecedented speed, but eight Labor MKs joined the coalition to vote for the bill. The reasons enumerated for the annexation by the premier were historical, strategic, and moral. In his short speech Begin recalled Syria's intransigence, its persistent rejection of conciliation, the importance of the Golan to Israel's defense, and the public consensus over the issue.[80] The support in the Knesset (63 to 21) reflected not so much a consensus as much as the confusion and vacillation of the Labor Alignment, which was once again caught between its antagonism to any move designed to render Israel's retention of the territories permanent and the electoral imperatives. The few Laborites who did support the bill of annexation reflected the decision of one of its most important components. Labor's decision not to participate in the vote demon-

strated the rift between those for whom the territories were an inescapable burden and those for whom they were a blessed asset.

Why did Israel resort to annexing territories when a mood of conciliation was pervading the country and the peace process was in full swing? The answer lies in the intricacies of Israeli party politics, which enabled a marginal party, Hatehiya, to submit a proposal that neither the government nor the opposition could afford to reject. Nevertheless, the initiative of this arch-nationalistic party could not have been successful if it had not been compatible with the government's (and some of the opposition's) fundamental choices. Israel had surrendered a remote area, the Sinai, which was not historically a part of Eretz Israel.[81] But Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were a different matter. The capital city of the state was a symbol of ancient nationhood; the northern hills were conceivably vital for the newly independent nation's defense. The annexation of both areas served the incumbent government's purpose by reminding the world that territories were not only means to attain goals—including peace—but were goals in themselves.

Summary

Israel's territorial policy evolved in five consecutive, but nonlinear, phases. In the first phase the government, immobilized by the 1967 victory, formulated a threefold principle regarding the captured territories: no complete withdrawal to the prewar borders; no partial withdrawal for less than a contractual peace; and no indirect peace negotiations. The first phase ended when Israel accepted the Rogers Initiative and agreed to enter talks, thereby acknowledging the principle of mediation. It also agreed to consider a partial retreat for less than total peace. This readiness, however, did not materialize until the third phase, upon conclusion of the interim agreements that resulted from the separation-of-forces agreements between the belligerent armies. Not only did a mediator play the dominant role in bridging the gap between the adversaries, but the partial arrangements were also legitimized as a goal justifying retreat. Some ingredients of peace had been secured for some territorial concessions. The novelty of this phase resided in the linkage between lands and peace that became clearly visible in the trade-off of 1975. This linkage had its limitations, however, because the two involved parties, Israel and Egypt, refused to cross one line. Israel would not return all the lands captured in 1967, even on one front, and Egypt stubbornly refused to conclude a treaty of peace. These hurdles were

crossed in the fourth phase, when Israel, under a new government, reversed the process by insisting on a contractual peace arrived at by direct negotiations. The Likud was prepared to return a vast portion of territories, albeit in only one zone. But the concomitant annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in the fifth phase closed any foreseeable option of withdrawal from these areas. The only territory open for negotiations was therefore the West Bank and Gaza, lands of memories and aspirations for both the conflicting nations. The door was ajar for negotiations that had suddenly become defunct and inappropriate.

The opposition's reaction to the government's decisions also did not follow a linear trend. Table 1 presents the ten most important decisions on territorial policy and indicates the share of support enjoyed by the coalition and the opposition. Because the government always secured a parliamentary majority, it was never toppled on account of its territorial policy. The constraint applied by the opposition was not restricted to its numerical power in the Knesset, however. When the national unity government was in power (between June 1967 and August 1970), opposition was vociferous but extremely marginal. When Gahal, and then the Likud, resumed their oppositionary role, they presented a clear alternative to the official policy by persistently and unequivocally promoting Eretz Israel. Nevertheless, the coalition had no difficulty in mustering wide support among its own members. A different situation emerged when the Alignment was the party in opposition. The government could still muster a sizable (and on two occasions a remarkable) majority in support of its decisions. But it was up against its own party, which was not internally united; the parliamentary opposition actually agreed with the government on many vital issues. The opposition maintained its own order of priorities but did not really obstruct government policy. Consequently, it cannot be regarded as having been a source of serious constraint.

TWO

Behavior: The Implementation of Policy

The implementation of Israel's territorial policy had tangible repercussions in the real world. If the government decided to withdraw from territory, Israeli armed forces had to be removed. If it decided to stay put, however, it had to make arrangements to bolster Israel's control in the area. Such arrangements included both a military presence and the establishment of civilian Jewish settlements. Settlements were not created because pre-June 1967 Israel was too small to absorb all the Jews who wanted to live there. They were created expressly to implement the government's territorial policy.

Since 1967 the question of settlement in the territories has confounded and fettered all Israeli governments. The questions of whether, where, and when to settle parts of the territories have continually recurred. The answers given have often been spur of the moment and ambivalent, but this equivocation has not impeded action. During the period under discussion 129 settlements, inhabited by some 27 thousand Israeli Jews, were founded in the territories. The settlers' caravans became the symbol of Israel's determination to retain the territories. The establishment of settlements was more convincing evidence of policy than verbal statements. At the same time, settlement had a dynamics of its own. It not only reflected authoritative choice but determined it, introducing constraints that could not be removed.

In this chapter I will first present a short account of the historical and ideological bases for settlement activity. Second, I will examine the infrastructure of the settlements, including the social, political, and economic attributes of the settlers. Third, I will analyze the political process of forming the settlements. The question to be asked here is to what extent policymakers were consistent in their behavior. Was the settlement activity congruent with the political decisions delineated above?

Ideological Origins

Settlement of the land was one of Zionism's fundamental tenets. It was especially important to socialist Zionists. Working on the land was a means of individual redemption, of forging a new nation, and of determining the borders of the proposed sovereign state.

The exiled Jews had been restricted for centuries to those occupations approved by the Gentile authorities. Zionists believed that becoming pioneers would transform the returned exiles into manual laborers in agriculture and industry. The image of the pioneer settler was forged during the formative years of Jewish settlement in the prestate era. A pioneer was by definition self-sacrificing, engaged in agricultural or other manual work, self-reliant, and culturally rejuvenated. The "new Jew" was willing to live an ascetic life, immersed in physical labor. He was able to defend himself and to renounce the customs and habits of exile. All these features diverged markedly from the caricature of the Jew in exile. They were to be acquired by an individual's complete transformation. One was to leave one's urban home in Europe for the deserts and swamps of Palestine, resign one's white-collar or other "luft" occupations, and embrace work on the land. One was also to abandon one's predominantly religious environment, imbued with traditional cultural symbols, for a secular culture based on the revived Hebrew language. Reclaiming land was conceived to be the ideal vehicle for this personal transformation. Far from only offering a livelihood, it was first and foremost seen as providing personal redemption from the deformities of exile.[1]

Returning to the land did not only serve the individual pioneer, who, according to the words of a famous Hebrew folk song, arrived in Eretz Israel "to build and be built." It also furthered the collective goal of nation building. For the founders of socialist Zionism, the return to Eretz Israel was embodied in a return to its soil.[2] Berl Katzenelson described Jewish immigration to Eretz Israel as a "loud and bitter roar of

a landless people . . . the roar of a people uprooted from the life of the land and living the life of a leaf, drifting from one generation to the other, that at the end of days yearned to heal the injustice of generations and returned, wholeheartedly to their homeland."[3]

Returning to the land was thus a means of both remedying an historical injustice and building a future. The revival of the nation could not possibly have happened without toil on the land and the construction of Jewish settlements.[4] The significance of settlement is made crystal clear in the writings of Yitzhak Tabenkin, the founder of Achdut Haavoda and the affiliated kibbutz movement, Hakibbutz Hameuchad. Tabenkin perceived settlement as the paramount means of bringing about the Zionist revolution. In biblical times settlement had enabled Jews to achieve political sovereignty in Canaan. Similarly, cultivating the desert and reclaiming barren land would enable Jews to claim the right to their land in modern times. The first pioneers did not limit the concept of settlement to agricultural activity, but expanded it to other productive endeavors geared to "the transformation of nature and its conquest for the sake of human livelihood."[5] The wide definition of settlement thus covered all agricultural, maritime, industrial, and transport enterprises.[6]

Settlement was also a fundamental concept in the writings of Yigal Allon, Tabenkin's follower and devotee. For Allon, settling the land was tantamount to conquering the land, because the zones of Jewish settlement were coterminous with the geographical boundaries of Jewish political power. Without the settlements, the sovereignty of Israel could not have been achieved.[7] "Zionism's full implementation has been and will be carried out primarily by settlement. Settlement has been and will be the foundation of the social-national revolution of the People in their Land . . . There is no goal more sacred than pioneer settlement on the land."[8] Settlement also had a strategic value. "A dense network of settlements, inhabited by settlers toiling on their land, shepherds tending their flocks and guarding their crop is the substantial guarantee of Israel's control of its borders."[9]

Settlements were therefore intended to delineate future borders. Yishuv (prestate) experience had shown that frontiers were determined by the location of Jewish settlements. The inclusion of Upper Galilee (the Galilee panhandle) in the 1948 UN partition proposal was possible only because Jewish settlements crisscrossed the area. The purpose of the founding of eleven new settlements in the Negev on October 6, 1946 was to ensure that those areas would not be excluded from the future state.[10] The enlargement of the designated Jewish state from the Peel

scheme in 1937 to the UN scheme in 1947 has been attributed to the placement of Jewish settlements throughout the country. When Britain banned new Jewish settlements in areas designated for the Arab state, the Yishuv leaders immediately accelerated the process of settlement as a prime instrument for creating political realities. As stated by Moshe Sharrett (Shertok), "From a political perspective I know of no tenet more urgent and war-means more effective than the forming of our settlements in these areas and establishing facts."[11]

After the establishment of the Jewish state, settlement was no longer regarded as a primary means of determining boundaries, but as a way to protect the border areas. In the 1930s security had been one of the main considerations in selecting sites for new settlements.[12] In later years, however, the settlements were themselves perceived as an instrument of national defense. They served as bases for the training of paramilitary personnel and as weapons storage depots for the merging armed forces. Settlements played a unique role in the War of Independence; kibbutzim held up the enemy forces and gave military reinforcements time to assemble. Kibbutz Degania halted a Syrian armored thrust toward the Galilee. In the Negev, Kibbutz Yad Mordechai single-handedly held off an Egyptian armored column, giving the IDF time to strengthen its defenses.

The protracted conflict between Israel and the Arab states has made the settlements' role in providing security less effective. In an era of modern warfare that includes Soviet advanced missiles such as FROG and Scud, border settlements can hardly arrest the enemy's advance. There are also women and children living in the settlements who have to be hastily evacuated. This liability became conspicuous during the Yom Kippur War, when the evacuation of civilians in Golan settlements actually impeded the IDF's ability to operate in the area.[13]

Nevertheless, settlements were still regarded as a means of planting an enduring Israeli presence in disputed areas. The precept "no abandonment of settlements," sanctified by the blood of the defenders of Tel Chai in 1919, was adopted as a national slogan by both the Labor and Revisionist Zionists. Although a few settlements were abandoned during the 1948 war, their desertion was perceived as a national disgrace.[14] The public uproar over the evacuation of the settlements in the Rafah Salient in 1982 also stemmed from the national commitment not to yield a settlement at any price. Settlements could not be abandoned, because they were seen as the stronghold of a nation returning to its land. The significance of settlements was not only their security value; they were living testimony to the bonds between the people and the land.

Table 2
Settlements in the Territories, by Region and Year of Establishment

Year	*Golan*	*Judea & Samaria*	*Jordan Valley*	*Sinai*	*Total*
1967	3	1		1	5
1968	6	1	3		10
1969				1	1
1970	1	2	4	1	8
1971	2		1	11	14
1972	2		1	5	8
1973	2		2	1	5
1974	2				2
1975		4	1	3	8
1976	4		2	1	7
1977	1	8	5	2	16
1978	3	6	2	5	16
1979		3		1	4
1980	1	8	1		10
1981	1	11	2		14
1982	2	6	2		10
TOTAL	30	50	26	32	138[a]

Sources: Aharon Bier, *Settlement in Eretz Israel Since the Six Day War* (Jerusalem: Bier, 1981); Information given by local councils.

[a]Including 7 Nahal (IDF Settlement Unit) installations.

The Socioeconomic Infrastructure

An extensive network of Jewish settlements was created during the first fifteen years of Israeli control. By December 1982, 129 installations had been established throughout the territories. They were concentrated in five main areas: 50 on the West Bank, 26 in the Jordan Valley, 32 in the Sinai and Gaza Strip (most of which were evacuated under the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty), and 30 in the Golan Heights (see Table 2).

The total number of Jews living in the territories was 27,200. The geographical dispersion of settlements reflects the authoritative choice. Until 1977 most of the settlements were established near the cease-fire lines in the Jordan Valley and on the Golan Heights. The Rafah Salient

south of the Gaza Strip was settled to separate Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Since the advent of the Likud government in 1977, the focus of settlement has shifted to the West Bank, that is, Judea and Samaria. Sprinkling the territories with Jews has been a costly project, requiring massive funds and a consequent diversion of national resources. Details of the financing must be mainly gleaned from occasional press reports, supplemented with a lot of guesswork. The term "settlement" is nowhere to be found in annual budget proposals. The pertinent expenditures (reportedly abundant) appear under all kinds of headings like "rural construction," which conceal their real purpose.

Expenditures in the territories were distributed among all government ministries and disguised in their budgets. The Ministry of Education finances the schools set up for the children of the settlements, the Ministry of Construction is responsible for housing, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs pays for religious needs. These are only a few examples that illustrate how the government has camouflaged its expenditures in the territories. The secrecy shrouding this spending has been both ridiculed and criticized.[15] Criticism has been especially harsh when a comparison has been made between investment in the West Bank and that in the long-established development towns that are still groping for resources and coping with severe financial difficulties.[16]

Both in the pre- and poststate eras settlement was traditionally carried out by specialist organizations. Operating with expertise based on experience, these organizations were responsible for recruiting people and acquiring funds. One of their basic sources of power, however, was their linkage (both organizational and ideological) to political parties. Three settlement organizations are affiliated with the Labor movement,[17] Beitar is affiliated with Herut, and Oved Tzioni has in the past been affiliated with the Independent Liberal Party.[18] Two organizations are linked to the NRP. Amana, the autonomous settlement organization of Gush Emunim, was formed in 1977. This was the first Israeli settlement organization to be established that was not linked to a political party. (Gush Emunim is discussed at length in Chapter 4.)

A look at Table 3, which shows the organizational affiliation of settlements in the territories, indicates that all organizations eventually crossed over the Green Line (the pre-June 1967 armistice lines). There have nevertheless been some variations that indicate political preferences. Although all settlement organizations have been active in the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and the Sinai Peninsula, different organizations have favored some areas over others. Hakibbutz Haartzi (Mapam) has restricted itself to settlement in the Golan areas bordering

Table 3
Settlements in the Territories, 1982, by Political Affiliation and Region

	Political affiliation				
Region	*Labor*[a]	*Religious*[b]	*Likud*[c]	*Gush Emunim*[d]	*Other*
Golan Heights	20	6	1		3
Jordan Valley	22	2	1		1
Sinai and Gaza	10	8	2		12
Judea and Samaria		6	3	36	5
Total	52	22	7	36	21

Sources: Aharon Bier, *Settlement in Eretz Israel Since the Six Day War* (Jerusalem: Bier, 1981; Information given by local councils.

[a]Labor: Takam, Moshav Movement, Oved Tzioni, Ichud, Hakibbutz Haartzi.

[b]Religious: Hakibbutz Hadati, Moshav Movement, Poalei Agudat Israel.

[c]Likud: Moshvei Beitar.

[d]Gush Emunim: Amana.

Upper Galilee where many of its older kibbutzim are located. The Sinai Peninsula has been settled mostly by moshavim, who have found the material and human resources of this area (fertile soil and Arab laborers willing to take lower wages than Jews) particularly attractive. Organizations affiliated with Labor have been most active in the Jordan Valley, an area of prime political importance to this party. Judea and Samaria have been settled primarily by Amana, the practitioner of Gush Emunim's ideology. The total absence of Labor-affiliated settlements in this area, which may be relinquished sooner or later, is conspicuous.

Table 4 presents the pace of population growth in the territories. In July 1967 only a handful of people could be found squatting in the Golan Heights; by 1982 the number of Jews in the territories was almost 30 thousand. In 1972 (when the Israeli government was still reluctant to encourage large-scale settlement), Jews in the territories numbered only about 2,000. Despite the continuing political uncertainty, the population nearly tripled (to 5,700) in the next three years. A conspicuous increase took place after 1977. The number of Jewish settlers surged from 10,900 in 1977 to 28,400 in 1982. The growth rate was not even in all regions. When the Likud took office the Jewish population was nearly equally divided among the three regions (Judea and Samaria, including the Jor-

dan Valley; Sinai including the Rafah Salient and the Gaza Strip; and the Golan Heights). Of course, the Jewish population in Sinai dwindled after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, and it was completely evacuated in 1982. Since that year only 700 Jews have continued to reside in the Gaza Strip. Since 1977 the population in the Golan has increased only in small increments. The most dramatic change has occurred in Judea and Samaria. In 1972 only 800 persons lived in these territories, but by 1981 the number of settlers had mounted to 16.2 thousand. This growth vividly demonstrates the Likud's policy decisions.

Data on the demographic attributes of the Jewish settlers in the territories are available for only two regions: Mateh Binyamin (see Table 5) and Gush Etzion, both in the vicinity of Jerusalem.There are indications in unofficial and unpublished data, however, that this information is equally valid for other parts of Judea and Samaria. The data reveal a predominantly young population with high fertility rates.[19] The average number of people per household is 4.6, in comparison to the national average of 3.4. In Mateh Binyamin over half the families (53.3 percent) have more than five children. The size of the family is determined mainly by the orthodoxy of the settlers; two-thirds of the families are

TABLE 4
POPULATION IN THE TERRITORIES, 1972–1982, BY REGION
(THOUSANDS)

	Jewish				
Year	*Judea & Samaria*	*Sinai & Gaza*	*Golan*	*Total*	*Non-Jewish Total*
1972	0.8	0.7	0.6	2.1	993.2
1975				5.7	1070.1
1976				7.1	1083.6
1977	4.4	3.5	3.0	10.9	1099.9
1978	7.4	4.8	3.4	15.6	1122.5
1979	10.0	5.5	4.2	19.7	1110.6
1980	12.5	5.6	4.8	22.9	1131.1
1981	16.2	5.3	5.7	27.2	1145.1
1982	21.0	0.7	6.7	28.4	1236.0[a]

SOURCES: *Israel Statistical Abstract* [*ISA*], 1977–1983.
[a]Including 12,200 non-Jews residing in the Golan.

Table 5
Demographic Attributes of Jewish Settlers in Mateh Binyamin, 1982

	Mateh Binyamin	*National Average*
Age		
0–19	54.9%	38.6%
20–49	42.3	34.8 (20–44)
50+	1.6	26.5 (45+)
Unknown	1.3	
Years of Schooling		
0–8	0.8%	28.9%
9–12	25.8	48.7
13+	65.8	22.4
Unknown	7.6	
Place of Birth		
Israel	60.9%	15.4%
Europe-America	25.6	39.8
Asia-Africa	10.8	44.4
Unknown	2.5	

Sources: Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, *Comprehensive Regional Development Plan*, November 1983, pp. 40–72; *ISA*, 1984, pp. 38, 58, 624.

reported orthodox. Six of the eight sites at Gush Etzion are affiliated with religious settlement organizations. Throughout Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (excluding the Jordan Valley) secular Jews inhabit only 4 out of 75 settlements.

Settlers in the territories are primarily affluent, middle-class Israelis. Their educational level is markedly high. Nearly two-thirds (65.8 percent) have had thirteen or more years of schooling, far higher than the national average. Those born in Israel or in Europe and America outnumber those born in Asia and Africa, 8 to 1 (as high as 86.5 percent), also far higher than the national average. The proportion of new immigrants from the USSR and the United States among the settlers is relatively high.

The class affiliation of the settlers is reflected in their occupational data (Table 6).These data reveal marked variations among the regions. In Gush Etzion four of the eight settlements are cooperative agricultural

settlements—three kibbutzim and one moshav. Therefore, over half the inhabitants work in their settlement. A more typical picture of the territories emerges from the data for Mateh Binyamin. The predominant type of settlement here is the community settlement, the specified objective of which is to provide a high-quality life-style but not necessarily a livelihood. Community settlements were designed to solve the scarcity of employment for Jews in the territories, which threatened to hinder the settlement drive. In their initial stages community settlements were intended to be "dormitory towns," where people lived but did not necessarily work. In Mateh Binyamin only 29.4 percent of the labor force was employed in the settlements. Of these, only 20.2 percent were employed in "productive" occupations—agriculture and industry. The majority (around 75 percent) were employed in public and private services. It is worth noting that those employed outside their settlements were also primarily occupied in the services sector (76.1 percent). The settlers in Judea and Samaria have not followed in their forefathers' steps in the Valley of Jezreel, the cradle of Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel; they have neither reclaimed the land nor substituted industrial plants for ploughs. In 1982 only nine out of nineteen settlements in Mateh Binyamin had industrial or artisan enterprises of any sort. Of these, only 36 enterprises (located in five settlements) employed more than six workers.

A final note relates to political composition. Data on the electoral behavior of Jews living in the settlements leads to the following conclusions on territorial politics. First, political awareness (as measured by voter turnout) is on the rise. In 1973 the percentage of voters was only slightly less than that of the general population (77.2 percent as compared to 78.6 percent). In 1977 interest in politics declined somewhat;

TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH SETTLERS IN MATEH BINYAMIN AND GUSH ETZION

Settlement	*Employed in settlement*	*Agriculture*	*Industry*	*Services*	*Total*
Mateh Binyamin	29.4%	9.6%	3.5%	74.8%	100%
Gush Etzion	59.0	16.9	25.4	44.1	100

SOURCE: Mateh Binyamin Regional Council, *Comprehensive Regional Development Plan*, November 1983, p. 112.

Table 7
Voting Behavior of Jewish Settlers in the Territories, by Political Bloc and Region, to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Knessets[a]
(percent)

	Likud Coalition			Labor Coalition		
Region	*7th*	*8th*	*9th*	*7th*	*8th*	*9th*
Judea & Samaria	78.6%	85.8%	78.1%	6.8%	4.2%	10.8%
Sinai & Gaza	32.0	30.7	64.5	56.5	36.0	26.3
Golan	18.7	39.6	44.3	68.0	37.9	48.8
Total territories	50.6	57.3	65.4	35.6	23.3	25.0
Total national	38.5	44.6	44.3	41.8	25.8	38.0

Source: Compiled from Central Bureau of Statistics, *Election Results to the 10th Knesset* (Jerusalem, 1981), p. 38, Table 6.

[a]Elections to the 7th Knesset—1973
Elections to the 8th Knesset—1977
Elections to the 9th Knesset—1981

the gap between voter turnout in the administered territories and within the pre-1967 borders increased to 3.4 percent. In 1981, however, voter turnout in the territories surged to 85.7 percent, as compared to 78.5 percent in Israel proper.

Second, the Jewish residents in the territories exhibit a variety of political affiliations (see Table 7). In the three reported elections neither of the major parties secured more than a third of the votes. All slates except that of the Communist Party secured some support among the settlers, and those of the two big blocs, the Labor Alignment and the Likud, got the lion's share of the vote. Voters in the territories lean heavily toward the parties comprising the nationalistic coalition headed by the Likud. In 1973 these parties (Likud and the NRP) attracted 50.2 percent of the votes (as compared to a national proportion of 38.5 percent). The proportion of those supporting the Alignment coalition (42 percent) was also marked. In 1977 support for the nationalistic parties surged to 57.3 percent, and support for the Alignment and its affiliated parties declined to 37.5 percent. In 1981 the Likud coalition's share reached a high of 67 percent, compared to a decreased Alignment share of 27 percent.

Third, the electoral results in the territories deviated markedly from those in pre-1967 Israel. In all three elections the residents of the terri-

tories demonstrated a higher preference for the NRP than their counterparts in Israel proper. In 1981 ten times more territorial residents than pre-1967 Israeli residents voted for Hatehiya, an arch-nationalist party (23.1 percent as compared to 2.3 percent).

Fourth, a comparison of the electoral data from the different territorial zones reflects the composition of their settlements. In the Golan Heights there is a declining majority for Labor. In Judea and Samaria, however, nationalistic parties are preponderant. From 1973 to 1977 the voters in these territories divided their ballot preferences between the Likud and the NRP; in 1981 Hatehiya received a remarkable share of 24.7 percent, cutting into the share of both the secular and the religious hawkish parties. It is therefore evident that the distribution of ballots by settlement organization had an influence on voting patterns. Nevertheless, the variety of the settlers' political affiliations precluded the formation of a "territorial" constituency.

The Political Process

Since the inception of Zionism, settlement of the land has always been a political process; that is, it has been guided by political rather than economic considerations. Since 1967, however, the political significance of settlement has been accentuated. Although settlement has always been a national project, planned and executed by national authorities, the post-1967 pattern of settlement in the territories has been affected by special domestic and international circumstances.

Two major Jewish institutions set up long before Israel became a state were responsible for planning and developing settlements. These were the settlement department of the Jewish Agency and the settlement division of the World Zionist Organization (WZO). Legislation passed in 1952 specified the division of labor between international Jewish bodies and state institutions. The WZO and the Jewish Agency were to implement settlement in Israel, and the government of Israel was to determine settlement policies.

In practice, the formulation of settlement policy is much more complicated. To begin with, there are special bodies that determine general policies for new settlements. These include the Joint Settlement Committee, also known as the Interministerial (or Interinstitutional) Committee for Settlement, which is composed of equal numbers of government and WZO representatives. This committee, established in 1968, is headed by a government minister. Its composition is divided equally

between cabinet ministers and members representing the Zionist organizations.[20] The committee's main function is to determine the details of the government's settlement policy and implement it. It cooperates, however, with two other bodies. One is the Agricultural Planning Board, which is composed of representatives from no less than eighteen bodies, including government departments, Jewish Agency departments, and settlement movements. This cumbersome body is headed by an executive subcommittee of ten members, five from the Ministry of Agriculture and five from settlement movements. The other body is the intermovement settlement committee of the Agricultural Center, known as the Gvatti Committee. It is composed of representatives from all settlement movements and its purpose is to distribute the available resources among the various clients.

After settlement policy is determined, nine other bodies deal with planning, organizing, and implementing new settlements. Three joint committees have been set up to coordinate the various bodies responsible for settlements. Theoretically, the critical decision to establish a particular settlement is made by the Joint Settlement Committee. In practice, however, the many organizations and committees responsible for the various stages of setting up a settlement generate a chain of important decisions that involve the participation of many interested parties. The Committee for Location of New Settlements, for example, determines where a settlement will be situated. It has representatives from eighteen institutions that have some connection with the subject, including eight government ministries. The possibilities for soliciting support and building transient or permanent coalitions to push forward an ideology or political program are almost endless. The role of the government is only that of one actor among others, and perhaps not even as primus inter pares. Any attempt at rational decisionmaking is doomed to become bogged down in this bureaucratic morass.

Political forces operating for or against settlements have added to this bureaucratic confusion. At the institutional level, objection to the government's territorial policy has emanated from three sources. The first is the parliamentary opposition, which urged more settlements during the Labor Alignment's rule and fewer after the Likud gained power. This type of opposition has been ineffective. The second consists of constraints on government settlement policy from within the ruling coalition. In Alignment days, prosettlement forces within the cabinet (especially the NRP) were powerful enough to constrain authoritative choice. The Likud also encountered internal opposition, but from a different party. When the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) joined

the Likud coalition, it was given the right to appeal to the Knesset Committee of Foreign Relations and Security on issues relating to settlements. DMC head Yigal Yadin rarely resorted to this device, and his opposition to the government's settlement activities did not impede the government in any way.[21] The third source of opposition is the WZO. In order to forestall possible objection, the Likud split the WZO settlement department into two sections. One, headed by Labor-affiliated Raanan Weitz, was responsible for settlement in pre-1967 Israel; the other, headed by Likud member Matti Drobles, was in charge of settlement in the territories. Weitz was adamantly against settling in Judea and Samaria.[22] The WZO Executive Committee joined Weitz when it rejected the government's proposed resolution that "the settlement policy of the Zionist movement ought to grant priority to areas with scarce Jewish population," meaning the West Bank. It endorsed Weitz's argument for priority in settling the Galilee, the Jordan Valley, and the Negev.[23] This objection to the official choice, however, had only a faint impact on the formulation of settlement policy. The more important question is whether the government was faithful to its policy decisions. Did it comply with the undertakings inherent in its attitude toward the territories? Answers to these questions will follow our discussion of the chronological development of settlements in the territories.

The Initiation of Authorized Settlements: 1967–1969

At the end of July 1967 members of Galilee and Jordan Valley settlements began moving into abandoned Syrian army installations in the Golan Heights. Their aim was to establish a permanent civilian presence in the area to reinforce Israeli control. A similar initiative was taken in Gush Etzion, when descendants of the pre-1948 Gush Etzion settlers returned to sites established long ago by their parents. By the end of September 1967 the government had condoned the settlers' act and given its consent to the re-establishment of the settlements.

These events indicate that settlement activity was not a straightforward implementation of authoritative choice. Rather, it resulted from semiprivate initiatives that prompted the government's consent. On September 28, 1967 the government informed the United States that its plans to establish settlements were necessary for military security, but that they did not signal a change in policy toward the territories. In contrast to territorial policy, which was clear-cut, articulated, and intelligible, settlement policy was elusive and insidious. It was responsive rather than active.

The unobtrusive nature of settlement was also reflected in political agendas. From 1967 to 1969 the settlement issue was conspicuously rare in the Knesset's deliberations. The national unity government did not only refrain from raising the issue and putting it on the floor for debate; it even rejected attempts by the Free Center's two MKs to put settlement on the Knesset's agenda. But the Free Center could not resist the temptation to hit the government in one of its softest spots. On May 8, 1968, about a year after the war, Shmuel Tamir submitted a nonconfidence motion accusing the government of inactivity in settling the land. Censure votes are not common in Israeli parliamentary life and are hardly ever successful in toppling the government. The overwhelming majority supporting the government renders futile any attempt to demonstrate lack of credibility, but censure votes can still embarrass the government and perhaps even goad it to act. The premier's response to Tamir's motion reflected the typical prevailing attitude. Eshkol assured the Knesset that the government was aware of the problem; that it was doing its utmost to implement its policy; and that it was not ready to openly discuss the details of implementation.[24] To avert international admonitions and possible domestic opposition, the government preferred to act behind the scenes, away from the limelight of the media. The approach to the settlement issue was low-key, pragmatic, and prudent.

The politics of latency were interrupted by a settlement initiative that took place in Hebron on April 12, 1968. Hebron was King David's first capital and is replete with religious and historical symbols and sites. Jews and others consider it a holy city. The city remained a Jewish religious center for centuries until many of its Jewish inhabitants were massacred by Arabs in 1929. Calls to resettle Jews in Hebron were raised as soon as the war ended. When it became evident that the government was not going to yield, a group of 73 Jews—mostly observant members of the Land of Israel Movement (LIM)—took the initiative and celebrated the Passover Seder in the Park Hotel in Hebron.[25] The circumstances under which Jews settled in Hebron were conducive to retroactive approval. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was in the hospital at the time, and Shlomo Gazit, the coordinator of activities in the territories, was in mourning. The government clouded the issue, preferring to shut its eyes and not get involved. Some ministers, however, openly supported the settlement of Jews in Hebron, and a Jewish site near the city became a fait accompli.

Once again, the government did not allow the Knesset to debate the matter. Once again, it was the opposition that raised the issue of the Hebron settlement, attempting to highlight the disparity between what

the government said and what it did. It was only in an answer to a question put by Haolam Hazeh MK Uri Avneri that Dayan confirmed that the government had granted permission "to a group of people" to reside permanently in Hebron.[26] At the same time, following incidents at the site, the government issued an order forbidding Israeli citizens to remain in the territories for a period longer than 24 hours.

The government's equivocation regarding the settlement in Hebron persisted for years. Two months after the settlement initiative four motions of order presented in the Knesset revealed that officials had denied residence permission to five settlers. The pretext for this denial did not involve the principle of Jews residing in the midst of a densely populated Arab city, but the seemingly trivial issue of opening a kiosk.[27] Obviously, however, the real issue was the consolidation of the settlers' position in Hebron. When their requests to open commercial enterprises in the city were turned down, the settlers went ahead anyway. The military government reacted promptly, had the stands dismantled, and threatened its operators with eviction. In the Knesset, the government encountered criticism from both supporters and opponents of settlements. Some accused it of inhibiting Jewish settlement in Hebron, others of planting Jews in the midst of an Arab town. The premier, however, evaded the principal issue and stuck to technicalities: the government had acted as it would have with any other case of an unlicensed kiosk.[28] On June 7, 1968 the daily *Haaretz* reported that the government had approved a resolution establishing a Jewish higher religious institution in Hebron with some 120 students. The premier totally ignored this resolution, giving no hint of it from the Knesset podium. The government not only took pains to conceal its settlement plans but also sought to avoid a straightforward resolution. Press headlines in June 1969 ran, "The cabinet fails to decide on settling the territories."[29] It was not until March 25, 1970 that the government officially informed the Knesset that a resolution had been adopted to enlarge the settlement in Hebron by building 250 residential units.

It is therefore evident that although Israel was determined to retain at least some of the territories, it was reluctant to push forward a vigorous settlement policy. Instead, the government oscillated between two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, it continued to believe that there would eventually be peace negotiations and that the options for territorial concessions should therefore be left open. The practical implications of this position were to refrain from indiscriminate or outright settlement policy. On the other hand, it noted that chances for peace seemed remote and that creating settlements would bolster Is-

rael's need for secure borders and provide her with bargaining assets. Governmental vacillation was conducive to private initiative. Individual resources, however, were only sufficient to launch settlement enterprises—not to develop them fully. The government retroactively approved settlements that fell within its concept of future borders and barred any attempt to infringe on these boundaries. The government was resolute in only one region, the Golan Heights. By establishing ten settlements within two years it committed Israel to controlling the area and slowly eliminated the option of withdrawal.

Consolidation of Authorized Areas: 1970–1973

In this second post-1967 period some compromising breezes began to blow in Israel's diplomatic corridor. Nevertheless, the government increased its settlement efforts, concentrating on areas deemed vital to Israel's security. Generally speaking, the veil that had concealed Israel's settlement activity during the first period was gradually lifted. Settlement was no longer a dubious activity to be carried out by private initiative, but a legitimate means to achieve state ends. Accordingly, the Labor government initiated an extensive settlement project in northern Sinai. By 1969 two settlements had been set up by the IDF's settlement corps, Nahal, in the coastal strip south of Rafah. During the early 1970s northern Sinai became a major arena of settlement activity. The initiator of the Rafah project was Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who launched campaigns both in his party's institutions and within the government to make the project a national priority.

The shift of focus to northern Sinai was prompted mainly by security factors. In 1970–71 terrorist activities in the Gaza Strip resulted in the killing or wounding of 54 Jews. Military authorities became convinced that the approaches to Gaza, known as the Rafah Salient, served as a terrorist base. Therefore, they should be settled by Jews and turned into a buffer zone between the Egyptian town of El-Arish and Gaza, which was inhabited by around 400,000 Arabs. What Dayan seemed to have ignored was the bedouin population residing in the area. The defense minister claimed that "the area was desolate and is covered with sand dunes. It hardly rains and only a few bedouins populate it."[30] To allow Jewish settlement in the area, these few bedouin were forcibly evicted by the IDF even before a formal government resolution on the settlement project was announced. The maltreatment of the bedouin in the Rafah Salient triggered wide public criticism.[31] It was only after this that the government adopted a resolution (on July 9, 1972) to settle the

Rafah Salient. The deliberations in the government reflected a sense of self-righteousness. Meir said, "I realize that for the last two thousand years we have not dealt with administered territories, and therefore we are not guided by any pertinent constitutional arrangements. Judged by our policy, there has never been in the world a conquering force like ours. Yet, here and there deviations are evident, which are extremely distressing to all of us."[32] On December 24, 1972 the government approved the establishment of a regional center (a euphemism for a city) in the Rafah Salient.

Consolidation of Jewish settlement also occurred in the controversial area of Hebron. As already noted, in March 1970 the government notified the Knesset that it would allow another 250 families to settle near Hebron. This statement did not reflect the government's desire to take Knesset members into its confidence about settlement activities. Rather, it was a response to a motion of the day submitted by Shmuel Tamir of the Free Center.[33] The era of ambiguity had not yet ended, because Deputy Minister Yigal Allon insisted that the cabinet's decision to expand the settlement in Hebron had no political significance. The resolution was described as "flowing from the decision taken in principle some 18 months ago." Allon said that it was justified by the imperatives of daily life in the emerging settlement.

> The tiny community, which has taken root there, must reach the sort of size which would enable it to maintain the minimal services of a settlement, small as it may be . . . [and] even though we all agree not to draw maps, no single minister in the cabinet is ready to regard the 1949 armistice lines as permanent borders; our inaction would be tantamount to drawing that 1949 map again.

So in the same breath Allon was hinting that Jewish settlement in Hebron also had political significance.

The government's indecision was illustrated in another argument raised by Allon. He claimed that in expanding Jewish settlement in Hebron, the government had harkened to the will of the people; consequently, the government could not be charged with initiating the expansion of the settlement.[34] In spite of this ambiguity, the premier proclaimed two weeks later that Israelis intended to stay in the Etzion bloc (not far from Hebron) forever.[35] Furthermore, on January 30, 1972 the government granted the residents of Kiryat Arba, the new Jewish quarter overlooking Hebron, the right to elect representatives to manage their own affairs, an action that implied the municipalization of the

quarter. A few months later (on May 25, 1972), the government decided to expand the settlement in Hebron by 200 more housing units.[36]

Despite this congenial political climate for settlement, there was a discernible gap between decisions and their implementation. Verbally, government spokesmen continued to play down the importance of settlements as a political strategy and, except for northern Sinai, did not devise a comprehensive settlement scheme. Nevertheless, during this period settlements continued to increase in size and number in the Golan Heights and the West Bank, making Jewish presence in the territories an irrevocable fact.

Expansion of Settlements to Unauthorized Areas: 1974–1976

The Yom Kippur War shook many assumptions of Israeli society, including those about settlement policy. In 1974 only two new settlements were established, both in the Golan Heights. Between 1974 and 1976 three settlements were formed in the Jordan Valley, and in 1976 four more settlements were set up in the Golan. The pace of settlement in the territories had significantly slowed down.

The changed attitude on settlement extended to substance as well as to pace. On June 5, a crucial event occurred. Members of the independent settlement organization, Gush Emunim, conceived the idea of settling in Samaria, which they perceived to be the heart of the ancestral Jewish homeland. This time the target for settlement was not a zone legitimized by the government, but a densely populated Arab area not authoritatively earmarked for Jewish settlements. Resources were mobilized; people were recruited; and plans were made to settle on the chosen site. Officials were not oblivious to the preliminary preparations. A Gush leader actually sent letters to Premier Rabin and various other ministers notifying them of the exact date that the settlement attempt would take place.[37] These letters did not elicit official permission for the settlement, an impediment the would-be settlers simply ignored.[38]

The first attempt to settle in Samaria ended with the settlers' eviction and the dismantling of the embryonic settlement. This procedure became a recurrent pattern during the next three years. The first time it happened there was no real flare-up, and it appeared that the plan to settle in Samaria would burn itself out like other previous squatting attempts.[39] But only six weeks later, on July 25, 1974, a second settlement bid was made. The site chosen was Sebastia, an abandoned Ottoman railway station near Nablus. The scope of this second attempt was much

more ambitious than that of the first. The number of sympathizers participating in the event increased from 50 to 2000, including 18 MKs.[40] Throngs of people circumvented army roadblocks by using side roads and field tracks to reach the site. Once again, the settlers (offering only token resistance) were gently evicted by the army. Simultaneously, feverish negotiations were being conducted with relevant authorities. While Defense Minister Peres was negotiating the terms for the settlers' removal, the chief of staff was discussing alternative sites for settlement with the would-be settlers.[41]

Once the government had decided not to confront the settlers but to seek an orderly and nonviolent way out of the Sebastia affair, its spokesmen inevitably began to engage in double-talk in all directions. In a television interview Peres stated that the government's policy was to use force to prevent the establishment of settlements, but to avoid the use of force against would-be settlers.[42] In a press interview Rabin said that he was not in favor of settlement in Samaria, but that, in accordance with its platform, the government was pursuing a policy of settlement "appropriate to the possibilities and needs that arise from time to time."[43] The possibility of settling in the controversial area was thus not entirely ruled out. Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili went even further, proclaiming that the government had not put any prohibition on settlement in the territories.[44] Those who expected that the government would use the Sebastia drama to finally outline its policy regarding settlement in the territories, and to blow away the clouds of confusion that had piled up since 1967, were deeply disappointed. The government stuck to its policy of trying to be all things to all people, and by so doing, confused everyone.

In a heated Knesset debate, Premier Rabin emphasized that the problem was essentially one of law and order, not settlement.

> The discussion today is not about settlements, but about the preservation of state authority and responsibility, on the foundations of the democratic regime, on the authority of the government subordinated to the Knesset. The Knesset ought to rebut actions designed to undermine the foundations of the democratic regime and the government authority in Israel. This is necessary not only for judging the past but for securing the future. The Knesset's public statement would bear prime educational and political significance.

Rabin added that, basically, he had no argument with the settlers. "Our right to the land is unassailable. Not on this issue is the debate."[45] The premier fended off the challenge to the government's executive author-

ity without repudiating the principle guiding the settlers.[46] The problem was the legality of the settlers' conduct, not its intrinsic legitimacy.

The question of legality was itself moot. Begin, then in the opposition, asserted that no law had been broken. There had been a law forbidding settling in Eretz Israel (dubbed 'The White Paper'), but it had become null and void.[47] Begin's claim to legality was, at the very least, open to doubt. The Israeli government had itself proclaimed Judea and Samaria a "closed zone" in 1967. Although Jews were not actually forbidden to enter the area, permission to do so was subject to specified conditions. Furthermore, the law prohibited residence in the area for a period of longer than 24 hours without personal permission from an appropriate military commander. So the establishment of a settlement required permission of a type that had not been given in the case of Sebastia.[48] The dubious legality of the settlement did nothing to deter the squatters, who continued their settlement bids. Another serious settlement attempt was made on October 13, 1974 and was terminated by eviction—a procedure that by then had become routine.

The government's attitude on settlement was also tested elsewhere. On November 24, 1974 the government adopted a resolution to develop the area of Maaleh Adumim as an industrial zone for Jerusalem. Maaleh Adumim is located halfway between Jerusalem and Jericho. Despite its proximity to Jerusalem, the area was outside the boundaries informally accepted by the core of the cabinet of Israel's future borders. The government dragged its feet in implementing the decision to develop Maaleh Adumim by not allocating sufficient resources and thereby delaying construction activities. Moreover, responsibility for implementation of the development was vested in two ministers—Avraham Ofer, minister of construction, and Haim Bar-Lev, minister of industry and commerce—both known for their dovish, antisettlement attitudes. Thus, without abrogating its previous resolution, the government brought the designated project in Maaleh Adumim to a standstill. Gush Emunim squatters, who had already made themselves visible in the area, pressured the government to stick to its commitment. They were joined by prosettlement MK's, who raised the issue in the Knesset. Rabin's response was once again equivocal. The premier replied that the government was implementing its decision and would not put up with moves that flouted its policy. At the same time, he noted that the government's resolution would not disqualify any group from living in Maaleh Adumim, which effectively legitimized the squatters' settlement bid.[49] The ferment over Maaleh Adumim did nothing to quell activity in Sebastia,

where squatting continued unabated. A fourth futile attempt to settle this site was made on March 11, 1975.

In the summer of 1975 the government was pressured to end the era of ambivalence. On June 6, 1975 Labor MK Yosi Sarid, who later became the chief spokesman for the dovish camp, exposed in the Knesset another settlement attempt that the government had turned a blind eye to, but never approved. This settlement was carried out in Baal Hatzor in Judea, an area less controversial than Samaria. The settlers at Baal Hatzor adopted different strategies from those employed in Sebastia. The Baal Hatzor settlement took place away from the glare of publicity, almost clandestinely. The settlers tried not to attract attention, for fear of being evicted. Their strategy proved effective. Several weeks after the settlement had been accomplished, Sarid informed the public and the Knesset of the fait accompli. "In Baal Hatzor there are 50 people, including women, children and babies, residing in stone buildings, which are being gradually renovated."[50] The purpose of Sarid's Knesset motion was to not only get the settlement dismantled, but to also put an end to the government's strategy of hide and seek—a strategy that was actually intensifying settlement efforts in Judea and Samaria.

Evasion was still the name of the game, however. Peres, the major proponent of the Baal Hatzor settlement, continued his double-talk. He parried his militant critics with claims of budgeting difficulties. He pacified his dovish critics by emphasizing the technical aspects of the problem; he claimed that the settlers' presence at the site was required by the nature of their work. "The core of the job performed by the settlers requires them to live in the area."[51]

The next round in the settlement saga turned out to be the most crucial one ever for both the government and the Knesset. The event, known as the Kadum affair (lasting from November 1975 to May 1976), initially followed the familiar pattern. Settlers squatted in Samaria for the eighth time, eluding troops and slipping through army roadblocks. But the army, which had acted swiftly to end seven previous settlement bids in Samaria, did not move. The government's reaction was given in an official communiqué: "There has been no change in the government's settlement policy. Every attempt to contravene that policy will be dealt with as the circumstances demand."[52] Circumstances had once again become congenial for the settlers. They were aided by the presence in Israel of 170 diaspora Jewish leaders, who were attending the solidarity conference convened in response to the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism. Rabin explained that

using force against the settlers would have drawn attention to the disunity in Jewish ranks—to the delight of Israel's enemies.[53] The situation in Samaria came close to becoming an explosive standoff. The settlers were refusing to leave the site and the government was denying them permission to remain there. After protracted mediating efforts by Ariel Sharon, Haim Guri (a renowned poet), and Peres, a compromise was reached. The settlers were temporarily removed to a nearby army camp at Kadum to await the government's final decision.[54]

On December 14, 1975 the government decided that there was no way that the army camp would become a settlement. At the same time, however, it ordered the IDF to employ the squatters in work for the army. The issue at stake was no longer settlement policy, but that of the government's authority. The premier unequivocally denounced the settlers, describing them as a cancer in the body of Israeli democracy.[55] But the compromise allowing the settlers to remain in the area cast doubt not so much on Israeli democracy as on the proprieties of decisionmaking in the government. As one journalist noted, "A government which lets itself be bullied in this fashion is in danger of losing its authority and its control of the policy-making process itself."[56] The heart of the problem was political division within the government. It precluded all decisive action, approval of settlements or allocation of resources for their development, and the forcible eviction of settlers to forestall attempts to inhabit unauthorized areas.[57] Stranded between Scylla and Charybdis, the cabinet was no longer formulating its own settlement policy but was falling prey to both internal and external pressures. All Premier Rabin's attempts to keep hold of the reins had come to naught. The settlement issue had created a rift that could not be closed.

The Kadum compromise was unpalatable to several ministers, and it left the issue unresolved pending the government's final decision.[58] But concrete structures and caravans had been put up, which intensified the pressure on the perplexed government. The Joint Settlement Committee held several sessions in an attempt to work out a consensus formula, but agreement proved impossible. Galili, a master of ambiguous phrasing, was reportedly trying to invent a formula for the premier that would elicit maximum support in the cabinet. Such a formula could only be vague and elusive; however, there were strong pressures on the cabinet to clarify the issue once and for all.[59] A ten-hour cabinet session on May 9 devoted to the issue did not yield clear-cut results.

The first three provisions of the approved resolution, which was vague enough to win agreement from both hawks and doves, were ex-

tremely ambiguous: (1) Settlement would continue on both sides of the Green Line on the basis of the government's basic policy principles. (2) The government would prevent unauthorized settlement attempts. (3) Decisions on new settlements would continue to be made by the Joint Settlement Committee, subject to government approval. Acceptance of the first provision was tantamount to voting for motherhood. The second provision failed to specify what "unauthorized" meant and reiterated the government's authority to decide its own settlement policy. The third provision was tantamount to an open-door policy. Only the fourth provision held out some promise for future action. It stated that no settlement would be established at Kadum. At a date to be determined by the cabinet, the Kadum group would be transferred to a permanent place of settlement within the government's approved program. Until such time, nothing would be erected at Kadum that might transform it into a permanent settlement.[60] This formula was an invitation to pressure from all sides; the settlers would push for a site as close to Samaria as possible, and their opponents would insist that the settlers be removed to an "authorized zone."

As it happened, no pressure was needed from outside the government; the rifts in its ranks were wide enough. The NRP ministers stressed that the Jewish people's right to settle in all parts of Eretz Israel was eternal and unchallengable. Mapam demanded that the Kadum camp be removed at once, by force if necessary. The government's resolution was supported by only the Labor and the Independent Liberal parties. The major rift, however, was within the Labor Party. It was caused by the rivalry between Premier Rabin and his challenger Peres, who presented his candidacy for premiership after Meir's resignation in April 1974. The Labor Party's central committee preferred Rabin by a marginal majority. Peres had served as defense minister in Rabin's cabinet but continued to play an oppositionary role. In his memoirs, Rabin described the nature of the disagreement and its outcomes: "There can be no greater threat to the public's confidence in its government than having cabinet squabbles splashed across the pages of the daily papers." The premier added that on a number of occasions "the defense minister behaved as if he was not to challenge the cabinet's authority by taking his differences to the public."[61] Rabin and Peres disagreed on many important issues, chief among which was settlement in Samaria. Rabin objected to sites in the heart of a heavily populated Arab area; Peres was for "settlement everywhere." In line with this attitude, Peres claimed that it would not be disastrous if the Kadum settlers were left

where they were and allowed to build a settlement, since the western slopes of Samaria were strategically important for the defense of Israel's densely populated coastal strip.

The Kadum affair provided Peres an opportunity to consolidate his political power. By allying with the NRP and aiding the Gush Emunim settlers, Peres sowed the seeds of his own political advancement. The dispute with Peres, however, did not sway Rabin from his opinion. In fact, the premier warned that he would not hesitate to call an election rather than concede to the settlers' demands.[62] The upshot of all these cross-pressures was not surprising. The government was trapped in a quagmire and could not reach a definite resolution. Authoritative sources claimed that the government's inaction did not mean (as some observers had deduced) that it intended to let the Kadum issue drift into oblivion.[63] Allon also asserted in the Knesset that the deadline of a few weeks, announced by the premier to the cabinet on May 9, would be adhered to.[64] The issue lingered on, however, and the Joint Settlement Committee (which was authorized to select an alternative site) was not convened. It was clear that the government was dragging its feet.

It was seven weeks after the May 9 resolution that the issue was again raised in the cabinet.[65] In the heated, inconclusive, and unscheduled debate that followed, Rabin reported that the settlers had themselves rejected a number of suggestions for a permanent settlement site and proceeded to present his own proposal to the cabinet. He also denied charges that government money had been invested at Kadum, even though a workshop for manufacturing defense supplies was operating on the site and the religious affairs ministry was funding services of several kinds, including Torah instruction.[66]

The Kadum affair faded away without any formal conclusion. The government never adopted a resolution to either approve or dismantle the settlement. In his memoirs, Rabin claimed to have found ways to let the settlers know that any attempt to squat without government approval would trigger an IDF response, and that they would be removed not only from their new site but also from Kadum. Rabin added that no further attempt was made to settle in Judea and Samaria during his incumbency.[67] Although this was a true assertion, many observers regarded the Kadum affair as a watershed event that extended beyond Israeli settlement policy to the whole political arena. Shimon Peres, Rabin's contender within the Labor Party, has described the harmful effects of the Kadum affair. "In the Kadum event the cabinet proved that it could not summon its power to maintain law and order. In its submission to the squatters the government sustained a critical damage to its

credibility. From this point onwards the government moved from bad to worse, when failure followed failure until its final collapse."[68]

Enmeshed as it was in internal dissension, the government's settlement policy continued to be indecisive. Soon after the Kadum affair vanished from the political agenda, another settlement attempt took place in Mes'ha. Although this site had been approved by the government, troops forced the settlers to leave the area. Galili assured the Knesset that no principles had been violated, revealing that the government's policy regarding settlement activity was in complete disarray.[69] Attempts by opposition and coalition members to raise the issue in the Knesset were repeatedly thwarted by the government. Galili relegated discussion of the issue to technical matters of land, water, budget, and timing.[70]

The upshot of all this was the achievement of a breakthrough for those in favor of settlement everywhere. For seven years the various governments in power had carefully refrained from planting settlements in Samaria. But during the years 1974–76 settlers made a thrust into the heart of this area despite firm opposition within the government. The same government that had demonstrated such determination in the negotiations on the interim agreements with Egypt and Syria failed to stand firm against those Israelis who claimed the lands and were eager to settle them.

Expansion of Authorized Settlements: 1977–1982

When the Likud came to power a dramatic shift in settlement policy occurred. A week after Menachem Begin's electoral victory he participated in a ceremony marking the installation of a Torah scroll in the Kadum synagogue. He noted that the settlers had moved into the military base, where they would be located on a "temporary basis" and pledged that "in a few weeks or months there will be many Elon Moreh (the new name for Kadum)."[71] This pledge was underscored when, on July 26, 1977, the government recognized three previously illegal West Bank settlements (Kadum, Ofra, and Maale Adumim) as permanent legal communities.

The Likud's accession to power accelerated the pace of settlement, especially in Judea and Samaria. But as noted by Ezer Weizman, a prominent member in Begin's cabinet, settling Jews in the West Bank was easier said than done.[72] A systematic review of the Likud's actions reveals some discrepancies between its verbal commitments and its deeds. Like its predecessor, the new government was caught up in con-

flicting pressures that narrowed its freedom of action. Nevertheless, there was a major difference between the two governments. Whereas the Alignment had been trapped in the mesh of its own dissensions and ambivalences, the Likud was more vulnerable to outside pressures.

The evolution of the Egyptian peace process had a dual effect on settlement activity. On the one hand, it prompted the government to precipitate the establishment of civil and military installations in the territories to demonstrate its determination to hold fast. On the other, there were strong outside pressures on the Likud to freeze, or even uproot, some settlements. The government agreed to dismantle Jewish settlements in Sinai, but not before seven new ones had been founded as a bargaining chip in the peace negotiations. The Golan Heights and Jordan Valley were not targets for extensive settlement efforts.[73] Primary attention was directed at Judea and Samaria.

After Begin issued his famous statement about "many Elon Moreh," the settlers' expectations soared—only to plummet shortly thereafter. On August 17, 1977 the government decided to establish three settlements in the West Bank, but maintained that it was implementing an earlier decision of principle made by the Labor Alignment. All three settlements were close to the pre-1967 border. But before long, the familiar scene of soldiers evicting settlers ensued once more.[74] This time the Likud was dismantling a settlement put up by impatient diehards near Jericho. A few days later Deputy Minister of Defense Mordekai Tzipori announced the formation of six settlements, but they were to be disguised as military bases. The would-be settlers were to be employed by the army and regarded as civilians on a military mission.[75]

The Likud's apparent reluctance to launch a massive settlement campaign did not reflect a change in principle. Its equivocation was caused by the circumstances of the peace process. The cabinet was divided on the issue of whether a moratorium on settlement should be declared during the period of peace negotiations with Egypt. Some ministers argued that settlement activity should be halted temporarily; others thought Israel should push ahead with its settlement scheme, especially in Judea and Samaria, to strengthen its claim to the area. The case of Shiloh demonstrates the government's confusion. In January 1978 a site set up at Shiloh was retroactively approved by the government—not as a full-fledged settlement, but as an archaeological excavation site. The opposition battered the government in the Knesset for what was labeled archaeological fraud.[76] Although Shiloh developed into a flourishing settlement, the government stuck to its "archaeological site" fiction. The government repeatedly reiterated its commitment

to settle the land and its passionate devotion to Eretz Israel, but its deeds continued to lag far behind its words. During 1979 it was again Gush Emunim—not the government—that took the initiative in declaring the formation of ten "nuclei" ready for settlement.[77]

The commitment embodied in the Camp David Accord (signed September 17, 1978) to dismantle Jewish localities in the Sinai Peninsula was a severe blow to Israel's settlement policy. Begin expressed his pain at having to relinquish the settlements, but argued that the action was necessary to the peace process. After the signing of the peace treaty on March 16, 1979, however, the Israeli government determined to continue its settlement effort. In response to criticism of his settlement policy, Begin replied: "Under no circumstances did I ever agree with the assertion . . . that our settlements are illegal or that they constitute an obstacle to peace. Since forming the government we have not muted anybody. At every opportunity and particularly during the 12 days of the Camp David discussions, we declared and reiterated that . . . we have the full right to settle in all parts of Eretz Israel."[78]

This "full right" was challenged in 1979 by the Israeli Supreme Court in its ruling on Elon Moreh. Elon Moreh had been established on private land that had been seized by the military and put at the disposal of the settlers. On October 23, 1979 the Arab landowners petitioned the Supreme Court for the return of their land. The main question facing the court was the legality of seizure of private land for civilian settlement. The court's ruling, however, went far beyond the legal issue and shook the foundations of territorial policy. By a unanimous decision, the court ruled that the settlers, their equipment, and their buildings must be removed from the land. The court's decision put a serious constraint on the government by forbidding the confiscation of land for political rather than military purposes.

> We were unable to go into the deliberations of the Ministerial Committee and the government by inspecting the minutes, but even without that we have sufficient indications in the evidence before us that both the Ministerial Committee and the government majority were decisively influenced by Zionist views on the settlement of Eretz Israel as a whole.[79]

The Supreme Court declared that the settlement constituted a violation of international law on the legality of seizure of private property in an area subject to military government. Only direct security needs could justify such a seizure.[80] The court ruling established that the initiative for settlement, including the determination of the precise loca-

tions of the lands involved, must come from the military. That is, it must come from the Ministerial Defense Committee rather than from the Interministerial Settlement Committee. Furthermore, a settlement on requisitioned private land must make a *direct contribution* to the attainment of national security objectives. The ruling also declared that no permanent settlement could be established on land that was by definition temporarily "requisitioned" by the army.

By this ruling, Israel's judiciary recognized The Hague Convention of 1907 as binding on Israel's settlement policy. Its implications were far-reaching: No land could be permanently confiscated; no settlement could be considered permanent; and security was the vital factor for permitting settlements. This ruling threatened to seriously impede the establishment of settlements, which still occupied a prime place on the Likud's ideological agenda.[81]

The government's first reaction to the court's ruling was compliance. Begin declared that the government would not try to circumvent the court's orders. Simultaneously, however, the government took steps to have its cake and eat it too by honoring the court's decision while bolstering the settlement effort in Judea and Samaria. Obedience to the court ruling sparked opposition both within the government and among the settlers. Ariel Sharon, minister of agriculture and champion of the Elon Moreh settlement, had reportedly threatened to resign if the Elon Moreh people were removed. According to Sharon, "The question is not only that of Elon Moreh. The question pertains to the existence of all existing and future settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley . . . The issue is not the transfer of one settlement from its place to another place; the issue is the existence and development of all settlements."[82] He argued that the first national priority was security, and settlement did more to enhance security than abiding by the law.

The opposition took advantage of the government's quandary and submitted five motions of no confidence.[83] Although the motions were defeated by a vote of 59–47, they vividly exposed the government's dilemma. It was inconceivable that Begin, himself a lawyer, would disobey the court's order. Yet he was also bound by his unretracted pledge to promote settlement. Begin's problem was to maintain credibility while carrying out the commitment to settlement at the heart of Likud policies. The government had at least three possible options for Elon Moreh. One was retroactive legislation, which was ruled out by a government declaration that "the very idea of retroactive legislation" was abhorrent.[84] Another option was to legalize Elon Moreh by declaring, as the settlers claimed, that the territories were not "occupied" and,

therefore, not subject to The Hague Convention. Because the territories had previously been wrested from Jews in violation of their immemorial and inalienable rights, they were simply being "re-occupied."[85] Even the Likud government was reluctant to issue such a declaration, which would have violated its undertaking at Camp David. It even rejected a demand to introduce new legislation to prevent future appeals to the Supreme Court by Arab landowners over seizure of private lands for settlement. A third option was to set up an army installation at Elon Moreh in place of the civilian settlement.[86]

The government needed a solution that would allow continued settlement in the territories without confiscation of private lands and for other than "political" purposes. Pending this solution, the government was thrown into a severe crisis that threatened its survival. Divergence of opinion was so high that Elon Moreh became the overriding issue determining the coalition's stability. Unable to face the dual opposition from within his government and from the settlers, Begin threatened to resign. Dayan's resignation on October 21, 1979 added fuel to the fire. The crisis was averted when the contending parties dropped their extreme demands.[87] Ezer Weizman, who was attuned to external pressures, attempted to avert confrontation with both friends and foes by suggesting that only existing settlements be enlarged by creating five major settlement blocs on the West Bank. Sharon, wishing to appease the settlers, demanded the establishment of fourteen additional settlements in Judea and Samaria. The government gave heed to both demands. It adopted a resolution stating that existing settlements would expand by taking in more people and that new settlements would be established. A select committee of ministers was set up to implement the decision.

Both Weizman and Sharon felt victorious. The Ministerial Committee pledged that the government would build ten to fifteen thousand dwelling units in the planned and existing settlements, focusing on five territorial blocs (Reichan, Etzion, Maaleh Adumim, Givon, and Karnei Shomron). In 1980 and 1981 new settlements were formed with unprecedented vigor. Attempts were made to play down the significance of the decision,[88] but the government was ready to allocate nearly half of its entire 1980 state budget to implement it.[89] The decision embraced elements of both Sharon's and Weizman's plans, but the problem was not confined to reconciling the ministers. It also extended to the government's relationship to the settlers, who refused to evacuate their site. The confrontation that finally took place between the IDF and the settlers of Elon Moreh on February 4, 1980 ended a long period of sus-

pense. The government acted irresolutely. It half-heartedly adhered to the court's ruling; it adopted a far-reaching settlement scheme; but it failed to solicit the settlers' support. In the opinion of the zealous settlers, the government was dealing treacherously with Eretz Israel.

The principle at stake in 1980 was not settling the West Bank; it was the means to carry out this settlement. The main problem was not money but the availability of land. The Elon Moreh ruling established that no privately owned land could be confiscated for political purposes. A few months later, after a hunger strike by the settlers, a ministerial committee was established to develop administrative, rather than legal, measures to safeguard existing settlements from legal suits and to devise means for acquiring land within the constraints established by the Supreme Court.[90] The gist of the measures was to register lands considered "public" and make them available for settlements. Officials of two government offices—the Custodian of Absentee Property and the Justice Ministry—conducted an extensive survey to identify "state lands" to speed up land acquisition for settlement purposes.[91] The government is reported to have issued more declarations of state land in the two years following the Elon Moreh ruling than in the preceding twelve years of occupation—with an acceleration in the trend in 1981.

Expansion of settlements was also evident in Hebron, where the Jewish population infiltrated both the outskirts of the city (Kiryat Arba) and its center. In the wake of the signature of the peace treaty with Egypt in April 1979, a group of women occupied Hadassa House, a former Jewish home in central Hebron, thereby establishing a Jewish presence in the city's heart.[92] As in previous cases, the government's decision confirmed the settlers' initiative. Permission to settle and establish a religious school and a field school was granted by the government on March 23, 1980, following the murder of a Jewish Yeshiva student in the midst of Hebron.[93] By the end of 1981 Hebron was inhabited by Jewish families who intended to establish a permanent, conspicuous Jewish community in the city.

During 1982 Israel's government stuck to its territorial policy in word and deed. All the settlements in Sinai were evacuated in accordance with the Camp David Accords, but settlement activity in the other territories continued uninterrupted. A few days after the final withdrawal from Sinai had been completed, Begin announced that he would introduce a resolution barring future governments from dismantling settlements, even as a result of peace negotiations.[94] The events accompanying withdrawal, however, coupled with mounting tensions along Israel's northern frontiers, relegated settlement to the bottom of the po-

litical agenda. The issue does not even show up in Knesset deliberations for 1982. Numerous Jews were ensconced in Judea and Samaria. Many of them were not even motivated by the ideology of Eretz Israel, but were simply enjoying a safe cheap haven from Israel's congested expensive urban centers. The government was sticking to its ideology and cramming the territories with settlements designed to establish permanent Israeli presence and control.

Summary

It is not easy to tie together the diverse strands of the above discussion. Settlement, initially minuscule, has expanded and mushroomed. Settlements can now be found throughout all the territories. Although the various governments were determined to settle Jews in the territories, in actuality they were often dragged willy-nilly into retroactively approving fait accompli by nongovernmental actors. The settlers reflected the whole political spectrum of Israeli society but were mainly representative of the upper-middle class. They absorbed huge resources but were not economically productive.

Government implementation of its territorial policy (summarized in Table 8) reflected the uncertainties and constraints it faced. The labyrinthine bureaucratic process of decisionmaking left much scope for maneuver. The decisionmakers fettered themselves by establishing a system in which forming a settlement was much easier said than done. Resolutions to establish settlements could be adopted to assuage the settlers, but these same resolutions could become mired in one of the multifarious committees responsible for their execution.

Leaving aside the bureaucratic maze connected with establishing settlements, it is evident that Israeli governments were guided by two major principles. The first one, which operated during the Labor Alignment's rule, focused on settling the territories outlined in Allon's plan—the Golan Heights, Sinai, the Jordan Valley, and the vicinity of Jerusalem. The second one was congruent with Sharon's plan; that is, it focused on settling the West Bank. The evolution of the settlement process can be summed up in the five phases delineated in the previous chapter. In the first phase, Israel was reluctant to implement its steadfast determination to hold on to the land until peace was concluded, so it began to establish Jewish settlements in the territories almost by sleight of hand. The government avoided taking a stand on the issue by letting others take the lead. In the second phase, the government's de-

TABLE 8
MAJOR GOVERNMENT RESOLUTIONS REGARDING SETTLEMENTS

Date	*Area*	*Resolution*
September 19, 1967	Judea	Settlement in Gush Etzion
September 19, 1967	Golan	Settlement in Aleika
July 7, 1968	Judea	Religious school in Hebron
May 28, 1972	Judea	Two hundred residence units in Kiryat Arba
December 24, 1972	Sinai	Regional center in Rafah Salient
November 24, 1974	Judea	Industrial site in Maale Adumim
December 14, 1975	Samaria	Removing settlers from Sebastia to Kadum
August 17, 1977	Samaria	Approval of three settlements
October 11, 1977	Judea & Samaria	Approval of six settlements
September 16, 1979	Judea & Samaria	End of regulation prohibiting Israeli citizens from buying land
November 16, 1979	Judea & Samaria	Approval of nineteen settlements
February 4, 1980	Samaria	Eviction of Elon Moreh
February 10, 1980	Judea	Settlement within Hebron
March 23, 1980	Judea	Religious school and field school in Hebron
August 15, 1980	Judea	Approval of four settlements south of Hebron
February 2, 1982	Judea & Samaria	Construction of sixteen presettlements

SOURCES: Israeli press.

termination to retain the territories was modified. But, despite ambivalence, settlement activity surged. There emerged a clear demarcation between territories that were negotiable (and therefore not targeted for settlement) and those that, according to authoritative policy, were not to be surrendered. In the third phase, settlement activity was much reduced, but it still began to encroach into the unauthorized zone of Samaria. This development exposed the government's vulnerability to pressures from within and without. During this phase the government's conduct clearly contradicted its official policy. The government's frailty in the face of the power of those promoting settlements inhibited its taking effective action in line with its views. In the fourth phase, the authoritative choice was particularly lucid and decisive, and one might have expected full congruence between this choice and government

conduct. This expectation was not realized because of the mounting international constraints connected with the Israeli-Egyptian peace process. Although settlement activity expanded, it was still cloaked in double-talk. Settlements were often camouflaged in ideological or military disguises. The Elon Moreh ruling unleashed demands to cast off these disguises and confront the problem of the settlements directly. After this the gap between official policy and its implementation closed, and settlement burgeoned in a manner compatible with the government's outspoken commitments.

THREE

Political Parties: Factional Input

Political parties play a predominant role in the social, as well as the political, life of the Israeli polity.[1] Therefore, their supporting or constraining effects on official policy deserve a critical examination. Although, generally speaking, parties in the ruling coalition support the government and parties not represented in the government oppose it, the inflow of support or constraint often cuts across the boundaries of coalition and opposition. The reason for this blurring lies in the high incidence of factionalism in Israeli political parties. Factions emanate from socioeconomic divisions and personal loyalties. Ideological divisions over things like the territorial issue have also precipitated factions within parties. By definition, intraparty factions challenge the party's leaders and their policies. The extent to which the factional challenge is transformed into constraint is determined by the resources commanded by the faction. These include its leadership, cohesion, penetration of decisionmaking bodies, and identification with the values adhered to by the party's elite. Factions are not always institutionalized, and may exist only as "tendencies" that have no organizational attributes.[2] This discussion will focus on intraparty groupings whose purported goal has been to influence their parties' territorial policy. The analysis will trace the development of this process; that is, the expression of dissent within

the party leadership, the operation of the factional structures, and the interplay of power in partisan institutions.

Attention will focus mainly on the Alignment dominated by the Labor Party (LP) because (1) it was the dominant political force for a substantial part of the period under consideration (1967–1977); and (2) the party that succeeded Labor as the linchpin of the Likud government (Herut) was virtually united on the territorial issue. Although other parties were also a source of constraint or support to decisionmakers, their impact was most noticeable on the parliamentary level. With the exception of the NRP, which will be discussed later, other parties' internal dissensions were less relevant to the national political process.

Labor: Leadership Opinion

The most prominent, controversial, and intriguing leader to have an impact on territorial policy was unmistakably Moshe Dayan. Dayan did not always take issue with the government's policy; he was often a supporter of the official line. Because of his position as minister of defense, Dayan played a decisive role in the formulation of territorial policy, especially its economic and administrative aspects. Dayan, however, often presented his own opinions and influenced the government to follow his lead. It is difficult to perceive Dayan as a factional figure. Yet he enjoyed the unconditional support of Rafi, one of the LP's two major factions. Dayan was often accused of inconsistency—of changing his views with the seasons of the year. Indeed, he issued many seemingly incompatible statements. Nevertheless, his input into the formulation of territorial policy can be clearly identified. Dayan centered his policies around three major issues: the source of Israel's identification with the territories; the future implications of that bond; and its immediate consequences.

Moshe Dayan was a firm believer in the idea of Greater Israel, an idea eloquently expressed in his famous address at a funeral on August 3, 1967: "We have returned to the mountain, to the cradle of our people, to the inheritance of the Patriarchs, the land of the Judges and the fortress of the Kingdom of the House of David. We have returned to Hebron and Shechem, to Bethlehem and Anatot, to Jericho and the fords of the Jordan at Adam Ha'ir."[3] Dayan's yearning for the "cradle of our people" suggests that he had in mind not only security considerations but also (perhaps mainly) visions of Greater Israel. In the years that

followed, Dayan repeatedly associated himself with the proterritories option, an option initially also fostered by the government.

Very shortly, however, it became evident that Dayan was expressing his personal views rather than those of the government. Dayan disputed the official line promising the return of some territories for a whole-hearted peace agreement. To Dayan, returning lands for peace was inconceivable. "This is not the choice we face. We would not achieve peace by retreating. We have not been offered peace in exchange for withdrawal." The reason for his rejection of such a bargain was not only his distrust of the Arabs' willingness to make peace, but also the appeal of the territories. "One factor should be taken into account in any debate on the future of the occupied areas—the yearning of the people of Israel to return to their land. Without this yearning and its fulfillment, there would never have been a state of Israel, nor return to Zion, which is even more important than the state."[4] It is thus clear that Dayan's rationale for keeping the territories was not solely to attain peace but to preserve the bonds between the Jewish people and their ancient homeland.

Dayan definitely did not recommend annexation of the territories, but his opinions on the future consequences of occupation were vague.[5] Dayan's perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict was bleak. "The conflict between us and the Arabs is insoluble. The war is not about this hill or that river, but over the very existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East."[6] This gloominess led to three conclusions. First and foremost, Israelis had to learn how to live with Arabs. "Living with the Arabs" emerged as a prominent motif in Dayan's recommendations. Dayan maintained that "it is incumbent on us to address ourselves to the Arabs living under our administration . . . we must not only prevent the letting of our blood and the devastation of our land, but we must also see to it that we are not rendered incapable of finding a common language with the Arabs."[7] In his autobiography, Dayan spelled out the prospects of "living together." "I did not believe for a moment that when they got to know Israelis at first hand, our neighbors would suddenly begin to love and admire us. But they would at least discover that it was possible to live with us. We are an open and classless society . . . We are also a progressive state, and quite advanced."[8] Dayan trusted the supremacy of Israel to convince the Arabs that "living together" was preferable to other alternatives. By virtue of his formal authority over the territories, Dayan overcame opposition in the government and contributed greatly to the territories' administrative and economic integration with Israel.

Dayan's second conclusion involved Israel's future boundaries. Like

his colleagues in the government, Dayan initially refrained from drawing maps. In 1969, however, Dayan introduced a formula for "strategic borders." This plan called for the use of the Jordan River as a security border, retention of the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights, and control of Sharm el-Sheikh with a land link to Israeli territories. This was a clear attempt by Dayan to draw a map based on his own views. The defense minister stated that he did not accept his party's decision "not to decide."

> We must establish an atmosphere of peace and make the foundation for the map of peace, that will assure us secure strategic borders . . . We must make unilateral arrangements in the absence of a bilateral settlement . . . We must decide whether we want to unite Gaza with Israel or with Jordan. Is there anything which separates Jerusalem from the Hebron hills, Bethlehem, and Ramallah? It is one bloc. We must make all the necessary arrangements, to know what we want and what we want to achieve.[9]

On the basis of the above concept, Dayan influenced the Labor Party to legitimize Israel's claim to certain territories that it intended to keep for security purposes.

Dayan's third conclusion concerned the fate of the West Bank. Return of territories was out of the question. The alternative presented by Dayan was later dubbed the "functional solution." Dayan shared the widespread apprehension about demographic peril. "If we had to choose between having an additional one million Arabs as Israeli citizens or withdrawal from Nablus I would rather withdraw from Nablus than undermine the composition of the Jewish state."[10] But because he was unwilling to surrender lands, he envisaged a plan based on a dissociation between geography and citizenship. "In Dayan's view, the two nations in the area formerly called Palestine could function within a single economy, even though they belonged to different cultures and sovereign states."[11] The functional solution propagated by Dayan did not imply the emergence of a binational state, because he did not believe Israeli citizenship should be imposed on the Arabs living in the territories. Dayan urged the government to grant the Arabs personal liberties, but without Israeli citizenship. "In this period we should not impose on [the Arabs] Israeli citizenship. They do not want to be Israeli and, to my mind, we should not impose it on them . . . If they want to continue being Jordanian citizens—let them be Jordanians."[12] The functional solution proposed domination of the territories but not of the people dwelling in them.

Dayan was an ardent supporter of settlements. His motives, however, differed from the government's because they were grounded in nationalistic sentiments rather than security arguments. Dayan saw the West Bank as part of the "homeland" rather than as a barrier against possible, or even probable, attack. "I consider the Western Bank of the Jordan to be our homeland and for me there isn't much difference between the area of Tel Aviv and the area of Hebron or the area of Jericho. This is our homeland."[13] This sentiment had unavoidable ramifications: Jewish settlements on the West Bank were considered legitimate even without the extension of Israel's sovereignty to the area. Dayan, a loyal Rafi member, built a bridge to rival faction Achdut Haavoda by imbuing settlement with the highest significance. "From the Zionist point of view, then, the true criterion of what is called belief in the Whole Land of Israel is not just the political ownership of some part of the country, nor the abstract belief in its wholeness; the purpose and touchstone of Zionism is to be found in the actual realization of Jewish settlement in all parts of the land."[14]

This combination of a desire to settle on the land with the lack of a corresponding desire to extend Israeli sovereignty over it was unique to Dayan. He insisted that settlements served purposes other than security. "I do not regard settlement in Judea and Samaria as an unavoidable necessity just because it is needed for security. If we want to obliterate or prevent the sense of temporariness in Judea and Samaria we have to cease teaching the Bible."[15] It was Dayan's intense feelings of a historical bond, coupled with his cognizance of political realities, that sustained this ostensible paradox: a call for permanent settlements that lacked the shield of legal authority.

Dayan supported official policy between 1967 and 1973 by endorsing a hard line on the territories. He pushed the government into economic integration and was also successful in persuading the leadership to develop the coastal zone of northern Sinai. But Dayan failed to convince his party of the importance of extensive Jewish settlement on the West Bank. He was also unsuccessful in implementing the habitation of Samaria by Jews. Dayan's long-range program, the "functional option," was similarly rejected by the Labor Alignment. (It was only temporarily shelved, however; it came into its own under the peace plan.)

Dayan's enforced resignation from the government, following Premier Meir's resignation in April 1974, removed him from the locus of power. But at this time he was already showing signs of veering toward the Likud. Dayan shocked his party in October 1974 when he signed a Likud petition urging the retention of Israel's rule over Judea and Sa-

maria. He continued to object to any partition of the West Bank and supported settlement throughout the area.

Another figure who had great influence on territorial policy was Yigal Allon. Allon's formal position was less influential than that of Dayan. Although he was a deputy premier, his ministerial duties—immigrant absorption (from June 5, 1967 to December 15, 1969) and education (from December 15, 1969 to June 3, 1974)—were not linked to the territories. It was only in his capacity as minister of foreign affairs (from June 3, 1974 to June 20, 1977) that he was involved (ex officio) in the formulation of territorial policy. Allon's political background was Achdut Haavoda, so he had an ideological commitment to Greater Israel. In his book *A Curtain of Sand*, first published in 1959, he wrote, "If Zahal (IDF) should cross the borders of the divided land, it is forbidden to retreat again, but we must aspire from then on to stabilize the borders which from the historical, economic and security perspectives are the most natural."[16]

After the Six-Day War Allon took a very different stand from the one he had taken in his previous writings. Allon's plan, which became the touchstone of Israel's policy in the territories, was presented in broad outline on July 13, 1967.[17] The plan was never discussed or officially endorsed by the cabinet. According to Allon, this was because it had a low probability of being formally adopted, owing to the objection of Gahal and the NRP.[18] It was 1972 before Allon made public the details of his plan, which embodied the division of the territory—especially the West Bank—between Israel and the Arab states. Allon based his plan on his three main commitments: to the historical rights of the Jewish people in Eretz Israel; to the Jewish and democratic features of the state of Israel; and to Israel's strategic needs.

Allon did not share Dayan's despair of achieving peace. He was also not willing to pursue a "joint way of life" with the Arabs. He believed that peace was feasible if Israel was willing to make territorial concessions. Allon was also convinced that relying on time and blurring the territorial options would not be fruitful tactics. Instead, he urged Israel's government to draw up its map forthwith. "One never knows in advance when and how peace will come. Every possibility must be explored according to changing circumstances . . . We know there are influential people and quarters in Arab countries who have reached the conclusion that a continued state of belligerence will wreak havoc in Arab society for many generations to come."[19] He insisted that the consequences of not deciding were certain to be harmful, both domestically—"undermining the faith in the morality of our position and the

equity of our path"—and externally—"on our shoulders, and only on our shoulders will hinge the blame for the lack of peace in the area."[20] The dual implications of this position were territorial compromise on some areas and outright annexation of other areas.

Allon wanted to attain both security and peace—to inflict minimal harm on the Arabs in the territories while ensuring maximum rights for Jews. Allon's identification with Jewish history was no less strong than Dayan's. "The historical rights are the foundation for the very moral right of the Jewish state to exist in any borders . . . If I endorse compromise, it is for realistic politics and humanistic Zionism. A territorial compromise [is] designed to provide self-defensible borders from the strategic perspective and the prominent Jewish feature of the state from the national perspective." Allon's realism arose out of his conviction that the two targets—complete peace and all the land—were incompatible. "Let us not deceive ourselves that peace, de jure or de facto, and lands are both attainable. [But] let us not deceive ourselves that security is attainable if we give up all the territories."[21]

In order to obtain both peace and security, Allon proposed the following territorial arrangements: On the eastern front, the Jordan River would be Israel's security border; that is, it would be the border that Arab military would not be permitted to cross. The zone that lies between the Jordan River and the eastern slopes of the Samarian and Judean hills, from Mount Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert would be controlled by Israel. A corridor along the Jericho-Ramallah axis would permit communication between Jordan and the Arab zone of the West Bank. Allon also called for minor border modifications in the areas of Latrun and the Etzion bloc. Roughly a third of the land of the West Bank was thus designated to become part of Israel, with the remaining two-thirds to be relinquished. On the southern front, Allon proposed that Israel retain control of the Gaza Strip, the Rafah Salient, and Sharm el-Sheikh. Like Dayan, Allon called for a territorial corridor between the southern and northern parts of Sinai. On the northern front, Israel's defense line would be drawn on the Golan Heights, which should therefore remain under Israeli control.[22]

The first step Allon recommended to implement his plan was to establish settlements in areas deemed necessary to Israel's security. Settlements for this purpose had Allon's unabashed support. He was among the first ministers to visit the Jewish settlers in Hebron, and he repeatedly backed their cause in the government.[23] Together with Yisrael Galili, his factional co-member, he urged the government to build settlements in areas intended to be kept under Israeli control. More spe-

cifically, Allon's settlement scheme included the vicinity of Jerusalem (where the town Kiryat Arba was to be established), an area west of the Jordan River, and another area in the foothills and mountains farther west (both of which were largely uninhabited). A string of settlements, including one urban center, was to stretch between the Dead Sea and Jerusalem. These areas, Allon maintained, offered Israel the opportunity to build a security buffer without precluding political solutions. Although no formal resolution was ever adopted, the plan's broad framework became the hallmark of the Labor Party's settlement policy.[24]

The October War did not change Allon's views.[25] In an article published in *Foreign Affairs,* Allon stated that Israel was willing to make territorial concessions as long as they provided borders with an "essential minimum of strategic depth" to permit Israel a margin of security against invading armies.

> According to the compromise formula which I personally advocate, Israel, within the context of a peace settlement, would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war. Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity between the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a deliberate territorial compromise can be made.[26]

The only territories that Allon was not willing to concede were those he judged to be essential for Israel's defense. Consequently, most Palestinians would be able to find national expression in a single, Jordanian-Palestinian state. Neither years of euphoria nor years of adversity swayed Allon from his original plan. He insisted that divesting itself of the thickly populated areas of the West Bank was a prime Israeli interest. He therefore continued to recommend that Israel withdraw from those districts politically and physically and keep its strategic control by remaining in the Jordan Valley and the mountains of Judea.

One aspect of Allon's plan underwent a significant change, however. In 1967 Allon believed that in a final settlement the Gaza Strip would be absorbed by Israel and its inhabitants would take the opportunity to move to another Arab state. By 1976, however, Allon was convinced that Israel should not annex the strip, and he proposed that Gaza be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian state.[27] Another change was that by 1975 Allon was advocating territorial concessions in the context of an interim agreement, arguing that ceding only for "real peace"

would make an agreement unattainable in the near future.[28] Allon abhorred the idea of the functional solution, maintaining that it was "a South African concept . . . The Arabs and the world public opinion won't accept it."[29] He still ascribed prime importance to settlements, which he termed "the greatest leverage in our political struggle over the determination of defensible borders."[30]

Toward the end of Labor's rule, Allon's policies were more dovish; they emphasized the need for territorial concessions. The reasons for his conciliatory attitude, which had always existed but which became accentuated in 1976, were grounded in the demographic danger that seemed more imminent then than a decade earlier. The need to assure the Jewish character of the state of Israel had become more imperative.[31]

In harmony with his outlook, Allon took a firm stand against the settlers of Kadum and sought to remove them. In 1976 he attacked Gush Emunim as "a political movement of false messiahs and nationalistic demagogues whose settlement attempts had done no good and much harm."[32] By then, however, the official policy had become so blurred that it is difficult to determine whether Allon was a source of constraint or support.

Allon's natural ally in the government and the party was Yisrael Galili, also a member of Achdut Haavoda. As a minister without portfolio, Galili did not hold an important position, but he was still a close advisor to Golda Meir and a member of her kitchen cabinet.[33] Galili was also the head of the Ministerial Committee for Settlements, and in this capacity he influenced territorial policy. Galili's opinions (not often expressed in public) put him in the first rank of proterritorialists. In partisan forums Galili explicated his views quite clearly. "It has not yet been determined, from the political, strategic and historical perspectives, which is the graver danger—a large Arab population under Arab domination and possibly under hostile circumstances near us across the border, or the very same population within Israel, despite the tensions and perils."[34] By and large, however, Galili served as mediator between the rival factions and molded the various maps and attitudes into the formal consensual party policy that was subsequently adopted by the government. Galili retained his position in the government even when the veteran leadership of Meir and Dayan was wiped away by the blunders of the October War. His influence, however, markedly declined.

In 1974 the proterritories camp was joined by Shimon Peres, minister of defense from June 3, 1974 to June 30, 1977, and a member of

Rafi. In his position as minister of transport before the war, Peres did not often express his opinions regarding the fate of the territories.[35] As defense minister, Peres became the leading proponent of the functional solution, or the division of authority rather than of territory between Israel and Jordan. According to this plan, Israel was to remain responsible for the foreign and security affairs of the West Bank, but Jordan would be responsible for all other domestic issues. As early as 1974 Peres had advocated negotiating a reinstatement of Jordanian civil administration in parts of Judea and Samaria, providing the IDF would have a share in security.[36] In mid-1975 Peres elaborated his plan for local rule on the West Bank.[37] The goal of limited home rule was to establish an Israeli-Jordanian confederation that would be an alternative to Israeli annexation of the territories. Although the details of the confederation were not disclosed, Peres envisaged separate control at the national, regional, and municipal levels.[38]

Peres said that he did not see any factor that would turn the clock back. Issues needed to be explicitly stated—namely, that in Judea and Samaria Israel was not compromising any territory, only authority.[39] Peres's opinions were similar to Dayan's. There were, however, two major differences between them that may have emanated from the changed circumstances. First, Dayan preferred vagueness about the West Bank, whereas Peres called for the presentation of a clear and explicit program for the future of Judea and Samaria.[40] Second, whereas Dayan judged peace unattainable, Peres regarded it as inevitable. "I believe that any state in the Middle-East, in the span of 10–20 years, has no choice but to eschew war . . . Time is working towards peace."[41] Peres also belittled the importance of historical rights, demonstrating a greater concern for the state's future than for the vestiges of its ancient past.

In summary, the two top LP leaders, Dayan and Allon, were both proponents of historical rights. Both may therefore be regarded as hawks within their party. The differences between them, however, were remarkable. For Dayan, relinquishing part of the "homeland" was inconceivable. Demography aside, his main argument was that "living together" would provide a functional solution, enabling Israel to extend its authority without sovereignty. Allon abhorred the idea of "living together." Although he was personally familiar to (and admired by) many Arabs, he advocated a clear bifurcation between the two nations. He admitted that the separation would oblige Israel to part from lands with a deep historical significance, but he was adamant that this separation would also enable the state to maintain its security and, above all, its

uniqueness as a Jewish state. Peres shared Dayan's enthusiasm for the functional solution but played down the significance of historical rights. He was more security-oriented than Dayan and less apprehensive of the demographic danger than Allon. He also devised measures for "living together," but shared Allon's optimism regarding the inevitability of peace. Meir was another hawkish leader in the LP. As premier she sought to represent the views of the government more than she strove to influence the party. But the leaders of the LP never recommended extending Israeli sovereignty over all the territories. There were Labor hawks, but none of them was a land-monger; none of them publicly identified with what Likud leaders urged—the creation of a sovereign state, Greater Israel, by way of annexation.

There were also dovish influences in the Labor leadership. The leading actors were Abba Eban, minister of foreign affairs in Eshkol's and Meir's cabinets from June 5, 1967 to June 3, 1974; Pinhas Sapir, minister without portfolio from June 5, 1967 to December 15, 1969 and minister of finance from December 15, 1969 to March 10, 1974; and Arye (Lova) Eliav, secretary-general of the LP from 1968 to 1970. Eban has been depicted as an ardent dove who regarded the territories as a burden—a deposit to be returned with the advent of peace.[42] But Eban's official statements do not justify this description. He often adhered to the authoritative choice, reiterating the well-known Israeli commitments.[43] His dovish orientation was revealed in internal party deliberations, when he would insist that territorial concessions were absolutely essential. "A vision that does not incorporate territorial compromise in the landscape west of the Jordan River, is hardly a Zionist vision." A selective settlement policy was permissible "only in unpopulated areas where border changes are deemed essential." Eban's vision of Israel's future borders would ensure "that the percentage of the Arab population will not be significantly higher than before the war." The foreign minister also advocated deliberate vagueness and objected to the drawing of detailed maps. "It is preferable to lay down general principles than to draw maps which lend precision to matters that will be determined in the process of negotiations." He argued that imprecision was advantageous because "negotiations, in their essence, are a process whose conclusion is different from their inception."[44]

It is therefore not surprising that Eban rejected Dayan's scheme for integration. For Eban, integration without full citizenship for the Arabs constituted a violation of basic human rights. "It would look worse than the Greater Israel policy of keeping the territories and granting citizen-

ship and equal rights to Arabs."[45] When he was not in office, Eban expressed even more dovish views. In May 1975 he presented a plan for an overall peace with the Arabs. It called for an Israeli withdrawal from the bulk of the territories in return for Arab acceptance of a list of fifteen conditions that were short of full peace. At this time Eban also became a vociferous opponent of the government's policies and asserted that "the vast majority of the territories taken in 1967 must be returned."[46]

The major exponent of dovish opinion in the party was Pinhas Sapir, Dayan's chief antagonist in the cabinet and party. On December 9, 1968 Sapir appealed against a decision of the cabinet territorial committee that authorized firms to establish factories in the territories—a policy intended to speed up territorial economic integration with Israel. Some commentators have described Sapir as no ideologue. They have contended that he was an organization man par excellence, and that this was why he was brought into party headquarters.[47] But Sapir had a clear idea about what ought to be done with the territories, and he became the chief ideological spokesman for the dovish camp. Both in radio and press interviews and in party forums he reiterated his objection to the inclusion of populated territories in any future arrangement. Sapir even rejected temporary measures designed to establish a linkage between the Arabs in the territories and Israel.

Like others in his party, Sapir maintained that "our defense forces will not move from their present position until peace is achieved." Unlike his coleaders, however, he believed that by returning areas heavily populated by Arabs, Israel would not be surrendering anything. She would rather be "freeing herself of a burden."[48] Sapir presented five arguments in support of his position. These became the hallmark of dovish orientations in the LP.

1. The influx of cheap Arab labor from the territories would impede Israel's technological advancement, which was primarily based on the mechanization of industry.
2. The presence of masses of Arabs in the Jewish urban centers would constitute a grave security danger.
3. The integration of Arabs would also be economically expensive. The diversion of scarce resources to meet the needs of the Arabs living in the territories was beyond the financial means of the Jewish state.
4. Full-fledged integration implied granting Arabs Israeli citi-

zenship, which would mean that Arabs would probably be the deciding factor in determining the outcome of many undecided issues.

5. Last, but not least, the integration of Arabs would constitute a grave demographic danger. Within a short time Arabs would comprise 40 percent of the population and eliminate the Jewish features of the state. "We always wanted a Jewish state and we did not come back to the land of Israel in order to work and shed our blood for a binational state."[49]

In short, Sapir outrightly rejected all that Dayan advocated: economic integration; allocation of funds to the territories, the availability of an abundant source of Arab employees as a consequence of integrating the occupied lands. In line with his arguments, Sapir opposed any settlement in the territories because it "might close the way to peace . . . Plans for establishing facts will tie our hands once we reach the negotiating table."[50] Like other LP doves, Sapir was certain that both negotiations and peace were possible, or even inevitable.

Lova Eliav, Sapir's successor as the LP's general-secretary, was another renowned dove. Like Sapir, Eliav was in the core of Mapai's establishment (predecessor of the LP) and very close to its top leaders. Eliav's opinions first appeared in a series of articles in the party's daily, *Davar.* These were later compiled in a pamphlet entitled *New Targets for Israel.* The pamphlet was the first public expression of an explicitly dovish policy spelled out by a Laborite. The basic idea, later expanded in a book (*Land of the Hart*), was that Israel should return the territories and obtain peace by acknowledging the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. For Eliav, the key to Israel's future was in making peace with the Arabs—first and foremost, with the Palestinians. The only way to obtain such a peace was for Israel to announce as a declaration of principle that "it is ready to return to the Palestinian Arabs the majority of the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which, combined with Transjordan, will provide them with their own sovereign and independent state."[51]

Such an attitude was quite incongruous in a party whose leader (Meir) had claimed there was no Palestinian people. Eliav also took issue with the notion embodied in the phrase "there is no one to talk with." He suggested that there was no one to talk with precisely because the government did not discuss the Palestinian problem clearly and befogged the issue of the territories' future. Like Sapir, Eliav was strongly opposed to "the indiscriminate creation of facts in the territories." Every

Israeli activity was interpreted as part of a Jewish scheme to effect a creeping annexation by creating facts; every access road was a "fact"; every electrical switch was a "fact." He went further than Sapir by claiming that Palestinians had a right to self-determination. Eliav insisted that self-determination was the only way for Jews and Arabs to extricate themselves "if only slowly and delicately from the whirlpool of fears and complexes."[52]

The dovish option was supported by two other LP leaders: Ofer, a Mapai MK who served as minister of construction in Rabin's cabinet from 1973 to 1977, and Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the powerful secretary-general of the Histadrut, or General Federation of Israeli Workers. Ben-Aharon, a member of Achdut Haavoda, made an implicit call for a unilateral withdrawal from some territories even before the signing of a peace treaty. In a February 1973 LP Secretariat meeting he stated: "I have no doubt that a situation could develop in which we could unilaterally decide upon certain frontiers to be maintained by us. In other words, we would decide that in the absence of peace, we remain only in specific areas, and not in all the areas the Arabs have compelled us to remain in."[53] Like Sapir, Ben-Aharon feared the consequences of the influx of thousands of Arab laborers. He feared the day of crisis "with tens of thousands of Arabs working in our factories and manning our construction teams." A few days later, in an interview to the *New York Times*, Ben-Aharon explicitly demanded the return of some areas before a formal peace was signed. "Why should we wait for King Hussein's signature [on a peace agreement] to give up Nablus, Jericho, maybe a portion of Hebron?"[54] This proposal was a clear challenge to the government's pledge not to withdraw from any land before a peace treaty was drawn up and signed.

A summary of the Labor leaders' positions on the territorial issue is presented in Table 9. It is clearly evident that the party was fractionalized on basic aspects of the territorial issue. Not every leader disputed the official line. In fact, often the official line was precisely the one advocated by a member of the elite, all of whom participated in the process of decisionmaking. Furthermore, not all the leaders mentioned above were members of organized factions. Eban, Sapir, and Eliav belonged to Mapai, a group that was at the center of the Labor Party, not on the periphery. Ben-Aharon was a member of Achdut Haavoda. His opinions, however, were individualistic and could not be identified with those of his faction. The next section will address those opinions that were either sustained by factional activity or inspired the formation of factions.

Table 9
Labor Leaders' Positions on the Territorial Issue

Issue	*Dayan*	*Peres*	*Allon*	*Sapir-Eban*	*Eliav*
Settlements	All lands	All lands	Part of land	Highly selective	None
Historical rights	Yes	Irrelevant	Yes	Unimportant	Yes
Drawing map	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Territorial concession	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Living with Arabs	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Peace	Unattainable	Unavoidable	Attainable	Necessary	Necessary
Israel's presence in territories	Permanent	Permanent	Temporary	Harming	Devastating

Labor: Factional Activity

Factionalism was legitimized in the Labor Party, because the two minor factions—Achdut Haavoda and Rafi—were each accorded 21.4 percent representation in all party institutions and nominations. Penetration was therefore achieved without undue struggle. The present study is not concerned with factions as such, but only with those internal party organizations for whom the territorial issue was highly important or paramount. This definition pertains to factions that had roots in the pre-1967 era, such as Achdut Haavoda; factions that were deliberately set up between 1967 and 1977 to promote the territorial issue; or factions that ranked the territorial issue high on their agendas.

Achdut Haavoda

The Achdut Haavoda faction was rich in resources. Prior to the establishment of the Labor Alignment it had a sizable representation in the Knesset, eight MKs, a well-developed institutional structure, and a variety of publications that included a daily newspaper. Most important, the faction had an affiliated kibbutz movement, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, which provided Achdut Haavoda with money, manpower, and ideology. The founding fathers of the Labor movement and Israel's heroic, almost legendary, pioneers were included in the leadership of Achdut Haavoda. Despite endemic animosities and internal splits, Hakibbutz Hameuchad was the flesh and blood of Labor Zionism. Achdut Haavoda dismantled its partisan institutions when it amalgamated with Mapai in 1968. Its resources, however, remained intact. Its intensive factional activity was perpetuated through the kibbutz institutions, whose leaders became the chief spokesmen for Achdut Haavoda. The faction obviously ranked high in penetration ability, since its representatives—especially Allon and Galili—were among the top decisionmaking elite. Other Achdut Haavoda members were incorporated in the government and in the operating institutions of the LP and the Histadrut.

Establishing Greater Israel was one of the pillars of Achdut Haavoda's ideology. This commitment was one of the major causes of its split with Mapai in 1944. Paradoxically, it was also one of the factors leading to Achdut Haavoda's unification with Hashomer Hatzair (a party favoring a binationalist state) in 1948 to form Mapam. Achdut Haavoda opposed any division of the land and, at the outset, was even reluctant to support the UN's resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish

state in part of Palestine.[55] Although Achdut Haavoda compromised its ideological commitment when the state was founded, it remained in opposition to the ruling Mapai-dominated government between 1948 and 1955. Accordingly, it could advocate militant policies without having to test them in the harsh light of political reality.

In 1967 the situation was different, because by this time Achdut Haavoda had become a full partner in the process of decisionmaking. Because Achdut Haavoda recognized that the issue of Greater Israel was a bone of contention, it was not on the agenda of the unification negotiations between Achdut Haavoda and Mapai.[56] But the territorial reality in 1967 prompted Achdut Haavoda to emphasize its policy and pressure those responsible for making decisions. The faction was caught on the horns of a dilemma: It wanted to avoid the controversy that had split the party three decades earlier; yet it could not renounce its own essential values. The situation was aggravated by the political configuration in 1967, because Achdut Haavoda favored the same territorial policy as its chief enemy, Herut. In 1944 Herut (the Revisionist Party) was an outcast fringe group beyond the pale of the Zionist establishment. In 1967 Herut, in its new guise as Gahal, was an honorable member of the ruling coalition. To Achdut Haavoda's dismay, Herut virtually monopolized the Greater Israel idea. For the kibbutz movement, which had appointed itself the vanguard of mass pioneering, this was hard to sustain. Hakibbutz Hameuchad wanted to play the leading role in implementing what it had preached since its inception; namely, settlement of the land.

Startled by these exigencies, Achdut Haavoda set out to formulate its own territorial policy and managed to turn it into an all-party policy. At the first meeting of the kibbutz secretariat, held one day after the 1967 war, Achdut Haavoda's longing to play a leading role in settling the newly acquired lands was expressed bluntly. Yitzhak Tabenkin's plea for "the establishment of dense settlements in all regions," which implied the retention of all the captured lands, was accepted in principle.[57] There were, however, some qualifying factors that subsequently impeded the faction's ability to incorporate its own preferences into the party's official policy.

To begin with, there were the "real politicians," including Allon and Galili, whose desires were tamed by their government positions. Allon proposed to settle only those areas which were of strategic importance; Galili claimed that "there is no room for political declarations that will embroil us. I presume that there will be some territories we will not be able to retain." He also disputed the absolute value of settlement since

"we should realize that in our era the political significance is higher than the practical-settlement significance." True to his mediating role, Galili fostered opinions more moderate than those he advocated in partisan forums.

Other obstacles to extensive settlement were the limited financial and human resources available to the kibbutz. The militants were divided on how to handle this difficulty. Some devised measures to raise the required resources within the Labor movement by cooperating with other settlement movements, recruiting their members, and launching a campaign abroad. But it soon became evident that Hakibbutz Hameuchad's attempts to mobilize resources from within would fail, because the other settlement movements did not endorse the plan. In the absence of joint action, the kibbutz decided to rely on its own resources and to establish irreversible facts. The history of settlement in Palestine had taught the kibbutz a lesson: "What is more convincing than the person who resides on the site?" The activists' undisguised longing to settle the land without delay was, however, dampened by cold facts. "We cannot provide 50 nuclei of settlers; we cannot even man our own settlements."[58]

Thus were Hakibbutz Hameuchad's dreams dashed. On the one hand, the capture of the territories unleashed the pioneer spirit of the kibbutz and recalled the golden days when it was a vanguard of the settlement movement. In the Israel of 1967, however, Hakibbutz Hameuchad could not have reenacted the heroic events of its past without provoking a serious confrontation with the authorities of which it was a part. To be sure, there were those who urged unauthorized settlement; the majority, however, was reluctant to act. The first settlement in the Golan Heights was the result of a private initiative of kibbutz members, not the implementation of a formal resolution. The secretariat was actually reluctant to incorporate the new settlement, even though most of its members belonged to the movement.[59] Despite this equivocation, the kibbutz decided to found five settlements in the territories—three in the Golan Heights and two in Sinai.

The ability to implement this decision was a test case for the vitality of the kibbutz and a means to amass urgently needed power. Hakibbutz Hameuchad was disturbed by its ideological rivalry with Gahal and by Rafi's ascending power. The possibility of Dayan becoming premier was a nightmare to Achdut Haavoda. Therefore it was essential for the faction to gain power and exercise it in party forums. Reality, however, was not congenial to the faction's pressing needs. Although the kibbutz was resourceful by the criteria applied to factional activity, it was not capable

of carrying the burden of settlement. The era of heroic pioneering belonged to the past, and the younger generation was by then much less susceptible to national missions. The kibbutz leaders noted regretfully that "the distance between what bounces on our heads and our output is very wide."[60] By the end of 1967 Achdut Haavoda was experiencing a sense of failure. Tabenkin noted that "the last five months have been a total flop, we have done nothing. If we do not settle the territories, they will not be ours."[61] Even Eshkol, although reportedly willing to provide the kibbutz with land and water, declined to do so on grounds that "the kibbutz cannot mobilize its members to settle the land."[62]

The kibbutz zealots, however, were still determined to advance the idea of Greater Israel. They did so by forming a settlement outside the confines of Hakibbutz Hameuchad and by joining the Land of Israel Movement (discussed at length in Chapter 4). The initiative to settle the territories forced the kibbutz into a difficult position. On the one hand, the movement sympathized with some of its younger members, who—like their forebears—had no patience to await formal decisions and were willing to endure the hardships of establishing a new settlement in a barren land. On the other hand, the centralized characteristics of the kibbutz made it difficult to accept any unauthorized initiative. Some leaders were also concerned that support of this type of settlement would eventually reduce the kibbutz's already shrinking resources. Above all, there was a great reluctance to act in a manner that was incompatible with the government's policy. After lengthy deliberation, Hakibbutz Hameuchad yielded to the settlers' pressures and took them into its fold, emphasizing in its resolution "the urgent need to precipitate settlements in the areas."[63]

The affiliation of some of its prominent members with the Land of Israel Movement (LIM) was even more problematic for the kibbutz. Joining the LIM made these members associates of some of the kibbutz's bitter enemies in right-wing parties. The public identification of the kibbutz's founder, Yitzhak Tabenkin, with the LIM was especially embarrassing. Tabenkin justified his shocking act by blaming the exigencies of the day. "The integrity of the land is a question of life and survival. Shouldn't we sit with those who do not fully identify with us?"[64] The urgency sensed by its indisputable leader did not convince the movement's secretariat. The ensuing discussion highlighted the acutely awkward situation confronting the kibbutz in the wake of the Six-Day War. On the one hand, there was mounting impatience among members at the accumulating obstacles to decisive state action in the territories. On the other, the kibbutz was vexed at its own shortcomings regarding

settlement in the territories. These tensions generated deep frustrations. The kibbutz could neither take disciplinary measures against its own founders nor overlook the reasons for their unusual act. The kibbutz had experienced a bitter split in the early 1950's. To prevent a repetition of this situation, the leaders decided to ignore the issue. They dropped it from their agenda.

The elections to the 7th Knesset narrowed the rift within Hakibbutz Hameuchad by underscoring the unbridgeable gulf between the kibbutz and the political right. The greatest threat was perceived to emanate from Rafi rather than Gahal.[65] Intraparty relations deteriorated to such an extent that Achdut Haavoda contemplated withdrawal. The kibbutz movement, however, was still divided between the moderates, led by Allon, and the militants. The moderates were willing to follow the government's decision; the militants demanded unconditional settlement in Eretz Israel. A rift was averted by a compromise. The kibbutz passed a hard-line resolution calling on the LP to settle in all the territories and sent its warmest greetings to the settlers in Hebron.[66] At the same time, the kibbutz refrained from taking any unauthorized actions and bound itself to the party line. Also, Hakibbutz Hameuchad members of the LIM started to ease away from the movement. The kibbutz withdrew from the LIM after Gahal left the coalition.[67] From then on the kibbutz's role as an intraparty pressure group declined significantly. The Rafah issue temporarily invigorated the controversy within the kibbutz; many of its members denounced the forcible eviction of bedouins. Achdut Haavoda was also markedly reluctant to join the activists of Hakibbutz Haartzi (Mapam), who adamantly opposed not only the strategies but the basic principle of settling in the Rafah region. The Rafah affair was a storm in a tea cup that subsided shortly after it burst. In 1973 Hakibbutz Hameuchad clearly followed the Allon-Galili lead, and its activity became supportive rather than constraining.

Developments in the wake of the October War renewed the ideological tensions within Hakibbutz Hameuchad. From a political perspective, the kibbutz movement did not suffer much, and it still enjoyed wide access to decisionmakers. The postwar purges in the LP excluded the Achdut Haavoda ministers. Galili kept his former positions, and Allon was promoted to foreign minister. Rabin's incumbency was also favorable to Achdut Haavoda. The new premier was an ex-commander of Palmach (the pre-state Jewish defense forces), and both his social milieu and his political socialization were close to the kibbutz. The lingering strife between Achdut Haavoda and Rafi ceased, at least temporarily, after the former's victory.[68] But the kibbutz could not rest

content and enjoy the fruits of its apparent victory. Two impending problems rippled the still waters of the kibbutz—the fate of its settlements in the Golan and the emergence of Gush Emunim.

The separation-of-forces agreements with Syria included provisions for withdrawal from a small strip of territory in the Golan. The kibbutz resolutely objected to such a move, fearing it might be a precedent for other concessions. The problem was not only ideological. The kibbutz was also under strong pressure from its Golan members, who were not content to act within their own movement but formed an action committee with settlers from other parts of the territories. The kibbutz yielded to the pressure by adopting a resolution that both upheld official policy and catered to the needs of the settlers. "Hakibbutz Hameuchad supports the Israeli government's efforts to achieve a separation-of-forces agreement on the Syrian front. At the same time it demands that the government will base this agreement on non-withdrawal from the Golan, which is an inseparable part of the state of Israel."[69] The kibbutz did not retreat from this position until the Golan was annexed to Israel. Its members played a leading role in organizing the lobby of the Golan Settlement Committee (see Chapter 4). The kibbutz's Knesset members also pressured the government to extend Israeli sovereignty over the area. There was a unanimous agreement on the strategic importance of the Golan and the necessity for Israel to retain it permanently. This was one of the rare instances in which Hakibbutz Hameuchad was extremely effective in constraining the LP's leadership and influencing its decisions.

The kibbutz utilized its power on the Golan issue because its members agreed on the matter. The LP's platform to the 10th Knesset in 1981 included a provision proclaiming that "the settlement set up on the Golan would be under Israeli sovereignty, an inseparable part of Israel, a surety for security and peace." This provision, which represented a hardening of the LP's posture, was included primarily as a result of kibbutz pressure. In fact, the party became increasingly dependent on the kibbutz's organizational resources. The movement had another opportunity to display its power at the time of the signing of the interim agreements with Egypt. These agreements, which were fully supported by the kibbutz, ignited wide-scale resistance and violent street demonstrations instigated by the Likud and Gush Emunim. The only group that could counter this street opposition was the kibbutz, which summoned a mass rally in support of the agreements. Not all members of the secretariat were content with this form of action, claiming that street demonstrations in large cities were not compatible with the movement's

goals, style, and values. But even the skeptics admitted that "the only organized force in the country is the kibbutz movement." The support given by the kibbutz to the government, that is, the Labor Party, revealed the kibbutz's abundant resources; its disciplined members responded en masse to their leaders' call.[70]

The kibbutz's attitude to settlement in Judea and Samaria and to the leading actors in this drama—Gush Emunim—was more ambiguous. The first kibbutz council convened after the October War reflected the inescapable dilemma embodied in the term "territorial compromise" endorsed by the party. There was agreement on the importance of settlements, but there was a deep rift over future political arrangements. In the interest of unity, the council avoided voting on the "territorial compromise" and devised a formula that supported the "peace efforts of the government and the assurance of a Jewish majority in the state of Israel."[71] The resolution, by its vagueness, put the kibbutz on the moderate side of the fence. In practice, the kibbutz shied away from the formula of Greater Israel as a feasible political objective (although it still endorsed it as a guiding principle).

The 1974 resolution exacerbated the tensions between the kibbutz and Gush Emunim. The kibbutz was forced to face the new reality: pioneering activities conducted and even monopolized by outsiders. The kibbutz movement vacillated between its natural sympathy for those who "conquer the land," and its partisan loyalty. Frustration was inevitable once Gush Emunim challenged the kibbutz's leading role as the pacesetter for pioneering settlement on the land. Galili expressed the laborites' ambivalence well when he described Gush Emunim as bearing "a holy fire and an idolatrous fire."[72] "Holiness" emanated from Gush Emunim's devotion to settling in Eretz Israel, an activity that touched the most sensitive chords in kibbutz members. "Idolatry" was an obvious reference to the illegal aspects of Gush activities, which led to a kibbutz resolution that "demonstrative settlement constitutes a serious provocation to the foundations of Israeli society and its democratic regime."[73]

Despite this admonition, the kibbutz was reluctant to advise the government to use drastic measures against the settlers at Kadum.[74] Because of this, the kibbutz failed to cope effectively with the expanding power of Gush Emunim. It adhered more and more to the LP's policies. It reiterated its support for the Allon Plan by endorsing a new scheme known as the "Eastern Avenue." This plan was grounded in Allon's principles, including Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley.[75] On June 18, 1976 the kibbutz went even further. It proposed a resolution declar-

ing that for the sake of securing peace within defensible borders, Israel was ready to negotiate with each of its neighboring states and to make territorial concessions.[76] This resolution, which was subsequently approved by the LP, marked the end of the constraints put on governmental decisions by Hakibbutz Hameuchad. It resumed its pressures regarding the Golan only after the LP had become the opposition party to the Likud government.

The Circle for Greater Israel

After they had decided not to cooperate with non-Labor party devotees of Eretz Israel, the Laborites in the LIM tried to convince their own party members to join a new faction—the Circle for Greater Israel.[77] The initiators of this group belonged to various party factions, including Mapam, but an overwhelming majority were Hakibbutz Hameuchad members. The faction's founders appealed to the general membership of the Labor Party in an attempt to cut across the traditional factional lines. But the Circle for Greater Israel remained largely identified with the kibbutz movement. One of its first goals was to eschew the kibbutz's reputation for recalcitrant activity and manifest party loyalty. The faction's leaders took pains to explain that "we organize within the party . . . not as an opposition but to support all those who, like us, deem determining facts of settlement to be indispensable."

The faction was not only concerned with settlements. It its platform presented to the LP's convention it laid down three hawkish principles: historical rights of Jews to the land; unrestricted settlement in all territories; and no retreat from land under any circumstances. The faction's main activity was carried out in the corridors of the party's convention. Because it had notable figures like Tabenkin and Rachel Yanait, the widow of Israel's second president, among its members, the faction had no access problem. Its own members have testified that their demands received adequate responses.[78] But the faction's spokesmen stressed that they did not intend to undermine the government's authority. They refrained from opposing the party and were content to simply let their voices be heard. In fact, the faction could do little more than this; the government's own hawkish attitude rendered its activity superfluous, and also, the alliance between Achdut Haavoda and members of other factions did not work out well.[79] Hakibbutz Hameuchad members preferred to confine their oppositionary activity to their own movement, and the Circle for Greater Israel gradually died out without further impact.

Other Hawkish Factions

Three additional factions operated in the LP during its term of office. Etgar, which was approved by the party's bureau on August 24, 1972, was officially launched with the blessing of Premier Meir. The faction included senior executives in public and private enterprises, most of whom were former high-ranking army officers. Its formation was an attempt to counteract an alleged rising dovish tide in the party and it also marked a growing involvement in political affairs by reserve officers. Etgar called for an effort to establish settlements in the authorized zones.[80] Its recommendations were presented to the national party forums but, unsurprisingly, they made no impression. Etgar was a supportive faction; it adhered totally to the line advocated by the party leaders.

In the wake of the October War, the members of the Circle for Greater Israel who did not belong to Achdut Haavoda formed Ben-Gurion's Circle. The founding of this faction was triggered by ideological principles. The founders set themselves the task of reviving the party's nationalistic spirit, which had been considerably dampened by the blunders of war. Personal considerations were also involved, because the faction unofficially endorsed Peres' leadership.[81] For two years Ben-Gurion's Circle just had a few members who operated only in Jerusalem. The faction made headlines when its members joined the squatters in Maaleh Edumim. Its purported goal "to unite all those in the party who adhere to an activist state," however, was never realized.[82] In 1974 the LP was not ready for such unity. It was not until 1976 that Ben-Gurion's Circle expanded on a national basis, carrying the hawks' banner in the party. But at the same time it lost much of its impetus, which had never been particularly strong.

The Ein Vered Circle had a much stronger impact. Ein Vered was the phoenix that rose from the ashes of Hakibbutz Hameuchad's waning militancy. Gush Emunim especially fascinated kibbutz members in Ein Harod, the cradle of the kibbutz, who had become exasperated with the staidness of their own movement.[83] This fascination was turned into action when kibbutz members joined the Gush Emunim squatters in Sebastia. The group expanded by including moshavim members, and it became institutionalized when it convened its first public meeting on May 6, 1976 in Moshav Ein Vered. The meeting, which was attended by several thousand people, startled the LP's leaders. Ein Vered operated as a quasi-faction within the LP, although it was never approved by the party's institutions. Its members played a leading role in mediating be-

tween the Gush and the government. The activists of Ein Vered enjoyed wide access to the LP's apex, and they utilized their unique position to convey Gush Emunim's demands to the party leaders.

Apart from access, however, Ein Vered did not have many resources. Because it was not registered as a formal faction, it did not receive funding. The organizational resources at the faction's disposal, which consisted of one salaried employee and a vehicle, were solicited from private resources. But the impact of Ein Vered extended far beyond its organizational strength. The group's influence was perceptible in two ways. First, it acted as a link between the LP's traditional pioneer movement and the more modern Gush Emunim movement. Ein Vered members did not share the ambivalence of their comrades in Hakibbutz Hameuchad; they were unashamedly committed to the ideology and actions of the Gush. At the same time, however, they maintained full loyalty to the Labor movement. Therefore, their rights as loyal members could not be abrogated. The name Tabenkin was still legendary (and not only in the kibbutz). By utilizing their settlement experience and resources like equipment and transportation, Ein Vered members enriched the enthusiasm of inexperienced squatters with the know-how of veteran settlers. Moreover, the function of Ein Vered was not confined to the technical aspect of settlement. It also legitimized the idea of Gush Emunim and, in so doing, contributed to the downfall of Labor. When the Likud ascended to power, Ein Vered withered away. Some Eretz Israel zealots left the LP and joined Hatehiya. Others returned to their party and gradually drifted away from the public political arena. Begin's premiership barred Laborites from easy access to power, and membership in Gush Emunim gave them no additional advantage.

Between 1967 and 1973 only one faction was organized to promote dovish policies in the LP. The Circle for the Deliberation of Foreign and Security Affairs emerged at the end of 1970 at the same time as the formation of the Circle for Greater Israel. It was approved by the LP's bureau on October 8, 1970. The faction's cumbersome title did not reveal its goal, which was to promote the ideas spelled out in Eliav's *New Targets*. Like its hawkish counterpart, the faction emphasized its loyalty to the party and dissociated itself from the extraparty, anti-Zionist, leftist fringe groups. Its composition of young intellectuals—including faculty members of Tel Aviv University, journalists, and the editor of the party's periodical, *Ott*—distinguished it from the Circle for Greater Israel. Although access was assured, impact was not. The dovish mood was unacceptable to the Labor Party between 1970 and 1973, and the faction's members were gradually removed from positions of power.[84]

In the aftermath of the 1973 war, Israelis were awash in a tide of self-recrimination and regret. The climate was right for dovish inputs. The Circle for the Deliberation of Foreign and Security Affairs was still the only dovish faction. It was led by Eliav after he was ousted from his position as general-secretary. The faction increased its organizational activity and presented the party with a comprehensive peace program—proposing an Israeli withdrawal from almost all of the territories in exchange for the Arab states' recognition of Israel and their acceptance of minor border adjustments. The circle's influence rose because of its contribution to the 1973 electoral campaign. It also played a dominant role in organizing protests against the war leadership. The circle staged a demonstration outside the LP's headquarters, demanding the formulation of a peace plan based on "political realism" and the replacement of the party's wartime leaders. The faction declared that if its appeals went unheeded, it would urge the electorate not to vote for the party.

When Rabin replaced Meir as premier in April 1974, conditions were more favorable for dovish policies. At the end of 1974, however, the circle withdrew its support from Rabin—in response to statements that in effect, slammed the door on a dialogue with the Palestinians. The circle's influence was also limited by its obvious lack of internal cohesion. The rift between those advocating "constructive opposition" and those drifting to extreme attitudes widened. Eliav's resignation from the LP in May 1975 terminated the circle's activity. Many of its members, including Eliav, continued to work in other political organizations.

Another dovish input came from the Young Guard, an organization of younger party members who had originally banded together for purposes other than promoting peace. The territorial issue, however, was one of their main concerns. The Young Guard was highly organized—with national institutions, several branches, and a mass membership. It was composed of the party's younger generation, many of whom were highly educated and politically skilled. The faction also displayed remarkable cohesion. It was reported to be unanimous in its rejection of the Greater Israel option, and it astounded the party when it adopted a view implicitly acknowledging the existence of a Palestinian nation. Although the term "Palestinian" was omitted from the final version, the resolution recognized "the rights of two nations in historical Eretz Israel." This statement infuriated Golda Meir, who declined to participate in the faction's center and severed her relationship with its members. These measures were not very effective because the group had been

accorded formal representation in the party's institutions.[85] The Young Guards' voices were not silenced, but they remained a small minority.

If impact were measured on the basis of holding the party leaders' attention, *Ott*, the LP's periodical, would score extremely high. *Ott* repeatedly published articles criticizing the government's activities and policies. The editorial on April 27, 1972, which dealt with the expulsion of the bedouins from the Rafah Salient, was especially sharp. *Ott*'s recalcitrant attitude was often discussed in the LP's bureau. The bureau exhorted *Ott*'s editor, David Shaham, to stick to the party line. When efforts to discipline Shaham proved futile, the periodical was terminated and its editor dismissed (on October 31, 1974).

The discussion of the dovish input cannot be concluded without reference to Mapam, the junior member in the Labor Alignment. In the pre-state era Mapam had its own version of Greater Israel, which endorsed a binational state within the boundaries of Palestine. Mapam's objection to partitioning Palestine resulted from a desire to share the territory with the Arabs—not from a desire to assert exclusive Jewish sovereignty over ancient biblical sites. When the binational idea subsided, Mapam turned into a dovish party. Mapam was the only coalition party to articulate a peace plan in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The essence of the plan involved the demilitarization of Sinai and the Golan Heights and an agreement with Jordan allowing for the return of most of the West Bank with minor border modifications. Mapam's program also included some less moderate provisons. The party insisted that a united Jerusalem be Israel's capital and that Gaza be retained by Israel in perpetuity.

Despite this unequivocal posture, Mapam was riven by differences between its more hawkish members, who tilted toward the LP's policies, and its doves, who insisted on territorial concessions. The Alignment's decision to settle the Rafah Salient highlighted these differences. At Mapam's 6th convention in December 1972, a resolution was passed by a slim majority of 304 to 266 proclaiming that "under no circumstances will the Gaza Strip be returned to Egypt." Mapam also fostered demilitarization and the return of the West Bank to "the neighboring Arab state" after border modifications essential to Israel's security were agreed upon.[86] This phrasing did not deviate much from the LP's policies. Mapam pulled many dovish strings and resisted all proposals, such as those made by Dayan, to harden Israel's attitude toward the territories. In 1973 it threatened to pull out of the Alignment if Dayan's demands were accommodated. But it failed to tip the scales, and its leaders remained outside the inner circle of LP decisionmakers.

Labor: The Build-up of Influence

Leaders and factions alike attempted to stamp their seal on the party's decisions. The arenas for confrontation were the party forums, whose deliberations both reflected and determined intraparty power relations. There was much controversy, and the top leaders had irreconcilable goals: they wanted to tame the dissidents and secure their support and, at the same time, they wanted to impose their own policies. To maneuver between the competing leaders and opinions was not an easy task. Only the judicious use of carrots and sticks and the exercise of authoritative leadership deferred a party split and enabled the leaders to pursue their course virtually unobstructed. Concentrating on the highlights of intraparty divisions serves to expose the power play and disclose the pattern of interaction between the party leaders and their contending factions.

The controversy within the LP first surfaced publicly when Dayan called for the integration of the territories. But the seeds of the controversy had first been planted in the wake of the war. In the summer of 1967 disagreement was already evident in the first party debate devoted to the territorial issue. There was, for instance, the formal line expressed by Meir: "Nothing presses us to decide on borders. There is one international factor that [has] never failed us—the Arabs themselves."[87] Meir's policies were more severe than Premier Eshkol's, who acknowledged that territories were like "a lily with thorns."[88] Meir was less imaginative. "In my view it is very distressing, very strange—the questioning of our moral validity in holding the territories. How can a nation, after such a victory, be so confused the next day?"[89] This "confusion" was dispelled when it became evident that the hawkish mood, in the form of Dayan's opinion, was growing stronger.

Dayan had influence as minister of defense, but his influence was heightened because of his unique position in both the party and the national arena. Dayan rose to office despite Eshkol's objections. Eshkol, who by 1968 was an ailing elderly statesman, tried to reduce Dayan's public stature and took other measures to weaken the defense minister's influence.[90] Chief among those measures was the merger of the Labor parties—Mapai, Achdut Haavoda, and Rafi—to constitute the Israeli LP in January 1968 and the alignment with Mapam signed toward the end of that year. It was hoped that, within the Alignment, Rafi's influence would be tamed. At the same time, Eshkol appointed Allon deputy premier (and minister of immigrant absorption), a move that indicated that

Allon was meant to be Eshkol's successor. Although Rafi was part of the LP, it nevertheless challenged the party leadership. Before the merger took place, Dayan stated that he would support the move "in order that Eshkol will not be premier, that we will not continue the same economic policy and with the same finance minister [Zeev Scherf]."[91]

None of the measures taken against Dayan succeeded in reducing his clout. When Meir assumed office Dayan's star shone even brighter, and his two opponents, Sapir and Eliav, could not diminish his power. Sapir was noted for his unconditional personal loyalty to Meir and his unwillingness to confront her on policy issues outside his ministerial responsibilities. Eliav was less devoted to the premier; she disenfranchised him of all deliberations concerning war and peace.[92] But it was not only the favorable attitude of the party's leader that enhanced Dayan's power. The elections to the 7th Knesset provided him an opportunity to improve his position. In the Histadrut elections, which took place shortly before the Knesset elections, the Alignment lost 12 percent of its previous support in the 1965 elections. Labor leaders could not ignore these results as they prepared for another campaign in which Dayan, supported by Rafi, was a major electoral asset.[93] Furthermore, Dayan had political alternatives unavailable to other Labor leaders. To begin with, there was the State List, which regarded Dayan as its leader even though he was a member of another party, and which secured four seats in 1965. Second, there was Gahal, whose policies differed little from Dayan's. In a closed party forum Dayan brought attention to these alternatives by threatening to quit the party.[94]

Armed with these bases of influence, Dayan tried to have the Alignment adopt a position on the territorial policy that was more in line with his views. He insisted that his formula for "strategic" borders—based on the Jordan River as a security border and retention of the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and Sharm el-Sheikh—be adopted. The LP was caught in a dilemma, because it could neither endorse this position without alienating other factions nor reject it for fear of Dayan's threat to bolt. The compromise was the "oral law," an unwritten understanding outlining the party's decisions but not incorporated in its platform. Whereas the platform remained vauge,[95] the oral doctrine was specific and reflected Dayan's demands—delineation of the Jordan River as Israel's security border and Israeli control of the areas specified by him. Dayan consequently stated that since his proposals on national security had been adopted, he could run with the LP.[96]

Dissent lingered in the LP. It was 1972 before mounting pressures forced the party to face up to its differences. Lengthy deliberations

amounting to eight sessions of the secretariat (180 hours) were formally devoted to Israel's relationship with the Arab population, but the more critical issue of the future disposition of the territories was avoided. The party continued to argue that the time for such a discussion was not appropriate. In the words of the general-secretary, "We are obliged to deliberate and formulate our policy in the territories beyond the controversies over exact strategic security borders that in my view may not be determined before we enter significant negotiations with the Arab states."[97]

The secretariat sessions spotlighted the gulf between Sapir, Eban, and Allon on the one side and Meir, Galili, and Dayan on the other. The dovish mood became stronger, but Meir steadfastly stuck to her decision not to take sides, reflecting her unwillingness "to play chess with ourselves." Meir rarely expressed her personal views in public, choosing instead to state the official policy.[98] At Labor's secretariat meeting on April 12, 1973 she openly supported Dayan. She shared his concern about Israel's erosion of faith in the righteousness of its cause and clung to her deeply inculcated attitudes.

But the rift in the party could not be ignored. There were powerful figures on either side of the fence, and Allon was sitting on it. Once again, the solution was not to decide. No resolutions were presented, and there was no formal summing up of the debate. Decisions could not be put off, however, because the LP had to formulate its platform for the 8th Knesset elections. The focal issue was Dayan's proposal to build a deep-water port at Yamit and make land beyond the Green Line available for purchase by private citizens. Once again, Dayan threatened to withdraw unless his demands were met.[99] He put the issue of the territories before the party and called for a clear-cut decision on them as a condition of assuring his participation in the electoral campaign. Once again, the LP yielded to Dayan's demands, fearing that if it did not Rafi might defect to the opposition and join the fledgling Likud.

To avert this danger, in August 1973 the party adopted a formula—dubbed the Galili Document—as part of its election platform. This document satisifed most (though not all) of Dayan's demands. The LP committed itself to accelerated settlement in accordance with the guidelines set out in the oral law. Businessmen who invested in settlements would be granted tax exemptions. The proposal for a port in Yamit would be studied. The most dramatic change of policy concerned land sales in the territories. As a general rule, Israel's Land Authority was the only body empowered to acquire land beyond the Green Line; the Galili Document

opened up the territories to private enterprise. Although an elaborate provision restricting a private citizen's right to acquire land was included, the terms of this document marked a radical change in the LP's policy on the territories.[100]

The Galili Document was approved by an overwhelming majority of the LP's secretariat. Even Sapir moved slowly but unmistakably in Dayan's direction, thereby proving his loyalty to Meir and his desire for party unity.[101] Only Eliav raised serious objections. He was dissatisfied with his faction's meager influence, so he secured the signatures of some 10,000 supporters outside the party. Eliav fiercely attacked the formula, which he accused of being "born to the crack of the whip of threats" (a reference to the compelling influence of Meir, Dayan, and Galili).[102] He made no headway in the party, however; none of the 78 secretariat members present voted against the Galili Document.[103] Eliav claimed that the document stood "against all that I understand to be the values of the Labor movement." But other critics insisted that the document's only novelty was its written form; otherwise, it simply upheld the Allon Plan and gave it concrete objectives.[104] Allon himself did not concur with this opinion. He pointed out later that the document had been designed to rescue the party from another radical scheme that Dayan had attempted to force it to accept.[105]

The Galili Document was short-lived. The October War broke out a few weeks after its approval, forcing the party to come to grips with a new reality and respond to a new mood. It was vital to quickly prepare a program around which the party could unite for the postwar elections. The Galili Document was therefore scrapped and replaced by a scheme known as the Fourteen Principles. Both the theme and the key of the Fourteen Principles were different from those of the document. The search for peace appeared to be the party's primary concern; there was only perfunctory reference to settlements, which would be "continued in keeping with cabinet decisions, giving priority to security considerations." The principles further elaborated Israel's willingness to negotiate territorial concessions. None of the operational clauses of the Galili Document were reiterated. The party had not annulled its previous decisions, but it did not incorporate them into its new platform. Pressures were exerted from all directions. Dayan again threatened to cut his links with the party, saying that the party might adopt basic policies that he would be unable to support. Eliav said that "it is up to the party to decide the fate of my membership."[106] The compromise was typical. The LP approved the Fourteen Principles as if the Galili Document did not exist. It never bothered to inform its members or the public that the

Galili era was over and the principles embodied in his document were dead.

The repercussions of the October War were not confined to changes in the wording of documents. The government and coalition parties were flooded with oral and written demands to oust the war leadership. The protestors reportedly received encouragement from inside the LP's establishment. Some critics were genuinely confused and grief-stricken; others used the opportunity to settle old scores. Camps and factions fought bitterly against one another, but all encountered mounting obstacles. Achdut Haavoda struggled to keep its ranks united in the face of increasing pressures from its Golan settlers; Rafi's position weakened when Dayan was discredited; Mapai hoped that confidence in Meir's leadership would return. As the party deliberations vividly disclose, these problems did not mitigate the drive for influence.

There was acute danger of a split, which the party could ill afford. Dayan was especially menacing; he seemed more resolute than ever to remain outside the government. On March 9, 1974 Meir submitted her resignation; it was cancelled one day later in response to bold solicitations from the LP center. Dayan also rescinded his decision not to join the cabinet after receiving an intelligence report that Syria had decided to resume the war immediately. A short time later, however, unable to face the discrediting of her own party, Meir submitted her final resignation. Dayan followed suit and temporarily left the political arena. In his autobiography, he recalled the circumstances of this departure. "I did not have a group of adherents on whom I could rely to support me in the internal struggle. From the partisan perspective I was an electoral asset for attracting votes, I did not have power among those who formulated the choice from within. The party was not my cozy home and I was not its pampered son."[107] It is evident that Rafi did not provide Dayan sufficient support to withstand the rising tide against his leadership.

Purportedly, Rabin was appointed in Meir's place to pacify the party and restore its authority. But it did not take long to detect that although the new premier might be a leader of his country, he was not in command of his party. The events at Kadum accentuated the deepening rift in the government and the party's inability to lessen the leadership rivalry between Rabin and his challenger, Peres. The LP was caught in one of its most severe crises. Its general-secretary, Meir Zarmi, publicly acknowledged that "there are too many power bases in the party" and that leaders were taking decisions without consulting the party.[108] The party was not involving itself in the major events of the time. For ex-

ample, the ending of the talks with Kissinger was never discussed in the party's caucus, and cabinet ministers were faced with a fait accompli in the Sebastia affair. Foreign Minister Allon was not even consulted before Israel's air force bombed a PLO terrorist base in Lebanon.[109] Party members presented a demand, which was published in the press, to convene a meeting of the Alignment ministers and members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to formulate the party's policy.[110] These events triggered growing dissatisfaction with the premier's seemingly deliberate and systematic role in policymaking.

Personal as well as political difficulties were at the root of the crisis. Rabin had no party experience and no experience in manipulating the party machinery. It was anticipated that his "freshness" would itself bring about a new era. These hopes came to naught. Rabin failed to attract the support of central figures in the party, and he instituted close relationships with controversial nonparty people like Ariel Sharon, who became his personal aide. More troubling to some was his vacillation in the Kadum affair. Despite Rabin's unequivocal denunciation of Gush Emunim, the squatters were not removed from Kadum for a full eight months. Party members became very impatient with the leader's foot-dragging. Allon's dramatic outburst in the Labor Knesset caucus, "I have been silent for too long," made the headlines.[111] One of the repercussions of this outburst was renewed pressure to hold a political debate on the Palestinian question. Rabin did not object, but attempted to stall—fearing that such a debate would inevitably lay bare the deep differences in the party. The Zarmy resignation on February 24, 1976 illustrated that the party's central policymaking organs were virtually paralyzed.

These difficulties did not override the need to prepare for the approaching 1977 elections. Despite the total absence of dovish factional activity, there were important dovish members in the elite, particularly Yosi Sarid. The party moved toward greater moderation. The LP softened its platform, pledging specific territorial concessions on all fronts (including the West Bank). It clearly indicated that Israel would be ready to make territorial compromises with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—subject to the principle of "defensible borders." Dayan and Meir tried to block the shift by tabling amendments, but failed. Even Galili displayed a change of mood, saying that "Israel's readiness for peace, even at the expense of a territorial compromise with Jordan in Judea and Samaria, should be expressed and should be a basis for educating [people] so that nobody outside or inside, willingly or unwillingly, would be able to blur it."[112] Dayan again voiced his habitual threat to withdraw. He finally

agreed to run with the LP (only to defect after the elections and join the Likud's cabinet).

The victory of the dovish posture did not prevent the downfall of the Labor government, and may have caused it. The LP was pushed out of the power arena. The party had scarcely adjusted to the new circumstances when it had to face a new rift caused by the peace process. The LP was in an unenviable position, because it could hardly oppose the party that advocated territorial concessions in exchange for peace when this was precisely its own policy.[113] The settlements, which had been built with Labor's support, were now threatened with extinction. The discussion of the fate of the settlements rekindled the latent antagonism between doves and hawks. Achdut Haavoda was again in the forefront in demanding a Knesset motion opposing the peace contract. A small group of intellectuals known as Circle 77 played down the importance of the settlements, knowing the high price that would have to be paid if they were not removed.[114] Although the LP was no longer the ruling party, its internal divisions were relevant to the official policy. As already noted, the Camp David Accords could not have been approved in the Knesset without the support of those Laborites for whom the settlements were less significant than the chance for peace.

Other Parties

In 1977 the Likud replaced the LP as the party in control of the coalition government. Herut was the leading party in the Likud. It is therefore important to uncover this party's internal processes that impinged on the government's capabilities to enact and implement policies. Although Herut did not suffer from internal ideological fissions, Premier Begin nevertheless encountered opposition to his territorial policies. One source of objection was Dayan, who was not even a member of Herut. His objections to certain policies culminated in his resignation in October 1981, but until that time they were dealt with at governmental level. More significant was the constraint exerted by Ezer Weizman, a powerful minister of defense. Unlike Dayan, Weizman was a member of Herut. He had joined the party in 1967, at the end of his heroic military career. He was soon co-opted into the leadership, serving as a minister in Meir's unity government. Weizman had opposed Gahal's secession from the government in August 1970, but he remained active despite the futility of his objection.

Like his party counterparts, Weizman was a hawk—albeit a mod-

erate one. As he put it, "I did not deny the right of Jews to settle all over the land of Israel—but I said that right should be exercised in conformity with government policy and according to a fixed set of priorities." In fact, Weizman was not stubbornly devoted to Eretz Israel or impervious to all reason. "It was with great concern that I heard the extremist utterances of certain Likud leaders who—totally carried away by the no-less-extremist demands of Gush Emunim—spoke as if the West Bank was an uninhabited region. Their mystical zealotry greatly troubled me."[115] His attitude had political implications. Weizman accepted that Eretz Israel might be partitioned along lines that did not coincide with certain biblical boundaries. He accepted territorial concessions in principle, but he did not translate his convictions into an effective constraint—preferring to acquiesce in the declared policy. Although he presented an alternative to Sharon's settlement scheme, the difference between the two approaches was not sufficient to term it a constraint. Weizman, although at heart a dove, was loyal to the line upheld by the government in whose ranks he served. His resignation on May 26, 1980 was his most outspoken protest against the cabinet's territorial policy. Although Weizman was troubled by the stalemate in the autonomy talks, the main reason for his decision given in his resignation letter was the cut in the defense budget—not a denial of the principle of Greater Israel.[116]

Weizman's constraint was a mild one because of Herut's specific attributes. Until 1978 the party lacked any factional activity, and Begin's leadership was practically unchallenged. The introduction of the Egyptian peace plan, however, agitated the party's tranquil waters. The proposals for Israel's pullback from Sinai and autonomy in the West Bank provoked unheard-of opposition in Begin's party. The most forthright opponent was Geula Cohen (MK), a former member of the anti-British Jewish underground, Lehi. Cohen and another staunch supporter of Eretz Israel, Moshe Shamir, organized a faction called Banai (The Faithfuls to Eretz Israel), which challenged Begin's leadership and policies. The premier, however, had full command of Herut's institutions. His peace proposal was endorsed by a vote of 168 to 15 in the Central Committee.[117] A second attempt by Cohen to submit a resolution calling for the dropping of the peace plan was also overwhelmingly defeated.[118] As the peace process evolved, however, a new wave of opposition surged within Herut—or, more precisely, within its Knesset caucus. Twenty-three Likud MKs voted against or abstained from the Camp David Accords motion. Some of Begin's most faithful disciples were among his opponents: Cohen, Yitzhak Shamir, Moshe Arens, and Yigal Cohen Or-

gad. After Cohen withdrew from Herut on July 17, 1979, opposition to Begin within the party subsided.

The NRP's internal processes also affected the formulation of territorial policy. The NRP was a coalition partner in almost every government since the establishment of the state. Until 1969 it was a convenient partner, because foreign policy was not a high priority. It usually concentrated its demands on religious matters that were relatively easy to accommodate. The Six-Day War changed this pattern; the party became a vociferous advocate of territorial policy as a result of its own internal developments.

Organizationally, the NRP consisted of a number of officially recognized factions centered around leaders or based on social groups. One of the factions consisted of the party's younger members. The Young Faction endorsed militant foreign policy positions. At the NRP's third convention in 1969, the battle lines between the Young Faction and the party were drawn. The faction demanded that the NRP's platform express a categorical identification with Greater Israel and a commitment to settle in the territories. In contrast, the party's leaders followed the coalition policy of preferring more subtle pronouncements. Young Faction members rested their case on two grounds. First, they believed that a Greater Israel posture would attract secular voters swept up by the wave of nationalism. Second, this militant posture could be seen as congruent with religious tenets—the fulfillment of a divine command to settle in the promised land. The faction was evidently persuasive, because the NRP subsequently assumed a new, hawkish spirit. The convention committed the party to continue settlement in urban and rural areas of the "liberated" territories. The historical and religious rights of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel were reaffirmed. Both in content and style, the NRP retreated from its traditionally moderate, vague policies and became an active supporter of the hawkish option.

The reasons for the effectiveness of the Young Faction are numerous. The group was cohesive; it enjoyed support beyong the party's traditional constituency; and it was extremely competent in the art of politics. The faction's spokesmen played on the party's sensitive nerves by citing religious sources for their policies that the party's leaders could scarcely repudiate.[119] Although the NRP remained a relatively small party (with ten to fourteen MKs) its pivotal role in the coalition enabled it to have a marked impact on territorial policy. Meir's need to secure the NRP's support led her to pledge to call general elections before agreeing to withdraw from the West Bank. Rabin repeated this pledge. The NRP played a major role in inducing the government to let Gush

Emunim settlers remain in Kadum. Finally, the NRP wielded disproportionate influence on the Likud government by its threat to join forces with Herut's militant faction.

Summary

Factionalism was a source of both support and constraint to party leaderships. The political factions exerted influence via three main mechanisms: organization, penetration, and ideological persuasion. Achdut Haavoda left its imprint on territorial policy by virtue of its abundant organizational resources. Both the expansion of settlements and the areas designated for them were in line with the faction's recommendations. Achdut Haavoda's ability to act independently of the party bolstered its political impact. The fact that the LP, in effect, followed the Allon Plan is one important indicator of the faction's influence.

The other important LP faction, Rafi, operated mainly through penetration. Rafi's main power resource was its representation in the party's core. Although Achdut Haavoda was also substantially represented in the party's institutions, the power of Rafi's delegates extended beyond the confines of their faction (and perhaps even of their party). Dayan and Peres wielded enormous influence over the party's leaders, and the support of their faction increased the effectiveness of their pressures.

Other factions, both hawkish and dovish, lacked viable organizational bases and had meager penetration of decisionmaking forums. A good example is Eliav's dovish faction. One could argue that the faction was not influential because it lacked resources. But it was the faction's own policies that deprived it of access to resources. The faction therefore had to resort to persuasion; it attempted to convince people of its aims with words. A similar strategy was adopted by the counterfaction of Greater Israel (even though its leaders were among the party elite).

Noticeable changes have occurred in the LP over time. The first period considered (1968–1973) was dominated by a cross-factional alliance of Meir, Dayan, and Galili—all of whom adhered to the party's platform. Although each faction had its own internal dissensions, interfactional rivalry was due more to personal than ideological animosities. The radical dovish and hawkish factions were accorded the right to speak, but they were not able to induce change in the party's fundamental attitudes. Up to the October War the party's policy was dedicated to the functional integration of the territories into Israel (Dayan) and

their settlement by Jewish installations (Allon and Dayan). Between 1974 and 1977 the party underwent a process of moderation of its territorial policy. The ideological controversy nearly subsided, but the LP was riven by the rivalry within its leadership. Although the ideological factions ceased to operate, Achdut Haavoda and Rafi engaged in a bitter struggle following the transfer of power from veteran leaders to their successors. The factional constraints, which tended to neutralize each other up to the time of the October War, were replaced in later periods by constraints caused by individual leaders. After 1973 action was impeded because the leaders themselves could not agree on what to do. The above analysis indicates that factions within the ruling political parties served more to uphold official policy than to constrain it.

FOUR

Interest Groups: Hawkish Constraints

The territories taken in the 1967 war soon became a focus for group activity. Only 60 days after the capture of the territories, the first organized group concerned about their future published its manifesto. In the next fifteen years groups of all varieties sprang up. Although none of these territorial groups endured the test of time or retained their initial structures or titles, their spirit and goals survived. Each group challenged government policy, presented an alternative, and tried to constrain government actions. No group was formed to support government policy—perhaps because the political parties were thought to be sufficient for this task. It did not seem worthwhile to muster and expend scarce resources on additional organizations. Sporadic attempts to initiate government support groups failed; it was only the desire to change official policies that inspired action. Doves and hawks both strove to influence governments, although their efforts were not equal in scope, pace, or intensity. Input—that is, the initiation of group activity—occurred on both sides of the political fence. Only a few groups, however, made a discernible impact. The relationship between input and group impact will be analyzed from three standpoints: first, in terms of available resources; second, in terms of the ability to penetrate spheres of decisionmaking; and third, in terms of the expansion of policies.

The Land of Israel Movement

The guns of the Six-Day War had scarcely cooled before a hawkish group—the Committee for Action to Retain the Territories—was set up. The group was initiated by Aharon Amir, a famous writer. Almost simultaneously, another movement—the Land of Israel Movement (LIM)—emerged. Between 1967 and 1973 the LIM was the dominant public hawkish group acting to constrain Israel's decisionmakers. Its accumulated resources, its strategies, and its access to the locus of power enabled the movement to play an important role in the formulation of territorial policy.

Organization

One of the LIM's best resources was the quality of its leaders. In her authoritative study of the Land of Israel Movement, Rael Isaac described its leadership in detail. The founders of the movement and their immediate followers were highly respected in Israeli society. The three leaders who set the stage for the movement's formation were Moshe Shamir, a well-known novelist; Tzvi Shiloah, an activist in Mapai (Rafi); and Nathan Alterman, a renowned poet. The 72 signatories of the movement's manifesto included many prominent members of the mainstream of Israeli society; there were 23 writers, 11 university professors, 9 high-ranking army commanders, 19 noted political leaders, and 9 successful businessmen. Among the signatories were Shmuel Yosef Agnon, the novelist; Rachel Yanait, the first Israeli Nobel laureate; Antek and Zvia Lubatkin, the leaders of the Warsaw ghetto uprising against the Nazis; and Haim Hazaz, one of Israel's leading writers.

The movement's leadership was conspicuous for its political heterogeneity. It accommodated members with backgrounds at diametrically opposite ends of the political spectrum. It included ultranationalists like Dr. Eldad-Sheib, a former leader of Lechi, the anti-British underground, and the Canaanites. Eldad had always been outside the political establishment, and he endorsed more extreme policies than those of the movement. In his publication *The Front* he called for the extension of Israel's borders from the Euphrates to the Nile and for the revival of Judaism.[1] Eldad's religious aspirations were shared by the orthodox signatories (mostly professors of Bar Ilan University and other religious institutions), who rejected the NRP's moderate stand in foreign policy

affairs.[2] The Canaanite members of the Committee for Action were originally anti-Zionist Jews whose basic goal was to cut the link between the state of Israel and the Jewish people elsewhere. In the Canaanites' perception, the expanded borders did not serve to accentuate the Jewish features of Israel but to attenuate them. LIM's founders also included two more nonreligious groups: members of Gahal, who were traditionally devotees of Eretz Israel, and members of the Labor movement. Almost two-thirds of the signatories of LIM's manifesto belonged to various wings of the Labor movement—including the left-wing Mapam party. There were members of Mapai, the core Labor party, but members belonging to the Rafi and Achdut Haavoda factions were more active. For Rafi members, joining the LIM was not a follow-the-leader activity. David Ben-Gurion, the founder of Rafi, openly adopted a dovish posture. He claimed that all the lands except Jerusalem should be given back to the Arabs in return for peace. Ben-Gurion actually declared that if he had to choose between the pre-1967 war boundaries and peace with the Arab states, or Greater Israel without peace, he would opt for the former.[3] It was Ben-Gurion's renunciation of the Greater Israel idea that provoked Tzvi Shiloah to look for a nonparty means of action (because his chances of effectively challenging Ben-Gurion inside his own faction were slight).[4] The LIM provided a forum for individuals to raise their voices in an organization that was entirely independent of their parties and factions.

The fact that the initiators of LIM were well-known respectable members of the political community had direct bearing on the financial resources available to the movement. Soliciting contributions was much easier after celebrities like Nathan Alterman and Moshe Shamir became LIM champions.[5] But the diverse backgrounds of LIM's leaders jeopardized the movement's cohesion. The first defectors were the Canaanites, who had not been invited to sign the manifesto and whose ideology could not be reconciled with the views of most other LIM leaders.[6] The Canaanites wanted to establish a political entity ("Greater Israel") as a state for Jews and Arabs—a Hebrew state rather than a Jewish national home. This idea was not shared by any other LIM leaders, who regarded the Arabs simply as an irritating presence that had somehow or other to be lived with. An organizational rift occurred when membership in both the Committee for Action to Retain the Territories and the LIM was declared to be incompatible. But since the Canaanites played a very minor role in the movement, their disappearance did not seriously crack its cohesion.

More significant was the rift that developed between the Laborites and members of Gahal. The relationship between Gahal and the Labor members who had joined forces to promote Greater Israel was never a love match.[7] The habitual personal animosities and traditional ideological differences between the two groups were too serious to be transcended by agreement on a single issue, important as it was. The Laborites were not all of one mind on Gahal either. Some Labor members could tolerate being bedfellows with the right wing; others (mainly from Achdut Haavoda and Hakibbutz Hameuchad) saw Gahal as the devil incarnate. The only common denominator was the commitment to establish Greater Israel.

Disagreements were not confined to ideology; they also intruded into the movement's activities. The right wingers demanded uncompromising action (especially after August 1970) against a government they opposed. Unwilling to confront their own government, the Laborite LIM members reluctantly rejected militant strategies and encouraged moderation. By the time of the 1969 elections, dissent within the LIM had escalated into a real political split. Some Laborite LIM members insisted on their right to speak out against the LP—or at least not to participate in the party's campaign.[8] A renowned Laborite, Eliezer Livneh, went so far as to urge LIM supporters to vote for parties other than the Alignment.[9] LIM activist Dr. Eldad-Sheib presented an electoral list to the elections to the 7th Knesset—The List for Eretz Israel. Although the list was not formally endorsed by the LIM, it also was not repudiated by it.[10]

A clear-sighted observer could see that the LIM was tilting in an anti-Labor direction. The Laborites in the LIM were thus left with an awkward choice; they had to opt either for the party or the LIM. Their first reaction was to form an internally disciplined faction within the movement.[11] When Gahal seceded from the government, however, the Laborites could no longer cooperate with an organization that included people in opposition to their own party. They quit the movement and, by doing so, weakened its cohesion.[12] Within days of this split, the Circle for Greater Israel was founded within the Labor Party itself. The secession of the Laborites (most of them from Achdut Haavoda) was a serious blow to the LIM. The action precipitated the end of the group as an extraparliamentary movement and prompted its organization as a political party in its own right.

The LIM's members were not unanimous about strategies. As noted by Louis Kriesberg, a social movement may choose from among three

strategies: coercion, reward, and persuasion.[13] From the LIM's perspective, coercion meant either putting direct pressure on the government by violent street action or implementing its beliefs by establishing settlements. Persuasion relied less on such actions and more on the dissemination of ideas. The movement was caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the members of Achdut Haavoda regarded themselves as the spearhead of activist Zionism. But on the other hand, they could not implement their vision within the LIM, which was criticized for its impotence and ineptitude. As one leader complained, "The response to our call was widespread but half-hearted. There was a wide consensus over our goals but it has not matured into actions. People came to our meetings but it never turned into a decisive force."[14] According to Achdut Haavoda members, the movement should demonstrate its decisiveness by actual settlement on the land.

By associating with the LIM, Achdut Haavoda members were exposing their disillusionment with their own movement's failure to implement what they considered the genuine objectives of Zionism. Their disappointment, however, was not eased by joining the LIM. Members of Hakibbutz Hameuchad were trapped between their devotion to the idea and practice of settlement and the obstacles to its implementation embedded in the newly formed LIM.[15] The factors that hindered Hakibbutz Hameuchad from establishing settlements were the same ones that deterred its members in the LIM from doing so: the nonavailability of resources and the inability to act against the authoritative policy. The allegiance of the LIM's Laborite members was primarily to their party. In the early stages of the movement (1967–1973) the LIM would take no decisive steps to harass, or even embarrass, the government.

The dual loyalties of the Laborites in the LIM were tested when a small group of youngsters did what the others only preached; they founded the nucleus of a settlement and squatted on a mountain near Nablus. The settlers issued a public statement that proclaimed:

> We are a group of youngsters which has organized for one purpose only: settlement. We are not partisans and we represent no political body, the idea of Greater Israel is the only one that guides and unites us; we believe that Nablus is just like Ramat Gan and we urge the public and government ministers to grant us full support.[16]

Although the congruity between the settler's goals and the LIM's policies could not have been greater, the movement responded coolly to the settlement. A note found in a personal archive even proposed that Ha-

kibbutz Hameuchad members resign from the LIM because of the settlement attempt. In an official document the movement rejected "intangible spectacular activities" and asked its followers not to initiate further settlement attempts that had slight prospects of success.[17] Furthermore, the movement claimed that responsibility and authority for settling the land was vested solely in the government. Accordingly, they urged that settlement not be undertaken by a few entrepreneurs, for only the government's initiative, drive, and resources could effectively accomplish the judaization of Judea and Samaria.

Criticism of the LIM by Achdut Haavoda members was inconsistent, however. They attacked LIM leaders for being "political" rather than activist—that is, for not practicing what they preached. But they also denounced the movement for being too involved in settlement activity—that is, for supporting initiatives that were antigovernmental in nature. Following the Laborites' lead, the LIM defined itself as a "moral force" rather than as a pressure group. The movement's leaders used their eloquence to disseminate their ideas, primarily through the press.[18] They did not stage mass demonstrations or convene rallies. They tried to persuade decisionmakers rather than to impose their views through pressure. At the insistence of the Laborites, the LIM did not address itself to the government as an antagonist, but rather as a rallying point. Yet these same Laborite members broke away from the movement because of its ineffectiveness, and primarily for its failure to produce large numbers of people for settlement in the territories.

The strategies adopted by the Land of Israel Movement had direct bearing on its institutional structure and its level of public support. Soon after its formation on November 13, 1967, the LIM's leadership devised an elaborate organizational structure. The senior body was the Executive, composed of fifteen members who formulated policy. A 60-member council and another council of activists composed of the movement's founders, latecomers, and local representatives were formed. Six committees were set up to deal with various aspects of the movement's activity. This organizational structure, however, failed to implement the LIM's initial purpose—the dissemination of the idea of Greater Israel. The two bodies were subsequently merged into an Executive of 21 members headed by a core leadership of 5 members.[19] The council of activists was open to all members. It mainly served as an audience for the movement's leaders, but it also allowed their followers to enjoy a feeling of participation.[20] The LIM's organizational resources dwindled as its initial cohesion loosened. Members ceased to queue on its doorstep and deinstitutionalization followed.

Penetration

The LIM was more successful at penetration than in its organization. It had representatives in the Knesset, access to decisionmakers, and legitimacy with the establishment. The LIM prided itself on having three members elected to the 7th Knesset: Isar Harel, Zvulun Hammer, and Yigael Huruvitz. It also had access to political parties through its leaders and could make its voice heard. A closer look at the LIM's relationships with political parties, however, reveals a marked ambiguity. In the first issue of the LIM's periodical, *Zot Haaretz*, the movement displayed an antipartisan spirit. Editor Yisrael Harel wrote,

> The Movement for Greater Israel introduced a blessed renovation into public life in Israel: the promoters of the united people and the united land gathered from all camps and parties. Any public movement that attracts people from such a wide spectrum of opinion demonstrates, in its essence, the lack of confidence of those gathered in their previous organizations. They thus chose to act in a public movement whose basis is the nation as a whole and not the partisan establishment.[21]

The lack of confidence between the LIM and the parties was mutual. We have already discussed Achdut Haavoda's ambivalent attitude toward the LIM. The religious members of the government also showed little enthusiasm for the movement. On October 24, 1968 they tried to cancel a protest demonstration held by movement supporters at Bar Ilan University.[22] Only after the NRP's Young Faction effectively campaigned at the NRP's convention did the party appear to be more sympathetic to the movement. Gahal was reluctant to cooperate with the LIM because of its Labor bias. Although the LIM leaders' prestige gave the movement abundant access in the technical sense, their prestige did not derive from holding top positions in political parties. Therefore, their public reputation was not necessarily reflected in their power; they could reach top decisionmakers, but their influence over them was slight.

As the elections to the 7th Knesset approached, the LIM discarded its antipartisan attitude. The movement realized that it would fare better if partisan representatives could be united for wide-scale activity in the Knesset.[23] Effective opposition to perceived defeatist trends in the government (some ministers were willing to consider partial withdrawal under certain conditions) was judged to lie within the cabinet itself. Only hard-line ministers could prevent the government from making conciliatory gestures to Arab leaders.[24] The LIM had to decide which parties should be chosen as channels of influence. The choice was rather

limited. None of the Labor MKs publicly identified with the LIM, although many endorsed its aims.[25] Meir did not yield one inch of the territories, but her declarations in favor of territorial compromise in return for peace were fiercely denounced by the LIM. The NRP was more responsive to the movement, but the main protagonist of the idea of Greater Israel was Gahal (soon to become the Likud).[26]

The LIM's shift away from Labor and toward Gahal occurred in stages. The first step was taken by a few leaders who attempted to form a "Nonpartisan Committee to Prevent Retreat" in cooperation with Gahal. This committee was short-lived and unpopular. The LIM executive—including Laborites Shamir, Eliezer Livneh, Avraham Yaffe, and Haim Yahil—rejected it outright. The chasm separating Labor from its right-wing opponent was unbridgeable. Begin, Gahal's leader, was no more enthusiastic. Although he recognized the opportunity to construct a bridge to Labor, he was confronted by two insuperable obstacles. One was a possible veto by his political partners in the Liberal Party (at the time not a Greater Israel protagonist); the other was the probable inclusion of his erstwhile partner, Shmuel Tamir, in the new committee. Begin decided not to risk either eventuality.[27]

The alliance between Laborites in the LIM and Gahal materialized only after the Likud was founded. This new alignment gave the new list (the Labor Movement for Greater Israel) one realistic place on the Likud's list. The LIM gained one representative in the Knesset (Yaffe in the 8th Knesset; Shamir in the 9th)—thereby achieving access, representation, and legitimation. The price it paid was a decline in its efficacy as a nonpartisan movement. The LIM's career as a partisan group was not impressive. Once it became shackled to the Likud, it lost its access to other parties. Having a Knesset member gave it access to decision-making circles, but its close identification with Gahal blocked its access channels to the Labor government (one of its prime assets).

Expansion

The LIM was no more successful from an ideological perspective. The movement injected some new ideas into Israeli political thought. At the very least, it offered new outlets for ideas that were dormant. Four of the LIM's notions—its proposed elimination of the 1948 territorial partition; the prominence it accorded to Sinai; its recognition of the importance of geopolitical factors; and its relegation of peace to a lower political priority—were novel ones.

Denial of the legitimacy of the 1948 partition was the LIM's major

contribution to the ideological debate in post-1967 Israel. As noted by Gabriel Ben-Dor, the LIM sought to reverse the "clock of history."[28] Israel's founders were not primarily preoccupied with geographical considerations; they accepted partition as the only viable means of securing a homeland where Jews could dwell in safety. Territory was subordinated to people. For LIM leaders, however, partition was a disaster—not because it violated the rights of the former inhabitants, but because it impaired the integrity of the land itself (a concept to which they gave absolute priority). They wished to fuse state and land absolutely. The LIM's manifesto expressed its unequivocal objection to partition. "The whole of Eretz Israel is now in the hands of the Jewish people and just as we are not allowed to give up the state of Israel, so we are ordered to keep what we have received there from Eretz Israel. We are bound to be loyal to the entirety of our country . . . and no government in Israel is entitled to give up this country." The Greater Israel theme was not invented by the LIM, but the 1967 victory made it possible to implement the theme. Control of the territory became an end, not a means. Its partition, therefore, was considered obsolete.

The Sinai Desert has undoubted historical and religious significance for Jewry and Judaism. It can reasonably be argued that it was here that the nation was formed and that it made its covenant with God. During the period of wandering in Sinai after having been brought out of slavery in Egypt, the Israelites slowly relinquished their slave habits and were made ready for their encounter with God and the land allotted to them. Nevertheless, Sinai was never an integral part of Eretz Israel. The early Zionist idea to settle in El-Arish failed not only because Egypt was uncooperative, but also because the Zionists themselves did not feel strongly attracted to the place.[29] Not even the revisionist Zionists had their sights on Sinai, although they were adamant that all the territory included in the mandate to Great Britain before Trans-Jordan was separated should become the Jewish state. It was therefore somewhat surprising that the LIM accorded Sinai such great importance. The justification for their claim was that Sinai was not historically part of Egypt, but had only been tacked on to it by great-power agreements that ignored rightful sovereignty. LIM leaders insisted that the Sinai was "no man's land" to which Israel had a claim. Sinai's desirability, then, did not lie in its historical associations. "There have been many boundaries and all of them are historical."[30] It also did not lie in its natural resources, vital though they were. It lay, rather, in the strategic advantages the region had to offer in the regional geopolitical context.

According to the LIM's geopolitical concept, in the post-1967 era

Israel was no longer a small state subject to severe external constraints and unable to impose its will on world powers. LIM leaders argued that the acquisition of Sinai accorded a geographic logic to Israel's influence in the area, enabling it to determine regional and even world events. Sinai's importance as a geographical asset was reiterated in *Zot Haaretz* during the War of Attrition. "There is a validation of the assumption that occupying Suez not only provides a strategic advantage and a secure border but also gives us a political asset, perhaps the most vital one that emanated from the war. Israel has become the geopolitical center of the region. This is more important than a million gallons of oil and other natural resources.[31]

The vital importance the LIM attached to Sinai led to three conclusions. First, a state's geographical size (especially in the Middle East) is itself significant as a barrier to belligerent acts.[32] Second, since the Middle East contains a number of minorities, none of which has ever achieved a secure political position, the region ought to be divided according to its natural boundaries anchored in geography, history, and economics.[33] Third, the bloody conflicts of the Middle East could be terminated by setting up two geographic zones: a northern tier including Iraq and Syria, and a southern tier including Israel, Jordan, and Kuwait. Only this arrangement would render the area prosperous and stable.[34] The LIM's geopolitics was grounded neither in religious beliefs nor in historical memories. It was anchored in regional demographic and political conditions in which the movement thought Israel should continue to play a leading role—both because of its strategic position as a bridge between Asia and Africa and because of its putative technological and cultural superiority.[35]

The LIM's position on peace was also alien to Israeli political thinking. Admittedly, prior to 1967 not much thought had been given to the possible exchange of land for peace; it was inconceivable that territory would ever serve as a bargaining counter. In reality, if not in ideology, partition was no longer viewed as a stage of Zionism interrupted by military events, but as a durable situation. Both the boundaries and the absence of peace had become permanent conditions. The Six-Day War shattered the inviolability of the borders and invigorated hopes for conciliation. The idea of exchange was adopted as a central theme in Israel's policies. The LIM totally rejected this concept. Eliezer Livneh wrote, "Our firm goal in Eretz Israel is not a peace contract with any Arab government but the revival of Zion, the ingathering of the exiles, the settlement of the people of Israel."[36] He was joined by Yitzhak Tabenkin, who claimed that Israel's standing within her present borders was

preferable to a peace that would be violated with less-desirable borders.[37] The expanded territories were attractive not because they were a bargaining counter but because of their intrinsic value, which would inevitably depreciate upon their return. Intrinsic to this concept was absolute mistrust of Arab intentions. The return of territories, argued LIM leaders, would simply tempt new aggression. They insisted that, to the Arab rulers, [the return of lands] "will be a clear indication that it pays to attack us, for if they fail, they can always have their losses returned to them. Hence there is no more certain way of ensuring renewed warfare than by making territorial concessions to Arab rulers."[38]

Accordingly, the LIM introduced the idea that the territories were a substitute for peace and not a means of achieving it. The lands were a means, argued the LIM, not for chasing an unattainable peace but for implementing Zionism's fundamental goals. There was therefore little sense in trading them for a less-desirable objective.

The four principles advocated by the LIM limited its expansion and curbed its growth. The first principle—partition's illegitimacy—was unacceptable to the die-hard Zionist Socialists (Ben-Gurion's followers) who became the leaders of Mapai. They still preferred the attainable to the desirable. The second—Sinai's importance—distanced the movement from the die-hard advocates of nationalism in Israel (the Revisionist Party, which advocated Israel's historical claim to "Both Banks" of the Jordan, and its successor, the Herut Party). Sinai was not beloved by the nationalists but was rather regarded as an appendage to be suffered. The LIM and Herut agreed on the West Bank's paramount importance; they deemed it the heart of the Land of Israel and denied that Jordan had any claim to control or sovereignty over it. The two groups diverged, however, over Sinai. Furthermore, supporters of Greater Israel on religious grounds disapproved of the elevation of geopolitical concepts to primacy. They insisted that the only source of legitimacy for the Jews' claim to Eretz Israel was the Lord's promise. How could they condone claims based on strategic considerations, which were by definition impermanent? The LIM's third tenet—relegating the search for peace to secondary place—was inimical to Labor Party ideology. The Israeli Labor elites had argued since the state's establishment that peace depended more on Arab decisions than on Israeli actions.[39] Consequently, Laborites would not agree to the LIM's proposed change in national priorities. Although Labor politicians differed on how to obtain peace, its desirability was unquestioned. The policies presented by Eshkol and Meir always had peace as their final goal. Whether the actions of these

leaders reflected their words is another story, but they never denigrated peace as a national goal.

The LIM tried to overcome the resistance to its expansion. In the years 1970–1972, it directed most of its energies to the Sinai issue. After 1972, however, it gradually turned its campaign toward other territories—notably the West Bank. The movement tried to earn legitimacy in religious hearts and minds by emphasizing the principle of its geopolitical thinking—that no land could be yielded. This principle conformed to the orthodox religious interpretation that territorial compromise on any terms whatsoever would contravene the Lord's command. The LIM also emphasized its adherence to national goals, especially the ingathering of the exiles. It set up a special *aliyah* (immigration) committee, published a supplement to *Zot Haaretz* in Russian, and involved itself in the absorption of Jews from the USSR.[40] Although LIM leaders had limited success in achieving their objectives, their organization remained steadfast to its main goal—the preservation of the integrity of the Land of Israel and the obliteration of "partition" from the Israeli political vocabulary.

How successful was the LIM in its efforts to expand? Since membership was not institutionalized, it is hard to gauge the extent of public support. One weak indicator is the number of subscribers to the biweekly *Zot Haaretz*, which in September 1972 amounted to 14,000. Another indication is the number of people who attended public meetings—roughly a few hundred. These indicators are extremely crude and only suggest the interest stirred up by the movement. It is nonetheless clear that the LIM did not develop into a mass movement, but remained primarily an elite organization. How much support the Greater Israel ideology (as opposed to the organization itself) had among the public will be discussed later.

In conclusion, the Land of Israel Movement demonstrated its capacity to muster a variety of resources—mainly, to mobilize a prestigious elite. Its various components, however, failed to act together, because the partisan affiliations of the leaders (although assets in gaining access to decisionmakers) prevented unity. The withdrawal of some Laborites prompted those who remained in the movement to form a party of their own. The absence of mass support was also a handicap. In order to disseminate its ideological innovations, the LIM altered its course. The few practical attempts to implement the settlement goal shared by all supporters of Greater Israel came to naught.[41] Had it been otherwise, the ideological divergencies within the membership might have been overcome and the LIM's expansion might have been wider. As it was,

the LIM fell victim to its members' dissensions. Even when access channels were open, allowing deep penetration to decisionmaking spheres, the LIM's own conditions limited its ability to act successfully. These constraints were only lifted as the LIM's resources dwindled—after part of its membership had withdrawn from the movement. But the organization's tighter cohesion was offset by a reduction in the number of its access channels to powerbrokers. The LIM had more success in propagating its ideas, especially in throwing the legitimacy of the pre-1967 borders into doubt. In hindsight, this achievement served as a necessary first step toward the movement's ultimate goal—Israel's annexation of all the territories captured in the June 1967 war.

Gush Emunim

Gush Emunim, the most passionate and renowned proponent of Greater Israel, came into being when the LIM was already declining as a public movement. The Gush was the LIM's legitimate heir. But the Gush's superior resources, deeper penetration, and larger expansion distinguished it not only from its parent organization, but from every comparable organization in Israel's political milieu.

Organization

Gush Emunim was officially founded on February 4, 1974, but its ideological origins can be traced to the aftermath of the Six-Day War (or even to the formative period of politically organized religious Zionism at the beginning of the twentieth century).[42] Tangible evidence of its existence could be seen before the winter of 1974, because the resettling of Gush Etzion in September 1967 and Hebron in April 1968 were both undertaken by future members of Gush Emunim. In the months preceding the October 1973 war, the private initiative of two Kiryat Arba residents led to the formation of a *garin* (nucleus) preparing to settle in Samaria. In the wake of that war, Gush Emunim became formally organized and started to operate as a public movement to influence territorial policy.[43]

The founders of Gush Emunim were young (mid-twenties), mostly male, religiously orthodox people born in Israel to parents of European origin. Most of the leaders had acquired higher education in religious institutions. At the time of the group's inception, most of its founders had two to three children and were employed in managerial or profes-

sional occupations. In short, the Gush Emunim leaders were the offspring of orthodox, affluent, middle-class parents. Unlike the LIM's founders, the initiators of Gush Emunim were not celebrities and their parents were not well-known figures. They had to make their own way through Israel's political labyrinth, equipped only with their own personal attributes.

What was conspicuous about Gush Emunim members was their cohesion, their spirit of unity, and the esprit de corps that fired their deeds and enabled the movement to amass substantial resources. Their cohesion was grounded in the socialization pattern shared by all Gush leaders. The founders of Gush Emunim were observant Jews, a characteristic that had influenced their past experiences and that continued to influence their way of life. Three institutions were responsible for the socialization of Gush leaders: the youth movement (Bnei Akiva), the religious high school, and the religious higher-learning institution. Like its secular equivalent, the Bnei Akiva youth movement (founded in 1928) preached self-fulfillment and pioneering. Its message was wrapped in religious norms and behavior. Although the Zionist religious youth shared many values with their secular contemporaries, they were nevertheless different. Their separateness was reinforced because they lived in particular neighborhoods, practiced orthodox precepts, and even wore distinctive garments. The knitted skullcap, for example, became a symbol (often derided by their secular peers) for religious youth who had grown up separated from the mainstream of Israeli society. Their isolation was sustained by the separate religious educational system, which Ben-Gurion allowed to continue even after he had abolished the several different systems and set up a united, state-run educational system.[44] The state religious schools imbued their students with national religious ideology.

The next step in the process of separation occurred in the army, where many religious youngsters served in special units (Yeshivot Hesder) that allowed them to divide their time between religious studies and military duties. When released from the army, many went on to religious higher-learning institutions, especially Yeshivat Merkaz Harav (the Central School of the Rabbi) in Jerusalem. Merkaz Harav was a selective academic institution that became a breeding ground for the rising religious elite. Students were inculcated with a sense of pride, of belonging, and of meaning. Merkaz Harav was not only a place of learning. It was also a refuge, a home, and a sanctuary. The head of the Yeshiva, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, was more than a teacher. He was a father-figure who was adored (even worshipped) by his students.[45]

Merkaz Harav was the perfect setting for the foundation of Gush Emunim. It not only provided an environment for would-be leaders to air their grievances and express their concerns, but also offered its students goals worth striving for. From this ideal setting emerged a group of men with many commonalities. They had similar socioeconomic backgrounds and ideas. They were also distinguishable from society at large by their orthodoxy, which itself generated a unique way of life. They were thus predisposed to cohesion.

Although (as will be shown later) Gush leaders eventually took different paths, and there was some institutional proliferation, the group's emotional and organizational cohesion persisted in spite of enormous obstacles. Gush Emunim presented a remarkably united front to foes and friends alike. The mutual support and family-like spirit that characterized the group was one of the secret weapons that helped the Gush muster other resources essential to its activities.

Political theorists offer two major explanations of group formation. One, espoused by David B. Truman, holds that an interest group forms as a result of a crisis that disrupts the social equilibrium and triggers all those united by a common concern to act together to promote their interest. The other, whose major proponent is Robert H. Salisbury, maintains that an interest group forms when entrepreneurs are available to muster and dispense sufficient resources to attract followers and supporters.[46] Both sets of conditions existed in the case of Gush Emunim. The October War was traumatic. It was perhaps the immediate catalyst for Gush Emunim's foundation, but the basic elements were already prepared. Certainly entrepreneurs were standing by ready to head the campaign for Greater Israel. The LIM had declined to lead the campaign before the war, but the idea remained to beguile the would-be leaders, who were young, vigorous, and—above all—dedicated. Their dedication was unmatched by the leaders of the other territorial groups. The founders and adherents of Gush Emunim were not content merely to support the group; they virtually altered their own lives by practicing what they preached and settling the lands.

Like the LIM, Gush Emunim's resources were largely determined by their strategies. Whereas the LIM opted to influence by persuasion, Gush Emunim chose to exert pressure through coercion. From the outset the group proved to be tenacious; it steadfastly stuck to its selected course. Gush Emunim leaders were unwavering in their opposition to any retreat from the territories and unswerving in their demand to settle them. The Gush had three strategies to attract public support and accumulate resources: staging street demonstrations, conducting marches

throughout the territories, and squatting in places chosen to become settlements for Jews.

Street demonstrations were staged only when Gush leaders perceived an imminent threat to Israel's retention of the territories. Specifically, Gush Emunim resorted to street action on the eve of the separation-of-forces agreement with Syria (May 21, 1974) and on the eve of the interim agreement with Egypt (August 24–27, 1975). Violence broke out on the second occasion when policemen indiscriminately used their clubs to disperse the demonstrators gathered to protest the pending withdrawal from Sinai. Gush Emunim members themselves did not use force against people; they did, however, make their presence felt by blocking roads and by using a loudspeaker at 4 A.M. opposite the hotel where Dr. Kissinger was staying.

The most striking aspect of these demonstrations was their ubiquity. Protests occurred simultaneously in the three major cities and in provincial towns. Their impact was noted by a Labor MK, who commented that Gush Emunim was setting the tone of public reaction to the Sinai accords.[47] The Gush was also able to attract other organizations to its activities. In 1974 it was practically alone when it demonstrated, but in 1975 it was joined by other like-minded groups—for instance, Bnei Akiva, the Young Guard of Herut, Beitar, members of the Public Committee for Abu Rodies, Women for Safe Israel, and some prominent individuals.[48] The uproar provoked by the continuing demonstrations proved that Gush Emunim had become a resourceful organization. The resulting commotion inspired Gush Emunim's people to go all out in gathering more resources.

The purpose of marches was to demonstrate that Gush Emunim was a mass movement capable of mobilizing large crowds committed to its ideas.[49] Unlike demonstrations, marches were held not to protest any particular event, but to display the group's power. Marches were arranged to support settlers who wanted to demonstrate their determination to put down roots in the territories. They were usually held on religious festivals when driving was permitted so that thousands of participants (mostly religious observers) could be transported to the marching area. The tight bonds between Gush Emunim and the religious educational institutions made it easy to assemble tens of thousands of young people to march in the territories. These events attracted much attention and impressed both the public and the media.

The third and most frequent Gush strategy was squatting on land to initiate a settlement. As already noted, such attempts preceded the 1973 war. Just a few days before fighting began on October 2, 1973,

future members of Gush Emunim wrote to Meir asking permission to set up a field school near Nablus.[50] The war, as well as bureaucratic obstacles, interrupted the settlement efforts.[51] The families who were already mobilized for action, however, would not be put off, and they renewed their efforts after the war when the men were demobilized from the army. A Group for Settling Nablus addressed letters to several political authorities, notifying them of its intention to settle the area, with or without permission. But government and public attention were focused not on Samaria, but on the Golan Heights. As already noted, the pioneers of unauthorized settlement in the territories were the members of Hakibbutz Hameuchad who had squatted in the Golan in 1967. In 1974 it was once again the Golan settlers who founded an "instant settlement" designed to prevent the pending Israeli withdrawal when the separation-of-forces agreement with Syria was signed. The settlers did not have the support of their own kibbutz movement, but Gush Emunim responded to their call. Some Gush people eagerly joined the Golan settlers.[52] As a result, the new boundary fixed between Israel and Syria had to take the new Jewish settlement into account.

The major arena for the Gush settlers' strategy was Judea and Samaria. There were eight features of this strategy that contributed to its success: persistence, insistence, good timing, conspicuousness, concreteness, pragmatism, provocation, and expansion. Between 1974 and 1977 Gush Emunim only established two or three settlements. Nonetheless, these settlements constituted a watershed in Israel's territorial policy. As described in detail above, the settlers made recurrent attempts to locate themselves in the area. The best-known settlement attempt took place in Sebastia (subsequently known as Kadum, and later as Elon Moreh). The Labor government's tacit approval of settlement in the area was preceded by eight squatting attempts.[53] The first attempt (on June 5, 1974) was carried out by some 100 persons. Six weeks later, in a July 26 attempt, the number had risen to a few thousand. On the third attempt, the Gush spokesman explicitly stated that there would be no let-up in the drive to establish Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria.[54] Gush Emunim has never ceased its attempts to settle where it pleases in the territories. At this writing, it continues to move into places uninhabited by Jews. The settlers' persistence bore organizational fruits, because the 25–30 families that had intended to settle in Samaria prior to the 1973 war were joined both by thousands of well-wishers and by 500 families organized in six groups and ready for any call.[55] Two other groups already living in Ofra and Maale Adumim also declared themselves available for new settlement bids.

Gush Emunim followers persisted in their settlement effort, which they regarded as a sacred mission, and gained much renown for their perseverance. They stayed on the primitive settlement sites in sweltering heat and torrential rains. Most of the settlement attempts were ended forcibly, but the settlers themselves did not resort to violence. On the contrary, Gush statements indicated that the squatters would not resist the IDF. "We do not want a bloody clash, so we call upon you [the squatters] not to resist the soldiers in any way."[56] Evacuation was not always straightforward. In one incident most of the men installed themselves in the upper story of the Sebastia railway station, endangering both themselves and the soldiers sent to remove them. There was a lot of noise, but no blood was shed. The squatters' determination to settle did not escalate their clashes with the military authorities. But the settlers' forcible eviction did not deter them from repeating their squatting attempts.

Gush persistence was not arbitrary; it was well timed. Six of the eight settlement attempts in Sebastia occurred after Israelis had been shocked by a critical event associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. At these times Israel's elite was more susceptible to the idea of Greater Israel. The two most prominent events were the PLO's attack on the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv on March 11, 1975 and the UN General Assembly's resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism on October 18, 1975. Gush Emunim's exact timing was obviously the result of last-minute decisions, proving the organization's ability to mobilize resources hastily. The intention of Gush members to settle was no secret. The group notified Israelis of concrete plans for further settlement bids in both private letters and public statements.[57] Gush Emunim's conspicuousness bolstered its confidence and self-assertiveness, which made it even more attractive.

Perhaps the most effective feature of Gush Emunim's strategy was its practical achievement—the building of settlements in Judea and Samaria. Before the government would realize what was going on, sections of the media would be applauding a settlement that was already a fait accompli. Settlements were sometimes established in stages, sometimes in one fell swoop. Ofra, for example, started out as a working camp on army land. According to one of its founders, "We were content with every quiet moment, we have kept a low profile hoping that our presence will finally convince authorities to let us stay."[58] A different strategy was employed in Sebastia. There the squatters put up prefabricated concrete huts and brought all the supplies (like gas and water) necessary for self-contained encampment. A settlement was

founded before the authorities could bat an eye, creating a fact and precluding easy evacuation.

Gush members were not only well equipped to establish settlements; they also confined themselves to what was possible. "We did not choose a path that led nowhere but embodied our dreams in concrete and feasible reality."[59] Gush Emunim members were inspired by a vision, but they also knew how to temper their dreams to the exigencies of the political world. They struggled with the military only up to a reasonable point. Even in Yamit, where the confrontation was most bitter, they did not lose control and endanger life. They acted within their capabilities and terminated their activity in the face of insurmountable obstacles. This unusual combination of scrupulous pragmatism and far-reaching vision made the Gush cause successful.

Gush Emunim's combination of persistence, good timing, conspicuousness, practical achievements, and pragmatism made provocation well-nigh inevitable. The group achieved high levels of nuisance impact, which made it difficult for people in power to ignore the group.[60] The incessant attempts to settle, the squatters' endurance and ability to create irreversible facts, and the repeated need for forcible evictions threatened the government's authority and legitimacy. The world media showed Jewish soldiers forcibly removing Jews from places they claimed to be Jewish land. In a state composed of many citizens who had been expelled from their former homes by Nazis during World War II, or who had clashed violently with British forces during the mandate period, these scenes triggered painful memories and fierce emotions. Although the government was not unaware of these reactions, it stuck to its decision to remove illegal settlers. Such settlement activities demanded a response—either acquiescence or resistance. Government reaction to the nuisance provoked a reaction that was itself an instrument for mobilizing further resources. Eviction scenes were followed by increased contributions to Gush coffers and large numbers of new recruits eager to take part in the group's activities.[61]

Gush Emunim's growing popularity strengthened the movement's strategies. One reason for its continued expansion was its willingness to cooperate with whomever would support its goals. Gush leaders made alliances with Beitar and with settlers in other movements willing to help them (Ein Vered, for example). Its membership was open to both the religiously observant and the secular. Admittedly, Gush Emunim's leadership remained virtually unchanged. It appeared to belong to an elite group that outsiders could not penetrate. But unlike the LIM's leaders, Gush leaders were not choosy about allying with different social

groups for practical purposes. Its most prominent alliance was with Ein Vered, but it also formed cooperative associations with members of veteran settlements.[62] Gush Emunim was the only ideologically based group that successfully recruited forces far beyond its natural constituency. It constructed a bridge between the two main Zionist segments—the Socialists, who fostered settlement activity, and the Revisionists, who believed in might. The Gush's blending of these two beliefs with nationalist orthodox religious belief, and its implementation of these beliefs in ways that resembled the good old days of pioneering, made a remarkable impact.

On examination, Gush Emunim's organizational structure appears to have been rather loose. The Gush did not institutionalize; it did not issue membership cards or collect fees on a fixed basis. The movement did not have a regular publication (although from October 14, 1978 on its name appeared on the front page of *Zot Haaretz*). The movement was not even registered as a formal association. Its leaders claimed that "the tremendous potential . . . the limitless energy and human resources of the camp that could direct the activities of huge numbers of people, has not attained even a fraction of its power owing to the weakness of its organizational capabilities."[63] In spite of this, Gush Emunim excelled in carrying out highly sophisticated projects that necessitated organizational competence.

The members of Gush Emunim's secretariat were not nominated until the spring of 1974, although the seeds of the movement had been sown years earlier when a natural leadership emerged among the settlers in Judea. The first action committee, the predecessor of the secretariat, came into being in the winter of 1974, when the title "Emunim" was adopted. In 1975 there was an organizational expansion. The Gush acquired a permanent address and set up four departments: political, financial, settlement, and information. In addition to fund raising and settlement activity, quantities of oral and written propaganda were disseminated, and Gush branches were founded throughout the country.[64]

The organizational thrust was only half-heartedly accepted by Gush branches. An efficient branch, claimed a member in the Gush leaflet, was a branch that demonstrated initiative and did not wait for inducements from the center. The Gush institutionalized reluctantly, fearing that the price would be the loss of one of its major assets—individual motivation and enthusiasm. The term *Msirut Nefesh* (self-sacrifice) acquired a special significance for Gush Emunim followers. They were convinced that human will-power could move mountains. Over and

again the leaders interviewed in the course of this study claimed that no government in Israel, regardless of its political orientation, could stand against a group so profoundly dedicated to its goal and so willing to implement what it preached. Many feared, however, that this extraordinary commitment would inevitably weaken if the Gush were to become overinstitutionalized. Were the passionate enthusiasm to be replaced by a rigid organization, the Gush would undermine its major asset and lighten its impact. Gush Emunim leaders were therefore in a quandary, because they needed an organization to accelerate their settlement actions.

The Likud's ascent to power briefly rescued the leaders from their difficulty and resulted in the modification of Gush Emunim's organizational structure. The Likud's victory gave rise to great expectations, which, however, soon changed to deep disappointment. During a press conference Gush spokesmen vented their frustrations. "We anticipated huge state-directed settlement activities, a budget of tens of millions, highways criss-crossing Judea and Samaria, but we received a few caravans and no genuine drive for settlement."[65] The Gush leadership was divided on how to deal with this difficulty. Some were willing to adjust their expectations to match the government's pace; others demanded resolute action and the continuation of illegal squatting. The unexpected political realities provoked the Gush into developing its organizational structure as a means of confronting them. Three branches—Amana, Yesha, and Hatehiya—were created.

The first branch came into being in 1977, when Gush Emunim decided to enhance its stock of resources by establishing a settlement movement (Amana). Amana was intended to join the ten existing settlement organizations, all of which enjoyed benefits from state-run bodies. As explained earlier, settlement organizations' activities are accorded official standing in the process of founding settlements. They are entitled to a share in national resources such as land and water and receive money from the World Zionist Organization. Settlement organizations are respectable units in the economic and political life of Israel; they can solicit funds and mobilize support abroad, and they receive a proportional share of the national cake. As a registered association, Amana had a well-designed institutional structure and abundant resources.[66] It acquired a building in Jerusalem, ten vehicles, and about twenty employees. It also set up an *aliyah* department with ten representatives abroad and an information department that vigorously mobilized potential settlers. Amana's greatest practical achievement was the number

of settlements it established—from a handful in 1977 to 35 by the end of 1982.

The success of Amana has been more or less indistinguishable from the success of Gush Emunim. The two organizations have close manpower, funding, and ideological connections. Nine of the eleven members of Amana's secretariat were at one time or another activists in Gush Emunim. Amana has provided funds for Gush activities and implemented its policies. In practice, however, Amana is mostly engaged in planning and executing settlements. Its staff concentrates on lobbying in the corridors of the settlement administration and lacks the characteristics of an ideological movement.

Yesha (the Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) was the second branch founded by Gush Emunim. In the framework of organizational theory, the impetus for Amana's foundation may have been the availability of entrepreneurs seeking to increase their assets. The impetus for Yesha, on the other hand, better fits the crisis theory. The main event that triggered Yesha's founding was the peace process—especially the Camp David Accords. The peace process hit Gush Emunim hard, for it was its own government that had conceded to Egypt and was about to yield territories, its own allies that had broached the idea of autonomy. It also became evident that settlements were not an immovable obstacle to withdrawal.

The fourth phase of the territorial policy—the period of peacemaking—coincided with a decline in morale and resources for the pro-territories group. Amana was preoccupied with the daily chores of settlement. The political arena was vacant, because Gush Emunim was embroiled in a crisis of its own. It lacked an effective organization to pressure the government to choose a more definite territorial policy, and no one was available to counter what seemed to be a more imminent danger—the lack of land available for settlement. This problem became critical when the Lyonowitz Document, which recommended the preservation of the territorial status quo, was published. The government was actually dragging its feet in settling the territories. The Elon Moreh ruling was also seen as a grave danger to future settlement.

By mid-1979 Gush Emunim had to confront an increasingly paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the autonomy plan—so perilous to Israel's absolute control over the territories—was gaining acceptance at home and abroad. But at the same time the number of Jewish settlers in the area was noticeably growing. The typical settler group was no longer a bunch of youngsters squatting in the hills of Samaria armed

only with their faith in a divine promise. It was a group of residents determined to develop a locality to meet their own immediate desires for a better standard of living as well as to fulfill national goals.

Gush Emunim sought to stoke the ideological fire by founding an organization (Yesha) based on the settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It was intended as an umbrella organization for all Jews living in the territories. The founders hoped it would strengthen their hand and widen Gush Emunim's embrace. A municipal framework would make the settler's interests sufficiently legitimate to override the controversy about where they settled. Moreover, it was hoped that this administrative legitimacy would attract new supporters to the cause—a hope that was not realized. Settlers in the Jordan Valley, a significant portion of whom were Laborites, rejected the appeal to join Yesha. Other settlers were equally hesitant.[67] When founded, Yesha comprised forty localities attached to nine settlement movements. Labor-affiliated settlements were conspicuously absent.

Yesha started out as an "Association for the Advancement of Population and Absorption in Judea, Samaria and Gaza" instigated by the "Forum of Heads of Councils," whose members were activists in Gush Emunim. Its first strategy, however, was not compatible with Gush tactics. On March 19, 1979 the forum staged a hunger strike opposite the Knesset, demanding that the government either introduce legislation or issue an executive order that would guarantee the settlers' legal status in the territories.[68] This demand was quite unrealistic. What the strikers really wanted was the release of state-owned lands and the confiscation of private lands for their settlement activities. Staging a hunger strike was not typical of Gush Emunim; it smacked of impotence and uncertainty rather than the movement's characteristic assertiveness and resourcefulness. Nevertheless, the strike elicited support. The council's heads were repeatedly beseeched by their government and Knesset supporters to end their strike. Once they were joined by some 40,000 sympathetic demonstrators.[69]

The strike tightened the settlers' cohesion. They united behind their heads, providing the needed impetus to found Yesha. At the first council meeting on December 24, 1980 a twelve-person secretariat and six committees were elected. Yesha's founders wanted it to remain nonpartisan in order to accommodate settlements of all political stripes. Gush Emunim maintained its dominance by including in the secretariat "people involved in the act of settlement but not necessarily representing their localities." Consequently, Gush Emunim activists could be recruited to powerful positions by Yesha's leaders instead of waiting to be

elected. (Until 1982 this device proved superfluous; there were no serious disagreements among the various sections of Yesha, and resolutions were reached by consensus.)

The above tactics were congruent, in word and spirit, with Gush Emunim's policies in its new municipal disguise. Yesha had a wealth of resources. It issued a regular publication, *Nkuda*, and had a formal position in the state's municipal structure. As noted by a reporter attending a Yesha meeting in 1980, however, the speeches were less passionate, feverish, and spontaneous than those in Gush Emunim. The parent group remained less institutionalized and more defiant than its offspring, in which Gush fervor had been replaced, or perhaps supplemented, by bureaucratic institutionalization.[70]

Gush Emunim's third branch was a political party, Hatehiya. It was established on July 22, 1979 by Likud defectors opposed to the peace treaty. Shortly before the 10th Knesset elections in 1981, Hatehiya approached Gush Emunim's leadership with an invitation to join the newly formed party. Only some Gush leaders accepted. The others were reluctant for two reasons. First, they feared that any identification (let alone amalgamation) with a political party might hinder Gush activities, and that the group might subsequently share the fate of its predecessor, the LIM. Second, Hatehiya was basically a secular party, and despite the Gush's experience of successful cooperation with secular groups, amalgamation with them was a different story. For the first time since Gush Emunim's creation, an internal controversy threatened its cohesion. Most of its members, cognizant of the disadvantages emanating from partisanship—the disaffection of those belonging to other parties and the inability to accurately measure the group's public support—were not ready to turn their movement into a political party. Hatehiya's small size occasioned other doubts. "While Hatehiya identifies with all our goals . . . won't it be naive to rely on this party alone to influence the Knesset?"[71] Among those in favor of joining Hatehiya were noted leaders such as Hanan Porat, one of the founders of Gush Etzion, and Gershon Shafat, the Gush's political secretary. For these two, Gush Emunim's declining influence (as evidenced by its inability to counteract the peace process) clearly pointed to an urgent need to take a partisan political path. Porat and Shafat felt unable to secure their goals alone, and they made a conscious decision to preserve the bridge between secular and religious Greater Israel supporters. They joined Hatehiya and became major figures in the party.[72] Despite the fact that some Gush leaders joined Hatehiya, no split took place in the Gush itself. The secretariat decided that the Gush would remain autonomous but would not

impose any obligations on its members. They ruled that joining Hatehiya was a matter of individual choice, and Gush Emunim remained united.[73]

By 1980 the people of Gush Emunim had developed a distinct way of life. They had evolved a subculture that further differentiated them from the mainstream. After their efforts to integrate the territories with Israel failed, they became very dependent on internal association.[74] Gush Emunim thus maintained a distinct "catnet," that is, "a set of individuals comprising both a category and a network."[75] Gush Emunim members formed a category because they belonged to the same social milieu and had much in common. They were also a network; individuals unquestionably had a mutual sense of interdependence, which enabled the organization to contain friction and preserve its cohesion even in the face of mounting differences.

Penetration

Gush Emunim also scored well in penetration. It must be borne in mind, however, that during Labor's rule penetration did not consist so much of influencing authorities to enact legislation as of obtaining acquiescence to acts already carried out by the group. In this respect, Gush Emunim was unique as an interest group. Interest groups usually try to compel policymakers to carry out or terminate a certain policy in exchange for their support. In its early stages (1974–1977) Gush Emunim neither sought influence nor offered support; rather, it sought agreement with a policy initiated by the group itself. In a way, the government became the group's client. Gush leaders wanted a passive government that would not meddle in their activities but would shut its eyes and ears and leave them to their own resources. In one of the first recorded meetings, a Gush participant asked the premier for tacit approval: "Don't agree with us but don't remove us."[76] The settlings of Ofra and Sebastia were examples of obtaining consent by default. Without deep penetration into the locus of power through representation, access, and legitimacy, such consent would not have been forthcoming.

Gush Emunim had no named delegates in the 8th Knesset (1974–1977). Yet its first settlement bid in Samaria was joined by four MKs from the Likud and the NRP. Its second settlement attempt attracted 20 MKs. In the 9th Knesset, the Gush had a named representative, Haim Druckman (a member of the secretariat), who was second on the NRP's

electoral list. The Gush obtained additional representation in the Knesset when Porat entered the legislature on Hatehiya's ticket. In the 10th Knesset, Hatehiya was regarded as chief spokesman for the Gush. Interviews with Gush leaders revealed that they perceived the Knesset as the most effective channel to influence authoritative choice.[77] Penetration, however, was not confined to formal representation. Settlers had direct access to ministries and received tremendous aid not only from Peres but also from doves like Sapir.[78] Political doors were wide open for Gush Emunim's emissaries.

The government also conferred legitimacy on the Gush. This did not mean that the group's policies were endorsed, but that it was accepted as the spokesman for a legitimate set of interests. Gush Emunim was acknowledged to be the leading representative for the Greater Israel council. The words Gush Emunim do not conjure up the groups' almost nonexistent organizational framework, but the settlers who live in the territories, striving to keep them under Jewish control forever. By Gamson's criteria, Gush Emunim was widely accepted.[79] Its representatives were consulted by officials and politicians. The government was always ready to enter into negotiations with the Gush, whose most ardent supporters had positions of power in the administrative structure. This situation existed not only under the Likud government but also under Labor. The two best-known Gush representatives in the Labor government were Ariel Sharon, who was a senior aide on security affairs to Premier Rabin, and Yuval Neeman, who was chief advisor to Defense Minister Peres. Interviews with Gush leaders revealed that contact with decisionmakers was frequent and varied and extended to all branches of government. A browse through the Gush archive reveals copious correspondence with a myriad of political authorities.

It is most illuminating to study the relationships between the Gush and the political parties. Only a few of Gush Emunim's founders were party members at the time of the group's inception, but their social and political inclinations were tightly linked with the NRP. Bnei Akiva was an extension of this party, and Gush founders were former Bnei Akiva members. A further link was forged when the NRP's Young Faction tried to prevent their party from entering the government coalition in 1974. Gush Emunim cooperated with this faction, but remained outside the confines of the party.[80] The NRP, however, did not meet Gush Emunim's expectations. The Gush maintained close relationships with two NRP leaders, Zvulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben-Meir, but the NRP itself went back to being absorbed with religious issues. The party did not assume

a leading role in the advancement of settlement. Although it pledged support in its platform (and in a letter signed by its leader, Dr. Burg) for settlement in Samaria, it was not eager to honor its commitment.[81] The party was satisfied with what it regarded as a major achievement: the inclusion in the government's policy of a commitment to hold elections prior to any serious negotiations with Jordan.

The NRP's Young Faction, whose MKs were avowed supporters of Gush Emunim, would not be fobbed off. They constantly prodded the government for denying settlement in Samaria. The two MKs played a crucial role in the Kadum affair, pressuring the government to allow the settlers to remain on the site. Relations between the Gush and the NRP deteriorated rapidly when the party joined Begin's cabinet and approved the peace accords. Although the NRP continued to favor Gush aims, it would not always identify with the Gush. Gush Emunim's leaders, however, did not let the NRP off the hook easily. They arranged demonstrations and made uninvited visits to NRP leaders' private homes to lobby them on the Elon Moreh issue. The NRP's reluctance to support the Gush was understandable; the party was a member of the coalition, and the Gush often went too far in its rejection of official policy. Nevertheless, the party did not want to completely sever its ties with the group.[82] Gush Emunim's leaders could not blind themselves to the NRP's disenchantment with their methods and goals, so they looked for another partisan avenue.

Between 1974 and 1982 there was intensive interaction, including correspondence and meetings, between the Gush and MKs of other political parties, and religious and security authorities.[83] This happened under Labor as well; some Laborites were more willing to aid Gush Emunim than they admitted in public. For example, Yisrael Galili, a publicly declared opponent of the Gush, responded positively to many of the group's needs.[84] Peres's contribution to the Gush has already been noted. Whether he was a sincere supporter of Gush Emunim or was using the opportunity to undermine Rabin's authority is irrelevant to this discussion. The important point is that the Gush enjoyed the benefit of the chronic personal rivalry between Rabin and Peres and thereby gained access to the top echelons of decisionmaking. From 1981 on Gush Emunim members no longer had to restrict their lobbying to those outside the confines of power, for they had themselves penetrated the corridors of power. Initiated as an extraparliamentary group remote from the centers of authority, Gush Emunim obtained a foothold within the locus of power itself after less than a decade.

Expansion

A review of the ideological dimension of Gush Emunim also reveals a remarkable expansion. An ideology that Robert Lane has termed "forensic," consisting of articulated and differentiated political arguments,[85] has been set out in a short document published by Gush Emunim in 1975—*Gush Emunim: A Movement for the Revival of the Zionist Fulfillment*. The origins of the ideology and its ramifications are to be found in the writings of the religious authorities who inspired the group's foundation[86] and in *Nkuda*, Yesha's periodical, which since 1980 has been Gush Emunim's printed mouthpiece. Scrutiny of these publications reveals that their underlying principles and Gush Emunim's declared policies have not always been compatible. Gush Emunim's four dominant ideological objectives were (1) to renounce the goal of "normalization" for Jewry, (2) to revive Zionism, (3) to foster a collective ethos, and (4) to bring about religious redemption.

Renunciation of Normalization as a National Goal. Gush Emunim people desired to reverse the processes that had contributed to Israel's integration into the organized international community. Gush Emunim's manifesto explained:

> The people of Israel naively conceived that, following the struggle to establish and consolidate the state, it would be recognised by all other states and accepted amongst the world nations, including Arab states which would allow Jews to live a normal, peaceful life on their land, just like other nations do. Now, a generation since the founding of the state, it is evident that the struggle lingers, escalates, becomes more compounded politically and militarily. It also demands more sacrifices and generates endless tension. This situation produces frustrations and undermines the basic premise of classical Zionism, which saw Eretz Israel as a safe haven, a solution to antisemitism and the persecution of Jews.

The key words seem to be "acceptance" and a "safe haven." Gush Emunim challenged some of the basic premises used to justify Jewish national revival in Eretz Israel. The founders of political Zionism thought that the Jews would be integrated in the Gentile world if they were politically organized in the same way. This is one reason why Theodor Herzl tried to obtain an international charter for Jewish political sovereignty in Palestine, or some parts of it. Many Zionists deemed recognition and acceptance of Jewry as a political nation like any other to be a sine qua non for national revival in Eretz Israel. In other words,

Jewish political sovereignty would bring with it political equality with other nations. Gush Emunim rejected this assumption as unfounded. Their proposed alternative was for the Jews to go it alone—to be completely self-reliant and pay no heed to anyone else. Ben-Gurion's famous dictum—"Never mind what the Gentiles are saying, what counts is what the Jews are doing"—became a Gush Emunim motto (even though Ben-Gurion did not practice what he had preached when he became a statesman). Gush Emunim leaders argued that they did not manufacture Israeli suspicion and hostility to the outside world, but merely nurtured the seeds sown in the weeks preceding the Six-Day War. The Israelis felt acutely isolated in the face of international hostility. Abba Eban has recalled that "as we looked around us we saw the world divided between those who were selling our destruction and those who would do nothing to prevent it."[87]

After the fear of annihilation receded, Israelis gradually created a self-image of invincibility. This illusion was smashed in October 1973, when Egypt and Syria caught Israel napping. The state's physical vulnerability and political isolation were made apparent to everyone, despite the enormous and invaluable help given Israel by the United States. As far as Gush Emunim people were concerned, 25 years of statehood had proved that acceptance was not forthcoming. Therefore, it was clearly a false goal and should be abandoned. They attributed the world's failure to support Israel to the Jews' uniqueness, a situation that they insisted could never be otherwise.

This attitude was at odds with another theme of classical Zionism. Leo Pinsker postulated that anti-Semitism arose in Gentiles because they saw Jews as a kind of ghost people whose survival in dispersion was inexplicable and, therefore, threatening. Anti-Semitism, he argued, would inevitably disappear if there was a sovereign Jewish state. Gush Emunim's ideology sought to perpetuate the "anomalous" situation of the Jewish people. Nothing, they said, would end Gentile prejudice, so Israel should be "a nation unto itself." It should emphasize its uniqueness, which was grounded in the Jews' divinely appointed mission to the nations. "The only reason for a national revival is grounded in the willingness to exist as a Jewish nation in spite of all difficulties, and this revival cannot occur without a sense of uniqueness, without a sense of divergence and dissociation from the family of nations."[88] The theme that the Jews are the people chosen by God to be a light to the nations is not in the forefront of Gush Emunim's forensic ideology, but it is definitely present in the more subtle aspects of the ideology. National revival in Israel is intended not only for the salvation of the individual[89]—

or even for national liberation[90]—but for the redemption of the world. The gulf between the Jewish people and the rest of humankind will be bridged not by other states' acquiescence in Israel's existence, but by their acknowledgment of the Jewish people's infallibility.

Gush Emunim's conviction that Israel had an active mission challenged another tenet of Zionist thinking: that the state's establishment was designed to provide a safe haven for the dispersed Jewish people. According to Gush arguments, the concept of a "safe haven" was itself negative. It assumed that there was no alternative solution for the Jewish people to live safely elsewhere. One Gush leader, Rabbi Levinger, summarized his rejection of the "safe haven" concept. "Israel is not a nation escaping from its prison and seeking a haven but young Yehuda Lion who returns to his land to carry his message unto the nations." Gush Emunim criticized those for whom contemporary life in the Land of the Bible was not the incarnation of the wonder of Jewish revival, but an escape from exile. As "descendants of persecuted people the only justification for their being here is a lack of choice."[91]

Instead of the "safe haven" motif, the Gush demanded the development of an authentic Jewish state. The ideological eradication of the "safe haven" concept had practical implications. The Gush predicted that it would produce a renewal of *aliyah* from countries where Jews were not persecuted. Israel would become a positive attraction rather than a refuge. Immigration to Zion would be perceived not as a flight from suffering but as a return to a land sanctified by divine choice and the divine covenant with Jewry. The feeling of "abnormality" felt by some Jews in Israel would be eradicated by awareness of the Jews' divine mission, which the Gush felt should be the only driving force for the existence of the state and the preservation of its uniqueness.[92]

Revival of Zionism. Gush Emunim's interpretation of Zionism was closely associated with practical settlements. The Gush pointed to the critical lack of a sense of Zionist challenge and goal in contemporary Israel, attributing that defect to the emptiness of contemporary Zionism. "The founders of Zionism made something out of nothing, they built settlements, made the deserts flourish, gathered in the exiles and established the state. For the contemporary generation nothing remains but to maintain the present and embrace the past without a specified plan to designate the future road." Gush Emunim offered a detailed plan centered on one specific activity—settlement on the land. Settlement was thus not only an instrument for attaining the Gush's political objectives; it was also a paramount ideological tenet grounded in the Gush's Zionist imperatives. As pointed out in the Gush manifesto,

settlement was considered to be a lever for the immigration of the masses and a vehicle for the development of a great state bearing in its substance the existence of the Jewish nation on its land. There were also other benefits attached to settlement—such as the wider dispersion of the population, the cultivation of the wilderness, and the improvement of Israel's security and tranquility. In short, settlement was perceived to be the essence of Zionism and the touchstone of Jewish revival in Israel.

Gush writings, together with oral interviews, indicate that settlement had intrinsic merit as well as being a means to an end. "Settlement in itself . . . is the A and the B. There is no question of 'a faith that precedes deeds,' but the deeds visibly generate faith."[93] Settlement was distinct from political objectives, such as annexing the territories, because it created a practical bond between the individual and the land. This bond was a source of conflict for Gush people, because their worship of the land resembled idolatory. This was abhorrent to Jews, whose religious beliefs condemned the worship of anything other than God. How, then, did they reconcile their tenacious clinging to the land?

Gush Emunim offered a new synthesis designed to fuse the spiritual aspects of their religious faith with the physical reality of the beloved soil. Rabbi Kook, Sr., asserted that "the holy link of Israel with its holy land is not similar to the natural link of any nation to its land . . . The eternity of Israel is founded on the Divine nature of this lovely, prodigious land, matched to this nation."[94] Kook's son followed his father and took it upon himself to herald the holiness of the land. In the wake of the 1967 war he published two proclamations devoted to the listing of biblical quotations proving that the return of any territory would be illegal and intolerable.[95] "The eternal land of our forefathers" became a cornerstone in Gush Emunim's forensic ideology. Gush members were not content with their forebears' landless faith. They created a tangible, physical link between themselves and God. They perceived settlement on the land as a form of worship, which they believed was required by God. It is noteworthy, however, that "settlement of the land" did not necessarily imply an agrarian way of life. Pollution and crowding were not incompatible with the sanctity of the newly settled lands. The only thing that mattered was continued Jewish occupation.

Collective Ethos. The growing inclination of Israelis to give priority to their individual needs rather than to collective national goals was also challenged by Gush Emunim. The Gush ideologues contended that Israelis had fallen prey to the "individualistic and nihilistic attitudes that prevail in the Western world." They alleged that such attitudes sanctify

the individual's prosperity and pleasure as the purpose of existence and subjugate state, society, law, and morality to individual whims. Gush Emunim put forward a pioneer concept that placed general national ends above individual needs and offered the public a sense of mission and devotion. The anti-Western and antiindividualistic mood of Gush Emunim has been pointed out as one of its dominant outlooks.[96] Western values like consumerism, material success, and sexual permissiveness were perceived to be immoral and socially disruptive.

Eliezer Livneh, one of the LIM's leaders, repeatedly preached asceticism, frugality, and self-reliance. In his copious writings published by Gush Emunim, he claimed, "We cannot maintain a society here based on a Western design. Materialism and permissiveness, the worship of goods and services that nurture egotism and the idolatory of the here and now, will shortly cause Israeli society to crumble."[97] Western individualism was to be rejected because of its moral consequences. "When pleasure-seeking and personal gratification become the focus of one's life," claimed a Gush leader, "egotism and avarice dominate both the individual and society."[98] The Gush considered egotism incompatible with national objectives. They believed it led to escapism and to a lack of faith. Gush criticism was not aimed at secularism or atheism but at the pursuit of individual desires and the rejection of communal responsibilities. The "end of ideology" theme was unacceptable to the Gush. "Without belief in absolute values, a vacuum forms which is then filled by materialism and desolation."[99] Gush Emunim demanded total commitment to a collective end, which it saw as Jewish control throughout Greater Israel forever.

Religious redemption. Religiosity was the backbone of Gush Emunim's ideology. In its manifesto the Gush postulated that "in the Jewish tradition lies the key to the understanding of the uniqueness and mission of the people and the Land of Israel . . . Forfeiting Jewish roots puts into question the very value of the Israelis' survival and their adherence to Eretz Israel." Gush Emunim's main contribution to the proterritories camp has been to permeate the Zionist process with Judaism. The Gush insisted that religious imperatives, not security needs, necessitated the retention of the territories. "Just as we have to settle the wilderness of our land, we also have to redeem the injured souls and the losers of faith. The days when nationalism did not emanate from religiosity have passed away."[100]

The capture of the land signified no less than the Messianic process of redemption, manifested in the implementation of full Jewish life within the framework of national revival. As pointed out by Ben-Dor,

the question of how the Jewish state might differ from a state for Jews was never seriously debated, much less answered, by Israelis.[101] The prevailing feeling, however, was that the link between the Jewish people and Judaism was not an historical accident but "a defining quality of an ancient but continuing situation. Religion and nation thus cannot be separated; they represent a unity which stands in contradiction to modern concepts of both religion and nationhood. Because of this opposition the unity perpetuates a battle even in secular times, and even in Israel where political Zionism has created the first non-religious community of Jews."[102] Gush Emunim people did not experience a "battle," because their way of national revival was the performance of divine commands. So they demanded the formation of a Jewish state rather than a "normal" state for the Jews. Gush Emunim yearned for the Messiah; in fact, some of its members attempted to precipitate his arrival. But most prepared for his coming by settling the holy land, which was a new way to fulfill the Lord's commands.

Although their ideological banners were not identical, Gush Emunim had much in common with the LIM. Both groups objected to partitioning Eretz Israel and demanded that Israel eventually annex the territories. Neither listed peace as an objective worth striving for. But here the similarities ended. Gush Emunim rejected the geopolitical concept and did not consider Sinai to be that important (although it reacted with horror to the uprooting of settlements). It projected a strong religious theme intended to transform private and public behavior. Although the LIM also urged a return to Zionist precepts and shunned Western materialist values, these attitudes were not enshrined in its teachings. The LIM was a political movement with ideological underpinnings. Gush Emunim was an ideological movement that effectively employed political tactics to attain its goals—a return to the austerity of the pioneering era and, if possible, to the times of King David.

In 1974 many Israelis were ripe for Gush Emunim's ideas and practices. Grief over the Israeli casualties sustained in the 1973 war was widespread. So was shock at the blunders made by the government and the military during the war. The legend of Israel's invincibility was no more. People were very confused, and many were reaching out for reassurance and guidance. Gush Emunim's leaders offered clear, simple answers to some of Israel's besetting problems. First of all, their self-assured attitude itself relieved some of the anxieties generated by the war. The argument that the Jewish people should foster their uniqueness revived a national pride that had been severely shaken by the unclear consequences of the war. Second, although by 1974 most Israelis

had long since abandoned pioneering ideals, talk of "making the desert bloom" brought forth more than tears of nostalgia. The reappearance of the pioneer spirit reinculcated a sense of purpose and worth in many Israelis. Perhaps the war had not turned everything rotten, but had instead given rise to opportunities to fulfill new aspirations. Third, although many Israelis were preoccupied with their own mundane problems, there was a yearning at the back of their minds for the days when the individual subjected himself to the collective—when public affairs loomed large and self-sacrifice was praised. Many Israelis living in affluent homes were filled with admiration for the pioneers who lived in caravans on the hills of Samaria. Fourth, although most Israelis were not orthodox in practice, after the Six-Day War they began to cling in an almost inexplicable way to religious symbols. Historical sites like the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and, especially, the Western Wall in Jerusalem became extremely important even to nonbelievers. The intense excitement associated with these monuments was felt by all, not just the orthodox. Israelis did not become more devout, only more traditional. They apparently performed certain rituals without adopting Judaism's prophetic teachings. The idea of God's intervention on Israel's behalf recurred in October 1973, because there were times when Israel's situation was so perilous that it seemed only a miracle could save it.

Gush Emunim's arguments were more attractive precisely because they did not insist that everyone else follow their example. Gush leaders did not harangue people to leave their comfortable homes and settle in the barren hills of Samaria or insist on the practice of orthodox Judaism. Gush Emunim people were willing to do the work. All they wanted in the early stages were tools—the public's support and a congenial atmosphere.

In the climate following the 1973 war, Gush Emunim was highly successful in disseminating its ideas. Its first target was the orthodox constituency, for whom the religious gospel was bread and butter. Its second was the Laborites, for whom the Gush promised to revive the spirit of pioneering and restore the value of settling the land. Its third target was those hardliners who were rapturous over the resurgence of militant activity and the neonationalists who were suspicious and apprehensive about Israel's assimilation into the world community of states. Gush Emunim's gospel also appealed to those who believed that Israel would only survive through military might. Finally, there was the general public, which was enchanted by the dedicated self-sacrifice of the "nice youngsters."

The expansion of Gush Emunim to the nonreligious sectors of Is-

raeli society had repercussions that were not confined to the territorial issue. Gush Emunim embraced anyone who performed God's command to settle the land, even though that was the only command obeyed. The movement's acceptance of secular supporters provided a new foundation for relationships between religious and secular Israelis. An underlying assumption of Gush ideology was that "there is no Jew who has no faith; that is why the term Emunim [faith] fits each and every Jew."[103] It was not Gush Emunim's warm reception in the orthodox camp that provoked wide mobilization in the secular camp; it was the Gush members' novel and appealing style of being religious.

Gush Emunim's influence on its natural constituents—orthodox youngsters—has been more conspicuous. The religious sector in Israel has always been overshadowed by the secular one. Prior to the state's foundation, orthodox youth did not join paramilitary organizations, so they did not take part in the heroic adventures of the early years. Although since the state's establishment most religious people have been integrated into civilian and military life, many feel (and are considered by secular Israelis to be) marginal. Skullcap wearers are often ridiculed by their secular peers. It is therefore no wonder that religious youngsters have been drawn to Gush Emunim, whose outlook has eased their own feelings of shame and frustration. Some Gush Emunim members have even attributed the movement's existence to the "deep residue of inferiority feeling among religious Zionist youth, accumulated over many years."[104] The Gush has introduced a new style, outlook, and fashion. The leaders proclaimed that "religious is beautiful" and that the knitted skullcap is a source of dignity, not shame. Heroic exploits are no longer monopolized by the secular, some of whom view Gush Emunim's rising popularity with envy. Religious youth have taken pride in the achievements of their coreligionists.

Gush Emunim's expansion might have been blocked by the response of the Sephardi communities. These were, by and large, religious and nationalistic groups and, thus, natural supporters of Gush Emunim.[105] Many Sephardi Jews, however, were disadvantaged and concentrated in depressed urban neighborhoods and development towns. It could be argued that because the Gush settlers were consuming state resources for their settlement activities, they and the Sephardim would have been rivals. Sephardim did not move to join settlements in Judea and Samaria, which were settled primarily by Jews of European descent. Yesha launched a mass campaign in urban neighborhoods, but it had no positive results.[106] Although Israel's Sephardim did not respond to the settlement call, they clung to hard-line territorial

policies and rarely competed with Gush Emunim for scarce state resources.[107]

Neither Gush Emunim's expansion nor its ideology was immune to change. About 1980 the ascetic pioneering spirit that characterized Gush members at the outset was replaced by a more materialistic mood that was far removed from the self-denial preached by the group's founders. The settlers in Judea and Samaria were visibly enjoying the benefits of a generous flow of government funds. They could hardly be compared to those Jewish pioneers who had drained the swamps and cultivated the deserts a few generations earlier. Although at the present writing there has been no explicit shift in values, the pioneer spirit has ceased to dominate.

There has also been an ideological change in the religious domain. The institutionalization of the Gush was accompanied by a growing isolation. After six years of undeniably effective activity, the Gush faced its first major defeat in 1979–80 when it failed to block withdrawal from substantial parts of Sinai. In the process of taking stock, a controversial article appeared in *Nkuda* ("The Killing of Messiah the Son of Joseph") that attributed the Gush's failure to its cooperation with secular Israelis. "Any vision that does not emanate from the clear divine lightning, even if it survives temporarily, is doomed to face an end."[108] Gush leaders were urged to abandon their pragmatic ways and return to religious sources—to disseminate "the true light of God" instead of immersing themselves in the chores of settlement. The article exposed one of the most controversial issues confronting Gush Emunim. Rabbi Kook's followers insisted that the boundaries between observant and nonobservant Jews be blurred for political convenience.[109] They were joined by members of Hatehiya, who were convinced that "the ghetto of the observant has to be broken."[110] There were others, however, who worked with nonobservant people for practical reasons but deep in their hearts yearned for the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. These people pursued their desire to set up a religious leadership in Israel and to replace Israel's secular political and legal systems with orthodox religious institutions through terrorist actions. Recently, this more extreme view seems to have become more influential and to have affected the organizational level. Orthodox Gush Emunim personalities have begun to disassociate themselves from the nonobservant. Porat has left Hatehiya, and the Gush has closed ranks in readiness for a mission extending beyond the retention of territories: to eliminate the "barricades that part the Jews from the Israelis."[111] Another implication has been the mounting religious extremism in Gush Emunim's settlements. The efforts to

establish communities of religious and secular people have not been successful.[112] A new type of settlement comprising ultraorthodox non-Zionist Jews has been welcomed by Gush Emunim. The non-Zionist beliefs of the new settlers do not trouble the Gush Emunim settlers, who heartily welcome an opportunity to bolster the orthodox environment in Judea and Samaria.

Our discussion of Gush Emunim cannot be concluded without reference to a major event; Israel's withdrawal from Sinai brought about substantive changes in Gush Emunim's organization, political action, and ideology. Yesha was the leading organizational actor in the drama of resistance to withdrawal. Gush Emunim and Yesha opposed the peace process and were petrified by the decision to demolish settlements (by force if necessary). Sinai, however, seemed somewhat remote to the settlers in Judea and Samaria, who were preoccupied with the perils of the autonomy plan and the alarming results of the Elon Moreh ruling. One Gush leader described the attention given to Sinai as an escape from the real internal problems of the settlements.[113] Although members of Gush Emunim protested against the withdrawal by founding a settlement on the sands of Rafah, the Gush did not organize to confront the situation until four months before the withdrawal date.[114] The group set up a staff to prevent withdrawal. It was directed to mobilize as many people as possible (whether or not they were Gush Emunim members) to settle in Sinai, to cultivate its lands, and to block Israel's retreat with their presence. Each settlement in Judea and Samaria was instructed to send a certain quota of people and money south to Sinai. Gush Emunim instituted a sophisticated communication and information network that coordinated the various sectors of the Movement to Stop the Retreat.[115] The effort failed, however; the masses simply refused to be mobilized. Gush Emunim's inability to achieve its goal exposed the movement's weakness and reduced resources, but awareness of this situation sparked a Gush revival. In May 1982 (the closing date of our research) a plan was drawn up to revive the Gush, to bolster its organizational structure, to formalize its membership, and to strengthen its institutions. The purpose of this organizational campaign was to prevent another failure. "We had to establish the Movement to Stop the Retreat because we neglected sustained political work in 'ordinary days' and woke up only when the sword of retreat was put on our neck. If we do not wish to form another movement to prevent retreat from . . . we have to organize instantly and start working." (Ellipses in the original.)[116]

The withdrawal from Sinai also affected the pattern of penetration. Gush Emunim's disappointment with the Likud has already been noted, but the rage and fury expressed by Gush leaders after the government's decisions on Sinai were unprecedented. "The government's activities . . . were a mixture of hypocrisy, false piety, lying and demagoguery" is an example of a typical Gush statement in reaction to the government's decision to withdraw from the area. The NRP was blamed along with the government, and the Gush bitterly charged the party with treason.[117] Gush spokesmen began to recall the days of the Alignment with nostalgia, insisting that Labor would never have relinquished the area or evacuated settlements.[118] Nevertheless, the Likud remained a means of access to power, and Gush members retained open channels to Begin's administration and support among Likud MKs.

Ideological changes in the Gush following the Sinai event were more serious. Gush members were divided over the issue of resistance. The controversy not only involved the specific Sinai event but the right of an individual to defy authority and disobey the law. Never before had Gush Emunim faced the reality of withdrawal from territory acquired in the 1967 war. Its activities had been geared to forestalling the option (seemingly remote) of yielding territories. But in Sinai (and especially in Yamit), the settlers' vulnerability and impotence to prevent withdrawal had been vividly exposed. It had become apparent that when a government was determined to relinquish lands, Gush Emunim's paramount ideological tenet could not be enforced despite all its organizational resources and channels of influence. Gush Emunim leaders had never clarified what degree of force its followers might use. Some demanded restraint and warned against any eruption of violence.[119] Others demanded forceful action.[120] The general mood, however, was to resist, but not to fight, the army.

Israel's retreat from Sinai was a source of much soul-searching for Gush Emunim. Settlers in Judea and Samaria were determined that "this will never, never happen to us."[121] But there was no unanimity on how to realize this commitment. Some continued to trust in the power of human reason and willpower.[122] Others called for "self-reliance," meaning that people should ignore official policy and flout the law if they did not like it. *Nkuda* lamented the "bankruptcy of Zionism," and its writers gloomily noted the death of hope. Some Gush leaders drifted into the Jewish terror organization acting against Arabs living in the territories. Others stuck to more conventional modes of political behavior, amassing resources and seeking avenues of influence.

The Golan Settlement Committee

Another group in favor of keeping the territories was the Golan Settlement Committee (GSC). Two things provoked the GSC's inception. One was the result of the peace negotiations, which proved that territories could be handed over. The other was a more immediate danger. When Foreign Minister Dayan said that "the Golan is not part of our ancestors' land," settlers in the Golan shuddered with apprehension.[123] When it was formed in 1978 the GSC included 24 settlements with a total of some 3500 people. The committee was an impressive organization. It had a regular biweekly publication, elected institutions, and publicly financed projects. It launched a campaign to ensure that the Golan Heights issue was kept alive and to influence policymakers to support its goals. The GSC's campaign was targeted toward the Knesset, the government, and the public at large. Among its activities were the initiation of a Golan lobby in the Knesset, meetings with ministers and MKs, mass rallies, and a petition calling for the annexation of the Golan.[124]

The GSC's strategy was effective because of its deep penetration into the locus of power. Twenty-four MKs from the Alignment, the Likud, the NRP, and Hatehiya formed a Knesset lobby embracing all but a few marginal Knesset parties. The GSC was accorded high legitimacy; its members often appeared before Knesset committees (especially those dealing with the allocation of resources) and sometimes participated in government meetings. (Only rarely is an interest group invited to a cabinet meeting.) GSC supporters had easy access to almost all political parties. They participated in party meetings and met with top party leaders. It is worth noting, however, that although the majority of the Golan settlements were affiliated with the Labor Party, the GSC was not active in the 1981 electoral campaign. Its members demonstrated a variety of political preferences in the elections.[125] But because of the committee's close association with Hakibbutz Hameuchad, whose members were champions of settlement in the Golan, its access to Labor circles was unique.

The Golan issue spread in every direction—to the Likud and to Labor, to both the observant and the secular. The GSC enlisted the support of other regional organizations—like the Galilee Settlement Organization and the Jordan Valley Settlement Organization—and acted in concert with other proponents of Greater Israel. Its goals were not wrapped

up in elaborate ideological garb. The founders set themselves one aim: the formal annexation of the Golan Heights by the Israeli government for reasons of security. (The security argument could hardly be challenged in post-1967 Israel.) The GSC was clearly resourceful, penetrating, and expansive. If it did not determine political decisions, it certainly accelerated them.

Summary

Activities by hawkish groups constrained Israel's decisionmakers to an amazing extent. In its infancy, this type of activity was modest. The LIM advocated the retention of all territories, but its leaders' close association with decisionmakers inhibited effective action. Although this group disseminated the idea of Greater Israel, it failed to bring about changes in the authoritative choice. The LIM's main purpose was to present alternative policies to the political elites. Its organization was weak, and penetration occurred mainly during the incumbency of the National Unity Government. The LIM's ideas gained support largely because they were not far removed in content (although different in style) from government policy. Expansion was confined to the LIM's ideologies and did not lead to increased participation in decisionmaking.

When Gush Emunim first appeared, the disparity between the group's goals and those of (some of) the decisionmakers was unmistakable. Gush Emunim did not only offer an alternative way; it took it. The Gush did not follow government action but tried to be the tail wagging the dog. Its resources were manifold—cohesive leadership, mass support, and a remarkable zest for action. Its capacity to penetrate different political elites enabled Gush Emunim to overcome what would otherwise have been an obstacle—the variety and richness of Israeli ideological beliefs. These assets operated as long as Gush Emunim was an opponent of official policy.

When the identity of interest between the Gush and the governing elite intensified, the movement's effectiveness declined. Although during this phase Gush Emunim people became highly integrated into the process of decisionmaking, they failed to induce changes favorable to their own priorities. The pace of settlement was dictated by the government; the settlers of Elon Moreh were removed to another site. The Gush was not instrumental in the campaign to annex the Golan

Heights. It also was not able to prevent or postpone the evacuation from Sinai, whose surrender tarnished the Gush image as the savior of Eretz Israel.

Gush Emunim declined for four main reasons. First, organizational proliferation diluted some of the group's mystery. The Gush paid a high price for becoming too much like an established, bureaucratic institution. An organization preoccupied with lobbying in the Jewish Agency, arranging sewage facilities for its clients, or entangled in ugly power games in the Knesset was a considerably less charismatic and, hence, effective promotional group than the early, heroic Gush Emunim. The organizational branches of the Gush became engaged in consolidating what had been accomplished in almost a decade and in the process, became diverted from the original sources that had given birth to the Gush.

Second, the Gush's deep penetration in the Likud government itself inhibited its effectiveness. Gush Emunim had a prominent spokesman in this government (Sharon) but even he could not change undesirable policies. The movement's limitations were revealed when it had ostensibly reached the peak of its power.

The third impediment was Gush Emunim's ideology, which, although basically constant, attracted a too-diverse constituency. The widening rift between the observant and the secular; the deepening gulf between the political camps prior to the formation of a national unity government in 1984; and the growing assertiveness of the religious community reduced Gush Emunim's ability to cross the boundaries separating social sectors in Israel.

Fourth (and perhaps most important), despite the recurring clashes between the mature Gush Emunim and those in power, the Gush performed its task well and produced a sizable presence in Judea and Samaria. Its followers therefore withdrew from the public political arena. As stated by one of its leaders, "It is not thou who has to complete the work, but you are not exempt from beginning it."[126] Gush Emunim had sparked the ideas of settlement, building on ideas promulgated by the LIM. By 1982 the spark had burst into flame, and thousands of people had settled in the territories. They settled not because they identified with what the Gush preached, but because they were lured by benefits that had become available only because of the group's efforts. Although Gush Emunim devotees remained the leading group among West Bank settlers, the influx of non-Gush settlers eventually diminished their group's role and impact.

Recently, the hawkish constraint that reached its peak in 1975–76 seems to have become less effective. Although Israel's presence in the territories in the form of sizable Jewish settlements is an indisputable fact, organized group activity aimed at influencing the future of the territories has dwindled.

FIVE

Interest Groups: Dovish Constraints

Policymakers were constrained by both hawks and doves, but not in equal measures. Doves were somewhat belated in their appearance. They were less homogeneous and not as well organized. Effective dovish input did not surface until 1978, when the peace process with Egypt was already in full swing. It had taken Israelis over a decade to organize for actions to promote peace.

The Era of Peace and Security

Whereas the retention-of-territories option was eventually articulated by a highly organized movement, the peace-in-exchange-for-land option was promoted only by loosely organized, uninstitutionalized groups. In the wake of the Six-Day War there were only a few individuals who were ready to advance the cause of peace. Peace was no doubt desirable, but more as a fantasy than a reality. The mood of the time was not conciliatory toward Israel's neighbors. Israelis were overcome by the putative "miracle" of their victory, and were slowly digesting their encounter with ancient biblical sites of central significance to Judaism. A faint voice on the fringes of society was raised against the retention of captured lands, but scarcely anyone struggled against the

intoxicating brew of military triumph that was filling everyone with national pride. Some attempts to resist this mood are revealed in a published record of conversations among soldiers who were kibbutz members.[1] These conversations were not arranged by any organization challenging the new circumstances. They were, rather, the result of an introspective and troubled mood experienced by the people who set them up. The participants did not question the need to fight, but they expressed anxiety at the results—especially about Israeli domination of large number of Arabs living in the territories. The soldier-kibbutzniks were perplexed and concerned, but their doubts about attitudes considered sacred by most Israelis did not inspire action.

Organization

The dovish input initially sprang from two marginal groups, Matzpen and Siah. Matzpen, founded in 1962 as a splinter of the Communist Party, advocated a radical communist ideology that included outright condemnation of the 1967 "imperialistic Israeli war." Its membership was very modest and so was its influence.[2] The other group, Siah (the Hebrew acronym for New Israeli Left), was less esoteric than Matzpen. Siah consisted mainly of defectors from Mapam. It was founded by Tel Aviv University students in reaction to Mapam's participation in the coalition government and its adherence to the official proterritories line. Siah's founders were joined by defectors from Maki, the Zionist Communist Party (who also rejected what they called the party's hard line), a few intellectuals, and some students from the Hebrew University.[3] Siah and Matzpen were both ideological groups lacking a well-structured organization. Neither had a paid staff or formal membership. Siah's only institution was a forum that was open to any who wished to take part in lengthy discussions. During 1972–73 Siah staged a few street demonstrations. At about this time, however, it ran out of steam, and its leaders rejoined the left-wing political parties. Matzpen's activity was restricted to a small group of adherents who met irregularly.

Another enterprise in favor of territorial concessions was launched by the Movement for Peace and Security. This movement announced its birth in July 1967 in a proclamation signed by young lecturers at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The proclamation presented their assessment of the new political situation following the Six-Day War. Its content and mood were far from extreme. The proponents of the dovish option spoke of peace as a desirable goal. In the same breath, however, they also enunciated "security" as a major concern, that should not be

overlooked in the clamor for peace. This dual concern for peace and security gave rise to the new group's name. The peace promoters were not very ambitious when they began to act within the confines of the university. Basically, they wished to put the peace option on the political agenda. Both the organizational structure and strategies of the Movement for Peace and Security were compatible with this objective. For two years the movement had scarcely any organization. There were no enrolled members, no institutions, and not even a stable leadership. The young lecturers were joined by some of their senior colleagues, the best known of whom were professors Yehoshua Arieli, Yaakov Talmon, and Tzvi Verblovski. But these senior members added practically nothing to the movement's organizational makeup or its (meager) activities.

Activists for the movement were outstandingly articulate. They appealed to the public in the daily press and eagerly accepted invitations to give public lectures.[4] The movement's major asset was the eloquence of its stars, who were predominantly from the more-educated social strata. The movement did not stage street action or mobilize large crowds. It limited itself to elitist types of activity and disseminated its message through the writings of its better-known members. Words were the only weapon wielded by the Peace and Security Movement, and, more often than not, these words reached people who were already inclined to support the cause of peace. The strategy of persuasion was not deliberately planned. It emanated from the group members' personal life-style, which was characteristic of academics whose interest in practical politics derived primarily from intellectual pursuits.

Penetration

Since the Movement for Peace and Security never devised an organizational structure, it is difficult to gauge the group's cohesion. Even its attempt at loose institutionalization did not last long. The movement's founders were not party activists. But they maintained close links with some Labor leaders and, thereby, gained access to decision-makers.[5] Despite these open channels, the group's contacts with the Labor Party were sporadic and intermittent. It had more frequent access to Mapam, which since 1969 had provided funds and granted its members permission to be active in the movement.

The "Mapamization" of the movement had four visible results. First, it removed the center of activity from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.[6] Second, it prompted members of left-wing parties (such as Maki) and other

leftist elements to join the movement. Third, the movement began to supplement its organizational activity by holding public meetings.[7] Fourth and most important, the group crossed the line distinguishing groups from parties by submitting an electoral list for the 7th Knesset elections. Gadi Yatziv, the head of the list, saw this leap into political waters as a device to bring about public awareness. "Not for one moment did we assume that we could pass the blocking percentage," he explained. "But the atmosphere was extremely congenial. We could educate the people and attract their attention. Between elections nobody will listen to you; it is only through the electoral process that you can reach wide publics."[8]

The Peace and Security list had no problem meeting the conditions necessary for eligibility (at that time 750 signatures and a financial deposit). Although they satisfied the formal criteria for an electoral party, the movement's leaders, somewhat paradoxically, preferred to remain nonpartisan. The peace list had one objective—to disseminate the idea of peace among other parties and the general public. It reached neither goal. Other parties were irritated by the competition, however slight, presented by the new list, and by the startlingly principled behavior of its leaders. The public was no more enthusiastic. It gave the peace list 5138 votes, only 0.4 percent of the electorate. The abortive electoral experience further attenuated the Movement for Peace and Security. It later joined other peace movements, but was never again active in its own right.

The demise of the Movement for Peace and Security did not silence the voice of peace; it was nurtured, inter alia, by the echo of roaring guns along the Suez Canal throughout the war of attrition. In the spring of 1970 the peace campaign took several forms, the first of which became known as the Goldmann Affair. Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, was approached by various intermediaries. They suggested that Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt would talk to Goldmann if Goldmann met him with the "knowledge" of the Israeli government. The government refused its "knowledge," and thereby earned the doves' condemnation for not seeking peace at every available opportunity. Dissatisfaction with the government's policy led to the first sit-in by peace supporters near Meir's home. More significant, from a publicity viewpoint, was a letter addressed to the premier by 54 high-school students expressing their doubts about serving in the army.[9] Among the signatories of the letter were two sons of reputable political figures—Yitzhak Sadeh, the chief commander of the Palmach, and Victor Shem-Tov, a minister for Mapam. The dovish outcry against the government

faded when Nasser denied that he had ever made the overture, and the whole incident began to look like a false rumor. Once again, the dovish mood was nipped in the bud, and the public appeared less ready to be mobilized. (One indication of the resistance to the peace option was the furious public response to the Chamber Theatre's 1970 production of a passionately propeace play, *The Queen of the Bath*, by Hanoch Levin. The play was closed because it aroused so much anger.)

By summer 1971 it had become abundantly clear that U.S. efforts to reach an interim agreement over the Suez Canal were fruitless. The evolving political stalemate provided another dovish input. On December 27, 1972 a group of university professors cabled Premier Meir, urging her to reassess Israel's attitude to negotiations with Egypt. "We presently sense that the government of Israel has not so far exhausted all available political options for negotiating with Egypt and for averting the perils of renewal of war." As one of them admitted, "The signatories were not organized, let alone a homogeneous group; in fact they hardly knew each other." In view of this, Meir refused to meet them and disregarded their input.[10] The exchange between the professors and Meir exposed the formers' apologetic attitude. One professor denied the group's connection to any former peace movement, emphasizing its ad hoc character.[11] Another professor claimed that the cable "does not express mistrust in the principles embodied in the government's policy and therefore does not violate the national consensus."[12] The doves seemed unable to withstand practically any criticism, and they remained virtually inaudible during the 1973 election campaigns.

The 1973 October war did not produce a more dovish mood, not even for those considered to be "attentive publics."[13] The postwar protest was not about territorial choices. It focused on demands for changes in leadership, not in policy attitudes. The protestors called for internal changes in the parties and the government but did not urge the leadership to alter its course and rescind its policy.[14] For all practical purposes, between 1974 and 1977 the dovish scene was dominated by political parties.[15] Only rarely did a peace group emerge from what seemed to be a long hibernation. The peace option was once again promoted by the characteristic strategy of peace supporters—open letters and regular publications in English (*New Outlook*), and Hebrew (*Emda* [Position]) fostering the peace option. But no activity followed the lucidly written articles.

Until 1977 peace advocates lacked organizational resources and penetration. Their activities were sporadic and fragmented rather than coordinated and sustained. The peace groups hardly ever extended be-

yond the confines of Israeli universities and intellectual circles.[16] There were also the fringe groups mentioned above, but they were pariahs in Israeli society. This is not to say that Israelis, en masse, were hawkish. It is evident, however, that dovish sentiments were not able to be translated into effective action.

Expansion

The peace option did not have a wide following in the decade between the 1967 war and the first concrete political arrangements in 1977. Propeace groups diverged so widely from one another in matters other than peace that it is almost impossible to trace their various ideological motivations. Matzpen members clung to one brand of Marxism. Their less-rigid counterparts in Siah became part and parcel of the new left, interpreting Israeli policy as a Western plot to conquer and dominate less-developed peoples. There were former Canaanites (like journalist Amos Keinan) and a group called the Semites, who favored reconstructing an ancient pre-Israelite Semitic entity that would result in bringing about Israel's acceptance in the region. These attitudes were the residue of prestate ideologies, or, according to Rael Isaac, "a deviant strain in Zionism" fostered by Brit Shalom and Ichud.[17] These groups failed to successfully advance either themselves or their ideas. The post-1967 peace promoters who did not belong to any of the fringe groups already mentioned were motivated by moral considerations rather than by political arguments couched in national terms.

The Seventh Day, a book of edited conversations of kibbutz members about the Six-Day War, reveals the personal motivation of some of the people who joined propeace groups. It was reaction to battle experience and revulsion against war that led some people to adopt the option of peace. One surprising aspect of these conversations is the denial by Israeli soldiers of any hatred for the enemy. On the contrary, the talks are replete with statements denying the soldiers' animosity toward their adversaries. "We fought the enemy because it was vital to do so—but we can't hate them," stated one soldier-kibbutznik. Another admitted that he "felt an awful repugnance about pulling the trigger. There were times when it was almost absurd; times when it was absolutely essential and when I still hesitated. I'm convinced that it had nothing to do with fear; it was simply an unwillingness to kill."[18] There was concern for the fate of individual Arabs. "We've got to try to do the best for the people. Wherever it'll be best for them, whether it'll be called Jordan or Israel,

that's where they have to belong. The minute the people living there suffer from the fact that they're in Israeli-held territory, then I claim no right to hold those areas."[19] For those who experienced it, the direct outcome of this "humanization" process was the deglorification of war. Jews in exile had not concentrated on physical prowess; they had not been fighters; they had not been war heroes. By 1967, however, military heroism was already well entrenched as a positive Israeli value—a source of vitality and national esteem. The view reflected in *The Seventh Day* was a minority one:

> The root of all this confusion lies in the glorification of war, accompanied by the indisputable fact that war can't be a good thing and that nothing can be achieved by it. No one comes out of a war unscarred. I find it very difficult to accept the idea that it was through the war that we achieved great and wonderful things, things that no one dreamt of before. Can you educate in the light of war? Can you establish and build and develop a set of concepts, values and ideals in the light of war, or in the shadow of a potential war? You can't build yourself on war.[20]

The kibbutzniks' denunciation of war was based not only on pragmatic and moral grounds but on their awareness of the ages-long historical experience of Jews as the victims of physical violence. "We know the meaning of genocide, both those of us who were in the holocaust and those who were born later. Perhaps this is why the world will never understand us, will never understand our courage, or comprehend the doubts and the qualms of conscience we knew during and after the war."[21] Out of this perplexity emerged an idea that pervaded the dovish camp:

> Once Jewish sovereignty was gained, once it became clear that this was the home of the whole Jewish people, that it was their shelter, the home of their dreams, their creative spirit, then we were left with another great dream, one no less fantastic, perhaps, than the vision of the establishment of the state, that we should be able to take root not only on the mountains, in the soil, but also in the human scene among the Arabs.[22]

In a nutshell, these were the sentiments that guided the peace camp. The situation not only affected Arabs, but Jews as well. The practical consequences of occupation might have appalling moral results. "We would have to adapt ourselves to a state that was unwillingly turned into a police state, to a government whose need to maintain a

special class with the responsibility for repression would affect its own mentality. We would have lost our souls for some additional territory."[23] For those not willing to pay this price, cession of territory for peace was one alternative.

The peace camp's practical proposals did not deviate significantly from official policy—namely, "peace within secure and agreed borders." Accordingly, the Movement for Peace and Security claimed that "no territory should be evacuated without a peace agreement ensuring our security." Furthermore, the peace movement underscored its allegiance to the norms of Israeli society. "We are proud of Zahal, the army of the people, as the effective and loyal tool of the Government's decisions."[24] Despite postulating security as a precondition for peace, the movement quarreled with the government on three major issues. It rejected the creation of "facts" in the territories; in plain language, it opposed settlement. Retroactive endorsement of unauthorized settlements was perceived as a "source of grave peril." The movement demanded that "the government take immediate action to put an end to Jewish civilian settlement in the areas in question aimed at creating new facts in the occupied areas."[25]

The second bone of contention between the peace camp and the government concerned the Arabs living in the territories. For the peace movement, Israel's acknowledgment of the Palestinians' right to exist as a nation and to determine their own political fate was paramount. "This is the touchstone that will determine our progress towards accommodation and conciliation, or alternatively, to expansion—to honoring the rights of others, or to ignoring them. This is the yardstick which will determine our state's democratic feature and moral essence."[26] Fearful of the consequences of their encounter in the territories for both Jews and Arabs, Arieli expressed the view of most peace supporters when he wrote, "It is in our most vital interest to find as quickly as possible a way towards a settlement which would enable us to return the occupied territories to their inhabitants, as the rule over another people against its will undermines the very moral basis on which the state of Israel was established."[27] The government was exhorted to "allow the population of the occupied territories to be a partner in, and party to, the general effort to attain peace."[28]

In contrast to the government, which in the first phase of its territorial policy had spoken of a "great leap to peace," the Movement for Peace and Security espoused a gradual process. "It would seem reasonable," wrote Arieli, "that the government of Israel would seek alternative proposals which might mean less than peace—if they bring de-

escalation of regional tensions and point towards a way to resolve the conflict."[29] (Israel's government only began to adopt and implement this approach after the 1973 war.) The peace advocates' insistence that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be ended by any available means predisposed them to heed outsiders' opinions. "Of course one can argue that what the Gentiles think makes no difference, but then we have to give up our position as a nation in the family of nations and return to the status of a closed, secluded sect that dare not regard itself as a partner to general human affairs."[30] When opponents of the peace groups claimed that Arab leaders denied Israel's own right to exist, Yaacov Talmon replied, "Should we resemble them? What then would be the superiority of our position?"[31] Paradoxically, the Movement for Peace and Security and Gush Emunim both wanted Israel to be a light unto the nations. But whereas Gush Emunim wanted Israel's light to be glaringly self-assertive, self-reliant, militarily strong, and uncaring of outsiders' opinions and rights, the peace movement wanted the light of Israel's moral integrity to shine forth and illuminate other nations.

The Movement for Peace and Security's goals were only vaguely translated into political options. The Land of Israel Movement's demand was to settle the territories and incorporate them into Israel. The peace movement was not sure what ought to be done to ensure both peace and security. It was far from clear how to enable the Arabs to determine their future political fate while satisfying Israel's defense needs; how to win the international community's applause while protecting Israel's basic national interests. One of the proposals was to establish a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Shlomo Avineri presented an explicit demand to discuss "with the Palestinians now under Israeli rule the possibility of a Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza."[32] Others rejected this goal, preferring to limit discussions to establishment of a Palestinian "entity." In 1970 Arieli presented a detailed peace plan that made no mention of a Palestinian state.[33] The ideological diversity within the peace camp precluded agreement on one clear objective. On one point, however, there was unanimity: that Israel should take the political initiative, the first step of which had to be a declared readiness to return territories. Although no one in the peace camp disputed the necessity to forfeit territory, many agreed "that Israel should capitalize on its present favorable situation to obtain the best security bargain possible in exchange for territory."[34]

Peace policies did not get far—not only because they lacked clear simple goals that could be implemented for all to see, but because the prevailing mood was unreceptive. Although peace slogans were accept-

able to parts of the population, 1967 was not the right season for sowing seeds of conciliation with Arabs.[35] One reason for this was the shocking confrontation with Jewish history, which all at once overwhelmed many Israelis. A participant in the *Seventh Day* talks, nonreligious in education and practice, expressed this feeling.

> We could see the Western Wall through an archway. We saw it before, but this time it was right in front of us. It was like a new life, as though we had just woken up. We dashed down the steps; we were among the first to get there, but a few had already got there and I could see them, men that were too tired to stand up any more, sitting by the Wall, clutching it, kissing the stones and crying. We all of us cried. That was what we had been fighting for. It goes so deep this emotion we felt when we reached the wall.[36]

Of course, not all territories were equally cherished, and the Western Wall had a very special place in people's memories. Still, the resentment felt at the thought of yielding any territory was widespread. Notwithstanding the moral justification, which troubled many Israelis, most were simply not ready to absorb the possibility of trading territory for peace. Israelis were reveling in their state's affluence (manifested in full employment), the arrival of many immigrants, and widespread self-satisfaction. The call for territorial concessions in return for the remote possibility of peace was hardly popular. Even Yaakov Riftin, who was at the far left end of the political spectrum, admitted that "to expect peace and direct negotiations from the Arabs is absurd." What the peace movement argued was "that between the certainty that the war will go on for years and involve ever-widening groups, the Soviet Union and even China, and a chance for peace, we say the chance is worth taking . . . More than a chance, we don't promise."[37] The likelihood that a willingness to take this chance would spread was low indeed. Israelis felt no compelling pressure to yield lands for a goal whose attainment was extremely improbable.

In conclusion, up to 1977 the peace movement's organization and penetration were rather weak. The propeace camp failed to acquire the external symbols of institutionalization; it lacked paid staff and registered membership. Its proliferation prevented cohesion. Some aspects of its ideologies were acceptable to some parts of the Israeli public, but more often, they were rejected altogether. The propeace activists had neither Knesset nor government representation.[38] Their access to decisionmakers was considerably weaker than that of the proterritories activists. There was a considerable gap between the champions of peace

within the Labor Party and those outside of it. Israelis governed by the Labor Alignment were not predisposed to support a policy advocating far-reaching territorial concessions. As for ideology, diversity was a major feature. Nevertheless, there was a wide consensus that Israel should embark upon a vigorous conciliatory policy and be ready to return lands in exchange for peace. There was no agreement on details, such as what lands should be given back, when, and to whom. As noted by Isaac, "While morality and justice made it clear that the territories or the overwhelming majority of them, could not be kept by Israel, morality and justice provided no guidelines on the means by which the return should be accomplished; indeed, morality and justice could be interpreted rather diversely on this question."[39] For all intents and purposes, the Israeli political elite virtually ignored the sparse peace input, which never matured into an impact.

The Era of Peace Now

Sadat's initiative revived the urge for peace among Israelis. No longer could their leaders adhere to a policy of *ein breira* ("no choice"), charging the Arabs with a total refusal to acknowledge Israel's right to exist; peace in exchange for territorial concessions was waiting on Israel's doorstep. In 1977 the climate was conducive to a strong peace lobby, which prodded the government to accelerate the process that was already evolving. The upsurge in peace input was prompted by a group that later became known as Peace Now. Unlike its predecessor, the Movement for Peace and Security, Peace Now demonstrated its ability to command resources, which enabled it to expand and penetrate decisionmaking circles. It proved successful in making its input effective enough to leave a mark on official territorial choices.

Organization

Peace Now was a direct response to the paralysis that followed Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Its roots, however, were planted in June 1977. The unexpected disruption of nearly 30 years of Labor-dominated government by the Likud's electoral victory prompted Alignment supporters to interrupt their political apathy and enter the political arena. They were impelled by a deep gloom. As one of them put it, "For us it was a dead end. We could not rest content and calmly watch the downfall of every worthy thing, every value in this coun-

try."[40] They demonstrated on the very day that Begin was on his way to the president to accept his nomination as prime minister-designate. The group, named A Movement for a Different Zionism, was not alone in its disenchantment with the Likud's success. It joined forces with another group whose members shared its determination to act democratically against the perils generated by the Likud government. The challengers of the new regime constituted a perfect "catnet." Most members were students who had shared a similar socialization; in fact, many of them were graduates of the same high school. They were the same age and had a common social status and similar ethnic origins. The group's behavior resembled that of a social club, but it had a clear-cut policy: no settlement in the territories. This particular issue was chosen for tactical and ideological reasons. Tactically, the territorial issue's high position on the state's political agenda almost guaranteed the movement's expansion. The ideological reason stemmed from apprehension that the Likud might implement its electoral pledges and establish many Elon Moreh. Membership in the Movement for a Different Zionism did not immediately accelerate; the activists saw themselves as catalysts igniting other people and organizations to challenge the retention-of-territory option.

The first organizational peace effort was targeted toward mobilizing larger public support. To this effect, a convention was held in Jerusalem. The participants, who included members of parties extending from the leftist Shelli to the centrist DMC, did not speak with one voice. All, however, expressed repugnance at continued Israeli rule over Arabs living in the territories and wished to revive authentic Zionism, which, they alleged, had been forsaken since the Six-Day War by those veering toward "the abyss of nationalism."[41] The scenario resembled events that had taken place a decade earlier; only the actors had changed. The policies of the peace activists, like those of their predecessors, failed to command wide support. None of the parties seemed to be a proper channel for expansion. The Alignment was licking its wounds at the time and was therefore not a strong partner for a peace campaign. The emptiness of the propeace arena eliminated the option of alliance with other input actors. The Different Zionism movement followed the strategy available to groups lacking resources; it appealed to a third party—in this instance, the media.[42] Actually, resources were not as scarce as it seemed at the time. Most members were well educated, articulate, and members of well-established families. Many had excellent contacts with the media and used its services to air their major concern, the change of government. Their protest was essentially against the Likud—not only against one of its policies.

Sadat's visit to Israel silenced the voice of A Different Zionism. It was inconceivable to criticize, let alone oppose, the first Israeli government to enter peace negotiations and declare its readiness to relinquish territories. Eventually, the stalemate in the Israeli-Egyptian discussions made many feel frustrated. Even more shocking were Ariel Sharon's attempts to install new settlements in Sinai. As posited by Ted Gurr, it was the growing gap between high expectations and modest reality that invigorated activity.[43] The initiators of Peace Now were the usual champions of peace aims: students from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. There was, however, some novelty in their peace input, for the students were also high-ranking reserve officers in the IDF. The fact that they were war heroes (one had received the Medal of Valor, the IDF's highest medal) was no secret. The group made its first public appearance on March 8, 1978, in a letter to the premier printed in the daily press. The 348 signatories of the letter added their military ranks to their names. They did that, recalled one of the initiators, to avoid being dubbed "leftists" and "deserters," which had been the customary response to other peace promoters.[44] The fact that the new movement was not composed of the usual peace-seekers, but of combat officers, attracted wide attention. The press emphasized the event's singularity, and the premier's reply included reference to the military rank of the authors. The leadership of Peace Now enjoyed the benefits of the prestige attached to heroism on the battlefield, but it lacked endurance—an essential quality for organizational maturity. In contrast to the Gush Emunim activists, the Peace Now leaders did not give up everything else to become full-fledged political activists. Most of them were extremely dedicated to the cause of peace, but for only a short time. In 1983, five years after its inception, only a few of the original founders of Peace Now were still active. The group's frequent changes in leadership were advantageous, because a sizable number of people were able to reach the apex of the organization and enjoy its status and power benefits. But Peace Now lacked organizational endurance and offered no figurehead for its members to identify with. Membership was also fluid. No formal links attached the champions of peace to their movement. In fact, the only criterion for membership was participation in the group's demonstrations and rallies.

Peace fever was not confined to Jerusalem. Ad hoc peace groups also sprang up in other parts of the country. The people who joined these groups were characterized by their feelings of efficacy to influence the flow of events; by deep frustration at the thought of seeing the hope for peace pass by; by a common socioeconomic background as second-

generation, affluent Israelis; and by their access to the media.[45] In Tel Aviv, for instance, "Citizens for Peace" organized to prod the government to keep the peace process moving. Like their predecessors, the peace activists were "sporadic interventionists" in politics who entered the political arena for one particular purpose.[46] They were not sure of the exact dimensions of their goal or the best strategy to promote it. They were absolutely certain, however, that the moment demanded action. The peace groups formed in 1978 were not based on a well-defined, meticulously planned, clearly articulated goal. Rather, they were formed out of frustration, serving as outlets for the disappointment that followed their members' rising expectations of peace.

Even in the group's early stages, the uncertainty about what ought to be done, in contrast to the assuredness that something must be done, proved detrimental to its cohesion. The harmony of the peace input was marred by fierce controversies between the group's Jerusalem and Tel Aviv branches. The initiators of the Officers' Letter in Jerusalem were determined to keep out of professional politics and to stay within society's mainstream. The Tel Aviv activists were more militant, demanding blatantly unconventional actions and closer links with left-wing parties. One of the manifestations of the controversy between the two branches was the dissent over the title Peace Now.[47] Disagreement extended beyond titles to the nature of the movement's activity. According to their own testimonies, the Tel Aviv activists refused to be fettered by the national consensus. What they had in mind was a professionally organized protest movement that would be continually active. It was not ideological differences that separated the Jerusalem activists from their counterparts in Tel Aviv but rather tactical disagreements and petty squabbles over scarce resources.[48] Since no organizational structure existed, no formal split could take place. It was not until the Lebanon war in June 1982 that the branches resumed their association.

Cohesion was further weakened when two Peace Now founders were persuaded to secede from the group a few months before the 1981 Knesset elections. The pretext for their withdrawal was their meeting with PLO spokesman Isam Sartawi in Europe without Peace Now's prior permission. The two leaders were on an official Peace Now mission to attract European friends and collect funds. Their meeting with Sartawi was not an aberration because he had already met with a number of Israelis. According to those involved, the matter had been aired at Peace Now meetings and a clear majority had favored contact with Sartawi. Other leaders denied this version, claiming that only a fraction of the movement had supported the meeting with the PLO envoy.[49]

The real issue was not this isolated meeting, but where to go next. The peace movement, which had grown out of frustration and impatience, remained largely moribund. Once a peace treaty with Egypt had been signed and activated, the original reason for setting up Peace Now was no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the Israeli government took no new steps toward expanding the peace and clung steadfastly to the remaining territories. To survive, Peace Now had to either modify its goals or initiate a process of organizational self-transformation.[50] Peace Now did not modify its basic goals—peace over territory. It did, however, shift its attention from the land itself to the people living there. It was only natural for the group to activate its ideology by trying to make connections with Arabs living in the territories. The problem was that such actions triggered controversy. By focusing its attention on the Palestinian issue, Peace Now weakened its claim to be a group seeking legitimate ends within the framework of a national consensus. Equivocation on the matter persisted, undermining the cohesion of the group's leadership and confusing its supporters.

A reappraisal of Peace Now's strategies was also called for after the conclusion of peace with Egypt. The group had been founded primarily as a means of showing the government that there was a groundswell for peace in Israel. As Peace Now matured, its leaders sought to influence government decisions more vigorously than in the early days.[51] Two channels were available to them: (1) to link up with one or more political parties and (2) to adopt radical strategies with a high nuisance value. But Peace Now leaders were reluctant to choose either path. They shied away from outrageous actions, and they were not willing to tie the movement to a political party. New goals were considered too controversial, and available channels of influence were rejected. It was therefore scarcely surprising that the movement began to wither.[52]

Despite the controversy over ends and means, Peace Now adopted a readily discernible strategy featuring street demonstrations and mass rallies. The first demonstration took place in Jerusalem on March 30, 1978, when a few dozen people drew Begin's attention to their concern for peace. Two days later, on April 1, 1978, some 40,000 people demonstrated in Tel Aviv to urge the government to accelerate the process of peace. This strategy culminated in a mass demonstration of some 100,000 people, staged a day before Begin set out for Camp David. Demonstrations were not only staged in city squares. On April 16, 1978 Peace Now members stood along the highway from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem carrying banners calling for peace.[53] On June 27, 1978 Peace Now supporters marched around the government's office calling for a terri-

torial compromise. The demonstrations and rallies were orderly. Peace Now acted within democratic rules. Its members chose to assert their rights of expression as citizens of a democratic state. Although the group used imaginative strategies and innovative activities, it nevertheless acted within the limits of conventional political participation. Even the huge demonstration calling on Begin to compromise at Camp David was described by the press as "one of the most original and good-natured demonstrations in years."[54] Peace Now urged the government to conclude peace through persuasion rather than coercion.

After the Israeli government agreed to trade lands for peace in the Camp David Accords, a change in the movement's methods of operation was needed. Further demonstrations were seen as superfluous. "We thought the government should be allowed to negotiate the details of the accords without undue pressures," recalled one of the activists.[55] The arena of struggle was shifted from the highways and the squares of large urban centers to the West Bank, where Gush Emunim people were rapidly founding settlements. Peace Now resumed its demonstrations, but with less vigor. Some demonstrations, however, were still staged in the major cities. One, staged in Tel Aviv on June 16, 1979, was attended by some 40,000 people in protest against the Elon Moreh affair. Another attended by 80,000 people on October 20, 1979, demanded an end to settlement activity, but the center ring was beyond the Green Line (Israel's pre-June 1967 borders). Imagination was still fertile, but fewer people turned up. Peace Now could attract crowds to demonstrate in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, but the group found it much more difficult to get people to turn up on the outskirts of Israel, far from the major population centers. The movement's ability to rally people for mass demonstrations declined significantly after peace with Egypt was concluded on March 26, 1979.[56]

The reasons for the decline can be found in the movement's resources and objectives. The resources available to Peace Now did not allow the continuation of its earlier strategy. The problem was not lack of money, which continued to be available for "essential projects," but lack of human resources to carry out the group's strategies.[57] Peace Now could not rely on throngs of people to join in their activities with the same enthusiasm as that shown by the religious students who joined in Gush Emunim activities on the West Bank. The supporters of Peace Now were individuals living and working in the big urban centers. Only a few were willing to join an activity staged in a remote place. The second reason was grounded in the group's objectives. Peace Now had initially urged the government to accelerate peace moves and reach a

peace agreement with Egypt. Once the government was engaged in the process of peacemaking, it was hoped that demonstrations of public support for peace would sustain the government and induce it to implement the authoritative choice. When Peace Now shifted its focus to the West Bank settlements, its original goals changed. It was no longer attempting to accelerate a process but to alter it. In order to change an authoritative choice, it would have been necessary to present a clear alternative, which could subsequently be followed by new strategies. No such process occurred.

Peace Now opposed the settlements in the West Bank and sought a just solution for the Palestinians, but it offered no clear-cut political remedy for the Palestinian situation. It only insisted that the situation called for change. There was another obstacle to its peace campaign. Peace Now had a partner in Anwar Sadat, but no Palestinian leader was willing to develop close relations with the Zionist peace group. Differences in outlook and difficulties in communication inhibited fruitful discussion between Peace Now activists and Palestinians. The two groups also had different aims. As one Peace Now activist recalled, "Peace Now wanted to communicate with the Palestinians but the Palestinians were after the results of such a dialogue. They sought goods that the members of Peace Now simply could not deliver."[58] Peace Now adhered to its imaginative strategies, but its partners were unimpressed by demonstrations that neither alleviated their immediate grievances nor advanced their national cause.[59] Because of its failure to engage in productive dialogue with the Palestinians (whose plight was at the center of the group's concern) and its unwillingness to radicalize and dissociate itself from the Israeli consensus, Peace Now gradually waned and its resources dwindled.

Peace Now's difficulties were not limited to ideology, leadership, and strategy. Institutionally, Peace Now had a loosely structured decisionmaking apparatus, composed of representatives from Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the kibbutzim. The national body included some 25 representatives. Approximately 250 people participated in local meetings of Peace Now. This was, however, a paper structure. In reality, an informal group of activists—termed the Forum—formulated the group's strategies. Besides the Forum, there were a few standing committees: information, youth and urban neighborhoods, external relations, projects, finance, and the West Bank. These committees all functioned voluntarily and intermittently. Peace Now never acquired a permanent headquarters or a paid staff.

Penetration

Another impediment to Peace Now's impact was its limited scope for penetration. Peace Now had no representation in decisionmaking bodies. The Likud government was more single-minded than the Alignment on the territorial issue, and, despite the putative support of Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman, no one represented the movement in the cabinet. In the Knesset the picture was somewhat brighter, because 20 to 30 MKs publicly supported Peace Now.[60] The group's relationship with some of these MKs' parties was, however, ambiguous. For instance, the left-wing parties Hadash (the Democratic Front for Equality—the Communist Party) and Shelli favored territorial concessions and were ideologically identified with Peace Now. But their support was not altogether welcome to Peace Now, because both parties (and especially Hadash) were anathema to most Israelis. Peace Now leaders took pains to break away from the "leftist" stereotype that characterized the peace movement in the 1960s and early 1970s and to rid themselves of the stigma attached to this stereotype. Any formal linkage with the fringe left-wing parties in the Knesset would have prevented this. Furthermore, although it urged peace with the Arabs, Peace Now failed to attract Israeli Arabs to its ranks.[61] Any direct association with Arab representatives in Hadash or their constituents was therefore ruled out. Peace Now was determined to remain inside the Jewish consensus. Any shift to the left would have threatened its legitimacy and acceptance. Whether Peace Now did, in fact, escape a leftist association in the eyes of the public is an interesting question. The term "Ashafistim" (PLO members) was often used by the movement's opponents as a term of abuse. Peace Now did not want to add fuel to this fire by siding with pro-Palestinian state parties.

Ratz (the Movement for Civil Rights) and Shinui (Change, a splinter from the DMC) were further to the right in foreign policy terms. Both these parties, especially Ratz, courted Peace Now. They each wanted to cooperate with the peace group or even to incorporate it into the party itself. Neither party's Knesset strength was very attractive, but Peace Now did not shy away from Ratz or Shinui; it simply declined to forge strong, enduring links with either.[62] Two ex-Peace Now leaders, Dedi Zuker and Yael Tamir, appeared on the Ratz list in the 1981 elections. By then, however, they were no longer members of Peace Now.

Within the big parliamentary blocs, Peace Now was said to have slight support from a few dovish leaders in the Liberal Party, one of the

Likud's coalition partners. But this in no way amounted to "representation." The situation was different with respect to the Labor Alignment's Mapam, which, both politically and sociologically, was a natural ally for Peace Now. Mapam's policies were highly congruent with Peace Now's; Hakibbutz Haartzi is reported to have provided generous financial support to Peace Now as well as other essential resources.[63] Many kibbutz members were active in the movement. Among the leadership nucleus of Peace Now, which included about ten people, two were members of Hakibbutz Haartzi and of Mapam's center.

It is doubtful, however, if the above type of relationship can be regarded as representation. Peace Now's attitude toward Mapam was highly equivocal. It must be borne in mind that only a minority of the peace group's leaders and members identified with Mapam. Its close relationship with the party also seems to have endangered Peace Now's independence. Mapam's centralized features threatened to swallow the group and dictate its activities. Mapam, for its part, was eager to join forces with Peace Now. Its younger members yearned for innovation and were disenchanted with conventional party politics. Peace Now's vigor and novelty were highly attractive, especially to younger kibbutz members. A strong linkage with the peace movement would have benefited Mapam by engaging its youngsters and diverting them from the allegedly negative influence of the leftist parties. Peace Now leaders, however, preferred to keep their close relationship with Mapam out of the limelight, and they forged no formal links with the party.

Last, but by no means least, was the Labor Party. Here Peace Now had a real problem. Labor favored territorial concessions and had ardent supporters of peace among its MKs, best known of whom was Sarid. Many Peace Now activists had grown up in Laborite homes and were emotionally and intellectually, though not necessarily organizationally, affiliated with the party. The Labor Party was a viable political force, and, as such, it could exert strong pressure on the government even as an opposition party. As an inexperienced political group, Peace Now might have been expected to keep close connections with the party and to seek representation in its institutions. This was hardly the case. One explanation is that the Labor Party was floundering in its own troubles when Peace Now was formed. After 30 years in government the party was in opposition. Its leaders had to congratulate Sadat not as heads of a peace-seeking government, but as leaders of a defeated elite that had failed to hold on to its domestic support or to bring about conciliation with Israel's hostile neighbors. Israelis were overwhelmed by the peace events and gave the Likud credit for achieving them.

Peace Now did not wish to cooperate with such a Labor Party. On the contrary, the founders of the peace movement regarded themselves as a substitute for the declining party, which had been a leading force in the peace arena. The group deliberately dissociated itself from Labor, unwilling to be contaminated by the unsavory aspects of party political life. The initiators of Peace Now claimed that their entry into the political arena was for one purpose only—to accelerate the process of peace. Had they associated their movement with a party so recently sent into opposition, it would have stained the group's image. The emergence of Peace Now was designed to revive an "Israel the Beautiful" mood and to retrieve the glory of the pioneering era. The movement could not achieve this goal by identifying with a party whose election defeat had been partially attributed to its allegedly corrupt practices. Consequently, relations between the movement and the party resembled a game of hide-and-seek. Peace Now sought the Labor Party's approval, and the Labor Party courted Peace Now. Yet no official links were ever established between the group and the party, and no Peace Now representative was ever on Labor's Knesset list.

The elections to the 10th Knesset in 1981 prompted Peace Now to seek avenues to the parties. In doing so they hoped "to transform the spirit of Peace Now into an impact on the political system, on the parties' platforms and positions; to influence the composition of the lists of candidates, and to support candidates whose views approximate to those of the Movement."[64] Peace Now was ready to take part in the 1981 electoral campaign. Although it did not seek representation in the strict sense of the word, it was committed "to support people who identify with the basic principles of the movement, to spur their position in their respective parties."[65] Peace Now preserved its nonpartisan character. "The Movement will not identify with any party, nor will it recommend its members to join either of the parties." The group set out to lobby a wide range of political actors, such as platform committees, nominating committees, and party leaders, factions, and branches. Of these goals, only one was actually pursued—deliberations with party committees about their platforms. Three factors made the meeting with the Alignment committee the most crucial one: (1) the Labor Party's political power, which might lead to its return to government; (2) the ambiguity of the party's platforms, which reflected the opinions of its several factions; and (3) the basic similarity of its outlook to that of Peace Now.

The results of the group's meetings with the Labor Party were dubious. In May 1978 Peres stated that "the principles of Peace Now are identical with those of the Alignment."[66] This statement was disputed

by Meir, the erstwhile, but still powerful, party leader, who fiercely attacked Peace Now for its attitudes. "To attach a date to peace is confusing . . . What's Now?"[67] In 1981, however, Labor accepted Peace Now's position in principle. It rejected the domination of one people by another and even agreed to adopt the slogan "Conquest Corrupts." The peace movement, however, was not able to change Labor's policy on the Golan Heights.[68] This issue became a sore point between the party and the group and obstructed any further cooperation. Their association did not resume until after June 1982, during the Lebanon war.[69]

Since Peace Now had public support amounting to at least several thousand people, why didn't it present its own list to the Knesset elections in 1981? There are five detectable reasons. First, Peace Now members had little in common except the desire to promote peace, which could not be translated into an explicit political program. Peace Now attracted atheist and religious people, urban entrepreneurs, and kibbutz farmers. The likelihood of these diverse groups agreeing on any other issue was remote. Second, members of Peace Now were affiliated with six existing parties: Shelli, Ratz, Shinui, the NRP, the Liberal Party, Mapam, and the Labor Party. If Peace Now had itself become a political party, all these parties would have resented it. Hostility between the veteran parties and the new one would have inevitably resulted. True association between the group and the parties was not very close, but a Peace Now electoral list would have demolished even those tenuous relations. Third, Peace Now was recognized as a movement capable of attracting mass public support. Its metamorphosis into a political party running for the Knesset would have shattered its image. Most Israelis are loyal to their parties. The number who would have shifted their allegiance to the new party would undoubtedly have been substantially smaller than Peace Now's constituency as a movement. An electoral list would have consumed the group's already limited organizational resources. Fourth, most Peace Now activists were antiinstitutional in nature. The movement's followers were "sporadic interventionists" in politics, unwilling and unable to carry the burden of daily bureaucratic chores. The adherents of Peace Now were preoccupied with their nonpolitical professional activities and were not ready to indulge in branch-type partisan routine work. Peace Now activists felt effective as nonpartisan advocates and feared that their transformation into political professionals might spoil that. Also, as already mentioned, they saw parties as inefficient, somewhat degenerate, institutions. Extraparliamentarianism was perceived to be an asset.

Peace Now's access, the second criterion of penetration, was not as

open as that of its counterpart, Gush Emunim. Interviews with activists revealed that Peace Now's contact with decisionmakers was infrequent and limited in scope. Meetings were held primarily with party personalities rather than with ministers or MKs. There were, however, some noted exceptions.[70] Despite the paucity of interaction, Peace Now achieved some remarkable successes for so young a movement. Movement representatives met with Prime Minister Begin on April 21, 1978 and with Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance Simcha Erlich on May 8, 1978. These meetings were mainly intended to attract media attention. The gap between these politicians and Peace Now was too wide to be bridged by a pleasant conversation. Begin rejected demands by Peace Now members that his government express its readiness for a territorial compromise on the West Bank. It was not surprising that the next day's headlines read, "The initiators of the Officers' Letter are disappointed by their meeting with the PM."[71] A few unpublished meetings were held with Ezer Weizman, whose opinions were closer to Peace Now's than those of most of his government colleagues.[72] The topics of these meetings, however, were more technical than political. Peace Now had only moderate access to those people whose decisions could determine the course of peace.

Peace Now's legitimacy could not be taken for granted. The movement became the chief spokesman for peace in preference to territory, and it was recognized as such by decisionmakers. No government, however, thought it necessary to consult with Peace Now's leaders. Furthermore, from a normative perspective, Peace Now was legitimized neither by public authorities nor by the general public. A Likud MK, Roni Milo, charged Peace Now with maintaining contacts with the CIA.[73] Dr. Meir Rosen, Israel's ambassador to France, publicly accused Peace Now of damaging Israel's cause.[74] Interviewed activists claimed they were subjected to harrassment and threats. Peace Now supporters were acknowledged as genuine representatives of the peace constituency, but, in spite of its effort to keep within the Israeli mainstream, the movement did not acquire widespread public legitimacy.

Expansion

Peace Now encountered some problems with the acceptance of its ideology. As noted above, after the peace treaty with Egypt Peace Now shifted its attention to the Palestinian Arabs living in the territories. The leaders had two orientations that, to many, seemed mutually exclusive. One revolved around the rights and needs of Arabs as individuals, the

other around Israel's national imperatives. Peace Now's few publications (the movement had no regular periodical) and the more voluminous writings of its adherents explain these orientations at some length. Like its predecessor, the Movement for Peace and Security (and in stark contrast to Gush Emunim), Peace Now emphasized the worth and right of the individual. The sanctity of human life and an individual person's inherent right to justice and self-determination had been promoted in *The Seventh Day.* After more than a decade of Israeli rule over a million Arabs, the peace movement did not stop at moral condemnation but reached a more compelling conclusion. Israelis should turn away from ethnocentrism toward an anthropocentrism in which the individual, not the nation, stood at the center of the stage.

This attitude, which implied that the territorial issue would no longer be discussed in terms of national or state interests, was not acceptable to all Peace Now members. Those who emphasized the wrongs inflicted on the Palestinians sooner or later quit the movement and joined more radical organizations, such as the Council for Peace—Israel-Palestine. Only 24 percent of the activists interviewed in the course of this study perceived the harm done to the Palestinians either as a major reason for their joining Peace Now or as a central issue for the group.

Most people in Peace Now had a different emphasis. They deplored the change in Israelis when they became a conquering people, rather than regretting the fate of the conquered people themselves. Attention was shifted from the victims of Israel's domination to the dominating nation itself, whose democratic character, it was argued, was being endangered by the protracted occupation. The proponents of the Movement for Peace and Security had already broached this subject, so Peace Now was not making an innovative statement. The group, rather, expressed the mounting anxieties sparked by the increasing number of settlements. Daily encounters between settlers and Arabs, harassment of Arabs by Israelis, and the transfer of lands by requisition or purchase from Arabs to Jews brought the democratic issue to the top of the agenda. "A lingering domination morally endangers the dominating nation, bolsters its chauvinism, and shatters the web of the democratic society," claimed Peace Now. The problem was no longer a demographic one, but one that affected the most profound goals of Zionism. "If we came here to establish a democratic and Jewish state," asserted one activist, "how can we accomplish these goals while we mess with other people's affairs?" In other words, acting as conquerors harms the rulers, even if it confers benefits on the ruled. The argument was thus essen-

tially self-interested and nationally oriented. The Zionist dream would never be realized if Israelis continued to dominate another people. "We are Zionists who wish to amend, as quickly as possible, the corruption inflicted by the conquest and domination of other people—for our own sake, no less than for the sake of the others."[75]

The prolonged occupation had another negative effect. In an open letter to Premier Begin, Yaacov Talmon argued that ruling other people and occupying their lands threatened Israel's security.

> The rights of the Arabs are none of my business, and I have no knowledge or deep interest in their past and in their culture—but only in Israel and its security . . . The drive toward annexation not only will not provide us with security, but will exhaust our power to defend ourselves in face of our neighbors' hostility and the objection of the world community to our occupation.[76]

This pragmatic mood was also expressed by Yehuda Amichai, a renowned poet. "The major mistake is that retention or nonretention of territories is calculated on the basis of international morality or on the basis of Palestinian needs. What we ought to do is heed our own needs. We should not settle the lands, not only because of the Arabs but for the sake of our own good."[77] Peace Now's leaders were convinced that unless Israel returned territories (without specifying when and to whom) no peace would be concluded.

In contrast to the ideologues of the Land of Israel Movement, Peace Now theorists perceived peace to be absolutely essential for national survival, because "peace is the precondition for implementing Zionism."[78] They also believed that unflinching determination and perseverance were bound to result in peace. They judged peace with Israel's Arab neighbors to be a means of advancing Israel's national goals, but added a mystical note when they spoke of peace as "the core and essence of human existence." Only territorial concessions could bring about peace, without which the state was doomed. In startling contrast to the proterritories groups, Peace Now regarded conciliation with Israel's neighbors as not only desirable but attainable. The opponents of territorial concessions proclaimed that "there is some ancient, mysterious curse of fate—because of which we are doomed to eternal conflict with an inimical, alien world, no matter what we do, and therefore we had perhaps better slough off the image of the 'nice Jewish boy' and become the big bad wolves for a change."[79] But Peace Now insisted on being "nice Jewish boys and girls" and advocated what it considered

moral behavior not only (or even primarily) for its own intrinsic worth but as an appropriate means of achieving desired goals.

The peace option was proposed as the best route to Israel's security and stability.

> Peace Now regards the secure existence of Israel as a precondition to peace; but it sees its function as preventing the undermining of security by an attempt to base it solely, or principally, on additional territory . . . Territory becomes a factor inimical to security when its retention involves ruling and oppressing another people, isolating Israel militarily and politically, consuming our scarce sources of finance and equipment, splitting public opinion in Israel, dividing diaspora Jewry and undermining, in Israel, the faith and justice of Israel's way.[80]
>
> This incomplete listing of the harm caused by the occupation underscores the pragmatic attitude adopted by Peace Now to attract widescale support.

Emphasis on the best interests of the nation is conspicuous in the Officers' Letter, which can be read as Peace Now's basic manifesto: "A government policy that will lead to the continued rule over one million Arabs is liable to damage the democratic character of the Jewish state, and would make it difficult for us to identify with the basic direction of the State of Israel."[81] Despite this latent threat, Peace Now was not a radical group, and it took pains to underline its identification with the mainstream. Peace Now's adherence to the national consensus, as understood by its ideologues, was a significant, normative attribute. The group often reiterated that it was a Zionist body, and it did not denigrate agreed-upon national values. Even before the Lebanon war, Peace Now declined to associate with people who refused to do their military service in the territories and rejected attempts by a few of its activists to forge closer ties with PLO representatives. Unlike peace movements in Western countries, Peace Now never burned draft cards or the national flag and never denied the legitimacy of the regime. All it wanted was a change in a specific policy. It sought to achieve this goal by working within the establishment.

Time and again Peace Now proclaimed that it represented authentic Zionism, albeit in a different guise. The question remains whether Peace Now offered anything new. Saul Friedlander, for one, insisted that Peace Now was not really "different." To be sure, it diametrically opposed those who regarded the right to the land as the sole source of political policy and rejected any other consideration. Peace Now also opposed those minimalists who restricted Zionism's political goals to

those necessary for Jewish survival in Israel. Peace Now associated with mainstream Zionism—with those pragmatic Zionists who opted for the feasible rather than the desirable and whose activities and goals were molded by the imperatives of reality.[82]

Presentation of the ideas delineated above enabled Peace Now to expand. By March 1978 the movement had grown from a small nucleus of 20–25 youngsters to 348 signatories of the Officers' Letter. A month later 100,000 people who supported the peace campaign were pressing Begin to conclude a peace agreement at Camp David. The movement's expansion was not confined to the state of Israel. "Associations of Friends" were established in Europe and the United States and attracted wide support.[83] This kind of support was particularly important to Peace Now. It not only provided funds but effectively underscored the group's connections with world Jewry, thereby proving its Zionist credentials. As Peace Now grew in size, so did its heterogeneity. At its inception, Peace Now was composed of a few dozen students. It later spread to both urban and rural areas—the center and the periphery. The movement secured the support of two groups that had previously not been identified as peace advocates. The first consisted of industrialists and executives of big corporations, who demonstrated their support of Peace Now by generous funding and media campaigns.[84] Once again, the advantage gained was not only money but increased legitimacy. The tycoons' support made it clear that Peace Now was not a bunch of radical leftists but an organization supported by members of Israel's prestigious business community.

Peace Now also secured support in the religious communities. The problematic status of observant Israelis and their close association with Gush Emunim has already been noted. There was, however, a small group of observant intellectuals and religious kibbutz members who formed a peace association named Oz Veshalom (Power and Peace). In the organizational sphere, Oz Veshalom was more resourceful than Peace Now. It had a stable leadership and an enrolled membership; it convened a national council and issued a monthly newsletter. It also had some measure of penetration. Two MKs, NRP representatives Avraham Melamed and David Glass, espoused dovish postures.[85] Leaders of Oz Veshalom included university professors, rabbis, journalists, and kibbutz members. The group's expansion, however, was not impressive. Oz Veshalom attempted to present "a religious alternative to Gush Emunim."[86] The group did not disagree with the mainstream orthodox community that "our right to Eretz Israel is unassailable and inalienable." Their deviation from that attitude was phrased in a moderate tone.

"On the road to the implementation of these principles, the realities of the national, social and political security must be taken into account." Oz Veshalom proclaimed that

> the prospects for a conciliation that will terminate the conflict with our neighbors hinges primarily on their willingness and the alteration of their political and military strategies. These prospects are also highly determined by our own readiness for a territorial compromise on all fronts. Israel's domestic peace and tranquility may be advanced by the prevention of conflicts, disputes, and discriminations deriving from the presence of a national minority, comprising a high percentage of the population, who live among us.[87]

Oz Veshalom also perceived that Israel's international status was a vital element in its security. It is thus evident that the group fully concurred with the ideas promoted by Peace Now. Oz Veshalom, however, failed to obtain a substantial degree of acceptance within its own constituency. The majority of Oz Veshalom members were NRP voters.[88] In 1979 the NRP, however, was only just beginning to drift toward less-extreme postures and away from Gush Emunim. Only a minority of the party's voters followed suit and subscribed to peace policies. Oz Veshalom lent color and substance to the peace drive because it constituted additional proof that since 1978 the peace movement had not been dominated by aberrant individuals. From the organizational perspective, however, the group's impact was weak. Members of Peace Now and Oz Veshalom marched together in street demonstrations, but the former remained a secular group and the latter a fringe phenomenon. Nevertheless, by 1980 the ideological barrier that parted the propeace groups from the religious community seemed to have been eroded, if not shattered. The main beneficiary of this process was Peace Now, the more recognized and legitimate representative of the peace cause.

Despite these achievements, there were substantial obstacles to Peace Now's expansion. "Peace" was not a pejorative term—at least not until it had been identified with Peace Now and scorned because of the group. But there was a fundamental flaw that inhibited the movement's effective mass expansion—the complexity of its ideology and goals. To begin with, Peace Now supporters were divided among themselves on the issue of the Palestinians and territorial concessions. This division impeded the shaping of a clear-cut posture. Many people were not sure of Peace Now's goals: territorial concessions, certainly—but how much, to whom, when, and under what conditions? Was Peace Now willing to adopt the boundaries suggested in the Allon Plan? Was it ready, as

some activists claimed, to return every inch of territory captured in the Six-Day War? What was to be Jerusalem's future, a city that was cherished by the overwhelming majority of Israelis?

Many Peace Now activists admitted that they had not even given serious consideration to these questions. What was important was to underline the importance of peace—not to specify a coherent program for its attainment. There was also no easy answer to the Palestinian question. Most activists interviewed thought that the Palestinians had the right to determine their own fate, provided they recognized Israel's right to exist. A minority, however, deemed such a condition superfluous as long as the Palestinians were willing to negotiate with Israel's government. A third segment of Peace Now favored the Jordanian option. Others simply disregarded the issue and asserted that what was important was that Israel's government declare its readiness to return land, on condition that the state's security not be impaired. Who would govern the territories was neither Israel's nor Peace Now's concern.

The peace movement also refrained from spelling out the conditions necessary to ensure security. "We are not policymakers," stated one Peace Now activist, "and we don't have the knowledge and competence to design the conditions for security. We are willing and ready to rely on the experts, as long as they are willing to return lands."[89] Peace Now deliberately remained in the political background, regarding itself only as the spearhead of the desire for peace. The group made it abundantly clear that "the movement for peace does not pretend that it can bring peace. It is the government of Israel that must bring peace. That is its function."[90] The objectives of Peace Now were much less pretentious: "The Movement of Peace wants to initiate a public discussion on the nature of peace and the ways and means to its achievement, in order to enable the entire population of Israel to realistically evaluate the national, political, and military options that face us today, to weigh them, and to choose among them."[91]

Most Israelis may have considered the option of peace because of Peace Now's activities, but not all adopted the attainment of peace as the guideline for action.[92] This explains Peace Now's inability to expand its activities beyond demonstrations. The protest movement, initially aimed at freeing the stalled peace talks and, subsequently, at preventing further settlement in the remaining territories, soon exhausted itself. The divergencies among Peace Now partners, the group's failure to gain the support of the Palestinian Arabs in the territories, the negative nature of its demands (no more settlements, end the occupation), and its failure to present a clear, positive alternative hindered expansion.

Another major impediment was Peace Now's lack of appeal to the Sephardi Israelis. Peace Now's activists were well aware of this obstacle, and they made repeated efforts to collaborate with representatives of these less-affluent Israelis. A good starting point for collaboration was the allegation that excessive expenditure for settlement and security in the territories deprived Sephardic communities of the funds necessary to improve their social and economic environment. Attempts to forge an alliance between the promoters of peace and the promoters of socio-economic improvement, however, were largely futile. Peace Now's failure to attract Sephardi support was recognized by the movement's activists as its Achilles heel.

The main obstacles to expansion, then, were of two types. One emanated from the group's own characteristics; the other was generated by the external environment. The group's own ideological dissensions, its reluctance to present a clear-cut posture, and its very nature as an interest group promoting limited objectives inhibited effective expansion. The environmental impediments were no less formidable. Peace Now was a movement with a narrow social base. Although it cut across religious boundaries, its members were mainly from one social class: affluent, upper-middle-class people who were dubbed the "cream children" in Israeli society. Finally, the hurdles to expansion were to a large extent ideological ones. Not in vain did the initiators of Peace Now underscore their battle experience and their military heroism. Peace Now members carried on their shoulders the burden of the proof that although the movement professed peace it was nonetheless a "responsible" security-conscious group. In other words, its members were not cowardly peace-mongers who were willing to surrender the security of their state simply because they were afraid to fight.

Summary

The development of the peace input after 1967 occurred in three stages. In the wake of the Six-Day War a spontaneous peace movement lacking any viable organizational basis sprang up. The Movement for Peace and Security was poor in material resources, achieved very little penetration, and encountered severe difficulties in expanding its ideology. Although it presented the alternative of peace as another option available to decisionmakers, its policies lacked a practical basis that specified what kind of peace, under what conditions, with whom, and

when. Its organizational deficiencies were both a cause and a result of its modest expansion. The October War further weakened the peace movement. The years between the war in 1973 and peace in 1977 constituted the second dormant stage. It was not until Sadat's dramatic visit that the peace forces in Israel displayed their ability to influence, or at least to be involved in, the political process of formulating official policy. The peace groups of this third phase were substantially different from the previous peace movements. Peace Now's organizational resources were considerably greater than those of its predecessor. Penetration was still a problem, however, owing to the ambiguous relationship between Peace Now and the political parties. Most noteworthy was the movement's ambivalent connection to the major opposition party, the Labor Alignment, whose decline as a leading actor in the political arena was one of the reasons for Peace Now's foundation. From the ideological perspective, Peace Now deviated from the Movement for Peace and Security by supplementing moral arguments with more pragmatic considerations. Before long, however, it was caught in the same trap as its predecessor; it fell victim to its own vagueness and ambiguity. Both Peace and Security and Peace Now emphasized the importance of Israel's security in their manifestos. But whereas in the late 1960s Israel's security needs were promoted by peace-loving intellectuals preaching from their ivory towers, a decade later they were promoted by people who had gained experience in the battlefield. Peace Now contained the flesh and blood of Israeli society—not only marginal intellectuals. Its initial success at mobilization suggests that the desire for peace is entrenched in some segments of Israeli society, but that a catalyst is required to activate it.

Compared with the Movement for Peace and Security, Peace Now was remarkably successful in launching a mass campaign for peace. It rallied thousands of people to accelerate the peace process with Egypt. Its impact, however, lasted only as long as prospects for peace were high. Peace Now could mobilize crowds to walk the last mile along the long road to peace, but it failed to convince the same people to set off along a new road whose end was not in sight. The resources available to the group's leaders were inadequate to build a permanent organizational structure. The movement's goals were too diffuse to ensure its endurance. The common denominators uniting the members in demonstrations were insufficient to exert effective impact on the public or parliament. Finally, and perhaps most important, Peace Now began as a pressure group and continued as such. It challenged government pol-

icy but did not present a definite alternative. Peace Now was against war, against settlements in the territories, against unjust treatment of the Palestinians, and against retention of lands. It lacked the resources, penetration, and coherent ideology to initiate an alternative and demonstrate to the government and the people that such an alternative would promise Israel security as well as peace.

SIX

Public Attitudes

One consequence of the great importance attributed to the territorial issue by successive Israeli governments since 1967 has been the relatively large public involvement with group activity centered around that issue. Even so, most Israelis have not been directly involved in the process of policymaking. Public opinion has been monitored in opinion polls that have regularly surveyed attitudes on the territories. The crucial questions have been to what extent Israelis have been willing to withdraw from territories, or parts thereof, in return for peace; to what extent they have supported or rejected official policy and actions; and to what extent public rejection of its policies has constrained or undermined the government's legitimacy. Attitudinal measures of the public's willingness to make territorial concessions have been mainly derived from a continuing survey conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research between 1968 and 1982. These findings have been supplemented by those of other polling institutes. The data analyzed here are of two types. The first type consists of general views, by region, on returning territories. The second type focuses exclusively on attitudes toward the West Bank and examines the distribution of opinion by demographic-political divisions including gender, education, age, ethnic origin, religiosity, and party affiliation.

Views About Returning Lands

In one survey, Israeli citizens (or, more precisely, Jews living in urban centers) were presented with a straightforward question: "Regarding the territories held by Israel after the Six-Day War, what is the biggest concession you would be willing to make in order to arrive at a peace agreement with the Arab countries?" Respondents could choose from five possible answers: (1) give up everything, (2) give up almost everything, (3) give up some part, (4) give up a small part, and (5) give up nothing. These alternatives, however, had two limitations. First, the respondents were not asked what concessions they would be willing to make for an objective other than a peace agreement (for instance, a nonbelligerency, or even an interim, agreement). Second, only "Arab countries" were mentioned as possible partners to negotiations that might eventually lead to peace and Israel's withdrawal from territories; the Palestinians were not mentioned as possible collaborators. Despite these limitations, the answers to the above questions represent the two types of constraints or supports: the hawkish, including those unwilling to return territory or willing to return only a small part thereof; and the dovish, including those willing to concede everything, or almost everything, in return for peace.

Immediately after the Six-Day War, Israelis were questioned about the newly acquired territories. Although most knew what areas had been captured by the IDF, a markedly smaller number could identify the exact area on a map. The territories were still perceived as vague, remote entities.[1] It was not long, however, before a division of opinion developed regarding the captured lands. Even a cursory glance at Table 10 reveals that there was a definite hierarchy of territories that Israelis would be willing to concede to Arab countries in the event of a peace treaty. The Golan Heights was the most-valued area; an overwhelming majority (an average 88.8 percent) of respondents were either unwilling to return this area or willing to return only a small part of it. This attitude may be perceived as a support for official policy, since all governments were steadfastly committed to retaining the Golan because of its vital significance for Israel's security. Successive governments vowed not to relinquish the region under any circumstances. In fact, the annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981 was overwhelmingly supported by the public. A poll taken four days after the Golan bill was passed revealed that 70.6 percent of the respondents were proannexationists.[2]

The data indicate that Sinai was the least-prized region. But this

TABLE 10
WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TERRITORIES TO OBTAIN PEACE, 1968–1982, BY YEAR AND REGION[a]
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION NOT WILLING TO RETURN TERRITORIES)

Year	*Average*	*West Bank*	*Gaza Strip*	*Sinai Peninsula*	*Golan Heights*	*Sharmel-Sheikh*
1968	85%	91%	85%	57%	99%	93%
1969	77	75	75	52	95	87
1971	68	56	70	31	82	91
1972	79	69	78	54	97	96
1973 (Jan.–Sept.)	83	82	80	69	94	92
1973 (Oct.–Dec.)	68	59	64	37	89	89
1974	66.5	65		32	86	83
1975	61	46	57	35	84	84
1976	69	68	69	39	80	88
1977 (Jan.–June)	71	59	60		83	84
1977 (July–Dec.)	58	60	51	16	82	80
1978	67	67				
1979	60	60				
1980	64	58	48		85	
1981	62.5	63	62			
1982	60	60				
Average		64.8	61.4	42.2	88.8	87.9

SOURCES: 1968–1977. Louis Guttman, *The Israel Public, Peace and Territory: The Impact of the Sadat Initiative* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies, 1978). 1978–1982. Israel Institute for Applied Social Research (IIASR), Continuing Survey.

assertion is valid only when a distinction is made between the southern and northern parts of the peninsula. Israelis clung to Sharm el-Sheikh with only slightly less intensity than the Golan (an average of 87.9 percent). People therefore agreed with the Alignment's postulates, which attributed prime importance to southern Sinai. It was inconceivable for a post-1967 government to forfeit lands whose defense had been a direct cause of the outbreak of the Six-Day War. Yet when it became evident that making peace with Egypt entailed far-reaching territorial concessions, the public seems to have wholeheartedly supported a withdrawal from Sinai. Recurrent polls indicated that the Likud became more popular because of the peace treaty, and its steps toward conciliation with Israel's Arab neighbors were approved by a preponderant majority of

the public.[3] After the Camp David Accords (but before the formal treaty was signed), an overwhelming majority of 86 percent professed great admiration for the government's handling of state affairs; 89 percent were of the opinion that the negotiations were bound to result in the signing of a peace treaty.[4] It is thus not surprising that a majority of the respondents (70 percent) supported the evacuation of settlements in the Rafah Salient concomitant with the conclusion of peace.[5] Such acquiescence was hardly surprising. Data reveal that resistance to the return of the northern part of Sinai was never as adamant as that to the return of its southern zones. (An average of 42.2 percent were unwilling to return the former area.) Before the October War a much larger proportion of the public (69 percent) had refused to relinquish northern Sinai. From 1974 on, however (and especially after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem), willingness to make territorial concessions significantly increased—reaching 82 percent in 1978.

Opinions regarding the West Bank remained more constant. In the wake of the Six-Day War Israelis were swept off their feet with the excitement of once more being in touch with Jewish historical sites. Accordingly, a huge majority of 91 percent were unwilling to return those lands. Since 1969, however, the percentage of people in favor of retention was clustered around 65 percent, with a high of 82 percent in pre-October 1973 and a low of 46 percent in 1975. The average percentage of those against withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was just slightly lower than that for withdrawal from the West Bank (61.4 percent and 64.8 percent, respectively), a factor that may have bolstered the government's hard-line policy on the former area. The endorsement of the option of retaining territories by nearly two-thirds of Jewish citizens may be regarded as a source of support for official policy.

A diachronic analysis reveals, however, that the Israeli public has slightly moderated its views on the territories over time. Although unwillingness to give up territories has fluctuated, it has somewhat decreased.[6] In the wake of the Six-Day War a majority of 85 percent were adamantly against territorial concessions on all fronts (99 percent against returning the Golan Heights). The entire Sinai Peninsula was prized by over half the respondents. Just prior to the October War the intransigent mood was on the rise again; 83 percent of respondents were unwilling to return land. The war had a marked impact in softening attitudes toward the territories; the percentage of those opposing concessions dropped to 68 percent. No significant changes took place during the rest of the period of Alignment rule. As noted, the advent of the Likud, and especially Sadat's visit, once again mitigated public

opinion; the percentage of those unwilling to compromise declined to an unprecedented 58 percent. The statistics reflecting the moderation of public attitude are somewhat misleading, however, since the average decline in opposition to withdrawal was mainly influenced by the overriding willingness to return northern Sinai. They therefore do not directly reflect attitudes on other zones. Resistance to returning these other zones, including Sharm el-Sheikh, remained practically unchanged (at 68.2 percent) after the Sadat initiative.[7] The data indicate that opinions about the West Bank also remained as adamant as ever. Only from 1979 to 1980 was there some decline in the proportion of those objecting to a return of these lands (60 percent down to 58 percent). In 1981 almost two-thirds of the Israeli public were still inflexibly against a possible withdrawal from what remained of the territories—a factor that decisionmakers most probably took into account.

Another possible source of constraint on decisionmakers was public attitude toward settlement in the territories (Table 11) The mood was generally hawkish on this issue, although changes did occur over time. A 1972 poll indicated that the sparse settlement taking place at that time was supported by an overwhelming majority: 95 percent for the Golan, 91 percent for the Jordan Valley, and 83 percent for Sinai.[8] The October War somewhat eroded this support, which by 1974 had declined to an average of 73.7 percent.[9] A preponderant majority, however, still supported settlement in the Jordan Valley (85.9 percent) and the Golan Heights (83 percent). The new settlements in Judea and Samaria also had the public's acquiescence. In 1974, at the height of the clash between the government and Gush Enunim's squatters, settlement activity was approved by almost two-thirds of Israelis (63.5 percent). In 1976 this support rose even further (to 65 percent), pitting the government and the public against each other. It therefore seems that public opinion boosted Gush Enunim, which was challenging the government, thereby adding strength to an already formidable constraint.

When the Likud was in power, support for settlement soared. The percentage approving it in the Jordan Valley, Judea, Samaria, and the Golan increased significantly (to an average of 76.3 percent). A weak constraint had grown into an all-out support. The evolvement of the peace process in 1978 had a moderating effect on public opinion. Support for settlements declined to an average of 65.5 percent. A year later, however (1979), the public regained its hawkish mood. Support for settlements rose to 72.7 percent.[10] From 1980 on, data on support for settlements pertain only to Judea and Samaria. The figures indicate that, with one exception (1980), more than 60 percent of the respondents fa-

TABLE 11
SUPPORT OF SETTLEMENTS BY YEAR AND REGION
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION STRONGLY SUPPORTING SETTLEMENTS)

Year	*Jordan Valley*	*Judea*	*Samaria*	*Golan*	*Sinai*	*Average*
1972	91%			95%	83%	89.6%
1974	85.9	65%	62%	83		73.7
1976	82	67	63	89		75.2
1978	68	58	57	79		65.5
1979	79	62	62	88		72.7
1980	79	62	62	88		72.7
1980		48[a]				48
1981		67				67
1982		61				61
Average	81	61		86.8	83	

SOURCES: 1972: Zeev Ben-Sira, *The Current Situation in the Public's View.* Analysis of Social Indicators in the Period October–November, 1972. Social Institute of Applied Social Research and the Communication Institute of the Hebrew University, *The Current Survey* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 89.

1974–1979: Hanna Levinson, *Public's Assessments on Positions Regarding Settlements Beyond the Green Line* (IIASR: March 1980), p. 10.

1981–1982: IIASR, Continuing survey.

[a]As of 1980, Judea and Samaria have been combined into one region.

vored settlement in this area.[11] The public clung tenaciously to those lands regarded as either vital to Israel's security or sanctified by divine promise.

That settlement was a favored course of action is also evident from other available data. In 1979 many Israelis not only supported settlement in the occupied territories but also were willing to pay the price for it. In answer to the question, "Are you willing to accord the settlements in the occupied territories budgetary priority?" 39 percent answered in the affirmative.[12] This percentage rose significantly in 1981, when 51 percent of respondents approved "massive government investment in Judea and Samaria."[13] A majority of 50–57 percent did not think that settlements interfered with the peace process, and favored their continuation even when negotiations were underway.[14] What emerges is a public view that fostered (1) retention of the territories and (2) settlement there by Jews. It is, however, also evident that the same

people who clung so fiercely to the lands drastically changed their views when the government proved itself determined to return territories in exchange for peace, a course that had previously been rejected by public opinion.

The Israeli Hawk

The next analysis concerns the demographic-political features of the Israeli hawk. For this purpose, a hawk has been defined as a person who thinks that none, or only a fraction, of the West Bank territories should be given up, even in the event of peace.[15]

Gender

Data from other countries reveal that women incline to the conservative end of the political spectrum. Italian women provide two-thirds of the support for the Christian Democrats and tend to be less supportive of the Labor Party in Great Britain.[16] If conservatism is tantamount to hawkishness, this tendency also prevails in Israel. Although the difference between male and female attitudes is not statistically significant (60.4 percent and 65.8 percent, respectively), women seem to be quite militant (Table 12). Obviously they are not less hawkish than men.

The militancy of Israeli women is evident not only in public surveys but in group behavior. In 1975 women organized the "First Circle" to protest the retreat from central Sinai, and they were full partners in settlement endeavors between 1974 and 1977. The only female member of Gush Emunim's secretariat conceded that "settling the land of Eretz Israel overrode the religious tenets inhibiting close cooperation between men and women."[17] *Nkuda* also gave Gush Emunim women a major role, highlighting their significance in the group.[18] Female hawkishness is difficult to explain. One possible reason is the identification of women with hawkish parties, but the paucity of information on female electoral behavior precludes conclusive evidence. The available data indicate that in 1969 more women supported the Alignment than the Likud. In all age groups some 5–11 percent more women than men supported the governing party. This trend was reversed with regard to Gahal, for which the percentage of men in all age groups was higher than that of women.[19]

Women's preference for the Alignment changed when the Likud

TABLE 12
OPINIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK, BY GENDER[a]
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION UNWILLING TO RETURN ANY PART, OR WILLING TO RETURN A SMALL PART, OF THE WEST BANK)

Year	*Male*	*Female*	*Number of Respondents*
1968	89.8%	92.3%	1856
1969	72.6	78.6	1899
1972	64.2	67.9	1798
1973	74.3	75.6	762
1974	54.4	61.9	538
1975	47.1	46.2	541
1976	47.2	51.5	442
1977 (Jan.)	53.1	69.4	477
1977 (Nov.)	53.6	66.4	506
1978	53.9	57.3	530
1979	58.4	62.1	1602
1980	55.3	61.1	526
1981	61.2	65.5	574
Average	60.4	65.8	

SOURCE: Data provided by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.

[a]Surveys were conducted in April 1968; February 1969; May 1972; October 1973; July 1974; March 1975; May 1976; January 1977; November 1977; February 1978; September 1979; October 1980; and August 1981.

gained office. In 1981 44.8 percent of women supported the Alignment, as against 53.4 percent for the Likud. The percentage of men voting for the Likud, however, was even higher (55.2 percent).[20] Voting behavior can therefore be rejected as an explanation for opinions about the territories.

Another possible explanation is the sense of insecurity and confusion generated among Israeli women by contradictions between ideal values and reality. Equality between the sexes was inscribed in the state's Declaration of Independence. In reality, there is a considerable measure of inequality—generated by religious norms, the conditions of military service, the socioeconomic discrepancies, and by self-identity. Religious norms depict the Jewish woman as a homemaker whose sole responsibilities are to produce children and to nurture the members of her family. It is through these tasks that she is to achieve her ultimate

self-definition and social status. The nonorthodox Israeli elite adopted some of these norms by acknowledging the vital importance of fertility. The deep conviction was that Israel had to expand its population in order to survive in the midst of a hostile Arab world. Demographic considerations motivated David Ben-Gurion to say that "a woman should not be deprived of any right and should not be exempt from any duty—unless it is detrimental to her motherhood."[21] The women were thus caught on the horns of a dilemma: ought they to contribute their share as citizens through their wombs, or ought they to be free individuals of a modern secular society?

There is also double-talk with regard to military service. Israeli law requires compulsory service in the armed forces for both males and females. The Law of Defense Service, however (adopted by the Knesset on September 8, 1949), allowed the exemption of a woman if she was married, pregnant, a mother, or could not serve on grounds of a religious way of life. A considerable number of women have been exempted from service on the basis of feminine attributes. Approximately half of those who do serve in the army occupy secretarial positions. Equality in the armed forces has remained largely a dead letter.

Another source of confusion is that, although the Israeli legal system commits society to equality between men and women, and laws promoting equal rights abound, Israel is not an egalitarian society as far as sex differences are concerned. Women tend to cluster in clerical and service occupations and earn less than men even when demographic attributes such as age and place of birth are controlled for. The Israeli females' income is only 79 percent of that of the males', and women's occupational status tends to be lower.

Last, there is a serious problem of self-identity. Israeli society is male-oriented and worships features stereotypically identified with masculinity, such as strength, courage, and activism. Women, however, are expected to be "feminine," emotional, dependent, and reassuring. Paradoxically, they are expected to play supportive roles in a society that values opposite attributes. Thus, as Lesley Hazelton wrote, "She [the woman] is expected to be feminine, even though the more stereotypically feminine she is, the less Israeli she then becomes."[22]

One of the ways of overcoming this dissonance is to adopt hawkish views. This tactic enables women to endorse "masculinity" and at the same time lose little of their "femininity." The relative militance of women with regard to the territories may therefore be explained by their need to establish their identity in a society where they confront incongruities in almost every sphere of life.[23]

Table 13
Opinions Regarding the West Bank, by Age
(percentage of population unwilling to return any part, or willing to return a small part, of the West Bank)

Year	*Young 20–39*	*Middle 35–49*	*Senior 50+*	*Number of Respondents*
1968	92.0%	91.7%	89.0%	1858
1969	78.3	77.1	69.8	1887
1972	66.4	66.0	66.1	1794
1973	78.3	75.5	71.1	757
1974	61.2	66.1	50.0	537
1975	41.9	54.6	46.8	539
1976	54.1	47.5	46.7	438
1977 (Jan.)	69.6	61.4	52.6	471
1977 (Nov.)	59.8	62.6	58.5	501
1978	59.1	63.1	46.2	523
1979	65.6	59.3	53.1	1582
1980	62.6	52.1	57.1	524
1981	70.8	57.0	59.4	570
Average	66.1	64.2	59.0	

Source: Data provided by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.

Age

Examination of hawkish leanings along age lines reveals no significant variations, although there appears to be a slight decline in hawkishness as a person matures. Respondents were divided into three age groups: youngsters, aged 20–34; middle-aged people, aged 35–49; and seniors, aged 50 plus. Data indicate that for the first group the percentage of people against relinquishing territories is approximately two-thirds (66.1 percent). (See Table 13.) This percentage declines slightly for the more mature age group (64.2 percent), and declines further for the senior age group (59 percent). It is somewhat surprising that there is no statistically significant difference among these groups—for two reasons: First, it is the younger age group that has been engaged in active combat; second, there is a marked variation in voting behavior on the basis of age. The Likud has consistently and increasingly enjoyed

the support of the younger age groups.[24] But research has shown that people who have participated in war are more likely to adopt a belligerent stand on foreign policy issues.[25] Others have also found differences in attitude between those who have experienced heavy combat and those who have experienced light or no combat.[26] The fact that most Israeli males, including those over fifty, have taken part in one of the six wars experienced by Israel in the last three decades may account for the lack of significant difference in hawkishness on the basis of age.

Education

Education—that is, years of schooling—is the variable most closely associated with class distribution. Data indicate that income rises with an increase in education.[27] The respondents were divided into three educational categories: low (up to eight years of schooling)—equivalent to elementary education; medium (nine to twelve years of schooling)—equivalent to secondary education; and high (thirteen or more years of schooling)—post-secondary education. The findings reveal a marked linear difference among the educational levels. Among the highly educated, over half (53.5 percent) gave a hawkish response. Among those with low education, 71.3 percent objected to returning territories. Those with secondary education expressed a middle-of-the-road attitude; 64.5 percent preferred the option of retaining the territories (Table 14). The linear relationship is consistent. Those with higher educational attainments did not outnumber those in the lower educational group in hawkish attitudes in even one survey year. The widest gap was between those with less than eight years of schooling and those with more than thirteen years. Statistically, there is less variation between those with medium education and those with high education. The difference between the low and the medium educational levels is not statistically significant. It is worth noting that educational differentiation is also evident with regard to other unresolved territorial issues. Those with elementary education outnumbered their higher-educated counterparts by 2:1 (44 percent against 22 percent) in thinking that the government's handling of the territories was good or very good.[28] Fewer lower-educated than higher-educated respondents (62 percent against 70 percent) thought that settlement impeded the peace process. As already noted, the less educated were not concerned about the alleged rivalry between themselves and the settlers in the territories over scarce eco-

TABLE 14
OPINIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK, BY EDUCATION
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION UNWILLING TO RETURN ANY PART, OR WILLING TO RETURN ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE WEST BANK)

Year	*Elementary*[a]	*Secondary*[b]	*Higher*[c]	*Number of Respondents*
1968	93.1%	91.4%	85.5%	1855
1969	84.4	74.4	61.1	1899
1972	77.2	65.4	52.3	1788
1973	90.2	75.5	64.1	758
1974	64.4	57.6	55.0	537
1975	57.2	48.2	35.9	541
1976	66.6	54.3	37.7	440
1977 (Jan.)	64.7	63.8	55.6	472
1977 (Nov.)	63.6	63.8	51.9	502
1978	70.8	57.0	46.9	530
1979	74.8	62.5	45.7	1588
1980	74.7	62.2	45.6	523
1981	64.7	66.2	58.2	571
Average	71.3	64.5	53.5	

SOURCE: Data provided by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.
[a]up to 8 years of schooling
[b]9–12 years of schooling
[c]13+ years of schooling

nomic resources. When asked for their views on the high priority given to settlement in the national budget, 60 percent of the lower-educated respondents approved, in comparison to only 47 percent of the highly educated respondents.[29]

The reasons offered for the correlation between education and territorial attitudes are twofold. First, voting patterns may serve as an explanation, because they are tightly linked to educational levels. Studies have repeatedly shown that there is massive support for the Likud among lower-educated Israelis. This tendency decreases as educational attainment increases.[30] Second, class differences have been said to influence opinions on foreign affairs. Working-class people are thought to have preferences for being tough, aggressive, and accepting of the use of violence. The evidence for this assumption, however, is weak.[31]

Religiosity

The religiosity of the respondents is a very strong indicator of hawkishness. Three groups have been distinguished in terms of degree of religiosity: observant, traditional, and secular. Observant people keep the commandments and practice a religious way of life; traditional people observe a few religious practices; and secular people, none. The differences among the three groups is statistically significant. The gap between the two extreme groups is astounding: 71.2 percent of the observant identified themselves as hawks, in comparison to 46.8 percent of the secular (Table 15). The difference among the three groups is both consistent and linear, establishing a clear and explicit association between religiosity and opinions on the territories. This association is hardly surprising. As discussed earlier, Gush Emunim's ideological package incorporated explicit religious elements, which attracted the mainstream religious community to adopt the retention-of-territories option. Commitment to the "promised land" and belief in the divine

TABLE 15
OPINIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK, BY RELIGIOSITY
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION UNWILLING TO RETURN ANY PART, OR WILLING TO RETURN ONLY A SMALL PART, OF THE WEST BANK)

Year	*Observant*	*Traditional*	*Secular*	*Number of Respondents*
1972	76.6%	66.0%	58.0%	1756
1973[a]				
1974	70.1	61.6	48.0	537
1975	56.1	47.6	36.8	540
1976	62.1	50.5	37.5	438
1977 (Jan.)	75.4	62.3	52.8	476
1977 (Nov.)	77.0	57.6	48.6	509
1978	70.3	54.3	41.8	526
1979	75.0	57.4	46.5	1990
1980	79.4	60.0	39.5	523
1981	70.4	61.5	58.1	572
Average	71.2	57.8	46.8	

SOURCE: Data provided by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.
[a]No data available for this year.

covenant hardened the attitudes of many religious Jews. Observant Israelis were unwilling to surrender land that, according to their belief, had not been captured but had, rather, been liberated and returned to its original rightful owners.

Ethnic Origin

In the Israeli context, ethnicity refers not to the two peoples living in Israel—Jewish and Arab—but to the divisions among Jews emanating from their countries of origin. The Jewish population is divided into two major ethnic groups. One includes immigrants from Arabic-speaking countries in Asia and Africa and their Israeli-born descendants (termed Sephardim). The other includes immigrants from Europe and America and their Israeli-born offspring (termed Ashkenazim). The groups differ in size. The proportion of Israelis of Afro-Asian origin has increased steadily because of their higher fertility rate; in 1967 the proportion of Sephardim in the Jewish population was 42.6 percent; in 1981 it amounted to 44.7 percent (excluding the third generation born to Israelis of Afro-Asian origin). In 1981 the fertility rate of Sephardi women was 3.0, in comparison to 2.6 for Ashkenazi women.[32] A more striking difference between the two groups is their position on the socioeconomic scale. By most indicators of socioeconomic status—education, occupation, housing, and income—Sephardim are positioned lower than Europeans.[33] The lot of second-generation Sephardim born in Israel is not much better than that of their parents.[34] Their socioeconomic status has remained virtually unchanged, despite the fact that they were born into an affluent society and have received benefits from institutions of the welfare state.

Evidently, the cleavage between the two ethnic groups is not confined to socioeconomic status but also relates to political attitudes. Survey respondents were divided into five subgroups according to ethnic origin: (1) those born abroad in Afro-Asia, (2) those born abroad in Europe-America, (3) Israeli-born descendants of Afro-Asian immigrants, (4) Israeli-born descendants of European-American immigrants, and (5) native Israelis. The data clearly indicate that more Sephardim are hawkish than their European counterparts. This is evident from the distribution of average attitudes. The percentage of Sephardim born abroad who adhere to hawkish views is 71.1. Their Israeli-born descendants are only slightly less hawkish (an average of 70.8 percent). The corresponding figures for European respondents are 56.3 percent and 62.2 percent, respectively (Table 16).

TABLE 16
OPINIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK, BY ETHNIC ORIGIN
(PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION UNWILLING TO RETURN ANY PART, OR WILLING TO RETURN ONLY A SMALL PART, OF THE WEST BANK)

Year	*Europe-America*	*Asia-Africa*	*Israel: Europe-America*[a]	*Israel: Asia-Africa*[b]	*Israel: Israel*[c]	*Number of Respondents*
1968	89.1%	93.5%	91.6%	94.7%	*	1826
1969	68.3	86.5	77.9	80.6	73.3%	1893
1972	61.3	74.5	64.3	73.2	71.2	1796
1973	70.6	84.4	60.8	85.0	80.3	777
1974	52.9	65.1	61.5	53.5	72.2	538
1975	40.0	56.0	49.5	48.0	61.3	540
1976	41.5	57.0	57.1	52.0	64.3	440
1977 (Jan.)	52.5	74.3	62.0	73.4	60.0	477
1977 (Nov.)	58.6	59.1	66.1	70.7	41.2	511
1978	41.4	66.7	57.3	72.2	48.6	528
1979	47.7	73.1	48.8	71.7	67.8	1594
1980	53.6	65.3	52.4	69.7	61.4	525
1981	54.7	68.8	59.6	76.2	75.6	572
Average	56.3	71.1	62.2	70.8	64.7	

SOURCE: Data provided by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.
[a]Descendants of a father from Europe or America.
[b]Descendants of a father from Asia or America.
[c]Descendants of a father born in Israel.
*No data available.

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test confirms the striking gap between Sephardim and Europeans when the two generations are combined. Surprisingly, when this test is applied only to those born in Israel from the three groups of ethnic origin, the difference is blurred and has no statistical significance. It might be asserted that growing up in Israel and being exposed to similar foreign and security affairs would mitigate, if not erode, the impact of ethnic origin on territorial attitudes. A further examination, however, qualifies this assertion. The Likud's accession to power had different effects on the attitudes of the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim. The Israelis of Afro-Asian origin manifested a remarkable consistency and did not alter their opinions. The average percentage of hawks in this group increased slightly, from 70.2 percent between 1968

TABLE 17
HAWKISH ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TERRITORIES,
BY ETHNIC ORIGIN AND EDUCATION, 1980

Education	*Israeli Sephardim*	*Foreign Sephardim*	*Average*	
Elementary	52.4%	57.1%	54.7%	
Secondary	51.8	52.8	52.3	
Postsecondary	48.3	50.0	49.1	
Education	*Israeli Ashkenazim*	*Foreign Ashkenazim*	*Average*	*Number of Respondents*
Elementary	28.6%	40.0%	34.3%	134
Secondary	37.8	38.8	38.3	297
Postsecondary	37.3	26.6	31.9	114

SOURCE: Sammy Smooha, Unpublished data on attitudes of Jews toward the territories.
NOTE: The question asked was "What is your attitude toward the settlement?"
The table represents the answers in favor of settlements.

and June 1977 to 72.1 percent between July 1977 and 1981. During the same period Israelis of European origin softened their attitudes. Within this group the average share of hawks declined from 65.6 percent during the Alignment's rule to 56.8 percent during the Likud's. The gap between the two groups of Israelis born in the country thus markedly increased.

The importance of the ethnic factor in determining attitudes toward the territories was also revealed in another study. Unpublished data collected by Sammy Smooha included questions about the territorial issue.[35] The question considered in this study probes attitudes toward the settlements in Judea and Samaria. The respondents were divided into those in favor of, those having reservations about, and those against the settlements; the first group was defined as hawks. Table 17 shows the distribution of hawkish opinions on an ethnic basis when level of education is controlled for. Generally, hawkishness declines with increase in education. This tendency holds true for all categories of Sephardim. Israeli-born Ashkenazim become less militant only when they acquire postsecondary schooling. Even in the more highly educated bracket, however, the percentage of Sephardim expressing hawkish opinions is

markedly higher (an average of 49.1 percent) than that of Ashkenazim (an average of 31.9 percent). This finding validates the overall inclination of the Sephardim toward militant positions.

The question to be asked is: Why have Sephardim of both generations remained consistently hawkish? Several explanations have been offered. First, the Sephardim's hard-line positions have been interpreted as a form of protest against the Labor Party, which they have held responsible for their plight. The Sephardim's mass defection from Labor to the Likud has been amply described. Since 1973 they have gradually increased their support of the Likud and turned away from Labor.[36] The Sephardi vote in the 1981 elections was found to be primarily influenced by their hawkish posture.[37] The immigrants from Asia and Africa expressed their resentment toward Labor not only by casting their vote for its rival but also by adopting policies not identified with Labor (even though many Laborites supported them).[38]

The second explanation lies more in the social domain. As all data indicate, Israeli public opinion in general tilts to the hawkish end of the scale. By fostering militant postures, Sephardim can identify with the mainstream of public opinion and demonstrate their fervent loyalty to the state. Hawkishness serves as a symbol of their commitment to national values and facilitates their smoother integration into Israeli society. Furthermore, from a systematic perspective, the Arab-Israeli conflict (which is perpetuated by hawkish positions) has been found to have had a marked impact on social integration.[39] The conflict has generated a sense of community and enhanced social cohesion. Groups aspiring to move from the margins of society to its center have perceived the armed struggle as having had positive effects.

Third, from the economic perspective, Sephardim have had something to gain by fostering hawkish attitudes. As already noted, Sephardim are characteristically in the lower socioeconomic strata. In the last decade, however, they have experienced some upward occupational mobility. The proportion of Sephardim employed in unskilled jobs has somewhat declined, from 9.6 percent in 1972 to 5.1 percent in 1982.[40] This mobility has been attributed to their replacement by Arabs from the territories, who are employed in large numbers in Israel—mostly in unskilled jobs.[41] A Sephardi Israeli living in a development town near Jerusalem spelled out his fears about the territorial issue as follows: "If they [the government] give back the territories, the Arabs will stop coming to work, and then you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs, like before. If for no other reason, we won't let you give back those territories."[42]

The fourth explanation is a psychological one. Sephardim manifest the typical features of relative deprivation. Objective socioeconomic deficiencies have produced aggressive feelings that have been vented on another group. The scapegoats in this case have been the Arabs.[43] Empirical studies of intergroup relations in Israel indicate that prejudice against Israeli Arabs is far higher among Sephardim than among Ashkenazim.[44] Hostility to Arabs has extended beyond state boundaries and has amplified the psychological tensions emanating from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, these hawkish tendencies have also served the purpose of "marking off"; that is, they have helped to perpetuate ethnic identity.

Both Sephardim and Ashkenazim had to acquire a new identity upon their arrival in Israel. The Ashkenazim, however, encountered fewer problems because they formed the elite class, were considered more acceptable, and did not have to discard their previous cultural features. They had to learn a new language and alter their daily way of life, but their problem was more ecological than psychological. In contrast, Afro-Asian Jews encountered severe difficulties as a result of two interlocking factors: their lower status in Israel and their identification with Islamic Arab culture. The Israeli elite's attitude toward the Sephardim has often been contemptuous and derogatory. Anthropological studies have confirmed the widespread public resentment of the habits and culture of the Sephardim, who have been labeled "primitive." The presumed source of this perceived primitivism has been their identification with the Arabs.[45] Afro-Asian Jews have thus been compelled to eschew their affiliation with the Arabs in an attempt to cast off their culturally different Judaism and establish a new, secular Israeli-European identity. One way to achieve this has been to denigrate the Arabs—that is, to foster hawkish opinions and thereby replace their personal needs with nationalist sentiments.

The fifth and last explanation pertains to life experience. As pointed out by Ofira Seliktar, the historical experience of living with Arabs (whether personal, or one passed down to a second generation) has produced what George R. Tamarin calls a "wisdom based on life experience."[46] This experience has fostered the belief that Arabs are acquainted only with the language of power. Tamarin quotes a Sephardi Jew as saying, "I know the Arabs well, they are all cowards and treacherous. A kick in the teeth is the only language they understand."[47] Sephardi suspicion toward Arabs was reflected in their attitudes toward the peace with Egypt. A poll taken in 1979 indicated that 41 percent of Israelis of Afro-Asian origin (as compared to 63 percent of those of Eu-

ropean-American origin) thought that "peace brings more advantages than disadvantages to Israel." Fifty-three percent of Sephardim asserted that "Egypt will join a war against us should it erupt," whereas only 47 percent of Ashkenazim thought likewise. Fewer Sephardim (55 percent, as compared to 67 percent of Ashkenazim) favored the improving relationship with Egypt.[48]

Despite the compelling reasons for the Sephardim's hawkishness, the data in this study indicate that the opinions of those who were born in Israel are closer to those of the Ashkenazim than their parents. The reduction of differences does not, however, indicate whether the direction of these opinions is hawkish or dovish.

Party Affiliation

The last factor presumed to influence attitudes to the territories is party affiliation, which has been defined on the basis of the answer to the question: "Whom did you vote for in the last elections?" Our analysis considers only the two major blocs: the Alignment and the Likud. As noted in Chapter 3, there are similarities as well as differences between the two main parties. Studies show, however, that the public sees the Alignment as less hawkish and more conciliatory than the Likud. More than two-thirds of the respondents (70 percent) believed that the Alignment was willing to make territorial concessions; only 31 percent thought the same of the Likud.[49] These perceptions are clearly reflected in the data. Over two-thirds of Likud voters (68.3 percent) are hawks, as compared to 49.4 percent of Alignment voters (Table 18). Given the close association between ethnicity and foreign policy attitudes, a relevant question is whether party affiliation is determined by ethnicity rather than by hawkish/dovish orientation. Shamir and Arian have concluded that territorial orientation is the strongest predictor of electoral behavior, which means that policy orientation is the predominant factor.[50] Peres and Shemer found that hawkish/dovish orientation constituted a more important factor in voting patterns among Ashkenazim than among Sephardim. They have amplified this conclusion with another finding—that ethnic origin is a more important factor in determining voting patterns among doves than among hawks. Half of the Sephardi doves supported the Likud, but virtually no Ashkenazi doves cast a vote for that party.[51] They therefore attribute prime importance to ethnicity rather than to policy orientations. But the linkage between attitudes toward the territories and party affiliation is statistically the strongest variable under consideration.

Table 18
Opinions Regarding the West Bank, by Party Affiliation
(percentage of population unwilling to return any part, or willing to return only a small part, of the West Bank)

Year	*Likud*	*Alignment*	*Number of Respondents*
1974	74.4%	49.1%	327
1975	63.5	40.2	299
1976	60.3	41.3	238
1977 (Jan.)	65.6	61.2	266
1977 (Nov.)	71.5	57.3	257
1978	62.0	53.5	293
1979	70.5	47.3	930
1980	71.6	43.6	284
1981	75.3	51.2	313
Average	68.3	49.4	

Source: Data provided by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research.

Finally, a word should be said about the attitudes of Israeli Arabs, who constitute some 17 percent of the population. The opinions of Arabs are not usually recorded by the national polling institutions. A study conducted by Sammy Smooha indicates that the overwhelming majority of the Arab-Israeli public identifies with the dovish outlook: 84 percent are against settlements in Judea and Samaria and only 5.5 percent favor the "present borders with certain modifications."[52] This attitude is hardly surprising in view of the cultural and national affinity of Israeli Arabs to their brethren across the border. As pointed out by Smooha and Peretz, however, Israeli Arabs have not been an effective factor in the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. "They share a consensus on this question which falls outside Israel's national consensus but within the world's operative consensus."[53] Arabs within Israel are politically isolated, and their views are largely ignored.

Summary

Israeli public opinion has been analyzed at both the individual and the aggregate levels. Two questions are appropriate. First, who is an

Israeli hawk? Second, which way is public opinion tending? The typical Israeli hawk is either a male or a female who not only believes in God but actually observes the commandments and leads a religious way of life. The hawk will probably cast her/his vote for the Likud and will, most likely, be of Afro-Asian origin. The typical hawk has not enjoyed the benefits of the affluent society since he/she has received only a few years of schooling. Those who wish to see Israelis move toward more dovish postures on the fate of the territories cannot console themselves with the thought that wisdom comes with age, since year of birth does not seem to affect willingness to return territory. Such a change is likely only if present conditions are disrupted and the association among ethnic origin, educational attainment, and party affiliation is broken. Unpublished data reveal, however, that a rise in the level of education does moderate hawkish opinions in the Shephardim. The rift between doves and hawks regarding the territories may be linked to political features outside Israel. As pointed out by Dalton et al., the public agenda is no longer dominated by economic issues but by what are termed "postmaterialistic" issues pertaining to the environment, consumer affairs, and war and peace.[54] In Israel as in other Western societies, the propagators of postmaterialistic issues are the more affluent, the secular, and the better-educated strata of society.

For the time being, however, public opinion in Israel inclines sharply toward hawkish attitudes. Although changes have occurred over time, and the degree of militancy has significantly decreased from the days when Israelis were enveloped in the banners of victory, most people continue to cling to the remaining territory and are unwilling to hand it over even in return for peace. It should also be noted, however, that the option of returning land in exchange for peace remains hypothetical. Although Jordan's King Hussein has made some gestures toward peace, at the time of writing his alliance with the PLO diminishes prospects for conciliation. Hostile Arab propaganda and continual terrorism against Israeli citizens weakens the position of the moderates. Although a change of mood on the part of the Arabs could revolutionize public attitudes in Israel, the prospects of such a development are rather dim. The possibility of a change in Israel toward more dovish attitudes on the territories is therefore remote.

SEVEN

Conclusions

In evaluating Israel's territorial policy and its impact on domestic politics, I have probed into the past to discover the dominant trend between 1967 and 1982. Doing so has led to intriguing conclusions on the prospects for future developments. Between the Six-Day War and the Lebanon war, territorial policy has undergone substantial changes. During the first phase, the principle of no return of territories for less than a full-fledged peace treaty negotiated by the warring states was widely accepted. This principle was modified in the second phase (when Meir was prime minister). Meir was willing to consider temporary arrangements somewhat less comprehensive than those conjured up in the exultation of victory. The principle crumbled completely in the third phase, after a change in government. In the two last phases, the Likud government surrendered a large part of the territories, formally annexed parts of the remaining ones, and notified its intention to annex others in due course. So it is apparent that, within certain fixed parameters, Israel's territorial policy has been dynamic. Throughout the period 1967–1982 Israel steadfastly refused to relinquish all territories and return to the June 4, 1967 armistice frontiers. But during the same time, successive governments refrained from legal annexation of most of the lands. Instead, they maintained the legal status quo, in which de facto changes occurred as a result of domestic and external constraints and

supports. Notwithstanding these general tendencies, however, there has been a clear distinction between the policies of the two leading political forces in Israel regarding one territorial area—the West Bank. Whereas the Alignment was willing to consider a compromise (albeit one whose limits were never clearly specified), the Likud was determined to retain the entire area and was not willing to discuss any withdrawal. No de facto change occurred under either government between 1967 and 1982.

The examination of the behavioral aspects of the authoritative policy revealed some inconsistencies between policy and action. During the first phase, when Israel's formal policy was to keep the lands for the foreseeable future, the government neither conceived nor adopted any detailed plan to implement this policy. The rationalization for this lacuna was given by Allon during the Labor Party's first convention after the June war.

> It is perceived that when a pompous resolution is adopted regarding the integrity of the homeland, the homeland is indeed integrated. Rather, selective decisions, guided by a political strategic concept that lead to another installation, another settlement, and another urban neighborhood—they are the ones that, because of their potential for performance, establish military-political facts equivalent to tens and hundreds of resolutions adopted by those who master politics or declarations.[1]

The "another installation and another settlement" policy replaced the prestate policy of "another dunam and another sheep," but its de facto implementation was handicapped because of the government's hesitancy to act. The government's guiding principle was the unapproved Allon Plan, but the initiative to put the plan into effect was largely confined to the grass roots. Many settlements created during this first phase were initiated by zealous settlers who only retroactively obtained official approval and recognition. During the second phase, when Israel's government was ostensibly ready to consider withdrawal, the process of settlement accelerated. The environs of Jerusalem (Maale Adumin), the eastern slopes of Samaria (Mesha), the Rafah Salient, and the Golan were all targets for settlement. Even so, in many instances government decisions did not indicate that expansion of settlement was underway. The government increased its involvement in settling the territories, but, except for the Rafah Salient (and part of the Jordan Valley), it still lacked a comprehensive settlement scheme. Instead, the government was influenced by Ministers Allon, Galili, and Dayan (among

other people) to settle the lands. Toward the end of its rule, the Alignment was, in effect, compelled to acquiesce in the settlers' initiatives. These initiatives were resourceful in that they matched, advanced, and implemented the settlers' own preferences—initially, without the government's aid and, subsequently, with only its half-hearted approval and legitimation. During the Alignment's rule, the main constraint on behavior emanated from within the elite itself. The ministers were pitted against each other and, at the same time, were allied with outside forces. These circumstances both facilitated and curtailed the process of settlement. In the two last phases, when the Likud assumed office, curbs on settlement were both domestic (the High Court's ruling) and external. Begin's pledge to President Carter to suspend settlement for three months until the signature of the peace treaty hobbled, but did not immobilize, settlement. The government's determination to expand settlements outweighed these constraints and enabled unprecedented expansion.

Domestic political inputs included a host of activities carried out by a myriad of actors. A number of political parties were formed specifically to advance the territorial issue, and some party factions were established to induce a party's leaders to adopt a particular policy. Obviously, these factions were formed only in parties whose ideological heterogeneity allowed for structured dissent. Factional activity was thus carried out mainly within the Labor Party, where doves and hawks alike organized to uphold their cause. The factions proved more adept at averting action than in promoting it. They were either too weak to exert substantial influence or they felt trapped by their own strength—fearing that overpressure might prove counterproductive and lead to an undesirable split. The factions' leaders proved more potent than factional activity. Primary among these was Allon, who advanced his plan for partial annexation and partial withdrawal, and Dayan, who opted for integration short of annexation.

After the October War factional activity largely subsided, clearing the way for group activity. A retrospective evaluation reveals a process whereby the parties and their factions eventually gave way to public movements. These movements forced issues onto the political agenda and provided the means for their advancement and propagation. The ability of the movements to adapt themselves to changing circumstances and adopt new policies was greater than that of the parties. Movements proved more susceptible to public moods. In fact, their very formation was a direct response to these moods. The movements also crystallized the vague policies presented by the political parties. Whereas the par-

ties had to yield to conflicting internal pressures, the interest groups were largely free of similar constraints. They turned the parties' liabilities into assets by setting objectives that cut across party lines and attracted mass support. Interest groups also replaced parties in communicating demands to decisionmakers. As the groups grew in stature, they developed a close relationship with the prevailing administration. The groups also provided a link between citizens and decisionmakers. In providing a broader scope for individual participation, the movements offered ordinary people an opportunity to influence public affairs.

An evaluation of the actors' inputs leads to two conclusions which are, on the surface, contradictory. The first is that during the Alignment's rule constraints and supports balanced each other out in a way that impeded any action. The political stagnation during Labor's era was basically an outcome of the conflicting pressures to which it was subject. The second is that the proterritorial inputs—that is, those in favor of Israel retaining territories—were far more substantial than the propeace inputs during the entire period considered. In other words, the actors favoring continued Israeli control in the territories outnumbered and were more powerful than those who advocated their return.

The Alignment's political stagnation has been widely discussed by scholars dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether or not the October War could have been averted remains a moot question. It is obvious, however, that by the eve of that war the government had taken no significant measures to change the status quo. At that time, belief in Israel's military superiority remained unshaken; the PLO's terrorist activities were considered bearable; the Arabs living in the territories were not showing signs of wide-scale insurgence; the Russians had been expelled from Egypt; Hussein had given a temporary knock-out blow to the PLO; the Arab states were immersed in their own dissensions; and U.S. pressures on Israel were not too severe. These congenial circumstances were not the only reason for the immobilization between 1967 and 1973. The Labor government was initially fettered by its coalition and, subsequently, trapped in its own dissensions—caught between doves like Sapir and hawks like Galili and Dayan. Nevertheless, the pressures were not balanced. Under Meir's premiership—and, in fact, throughout the whole period—the hawkish forces were more influential than their dovish counterparts. The reasons for the hawks' success are grounded in resources and circumstances.

The proterritorial interest groups also ranked higher in potential impact than the peace groups. Up to 1978 there was no viable peace group

that could effectively constrain decisionmakers. Such a group was formed in 1978, but its impact was weaker than Gush Emunim's when measured by the criteria employed in this study. Initially, Peace Now had only one organizational advantage over Gush Emunim: its leaders were more reputable because of their heroic military service. Individually, they were anonymous, but they were highly respected as a group. In all other aspects of the organizational syndrome, Gush Emunim ranked higher. The Gush did not have a registered membership, but it had a wide capacity for mobilization. Its institutional set-up was weak, but not as weak as that of Peace Now. Gush Emunim proliferated into three suborganizations. But the esprit de corps uniting its members was not lost, and its interpersonal cohesion was not eroded. Peace Now underwent no formal division, but the ideological and personal dissensions among its activists were much greater. Furthermore, members of Gush Emunim practiced what they preached and settled themselves in the territories. Peace Now members, although no less dedicated to their cause, could not bring about peace. Their task was simply to influence the public to join them in attempting to influence Israel's political leaders to move toward peace.

In effect, Peace Now did not so much advocate peace as reject war. It did not offer a clear political alternative; rather, it recommended that certain measures—such as Israeli domination over Arabs, the establishment of settlements, and the adoption of rigid political postures—be avoided. The movement thus waged war against war more than it promoted peace. Last, the benefits of the "nuisance impact" have been fully described. Only Gush Emunim employed this strategy. Although Peace Now used imaginative and colorful tactics, they were all within the accepted limits of interest groups presenting demands to the country's leaders. These tactics derived from the arsenal of protest-group behavior in Western societies, but they were ineffective in Israel. Although Israel's political institutions were tailored along Western lines, its political culture was more ideologically rigid than those of other democratic states.

Gush Emunim was also better equipped with political resources. Its representation in decisionmaking bodies was impressive, and its access to power was much greater than that of Peace Now. Although both groups possessed legitimacy, the Gush had more than Peace Now. In the process of bureaucratization Gush Emunim became the sole spokesman for the settlers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza and was accorded complete legitimacy. Peace Now remained a promotional protest group that represented an only partly legitimized idea.

When the ideological component of impact is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the hawkish option had a higher propensity for expansion. The ability to expand is perhaps the main attribute that converts input into impact. What may be termed the "law of the hotbed" is pertinent to this case. A hotbed is essential if one is to reap a good crop; one needs fertile soil, adequate humidity, and the right temperature. Seed of the highest quality will not yield fruit in a barren desert or under deep frost. This commonplace biological analogy may be applied to the political arena. Gush Emunim's ideological seeds were planted in a political, social, and emotional hotbed, and the yield was high. Gush Emunim wiped the dust off values that had once been cherished and admired in Israeli society and adopted their symbols. Pioneering, austerity, national religiosity, the cult of power and decisiveness, the ability to act rather than talk, were all ideas that flourished in the hotbed of uncertainty and self-doubt prevalent in Israel. The notion of peace—even when cloaked in the need for security—offered no contest to the popularity of the values revived by Gush Emunim. Peace Now remained alien to many Israelis. Its emphasis on security issues and its manipulation of military affiliations, such as the Officers' Letter, were futile attempts to adjust to the domestic environment. For many Israelis, the ideas propagated by Peace Now were tainted with a foreign flavor (even though they came disguised with appropriate Israeli rhetoric). Time and again, public opinion polls have shown that Israelis lean toward the hawkish end of the political spectrum. It is irrelevant to this discussion whether the hawkish public generates hawkish groups and factions, or whether the hawkish groups thrive by converting the general public to their policies. At all levels, Israelis have preferred to hold on to land rather than risk an unknown, and perhaps unknowable, peace.

There was another difference that characterized the ideological expansion of the two camps. The peace groups carried on a single-issue campaign, whereas the proterritories groups were part of a complementary and wider political movement. Gush Emunim's expansion followed a pattern of dynamic osmosis. One of the group's leaders compared its strategies to bicycle-riding technique: "If he ceases to advance, he topples."[2] From the end of the Six-Day War until today, the champions of territorial retention have continued to ride their bicycles. The movement has changed forms and slogans, but it has persisted. The Greater Israel people are everywhere: in parties, in public movements, in the administration, and in the general public. The idea of Greater Israel has infiltrated all organizational barriers and permeated the various social

strata. The ripple effect of the expansion of the proterritories lobby has precipitated far-reaching changes. As a result, in 1982 Israel scarcely resembled the Israel of 1967. Peace Now also brought about change. It accelerated existing processes and boosted Israel's readiness for peacemaking. It is appropriate to distinguish among three types of impact—that which induces a change in policy, that which prevents a particular policy, and that which promotes a policy that has already been adopted. Gush Emunim changed the Alignment's policy by settling in Samaria. Peace Now failed to halt the process of settlement, but it helped to precipitate peace once peace became an official policy.

The expansion of the hawkish constraint from the public to the interest groups and the political parties was sustained by the ideological preferences of the establishment. This research has not devoted much space or attention to the psychological environment affecting those decisionmakers who opted for a proterritorial policy. Most of the top decisionmakers (that is, the prime ministers) were hawks in their own right. Eshkol's premiership was too short to be judged, but Meir was an ardent hawk who denied the existence of a Palestinian people and seriously doubted the Arabs' willingness to make peace.[3] Rabin was not a hawk, but he was definitely not a dove either. He vehemently rejected the activities of Gush Emunim, but he was hardly receptive to the embryonic peace inputs that were promulgated under his premiership. Begin's attitudes need no further description. The Likud premier's socialization, orientation, and inclination were all congruent with the proterritories input. The divergencies between Begin and the hawkish groups were only about means, not ends.

Support for the hawkish option was sustained by congenial circumstances grounded in political, social, individual, national, and psychological factors. In the political domain, the rise of the hawkish forces—especially Gush Emunim—occurred concomitantly with the decline of Labor Zionism as a dominant political and ideological force. Hitherto, Labor had been paramount—not only because of its electoral attainments (which hardly ever exceeded a third of the votes) but because its ethos was accepted as one of the nation's mores. After 30 years in government the party lost its hegemony, leaving a void that was soon to be filled by the Likud. It is doubtful that Labor's downfall and Gush Emunim's ascendency were causally related, but the synchronization of the two processes has led some to the conclusion that Gush Emunim's constant challenges precipitated the Alignment's decline. The government's inability to withstand the group's pressures and act decisively were the

underlying causes of its demise. According to another version, Gush Emunim's effectiveness was a consequence of Labor's weakness.

There were, however, other reasons for Labor's fall from grace. First, a new generation of Sephardim had come of age who asserted themselves by turning their backs on Labor and embracing the Likud en masse. Second, Israelis of European descent were disgusted by the stagnation and corruption that characterized the Labor Party, and therefore cast their vote for the new party (the DMC). A third explanation emphasizes the wider historical perspective. According to this version, Labor had fulfilled its role by the late 1950s, when it completed the initial stage of state and nation building.[4] The absorption of close to a million immigrants, the industrialization of the state's economy, and the founding of a new society were carried out by the governing Labor Party. The Six-Day War dramatically rearranged the national agenda; overnight, military might and expanded borders became a prime issue. Until 1973 the perception of Israel's superiority enabled the veteran leadership to freeze the territorial issue and maintain its power. The October War, however, shattered myths as well as fortresses. The whole concept of "right is might" was crushed by the experience of a surprise attack. The Alignment's leaders were perceived to be just as responsible for this shocking event as the armed forces. Gush Emunim emerged in the twilight of Labor's power, when the old guard was withering away and the new guard was growing up. The movement also paved the way for the rise of a new type of leadership that professed national religious mores rather than socialist Zionism.

The congenial political circumstances for the hawkish option were sustained by social realities. The Israelis of the 1970s were an affluent people. Between 1968 and 1973 GNP had risen at an unprecedented average annual rate of 10.6 percent. In the aftermath of the 1973 war, however, economic prosperity could not conceal certain undercurrents that the war had introduced into Israeli society. Since 1967 many Israelis had regarded their country as a world power whose might extended far beyond the national boundaries of the state. "Might" emerged as a key concept that could not be abandoned even in the light of the October War. Israel thrived on its might, and the Israelis sought theories and practices to prove that the state and its people were still powerful and could change the course of events by their own will and action. Gush Emunim constituted the balm on the Israelis' wounded pride. The movement not only reminded Israeli city dwellers of the good days of pioneering but also helped to wipe out some of the more recent shames

of 1973. The young squatters were deterred neither by inclement weather nor by soldiers. They were not perturbed by their violation of the law and thought little about the long-term consequences of their settlements. They were intoxicated by their own activity and hypnotized by Herzl's dictum: "If you will it, it will not remain a dream." Determination regained its salience, reassuring people who, although still affluent, had lost essential emotional assets—pride and self-assurance. Gush Emunim compensated for this deficiency—providing a shining example of determination, perseverance, and achievement.

Gush Emunim also provided the optimal answer for religious people seeking status and recognition. Isaiah Berlin has observed that status is a basic human need: "People seek to avoid simply being ignored, or patronized, or despised, for being taken too much for granted—in short, not being treated as an individual, having any uniqueness insufficiently recognized." In *Four Essays on Liberty* Berlin quoted an expression of this longing:

> This is the degradation I am fighting against—not equality of legal rights, nor liberty to do as I wish (although I may want these too) but for a condition in which I can feel that I am, because I am taken to be, a responsible agent, whose will is taken into consideration because I am entitled to it, even if I am attacked and persecuted for being what I am or choosing as I do.[5]

Although Gush Emunim may not have been founded to provide individuals status and recognition, this need contributed to the group's enlargement once it was established. The circumstances of the mid-1970s provided the religious community an opportunity to correct the social injustices under which it labored and to be what it was for choosing as it did. The status incentive was compelling and, from the standpoint of mobilization, efficient. Thousands of people were ready to respond to Gush Emunim's call—not only because they wanted a Greater Israel but because it gave them the opportunity to satisfy a basic human need.

Certain features of the unique political culture of Israel were also favorable for the proterritories option. The yearning for national pride and prowess was a widely shared sentiment among Israelis—a formerly persecuted, landless people. A paratrooper who participated in the discussions chronicled in *The Seventh Day* admitted that his favorite festival was Hanukkah. "The main reason is the story of the Maccabees, the proud Jews, who lived in their own country, the Jew rising to defend himself and stand on his dignity."[6] Out of the long history of misery, and the shorter experience of the Arab-Israeli conflict, sprouted a cult

of heroism that flourished everywhere. One of Oz's interviewees expressed this feeling bluntly.

> As soon as we finish this phase, the violent phase, step right up, it'll be your turn to play your role. You can make us a civilization with humanistic values here. Do the brotherhood of man bit—Light unto the Nations, whatever you want—the morality of the Prophets. Do the whole bit. Make this such a humanitarian country that the whole world will rejoice and you can rejoice about yourselves. Make them stand up and applaud—the world championship in high-jump morality. Be my guest. That's the way it is, old buddy: First Joshua and Jeptah the Gileadite break ground, wipe out the memory of Amalek, and then maybe it's time for the prophet Isaiah and the wolf and the lamb and the leopard and the kid and that whole terrific zoo. But only provided that, even at the end of days, we'll be the wolf and all the gentiles around here will be the lamb. Just to be on the safe side.[7]

These blatant expressions spelled out the rejection of the traditional view of Jewish feebleness cultivated by the Gentiles (and allegedly absorbed by the Israelis). Joshua became a national symbol to replace Moses, who had stood on Mount Nebo and observed the country from a distance—prevented by God from entering the land and taking possession by force.

The hawkish option fulfilled another important nation-building goal—the necessity to put down roots. The attachment to the soil satisfied a basic urge of many uprooted people—regaining a stable identity. As an Israeli citizen explained, "My complete identification with the land of Israel isn't accidental or fortuitous. I came to the country completely broken up, shattered, without any feeling for what I had known in my childhood. I was searching for an identity. I had no deep roots anywhere. When I came to Palestine I felt I had been born anew. From that moment I began to live."[8]

This need for roots was one reason for the revival of Jewish nationhood in Palestine. Gush Emunim introduced a major change that was compatible with a new mood. The first pioneers immigrated to Israel to work on the land and, thereby, put down roots. Gush Emunim's objective was to take possession of the land—not to nurture it. Israeli city dwellers were most susceptible to this attitude. People who had replaced their ploughshares with swords were quite willing to live on the land but not to sweat over it. Furthermore, Israelis could pursue their "luft," or nonproductive, occupations without having qualms about their decision not to join in productive forms of employment. Settling on the land was less demanding and more rewarding. To be a genuine

patriot, one was only required to live a comfortable life in Judea or Samaria—rather than to reclaim the desert and make it bloom.

The effectiveness of the hawkish option also flowed from the attributes of the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the 1967 war Israelis radically shifted their emphasis in explaining this conflict—from "right" to "might." The question to be addressed was no longer Israel's entitlement to its independence, but the limits of this independence and the curbs on its national power. The possibility that Israel's sovereignty might be destroyed was no longer considered. To Israelis, the only remaining Arab objective was to regain territory lost to Israel in the June war. Accordingly, Israelis attributed great importance to those territories. Arab intransigence nourished Israelis' attachment to the lands, which became the central object of Arab-Israeli rivalry. For Israelis, the struggle was no longer about ends (the sovereignty of the Jewish state), but about means to achieve these ends (the retention of territories).

Last, there was the overwhelming psychological power of perceived reality. By December 1981 38.5 percent of Jews living in Israel were 19 years old or younger; that is, they were either born after the Six-Day War or were small children at its outbreak.[9] For these youngsters, the territories were not foreign lands but part of their daily environment. They were less excited than their parents when standing before the Western Wall and not as moved by the Tomb of Rachel. Most of them felt that the territories had already been integrated into Israel proper. Although feelings alone do not set policies, they constitute an important component of the conditions that produce the "hotbed" conducive to a certain choice.

For the future of the territories, there are two insistent questions. First, what are the prospects for an authoritative policy whereby territories (in other words, the West Bank) will be abandoned? Second, if such a policy is adopted, what is the likelihood of its implementation? Table 19 presents four alternative combinations of constraints and supports. Alternative (a) presents a situation in which both supports and constraints are low. This situation may occur if public attention is diverted from the territories to, say, the economic situation or the economic deprivation of one sector of the society. In such a situation political leaders would probably be granted wide leeway to make territorial policy changes if they deemed that the time was ripe for them. Alternative (b) presents the opposite situation—one in which both supports and constraints are high. Under heavily conflicting pressures leaders might find it difficult to move in any direction and opt to do nothing. To move in any direction might seriously undermine their legitimacy.

TABLE 19
ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS

		Supports	
		High	*Low*
Constraints	*High*	(a) Immobility	(d) Inhibition
	Low	(c) Precipitation	(b) Maneuverability

Alternative (c) presents a situation in which supports are high and constraints are low. In this situation, authoritative policy is accelerated and has a high chance of being rapidly and smoothly implemented. Alternative (d) presents the reverse of alternative (c): constraints are high and supports are low. If authoritative policy is formulated, it is bound to be impeded and inhibited by the force of the objections to it.

In light of these four alternatives, the question is: Whither Israel? Alternative (a) is ruled out as a feasible option. Experience indicates that Israeli policy formulation is highly involved with the territorial issue. A radical change in this state of events is a remote possibility. Alternative (b) has existed in the past and may reappear in the future. In fact, many Israelis hope that the status quo will be preserved so that critical decisions may be avoided. The prospects for this alternative are greater than those for alternative (a), since the balance between the two major political power blocs would counteract each other in the process of decision-making. A national unity government might be formed as a transient phase, but the distribution of political allegiances is not likely to undergo marked change in the foreseeable future. Moreover, there is the compelling force of present reality shaped by past decisions. In formulating policy, decisionmakers are to some extent fettered by existing conditions. If there should be a change in external circumstances—such as radical changes in the Arab world, irresistible U.S. pressure, or both—would the circumstances within Israel allow the formulation of a new policy? There is no definitive answer to this question. However, the changes that have taken place in Israel since the conclusion of a peace with Egypt indicate that the emergence of alternative (d)—that is, the

inability to act in the face of constraints—is quite improbable. The reasons why this scenario can be refuted are the same as the reasons that gave rise to the proterritories policy, as outlined below.

Current Israeli political life clusters around the two major political blocs—the Likud and the Alignment and their satellite parties—both of which have gained strength and legitimacy. The political scene is no longer dominated by extraparliamentary groups, but by relatively strong parties with stable constituencies. Strong parties that enjoy wide public support are more capable of rescinding previous postures than weak parties suffering from the effects of public disillusionment.

Whether or not Begin's promise to eradicate the shame of the October War was fulfilled on the battlefields of Lebanon is a moot question. Affluence among Israelis has declined substantially. The problem that faces Israel's government now is how to preserve Israel economically at a time when resources are rapidly dwindling. Admittedly, the problem engages state institutions more than individuals, but the mounting difficulties may diminish public resistance to policy changes. Furthermore, Israel is rapidly moving toward a postindustrial economy in which high technology is pervasive. This new economic pattern may diminish the importance of land as the traditional means of production.

The constituency of the 1980s is less amenable to mobilization than it was in the 1970s. The religious community has asserted its status and gained recognition. It is possible that religious, rather than national, zealotry is on the rise, owing to the wave of fundamentalism. Apparently, the newly observant Israelis mainly want to worship God and obey his commandments; the national imperatives deriving from these commandments have been relegated to second place. The repentant Jews who are now flocking to the religious institutions in Jerusalem are not champions of Gush Emunim, and the group's human resources have decreased significantly.

Although Israel still abounds with fervent hawks who would rather be vicious wolves than timid sheep, the peace with Egypt has had a significant impact. Despite the alleged lack of normalization between the two states, the wall that formerly separated them has been shattered. Peace in exchange for land has become a reality. To be sure, the territory returned does not have the same emotional value as Judea and Samaria, and no Arab leader is actually offering peace. Nevertheless, the first difficult step has been made, and many psychological barriers have been dissolved.

Last, and perhaps most important, is the reality of political life. Both the experience of withdrawal from Sinai and the experience of 37 years

of Israeli independence suggest that it is highly unlikely for constraints to provoke a civil war. Resistance to authoritative policy has so far been constrained by a civic culture that shuns violence. Although resistance to withdrawal from Sinai in general (and Yamit in particular) was fierce, it remained within certain bounds. Confrontation between government opponents and the army was bloodless, and confined to sticks and smoke.[10] These events indicated that Israel is basically a polity in which the leadership enjoys a high degree of legitimacy and is capable of mobilizing public opinion. The same people who fiercely objected to relinquishing Sharm el-Sheikh overwhelmingly supported the government that returned the area for the sake of peace. The high impact of the proterritories policy summoned up only 3000 people to resist withdrawal—a very low number compared to the numbers who participated in pro- and antiterritories demonstrations. Although Israeli society tolerates some lawbreaking, it is generally restricted to taxation and traffic regulations and does not involve the more fundamental questions facing the recreated Jewish state. So far, the right of the legitimate authorities to act and enact policy has not been seriously questioned.

These arguments attempt to answer questions regarding possible constraints on a future policy to relinquish territories. It remains questionable whether such a policy will indeed be adopted. Two compelling factors work against withdrawal from territories. First, the protracted hostility of Israel's Arab adversaries lifts a substantial share of the moral burden off of Israel's shoulders. Second, many of the contemporary decisionmakers in both major parties believe that the option to keep the territories holds many benefits. Their grounds for this opinion include religious faith, historical experience, apprehensions about the state's security, or all of the above. In any case, Israel's political leaders are not rushing to the peace negotiations. In fact, an Israeli journalist has described these leaders as plagued with "paxophobia," a disease whose sufferers advocate peace but at the same time keep well away from the earliest signs of it.[11] The pending question for those favoring peace over land, therefore, is not what will happen if a decision is made to forfeit territories, but what ought to be done to bring about such a decision.

POSTSCRIPT

The eruption of the Lebanon war on June 5, 1982 temporarily relegated the territorial issue to the margins of public interest. As soon as the guns were silenced, however, the territories once again ascended to the top of the political agenda. As these words were being written, Jordan's King Hussein was expressing his readiness to negotiate peace with Israel. Although the return of the territories was not mentioned as a precondition for peace negotiations, their fate remains the most critical point of controversy. Return of territories is still a nightmare option to the hawks; their retention is a source of much pain for the doves. Although both hawks and doves continue to cling adamantly to their positions, some changes on the political map have occurred that open up new prospects for Israel's territorial policy.

The first and foremost change has occurred in the partisan arena. The 1984 elections had an equivocal effect. On the one hand, the electoral results generated an unprecedented political stalemate. The high aspirations of the Labor Party, based on the forecasts of public surveys, did not materialize. As reported by Arian, only a small proportion of voters moved from the Likud to the Alignment.[1] Those who did so chose parties (such as Hatehiya) that belonged to the same political camp as the Likud. The upshot was a virtual tie between Labor and the Likud—which won 45 and 42 Knesset mandates, respectively—and a paralytic stalemate in the national arena. No party could gain the support of a majority to form a coalition; no party could form a coalition with the aid of its satellite parties alone. The solution was to form a national unity government based on the principle of power-sharing between Labor and the Likud. Divisions over the future fate of the territories were expressed in vague wordings that, in effect, implied agreement to disagree. The leeway for maneuver of this government has been very narrow. The Likud's chief representative in the government, Yitzhak Shamir (deputy premier and minister of foreign affairs) closely

watched—and often vetoed—any move that held a prospect of withdrawal from the West Bank.

The coalition agreement, however, constitutes the other side of the coin. In line with a rotation agreement, Labor is to head the government in its first two years of office. Peres, the incumbent premier, is in favor of territorial concessions and a Jordanian solution on the eastern front. In striking contrast to the past, he is supported by a party that is remarkably united. Under the surface of the tranquil waters of unity, however, some factional activity has taken place. The doves, including Abba Eban, present chairman of the Knesset committee on foreign and security affairs, convened a meeting in July 1985 "to advance the process of peace."[2] The hawks took countermeasures and summoned their own meeting to prevent "the sweeping of the party to the left."[3] Their meeting was attended by prominent party leaders like Shlomo Hillel, chairman of the Knesset. These activities, however, quickly subsided, and the party united behind its leader.

Labor both consolidated and demonstrated its cohesion in a third meeting, which reiterated the principles adopted by the party based on the four "no's": no to a Palestinian state; no to negotiations with the PLO; no return to the pre-1967 borders, and no annexation of the West Bank. Although the Allon Plan was not explicitly mentioned, the party remained faithful to its principles and to its commitment to territorial concessions.[4] The declaration of these principles not only indicated which ideological winds were blowing in the party but also fulfilled the political imperative to present a united front against the Likud. It also emanated from the party's wish to leave its imprint on Israeli (or even world) history by taking measures toward peace in the Middle East. The Labor Party did not wish to forego the opportunity to move toward conciliation before the end of its term of office—that is, before the helm of state is handed over to the Likud, whose stance on the West Bank remains as adamant as ever.

Labor's homogeneity may also be attributed to intraparty developments. Following the coalition with the Likud, both Mapam and MK Sarid, the Labor Party's most ardent dove, withdrew from the Alignment. Their defection diminished the size of the Labor faction in the Knesset from 45 to 37 representatives, but it enabled Labor to demonstrate a more cohesive front. Furthermore, the small dovish parties Ratz and Shinui scored relatively well in the 1984 election, each winning three mandates. Thus, even when the Communist Party and the Progressive List for Peace (together comprising 6 mandates) are discounted, the parties favoring territorial concessions have 13 MKs.[5] To

these may be added the three members of Yahad (Together), Weizman's party, which has allied itself with Labor.[6] A Labor Party relentlessly resolved to forfeit lands could thus rely on the support of nearly half the Knesset members.[7] It is questionable, however, whether all the Laborites would support such a move, and whether the Labor Party would be able to rebuff the exparliamentary opposition to withdrawal from the territories or count on the acquiescence of the general public.

Gush Emunim remains as adamant as ever in its objection to the division of Eretz Israel. In its effort to hinder the possibility of withdrawal, it underwent internal structural changes, the core of which was the selection of a new secretariat.[8] A decline in the Gush's organizational capabilities, however, has diminished its impact. Recently, Gush Emunim has faced two major difficulties. First, it has conspicuously lacked manpower to fill its ranks. All its efforts, including the use of modern propaganda techniques, have not attracted crowds to settle in Samaria.[9] The days of zeal and dedication seem to have passed. The second shortcoming has been the group's decline in cohesion, caused mainly by the exposure of the Jewish Terror Organization, which has engaged in terrorist activities against West Bank Arabs.[10] The members of the terrorist organization were affiliated with, or even leaders of, the Gush. Their involvement in violent illegal activities generated a deep rift within Gush Emunim. A minority justified the terror and condemned the Israeli authorities, Arab intransigence, or both, for the eruption of violence. They asserted that they were justified in violating state laws because the government had not fulfilled its duty in providing security to the West Bank settlers. This opinion led to serious repercussions on the territorial issue. Its promoters did not hesitate to announce that if the government decided to concede lands, the settlers would call for open rebellion. The majority of the settlers, however, denounced the terror and pledged loyalty to the state, its institutions, and its legal system. Yesha came forward with a declaration proclaiming that "the life of any individual, Jew or Arab, is sacred, and so are his honor, property, and rights."[11] The intra-Gush rift did not materialize into a split, because the group is not characterized by rigid organization. But the spirit of unity that has always been one of Gush Emunim's major assets seems to have eroded.

In spite of this erosion of cohesion, the Gush's penetration has remained as deep as ever. The group is still closely associated with Likud ministers and has secured access to Labor leaders as well. Gush Emunim has established itself as the legitimate spokesman of the idea of Greater Israel.[12] Yesha has become institutionalized as the sole repre-

sentative of the settlers in Judea and Samaria.[13] Disassociating themselves from the terrorist activities has enabled the advocates of Eretz Israel to maintain their penetration in the political establishment. This open access, however, has not been able to compensate for the weakness that has beset the proterritorial movement. Not only has the Gush encountered difficulties in mobilizing people to its activities; it has also faced serious problems with expansion that have reduced its impact. The exposure of the terror activities revealed how far zealotry can go and how grave its repercussions can be. Remembering the heady days of the Six-Day War, a Gush member lamented,

> We anticipated great events. 'The grand era.' We anticipated an overall religious revival in Israel, a glorification of God. We anticipated a national consensus on the revival of our sovereignty in Eretz Israel, to a state-authorized return of sons to their border. Today it seems we have been diverted to the sidelines, that all the live and fresh national exaltation has produced only remnants of embittered and exasperated nationalism, of an extreme minority. It seems that the internal awakening toward the holy and the glorious, toward faith in Israel and Torah, has faded away. There are only leftovers of half-primitive repentance, the furnace of hell, and evasion of reserve service. What has become of us? Did we miss the great moment? Did we irrevocably drift out of the way?[14]

The quotation may reflect a minority opinion within the Gush, but it expresses a feeling that is very common outside its ranks. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, who could not stop the water from flooding the room, Gush Emunim seems to have lost control over the ramifications of its beliefs.

The institutionalization of the Gush was the second reason for the relative demise of its expansion. The Gush fell into the pit it had been digging since settlement in the West Bank separated its people from the mainstream of Israeli society. In the 1970s the Gush operated in the big urban centers and was an integral part of Israeli society. It shied away from the image of a pressure group and adopted comprehensive goals of national significance. In short, the Gush behaved like a public interest group seeking a collective good whose achievement would not selectively or materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization.[15] At present, the Gush is in the process of adopting the characteristics of a pressure group promoting an interest whose attainment is bound to benefit the membership of the organization itself. One commentator noted that the segregation of the Gush, coupled with the

promulgation of what seems to be a narrow interest, may alienate the Gush membership and turn its struggle into a sectional rift that will weaken the nation.[16]

The attenuation of Gush Emunim's expansion may also be attributed to the unbridgeable rift between the semiorganized group upholding the cause of Greater Israel and its constituency. As noted earlier, the nationalist camp in Israel is characterized by distinct socioeconomic attributes. The hawks tend to be of Oriental origin, with low educational and occupational attainments. Admittedly this constituency never took part in the activities of Gush Emunim. It restricted itself to supporting the territorial cause in public opinion polls, but its participation was nevertheless essential for the Gush's expansion. The links between the Gush and the Oriental community have weakened for two reasons. First, the economic crisis that has recently beset Israel has mainly affected the underprivileged sectors of the society. The attention of these sectors has therefore been diverted to the immediate and acute problems of survival. Hatred of Arabs has mounted owing to rivalry over employment and increasing terrorist incidents. This hatred, however, has yielded little support for Gush Emunim. Rather, it has precipitated support for Meir Kahane, the leader of the anti-Arab racist party, Kach. The second reason can be found in the practices of the Gush itself. The desire of Gush members to live in a "high-standard" community prevented the absorption of settlers from development towns and urban neighborhoods. It was reported that candidates of Oriental origin were rejected by the acceptance committees of the West Bank settlements. One of the settlers complained that "the communal settlement has adopted the selective practices of the kibbutzim without following their pioneering path."[17]

In summary, Gush Emunim is now operating under a threefold constraint. Internally, it has had to cope with the controversy over the Jewish Terror Organization. Externally, it has increasingly been perceived as a sectional interest group attempting to improve the lot of its own members. Finally, the conspicuous paucity of human inflow to Gush settlements indicates that it faces severe difficulties with expansion. The frustration caused by these constraints has led to the injection of organizational blood into the veins of Gush Emunim. It remains doubtful, however, whether the Gush's resurgence can revive the historical role it has played in Israel's control of the territories.

Peace Now has scored no higher than its hawkish counterpart. In fact, its resources have dwindled to an unprecedented low. This decline is hardly surprising. As already noted, the peace movement was estab-

lished on the spur of the moment. Formed out of frustration with the hurdles obstructing the peace process, it lacked a well-structured organization and institutionalized leadership. Its members were middle-class citizens who were actively engaged in their own professional careers and preoccupied with their daily chores. Paradoxically, the opposition to the Lebanon war also contributed to the attenuation of Peace Now. The protest movement against this war was dominated by several new groups.[18] Peace Now was not numbered among them. It belatedly joined the public outcry against the war and hesitated to act unequivocally against the government while the guns were still roaring. Its dual role as a legitimate interest group and a protest movement hindered effective action. The ascendance of a Laborite to premiership was also detrimental to the group. Peace Now was reluctant to confront the government outright while access was wide open. The leader of Peace Now conceded in a press interview that "the credit we accord this government is different from that accorded to the Likud . . . This does not mean I give him [Rabin] an unlimited carte blanche but, as an honest man, I could not go out and demonstrate against the government."[19]

On the eve of Peres's departure to the U.S. in October 1985 to declare Israel's readiness for negotiations on the West Bank, Gush Emunim and Peace Now assembled their followers to stage demonstrations. Both groups resorted to historical arguments. Gush Emunim reminded the premier of the historical significance of Eretz Israel, which was "not for sale"; Peace Now urged him not to miss the historical opportunity to conclude peace.[20] Although both groups represented widely held opinions, they both failed to transform their support into political clout in 1985.

The organizational decline of Peace Now was not accompanied by the hardening of public opinion against returning the territories. In May 1983 almost half of the respondents in a national poll (49.9 percent) were unwilling to return any land on the West Bank in exchange for peace with Jordan.[21] But by September 1985 the proportion of those unwilling to make territorial concessions had declined to 39 percent.[22] The trend toward moderation in 1985 is also reflected in the answer to the question, "In exchange for peace are you ready to evict all or some of the settlements in Judea and Samaria?" An unprecedented 51.7 percent of respondents answered "yes."[23] All the polls indicate that the division of opinion does not cut across parties. An overwhelming majority of Likud voters (63 percent) are against any territorial concessions, as compared to only 18 percent of Labor voters.[24] These findings do not indicate high prospects for a smooth retreat from the territories. The polarization may

TABLE 20
WILLINGNESS TO RETURN THE WEST BANK, 1983–1985[a]
(PERCENT)

	Date			
Attitude	*May 1983*[b]	*May 1984*[c]	*December 1984*[d]	*September 1985*[e]
Unwilling to return anything	49.9%	40.6%	43.1%	39.0%
Willing to return some parts	35.6	42.7	35.2	59.0
Willing to return all except Jerusalem	8.1	11.1	18.8	
Willing to return all of it	2.2	2.2		
Number of respondents	1216	1195	1292	1229

[a]Blank spaces indicate no data available.
[b]*Maariv*, 28 June 1983.
[c]*Maariv*, 17 July 1984.
[d]*Maariv*, 23 January 1985.
[e]*Maariv*, 2 October 1985.

be a way of rallying around the Labor Party flag rather than a sweeping national shift toward conciliation. The change of mood is nevertheless undeniable. It remains to be seen whether this change will be reciprocated by Israel's adversaries—especially the Palestinians—and whether Israel itself will be ready to transform this mood into tangible concessions. Despite conspicuous changes in attitude over time, most Israelis still believe that the choice between peace and land does not lie in their hands, but in those of their adversaries. To paraphrase Neville Chamberlain's words after concluding the Munich Agreement on September 30, 1938, it is peace for our time . . . peace with land, or, at least, with most of it.

NOTES

Introduction

1. See, for example, Mordechai Nissan, *Israel and the Territories: A Study in Control, 1967–1977* (Ramat Gan: Turtledove, 1978); Shabtai Teveth, *The Cursed Blessing: The Story of the West Bank* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); and Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Judea, Samaria and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982).

2. Two problems are largely evaded in this study, not because of their unimportance, but because their salience merits a specific study: the unique problem of East Jerusalem and the problem of the Palestinians who live in the territories.

3. For an elaboration of this approach, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

4. Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 47.

5. For a summary of this issue, see Robert A. Dahl, "Power," in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 405–15.

6. Robert A. Trice, "Foreign Policy Interest Groups, Mass Opinion and the Arab-Israeli Dispute," *Western Political Quarterly* 31 (1978): 238–51. See also Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., eds., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), p. 67.

7. William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1975), p. 28.

8. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 73.

9. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

Chapter One

1. This statement followed a sharp attack on Rabin by the opposition for a statement he made in an interview with the daily *Haaretz*. Knesset Minutes (hereafter cited as KM), September 21, 1976, 77: 4055.

2. See Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 294–96.

3. KM, June 12, 1967, 49: 2330.

4. Ibid., June 27, 1967, 49: 2420. Amendment, Government and Judiciary Regulation Ordinance, no. 11, 1967.

5. Ibid., August 1, 1967, 49: 2825.

6. Ibid., June 12, 1967, 49: 2331.

7. The term "anti-system opposition" is derived from Hans Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society," in R. A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 232–35. Information on the origins of the Israeli Communist Party may be found in Moshe M. Czudnowski and Jacob M. Landau, *The Israeli Communist Party and the Elections to the Fifth Knesset, 1961* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1965).

8. KM, July 31, 1967, 49: 2783.

9. Ibid., 2770.

10. Ibid., June 21, 1967, 49: 2383, and October 30, 1967, 50: 3.

11. *Haaretz*, September 4, 1967.

12. *Weekly News Bulletin*, October 17–23, 1967.

13. KM, June 30, 1969, 55: 3268.

14. Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1976), p. 491 (In Hebrew.) See also *Maariv*, May 30, 1975, and September 24, 1975, and Yisrael Galili, "In the Midst of Conflict," *Mibifnim* 36 (1974): 546.

15. Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 145.

16. *Davar*, June 27, 1969; KM, July 15, 1969, 55: 3626. In an interview on "Face the Nation" on June 11, 1967, Dayan said, "I don't think that we should in any way give back the Gaza Strip to Egypt or the western part of Jordan to King Hussein." He also declared that Israel had no intention of remaining on the east bank of the Suez Canal, but was determined to obtain free passage through the waterway. The *New York Times* of June 12, 1967 reported that Israel intended to retain control of Sharm el-Sheikh until it received firm guarantees of free passage through the Tiran Straits.

17. See Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, *Conversations* (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1981), p. 74 (In Hebrew.)

18. *Jerusalem Post*, August 2, 1970.

19. KM, June 29, 1970, 58: 2242, and August 4, 1970, 58: 2757.

20. See Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers* (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1982), p. 145, and Anders Liden, *Security and Antagonism* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1979), p. 89.

21. Resolution 242 had caused controversy when Israel's ambassador to the UN, Yoseph Tekoa, made a statement accepting the resolution on May 1, 1969. See Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, p. 145.

22. KM, August 4, 1970, 58: 2756.

23. Ibid., 2758.

24. Ibid., 2764.

25. Ibid., December 29, 1970, 59: 34.

26. In an interview for the London *Times* of March 13, 1971, Meir hinted that there might be a possibility of a lease on Sharm el-Sheikh. See also KM, March 16, 1971, 60: 1957–8.

27. Ibid., May 3, 1972, 63: 2253.

28. Ibid., March 16, 1971, 60: 1858.

29. Ibid., June 9, 1971, 61: 2670.

30. Gahal took advantage of the Alignment's weakening strength in the Knesset after the 1969 elections and demanded that the government's basic principles explicitly recognize the historical right of the Jewish people to settle in all parts of the homeland, including the occupied territories. These principles are published in the *Israel Government Yearbook*, 1970, pp. 23–30. (In Hebrew.)

31. See, for example, Dayan, *Story of My Life;* Golda Meir, *My Life* (Tel Aviv: Steimatsky, 1975) (in Hebrew); and Bernard Reich, *The Quest for Peace* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1977).

32. Dayan, *Story of My Life*, pp. 527–28.

33. Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, p. 295.

34. Mordechai Gazit, *The Peace Process* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1984), p. 118. (In Hebrew.)

35. Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace* (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1981), p. 240. (In Hebrew.)

36. Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York: Random, 1977), p. 475.

37. KM, March 16, 1972, 63: 1842.

38. Ibid., March 16, 1971, 60: 1857.

39. Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (Jerusalem, Steimatsky, 1975), p. 284. (In Hebrew.)

40. Bernard Reich, *The Quest for Peace*, p. 247.

41. KM, July 25, 1973, 68: 4275.

42. Ibid., November 13, 1973, 68: 4592.

43. Abba Eban, for example, anticipated that partial withdrawal was likely to be the first step on the road to peace; KM, July 19, 1971, 61: 3301.

44. Ibid., November 13, 1973, 68: 4592.

45. Begin claimed that, according to Kissinger, the success of the Geneva conference was to be determined by Israeli withdrawal from territories; ibid., 68: 4594.

46. Ibid., June 3, 1974, 70: 1514.

47. Ibid., August 6, 1974, 71: 2643.

48. Ibid., November 5, 1974, 72: 240.

49. Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge: Belknap, 1981), p. 536.

50. Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Quadrangle; The New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 223.

51. See, for example, *Israel the Embattled Ally*, pp. 539–60; Reich, *The Quest for Peace*, pp. 295–347; Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, pp. 259–83; Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, pp. 253–75; and Golan, *Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*.

52. These principles were explicated in the Knesset. See KM, November 5, 1974, 72: 202.

53. Safran, *Israel the Embattled Ally*, p. 551.

54. KM, September 3, 1975, 74: 4080.

55. Ibid., 74: 4082.

56. Ibid., June 26, 1977, 80: 15.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., July 27, 1977, 80: 462. See also Embassy of Israel (Washington, D.C.), Prime Minister Menachem Begin's Press Conference, July 20, 1977, pp. 5–6.

59. Ibid., 80: 463.

60. In answer to a question presented to him while visiting Elon Moreh, a Jewish settlement in Samaria, Begin replied, "We did not use the word annexation. You annex foreign lands, not your own country." See *Jerusalem Post*, May 24, 1977.

61. Begin told the Knesset that the authority to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration over the entire area of Eretz Israel was vested in the government and would not be applied while Israel was negotiating peace with its neighbors. This extension was to be determined by appropriate timing, the government's discretion, and by Knesset's approval; KM, June 20, 1977, 80: 17.

62. Ibid., 80: 20.

63. Ibid., July 27, 1977, 80: 465.

64. Ibid., December 27, 1977, 81: 925–6.

65. Ibid., December 28, 1977, 81: 989.

66. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, June 29–July 5, 1980.

67. KM, December 28, 1977, 81: 997.

68. Ibid., January 23, 1978, 81: 1334.

69. Ibid., July 24, 1978, 83: 3720.

70. Ibid., 83: 3769.

71. Shimon Peres, KM, December 28, 1977, 81: 930.

72. KM, July 24, 1978, 83: 3686.

73. Shimon Peres, KM, May 25, 1978, 82: 2731.

74. Ibid., September 25, 1978, 83: 4068.

75. Ibid., March 20, 1979, 85: 1900.

76. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough* (New York: Knopf, 1981), pp. 227–31.

77. Michael Brecher, "Jerusalem: Israel's Political Decisions, 1947–1977," *The Middle East Journal* 32 (1978): 13–34.

78. Yael Yishai, "Israeli Annexation of East Jerusalem and Golan Heights: Factors and Processes," *Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (1985): 45–60.

79. The vast majority of the Israeli Jewish public was of the opinion that Jerusalem should remain under Israeli control. Between November 1974 and December 1977, when presented with the question, "What is the greatest concession you would be prepared to make regarding East Jerusalem in order to arrive at peace with the Arabs?" an average of 77.2 percent of the population chose the answer, "Leave under sole Israeli rule under any condition"; Louis Guttman, *The Israel Public, Peace and Territory: The Impact of the Sadat Initiative* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies, 1978), Table 2.

80. KM, December 14, 1981, 92: 764–65.

81. This claim is highly disputed. In fact, the Chief Rabbinate, the highest Israeli religious authority, has issued a statement proclaiming that Sinai was also a Holy Land. See *Maariv*, March 19, 1982.

Chapter Two

1. See Shmuel A. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 17–18.

2. On the ideological and instrumental origins of the settlement endeavor in Palestine, see Ben-Zion Dinoor, ed., *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah* [*The History of Israel's Defense*], vol. 1, no. 1 (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1965), pp. 146–49. (In Hebrew.)

3. Berl Katzenelson, *Ktavim*, [Writings], vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1946), p. 1977. (In Hebrew.)

4. Yehuda Eges, *Yalkut Aharon David Gordon* [Gordon Essays] (Jerusalem: The Zionist Federation, 1958), p. 127. (In Hebrew.)

5. Yitzhak Tabenkin, *Hahityashvut Umdinat Israel* [Settlement and the State of Israel] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1975), p. 9. (In Hebrew.)

6. Yitzhak Tabenkin, *Dvarim* [Collected Speeches], vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1974), p. 215. (In Hebrew.)

7. Yigal Allon, *A Curtain of Sand* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1968), p. 253. (In Hebrew.)

8. Yigal Allon, *Community Vessels: Essays* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1980), p. 263. (In Hebrew.)

9. Allon, *A Curtain of Sand*, p. 257.

10. The eleven settlements were founded as a response to the recommendations of the Morrison-Grady scheme, which included the northern Negev in the Arab zone and the southern Negev in the British zone. See Yehuda Slutsky, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah* [*The History of Israel's Defense*], vol. 3, no. 2 (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1972), pp. 963–64. (In Hebrew.)

11. Moshe Sharett, *Making of a Policy: Diaries of Moshe Sharett*, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971), p. 173. (In Hebrew.)

12. Slutsky, ed., *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 851–52.

13. Observers reported that the October War proved that the line of settlements contributed nothing to halting the Syrian attack. In fact, settlements captured by the Syrians were used as solid bases for continuing their offensive.

14. Four of the settlements were in Gush Etzion, two in the Negev, three in the Jordan Valley, and two in the vicinity of Jerusalem. See Dapei Elazar 3, *Hityashvut Ubitachon* [Settlement and Security] (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1981). Thirty-five years after the event, the settlers of Kibbutz Nitzanim pleaded "not guilty" and attempted to prove they had no alternative but to abandon their settlement. See Mordechai Artzieli, "Kibbutz Nitzanim 1948–1984: Do Not Mention the Battle Diary," *Haaretz*, December 23, 1983.

15. See *Haaretz*, October 6, 1981, and Zeev Shuldiner, "The True Price of Settlements," *Haaretz*, July 25, 1980.

16. Zeev Yefet, "Deprivation in the Shadow of Thriving Settlements," *Haaretz*, March 8, 1982.

17. These include two kibbutz movements: Takam, an amalgamation of Hakibbutz Hameuchad and Ichud Hakvutzot; Hakibbutz Haartzi, which is affiliated with Mapam; and a moshav (cooperative settlement) movement.

18. The Independent Liberal Party is presently affiliated with the Labor Party.

19. This information is derived from the Mateh Binyamin Regional Council (*Comprehensive Regional Development Plan* [World Zionist Organization, November 1983], pp. 40 and 115). In 1980 people 45 and older made up only 6.1 percent of the population in Judea, Samaria, Gaza, Sinai, and Golan, in comparison to 32 percent in the Tel Aviv district and 19.8 percent in the Jerusalem district (*Israel Statistical Abstract*, 1982, p. 39).

20. Until June 1977 the Joint Settlement Committee included fourteen ministers and the same number of members of the Zionist Executive. Since then it has included eight members of each group. The committee is convened "whenever necessary," generally fortnightly; Avshalom Rokach, *Rural Settlement in Israel* (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency and WZO, 1978) pp. 63–64.

21. *Haaretz*, May 7, 1980, and January 21, 1981; see also Dan Margalit, "To Hebron in the Back Door," *Haaretz*, May 28, 1981.

22. *Haaretz*, June 25, 1980; Raanan Weitz, *Peace and Settlement: A Master Plan for Rural and Urban Settlement in Israel* (Jerusalem: WZO, August 1978). (In Hebrew.)

23. *Haaretz*, June 29, 1980.

24. KM, March 11, 1968, 53: 679–80. In reply to an earlier question raised by Tamir coparty MK Eliezer Shostak, Eshkol stated that "settlement is constantly debated in the Foreign and Security Affairs Committee" (KM, February 5, 1968, 50: 914).

25. These events are well described in Rafik Halabi, *The West Bank Story* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), chap. 7.

26. KM, June 12, 1968, 52: 2230.

27. The marriage of two settlers necessitated the provision of food and drinks for the many guests and was the pretext for opening the kiosk; Interview with Beni Katzover, February 6, 1984.

28. KM, August 14, 1968, 52: 3325.

29. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, June 16–22, 1969. However, the June 25 issue of this newspaper also reported that when a group of Jews arrived in Samaria with the intention of settling there, the government acted promptly to forbid the attempt.

30. Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (Jerusalem: Edonim, 1976), p. 555.

31. Criticism was directed both at the harsh treatment of the bedouin and the clandestine nature of the government's operation. In an April 11, 1972, article in *Haaretz*, Communication Minister Amnon Rubinstein asked these critical questions: If the Rafah Salient is an integral part of Israel, why hasn't it been declared to be so? If it is not part of Israel, why is it necessary to establish permanent civilian settlements there? Who adopted this resolution? In which forum was it debated? Why has a military censorship been applied to this political issue? See also Oded Lifshitz, "An Open Letter to the Defense Minister," *Haaretz*, May 16, 1972.

32. Golda Meir, Minutes of the Government, August 13, 1972. State Archives. An earlier government meeting on March 27, 1972, had decided both to issue strict regulations to minimize the infringement of the bedouin's rights and to launch a mass campaign against public criticism of the government's action.

33. KM, March 9, 1970: 1071.

34. Ibid., March 25, 1970, 57: 1341.

35. *Haaretz*, April 1, 1970.

36. In August 1972 the first major Jewish industrial enterprise in Kiryat Arba was given approval by the government. See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, August 22–28, 1972.

37. Letter from Beni Katzover to Premier Rabin, May 31, 1974, Gush Emunim Archives.

38. A delay of one day occurred because of an urgent meeting between the settlers' religious leader, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, and Defense Minister Shimon Peres. This attempt to secure the authorities' tacit consent to the act of settlement proved futile; *Nkuda* 69, February 3, 1984.

39. The previous attempts reported by the press were carried out on June 25, 1969 (in Samaria); October 17, 1969 (near Nablus); February 18, 1970 (near Beitar); May 28, 1970 (near Nablus); and September 8, 1970 (also near Nablus). See *Jerusalem Post* for the respective dates.

40. Ibid., July 26, 1971.

41. "Sebastia Issue Deepens Israeli Political Rift," ibid., July 30, 1974.

42. Ibid., July 28, 1974.

43. *Yediot Achronot*, July 28, 1974.

44. *Jerusalem Post*, July 7, 1974.

45. KM, July 7, 1974, 71: 2536–37.

46. In a private conversation with the settlers after the first settlement bid, Rabin stated that it was inconceivable to expect the government to follow the lead of 50 hoodlums and that, personally, he was quite content with the situation preceding the Six-Day War. He was quoted as saying, "As a Jew, what did I miss before 1967?" Interview with Beni Katzover, February 6, 1984.

47. KM, July 31, 1974, 71: 2538.

48. See Minister of Justice Haim Zadok's reply to a question raised by Zvulun Hammer (NRP), KM, August 13, 1974, 71: 2747.

49. *Jerusalem Post*, March 4, 1975.

50. KM, June 6, 1975, 74: 3103.

51. Ibid., 74: 3114. Elsewhere, however, Peres has claimed that he was infuriated by his meeting with the settlers and did not yield to their demands. See Matti Golan, *Peres* (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1982), p. 181. (In Hebrew.)

52. See *Jerusalem Post*, December 2, 1975.

53. Yitzhak Rabin, *Service Notebook*, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979), p. 550. (In Hebrew.) Rabin deals with the Kadum affair only in the Hebrew version of his memoirs.

54. *Jerusalem Post*, December 9, 1975. Rabin (*Service Notebook*, p. 551) claimed that the Ministry of Defense treated the settlers "very generously." Peres's version is that, without his knowledge, Rabin authorized Sharon to negotiate with the squatters on the basis of Guri's proposal. See Golan, *Peres*, p. 182.

55. Rabin, *Service Notebook*, p. 551.

56. *Jerusalem Post*, December 9, 1975.

57. Ibid., December 10, 1975. Peres, who allegedly supported the settlers, did not act alone but according to guidelines set down prior to the cabinet meet-

ing by a committee consisting of Galili, Justice Minister Haim Zadok, and Premier Rabin.

58. Those who considered the compromise unpalatable included Minister of Commerce Haim Bar-Lev, Minister of Construction Avraham Ofer, and Mapam ministers Shlomo Rosen and Victor Shemtov. Both the substance of the action and the means taken to enact it were subject to criticism. Bar-Lev asked why the premier had not summoned a cabinet meeting before the compromise was agreed upon and executed. The premier replied that there had been no time. See *Jerusalem Post*, December 15, 1975.

59. One of the major proponents of this demand was Allon, who from the outset had adamantly objected to the settlement demands in Samaria. In a television interview Allon publicly announced that he would fight against deviations from the government settlement policy; ibid., April 27, 1974.

60. Ibid., May 11, 1976.

61. Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 307.

62. *Haaretz*, May 18, 1976.

63. *Jerusalem Post*, May 26, 1976.

64. KM, May 19, 1976, 76: 2697.

65. *Jerusalem Post*, June 22, 1976.

66. Peres pointed out that the defense plant had been built and was already working for the defense ministry before the cabinet's decision. He therefore had no objection to supplying further orders to enable the group members to keep on working; ibid., August 3, 1976.

67. Rabin, *Service Notebook*, p. 551.

68. Golan, *Peres*, p. 183.

69. KM, March 2, 1977, 79: 1758.

70. Ibid., December 22, 1976, 78: 813.

71. *Jerusalem Post*, May 20, 1977. Within days of his election Begin met with delegates of Gush Emunim and stated his unequivocal support of settlement in the West Bank. Begin said that his government would "establish rural and urban settlements in all parts of Eretz Israel in general, and in Judea and Samaria in particular." *Maariv*, July 1, 1977.

72. Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Bantam, 1981), p. 222.

73. On the difficulties encumbering the settlers in the Jordan Valley, see Aharon Dolev, "The Settlers of the Jordan Valley Carry on their Backs Heavy Debts of 'Tuition' in Millions of Pounds," *Maariv*, August 1, 1980.

74. *Haaretz*, September 30, 1977.

75. Ibid., October 11, 1977.

76. KM, February 8, 1978, 82: 1596.

77. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, June 17–23, 1979.

78. Ibid.

79. Piskei Din (Judgement of the Court) 1980, HCJ 390/79/Vol. 34 (I), Jerusalem, pp. 4–31.

80. Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan presented the court an affidavit claiming that the settlement contributed to the security of the area. The settlers themselves denied association with any military or strategic purpose, claiming that they had a right to settle in Samaria. An elaboration of the court's ruling can be found in Ian Lustick, "Israel and the West Bank After Elon Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto Annexation," *The Middle East Journal* 35 (1981): 557–77. See also Meir Shamgar, ed., *Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel, 1967–1980: The Legal Aspects* (Jerusalem: Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, 1982), pp. 404–41, and Moshe Negbi, *Justice Under Occupation: The Israeli Supreme Court versus the Military Administration in the Occupied Territories* (Jerusalem: Cana, 1981). (In Hebrew.)

81. Although in September 1979 the cabinet lifted a twelve-year ban on Jews purchasing land in the administered territoriès, the small amount of land available for purchase was not enough to satisfy the Likud's needs. See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, September 16–22, 1979. Prior to 1979 land had been purchased by the Heymanuta Company (affiliated with the WZO) and registered in the name of that company. See Moshe Drori, "The Israeli Settlements in Judea and Samaria: Legal Aspects," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Judea, Samaria and Gaza: Views on Present and Future* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), pp. 44–80.

82. Radio interview, quoted in *Jerusalem Post*, October 31, 1979.

83. KM, October 23, 1979, 87: 1274.

84. *Jerusalem Post*, October 23, 1979.

85. *Zot Haaretz* 284, September 11, 1979.

86. *Jerusalem Post*, October 29, 1979.

87. For further details, see Uri Dan, *Operation Bulrush* (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1981). (In Hebrew.)

88. In the Knesset, government spokesman Justice Minister Moshe Nissim claimed that the five settlement blocs had already been established by the Labor Alignment; KM, November 20, 1979, 87: 518.

89. The sum amounted to IL 320 billion. See *Jerusalem Post*, November 16, 1979. According to a crude estimate, the cost of the Elon Moreh affair, including the building of the new site, amounted to IL 120 million. See Yehuda Litani, "Just the Groom has not Arrived," *Haaretz*, December 23, 1979.

90. This decision was opposed by Sharon, who proposed to hasten the pace of land expropriation by the application of Jordanian land laws. See *Haaretz*, May 12, 1980. This proposal was contrary to the attorney general's recommendations on this issue. See *Haaretz*, May 11, 1980.

91. The responsibilities of the Custodian of Absentee Property office (created by military government ordinance in June 1967) are land survey and ownership, classification of land parcels for purposes of requisition, leasing of property to

local Arabs, and returning land classified as absentee to individual owners who are able to claim their property. The office is under the responsibility of the agriculture ministry. See Arye Shalev, *The Autonomy: Problems and Possible Solutions,* Center for Strategic Studies, no. 8 (Tel Aviv, 1980). (In Hebrew.) See also *Jerusalem Post,* December 25, 1979, and *Maariv,* March 21, 1980.

92. Hadassa House was purchased by a Jewish physician at the beginning of this century. During the 1929 riots the physician was murdered and his house captured. Members of Gush Emunim had tried several times to reclaim the building and restore a Jewish presence in the heart of Hebron, but their efforts had been thwarted. On April 9, 1979, a group of women from Kiryat Arba broke into the building and were not turned out by the authorities. In an interview on March 26, 1984, Miriam Levinger, the group's leader, said, "We were positive the military [would] not dismantle women and children."

93. On February 10, 1980, an Israeli cabinet communiqué said that the government had no objection to Jews living in Hebron as they would in any other part of Israel. See *Haaretz,* February 11, 1980.

94. *Jerusalem Post,* April 27, 1982. In an earlier campaign meeting, Begin had given his word of honor not to retreat from any more land. See *Haaretz,* May 8, 1981.

Chapter Three

1. Benyamin Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy," *Journal of Politics* 17 (1955): 507–45.

2. Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Great Britain," *Political Studies* 12 (1964): 31–46.

3. See Moshe Dayan, *Mappa Haddasha Veyehasim Haddashim* [A New Map and New Relations] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1969), p. 173. (In Hebrew.)

4. From an address to an open forum in Tel Aviv on November 30, 1967. Printed in *Jerusalem Post,* International Edition, January 1–7, 1968.

5. Dayan, *Mappa Haddasha Veyehasim Haddashim,* p. 323. "I think that more radical and intensive efforts should be made to integrate the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] strip into Israel—an economic integration and not political integration. In other words: not annexation"; Moshe Dayan, Report of television interview, *Haaretz,* December 2, 1968.

6. *Bamachaneh,* April 14, 1970.

7. *Jerusalem Post,* International Edition, September 9–15, 1970.

8. Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (Jerusalem: Edamin, 1976), p. 323.

9. *Maariv,* August 5, 1969.

10. Ibid., May 15, 1973.

11. Shabtai Teveth, *Moshe Dayan* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 348.

12. *Maariv*, November 15, 1968.

13. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, February 22–28, 1972.

14. Ibid., February 20–26, 1973.

15. LP Secretariat, April 12, 1973, LP Archives, File 24/73.

16. Yigal Allon, *A Curtain of Sand* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1968), p. 330.

17. See Yeruham Cohen, *Leor Hayom Uvamachshach* [In Dark and Bright Days] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1969), p. 114 (in Hebrew), and KM, October 22, 1968, 53: 13. The plan was extensively discussed by the Israeli press. Two illuminating analyses are Amnon Rubinstein, "Strong Israel," *Haaretz*, April 18, 1972, and Dan Margalit and Matti Golan, "The Twists of the Allon Plan," *Haaretz*, June 10, 1972.

18. See *Maariv*, June 1, 1970, and Yeruham Cohen, *Tochnit Allon* [Allon's Plan] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1972), p. 114. (In Hebrew.) It is worth noting, however, that in an interview for Achdut Haavoda's daily (*Lamerchav*, May 31, 1968), Premier Eshkol conceded that the government's policy was congruent with the Allon plan. Golda Meir also argued that the Allon plan was a base for the territorial policy. See *Maariv*, September 30, 1970, and *Davar*, April 18, 1972.

19. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, October 27–November 2, 1969.

20. LP Secretariat, November 9, 1972, File 24/72.

21. Ibid.

22. The details of the Allon Plan are presented in Yeruham Cohen, *Tochnit Allon*.

23. Rael J. Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 57. See also Dan Margalit, "A Green Light was Accorded to a Widescope Settlement," *Haaretz*, May 13, 1970.

24. During the months of November and December 1968, Allon made special efforts to persuade the government to approve settlements in accordance with his plan. See *Maariv*, December 8 and 11, 1968. *Maariv* (March 31, 1972) reported that a resolution to this effect was adopted by the government on January 26, 1969. The settlements were to be founded on former Jordanian government land and the speed of their establishment would be dictated mainly by the availability of water. See "Allon Reveals his Border Plan," *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, April 24–30, 1973.

25. In a 1976 press interview Allon conceded that since the topography, demography, and strategy considerations had not changed during the previous nine years, his views (summed up in the Allon Plan) had not changed either; *Yediot Achronot*, May 14, 1976. Seventeen years after the plan was submitted, *Haaretz* (December 2, 1984) published an article entitled, "It is Possible to Execute the Allon Plan." The article points out that the Arabs might finally realize that the Allon Plan set out the maximum concessions Israel would ever be ready to make and that it should therefore be acceptable to them. The plan was also

geared to accommodate the domestic factions. It satisfied both the doves (by advocating a retreat from a large portion of the West Bank) and the hawks (by advocating annexation of other parts of the same territory).

26. Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case Study for Defensible Borders," *Foreign Affairs* 55 (1976), pp. 38–53. This article includes an approximate map of the Allon Plan.

27. Initially, Allon had another alternative in mind for the Gaza Strip. His intention was to establish autonomy in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, granting the inhabitants authority to handle all affairs short of security and economic matters. See Reudor Manor, "The Conception of Borders in Yigal Allon's Strategic Theory," in S. Derech, ed., *Roots* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1982), p. 175. (In Hebrew.) Earlier hints on this change in perception had already been voiced by Allon before the October War (in a lecture at the Hebrew University on June 3, 1973). See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, September 28–October 3, 1976.

28. *Yediot Achronot*, June 6, 1975. When the possibility of forging interim agreements with Egypt was considered in 1970–71, however, Allon opposed Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal for military and political reasons; Cohen, *Tochnit Allon*, p. 54. See also Allon, *Community Vessels*, p. 162.

29. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, January 18–24, 1977.

30. *Yediot Achronot*, May 14, 1976. At one point, however, Allon conceded that the settlements would not necessarily be incorporated within the state of Israel. Therefore, he could rightfully claim that "everything is open for negotiations." See *Lamerchav*, August 10, 1969, and Manor, "Conception of Borders," p. 177.

31. *Yediot Achronot*, May 14, 1976.

32. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, June 15–21, 1976.

33. In her autobiography, Meir notes that Galili was an indispensable minister on whose advice she often depended heavily. See Golda Meir, *My Life* (Tel Aviv: Steimatsky, 1975), p. 299.

34. LP Secretariat, April 12, 1973, File 24/73.

35. One exception was a detailed interview to the *Jerusalem Post* (International Edition, October 5–11, 1970), wherein Peres claimed that Israel had to prepare itself to live a long time with "no peace and no war."

36. This proposal was a response to Allon, who on July 21, 1974, had presented the government a resolution committing it to enter negotiations with Jordan prior to any other political move. Peres later withdrew his proposal in order to avert a confrontation with the premier. See Matti Golan, "Rabin and the Jordanian Option 1974–1980," *Haaretz*, September 26, 1980.

37. The plan was outlined in *Davar*, June 28, 1975.

38. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, July 1–7, 1975.

39. *Maariv*, July 11, 1975.

40. Ibid.

41. *Haaretz*, September 5, 1975.

42. Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 114.

43. Eban's identification with formal Israeli policy was grounded in a rational argument. "There is no easy solution; any proposed solution bears a cruel implication: territorial, demographic, cultural and social. For this reason I propose to identify, if we can, with the old rule of collective responsibility"; LP Secretariat, September 14, 1967, File 24/67.

44. Ibid., November 23, 1972, File 24/72.

45. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, October 27–November 2, 1972.

46. Ibid., May 20, 1975; *Haaretz*, May 14, 1975.

47. Mark Segal, "Labor Lurches Left," *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, November 11–18, 1968. See also Yoel Markus, "The Mystery of Sapir's Appeal," *Haaretz*, November 26, 1968.

48. *Haaretz*, November 25, 1968.

49. LP Secretariat, November 9, 1972, File 24/72.

50. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, November 25–31, 1968.

51. Lova Eliav, *Land of the Hart: Israelis, Arabs and the Territories, and a Vision of the Future* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publications Society of America, 1974), p. 153.

52. Ibid., pp. 158–59.

53. LP Secretariat, February 1, 1973, File 24/73.

54. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, February 20–26, 1973.

55. Ibid.

56. Zeev Tzour, *Mipulmus Hachaluka Letochnit Allon* [From the Controversy over Partition to the Allon Plan] (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin, 1982), pp. 61–62. (In Hebrew.)

57. The founding convention of the LP on January 21, 1968, does not include any reference to the issue of Greater Israel. The settlement plank calls for "the comprehensive settlement, habitation and development of unsettled areas throughout the country" without specifying areas. Hakibbutz Hameuchad's periodical noted that the issue had not been discussed, owing to internal dissent. It was hoped, however, that "the party would guide the nation and the state toward acts of settlement and political decisions that would ensure rooting in all areas open for settlement"; *Mibifnim* 30, nos. 1–2 (1968): 6.

58. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, June 13, 1967, File 90/15.

59. Ibid., June 22, 1967. Hakibbutz Hameuchad came under heavy pressure from some kibbutzim, who urged it to take action. A good example of this pressure can be found in a letter from Kibbutz Gadot to the secretariat, dated May 5, 1968.

60. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, July 23, 1967.

61. Ibid., October 1, 1967.

62. Ibid., December 3, 1967.

63. Ibid., October 1, 1967.

64. See Tzour, *Mipulmas Hachaluka Letochnit Allon*, p. 104, and *Bakibbutz* 760, July 9, 1969.

65. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, December 3, 1967; Hakibbutz Hameuchad Archives, File 91/15. Although Tabenkin responded to the kibbutz's pressures and declined to sign the LIM's manifesto, his support for the movement was still tenacious.

66. The apprehension was that Rafi would quit the Alignment and join the State List (a small party headed by Ben-Gurion after he left Mapai), that Gahal, and the religious parties in an alliance would jeopardize Labor's nomination. See ibid., August 8, 1969, File 92/15.

67. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Center, *Mibifnim* 30, July 1968.

68. In a meeting that took place at Tabenkin's home it was proposed to set up a Greater Israel faction within the kibbutz. The proposal was rejected for fear of "factionalism"; Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, September 6, 1970, File 96/15.

69. The kibbutz's biggest threat was still Dayan. It supported the inclusion of the NRP in the coalition expressly to counter Dayan; ibid., September 12, 1974, File 107.

70. *Bakibbutz* 28, May 20, 1974.

71. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, September 9, 1975, File 117.

72. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Council, File 2/34/5.

73. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, December 12, 1975, File 117.

74. Hakibbutz Hameuchad Secretariat, December 4, 1975, File 119.

75. The Central Avenue concept was developed by Professor Avraham Vachman of the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology). It proclaimed the importance of the hills near the Jordan Valley for Israel's security and well-being.

76. *Bakibbutz* 27, October 21, 1974.

77. Beni Maharshak, private archive, Hakibbutz Hameuchad, File 15.

78. The "historical rights" principle was incorporated in the party's platform and the government enlarged the areas available for settlement and refrained from explicit reference to UN Resolution 242; *Zot Haaretz* 76, April 15, 1971.

79. Interview with Professor Arye Harel, May 23, 1984.

80. See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, August 14–20, 1973.

81. Interview with Micha Shavit, June 12, 1984.

82. *Zot Haaretz* 158, July 26, 1974.

83. The following information is mainly based on a lengthy interview with Tabenkin's younger son, Ahuvia, in Ein Harod on June 18, 1984. As early as 1967 Ahuvia Tabenkin had founded a group to settle in Nablus. His mobilization into the army in 1968 interrupted the implementation of his plan.

84. Interview with Lova Eliav, May 21, 1984.

85. Daniel Bloch, "The Young are too Radical and Leftist," *Davar,* March 25, 1971; Ran Kislev, "The Young Guard in the Labor turns into a Political Power," *Haaretz,* March 26, 1971. Although the Young Guard did not impose factional discipline, an overwhelming majority of its members endorsed the policy. See Moshe Meizels, "A Dovish Mood in the Alignment's Younger Generation," *Maariv,* January 25, 1973.

86. See Daniel Dagan, "Mapam's Convention Approved Modifications in the Party's Peace Platform," *Maariv,* December 31, 1972. See also Naftali Feder, "Mapam Views Labor Platform as Radical Shift in its Direction," *New Outlook* 16 and 17 (1973–74): 47–48.

87. LP Secretariat, September 14, 1967, File 24/67.

88. Ibid., June 8, 1967.

89. Ibid., January 2, 1968.

90. The IDF and its chief, Rabin, were credited with the victory in the Six-Day War. The stature of Allon, a hero of the 1948 war, was inflated, and information was leaked that once the war had begun, the defense minister had hesitated to send Israeli forces to the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights; Gershon R. Kieval, *Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 21.

91. *Haaretz,* December 13, 1967.

92. For Sapir's position, see Shlomo Nakdimon, *Low Probability* (Tel Aviv: Rvivim, 1982), p. 15. (In Hebrew.) For Eliav's, see Lova Eliav, *Rings of Faith* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1983), p. 297. (In Hebrew.)

93. Yoel Markus, "A General Rehearsal for the Knesset Elections," *Haaretz,* September 5, 1969.

94. Dayan said, "Personally, I have not felt at home in the party. I feel on its fringes" (LP Bureau, March 20, 1969, File 25/69). On March 19, 1969 Dayan stated at the Technion that he had serious doubts about his position in the LP (*Haaretz,* March 2, 1969).

95. The platform stressed Israel's determination not to withdraw from the territories until agreement was achieved on strategic borders essential for Israel's security.

96. *Marriv,* August 5, 1969.

97. LP Secretariat, September 21, 1972, File 24/72.

98. On one occasion, when she failed to express her opinion on land purchase, Meir noted that "this has always been my habit, and I can only regret that I fail to persuade other cabinet ministers to act likewise"; *Jerusalem Post,* International Edition, April 3–9, 1973.

99. Dayan told Meir that "there are issues that do not enable my participation in the electoral campaign"; Nakdimon, *Low Probability,* p. 39.

100. A private citizen could acquire land "only in instances in which land is required for construction purposes, after its acquisition is examined from polit-

ical and security perspectives and after it is clear that the land cannot be purchased for the Israel Land Administration (or that the administration is not interested in purchasing it)." For the full version of Dayan's scheme, see *Maariv,* August 6, 1973.

101. Sapir agreed to allot IL 125 million in four annual allocations for Dayan's scheme. See *Jerusalem Post,* International Edition, August 16–23, 1973. He also visited Kiryat Arba, thereby demonstrating his approval of the settlement; ibid., August 21–27, 1973. In a ministerial debate, Sapir also boasted of his aid to the settlement in Hebron. He justified his support for the Galili doctrine by citing Dayan's threat to bolt from the party: "He may divert 12–15 mandates from the party"; Nakdimon, *Low Probability,* p. 45.

102. LP Secretariat, March 9, 1973, File 24/73.

103. Shlomo Nakdimon, "Galili's Document Violates the Alignment's Foundations," *Yediot Achronot,* September 7, 1973.

104. Dani Bloch, "Galili's Document and Allon Plan," *Davar,* August 19, 1973.

105. Just prior to the October War, however, Allon claimed that the Galili Document implied no significant change in policy, no shift in policy, and no hardening of policy. "This is not an individual document, it is rather a collective document"; ibid., September 3, 1973.

106. LP Secretariat, November 28, 1973, File 24/73.

107. Dayan, *Story of My Life,* p. 558.

108. The party's cohesion had been demonstrably broken on two past occasions. First, Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapira had outrightly demanded Dayan's resignation. When he failed to secure it, Shapira himself resigned from the government on October 28, 1973. Second, three MKs—Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, Lova Eliav, and Avraham Ofer—had declined to support Meir's new government on its first vote of confidence. See *Haaretz,* March 26, 1974.

109. *Jerusalem Post,* June 24, 1975.

110. Ibid., December 16, 1975.

111. *Haaretz,* June 3, 1975.

112. Ibid., December 10, 1975.

113. The LP had to grudgingly acknowledge that what it had failed to do in thirty years, the Likud had done swiftly. Apologetically, Labor admitted that peace "was prepared by ants' work, if not for 30 years, at least in the decade following the Six-Day War"; Galili, LP Center, January 12, 1978, File 23/78.

114. Circle 77 consisted mostly of academics from the Hebrew University who organized in the wake of the 1977 elections to promote the party's renewal. The faction, which advocated very dovish positions, had two representatives in the LP's highest organ (the bureau). Its influence, however, was meager.

115. Weizman, *The Battle for Peace,* pp. 219–20.

116. The letter of resignation was printed in *Jerusalem Post,* International Edition, June 1–7, 1980.

117. Ibid., January 10–16, 1978.

118. Ibid., June 13–19, 1978. At the Herut convention in June 1979 Gershon Solomon, a member of Cohen's group, asked for a political debate before the cabinet's meeting on the future of the West Bank. But members in the front row rose to their feet and shouted him down, and his request was totally ignored; ibid. Cohen was also sharply attacked, both physically and verbally. She was actually prevented from making her speech, and was able to deliver it only intermittently; *Haaretz*, June 7, 1979.

119. For further elaboration, see Yael Yishai, "Party Factionalism and Foreign Policy: Demands and Responses," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 3 (1977): 53–70.

Chapter Four

1. Eldad also demanded the return of the Arabs to their "own lands." *The Front* was published between August 1967 and August 1971.

2. Unlike some rabbis, the famous religious leader Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook was initially willing to sign the manifesto but ultimately declined to do so because of its phrasing. Rabbi Kook regarded Trans-Jordan as part of Eretz Israel and disputed the version offered in the manifesto. See Dani Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side: Gush Emunim* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1982), p. 30 (In Hebrew), and Tzvi Shiloah, *A Great Land for a Great Nation* (Tel Aviv: Otpaz, 1970), p. 180. (In Hebrew.)

3. *Maariv*, April 30, 1968.

4. Tzvi Shiloah complained that his colleagues in Rafi rejected his arguments and refused to consider them. The editor of Rafi's periodical, *Mabat Hadash*, refused to print an article by Shiloah on Eretz Israel; Interview, June 3, 1984.

5. One of the major contributors was Reuven Hecht, a tycoon from Haifa whose financial contributions enabled the movement to launch an extensive campaign in the press. Hillel Dan, chief executive of Solel Boneh, one of the giant Histadrut corporations, also provided money and office space; Shiloah interview, ibid.

6. The chairman of the Executive, Isaar Harel, put the issue bluntly, saying that the LIM must choose between the Canaanites and the members of Hakibbutz Hameuchad. Rael J. Isaac, *Israel Divided* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 54.

7. The first preliminary meeting of the LIM was attended only by Laborites, especially members of Rafi. Some Laborites were dismayed when members of Gahal—among them the famous poet Uri Tzvi Greenberg—later joined the LIM; Shiloah interview, June 3, 1984.

8. Yisrael Harel, "The Movement's Activity during the Election Era," *Zot Haaretz* 34, August 15, 1969.

9. Eliezer Livneh, "Words from Heart to Heart," *Zot Haaretz* 37, October 10, 1969.

10. The list received 7,591 votes (0.6 percent of the electorate). It therefore failed to pass the blocking percentage and did not secure representation. The platform of the list was published in *Zot Haaretz* 38, September 24, 1969.

11. Beni Maharshak, Memo to "The Comrades," n.d., Hakibbutz Hameuchad Archive, File 4.

12. It was noted in an interview with Professor Arye Harel on May 23, 1984, that some Labor members tried to persuade the seceding group to remain in the movement lest it be taken over by the right. Tabenkin was among those who adamantly opposed the Laborite withdrawal from the LIM; Shiloah interview, June 3, 1984.

13. Louis Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 107.

14. Harel interview, May 23, 1984.

15. A personal note in Beni Maharshak's file reveals the frustration of kibbutz members in face of the LIM's impotence to settle on the land. "Beni, who does not know that you are a fighter and a pioneer? But if you think that . . . Hillel Dan, Dorman [a member of the kibbutz] and Hecht [Herut] will go tomorrow to settle the land you are wrong; not them and not me and not many of those sitting here can do it." Beni's reply was unequivocal: "If we will not settle, the movement will deteriorate since in this country what counts is what you DO."

16. The proclamation was issued in November 1969. It was found in Maharshak's files (see note 15).

17. Aharon Bar Tzila accused the movement of "dictating settlement policy and putting up settlements without proper tools, professional experience and previous research." This type of settlement, he claimed, "is not a genuine contribution to the settling of the land"; Aharon Bar Tzila, "The Land of Israel Movement—Introspection," *Zot Haaretz* 39, November 7, 1969.

18. In fact, it was an article by Moshe Shamir ("There is no Return," *Maariv* June 30, 1967) that was responsible for the inception of the movement.

19. The LIM's core leadership consisted of Issar Harel (Rafi, a former head of Israel's intelligence services), Tzvi Shiloah (Rafi), Beni Maharshak (Hakibbutz Hameuchad), Moshe Shamir (previously Mapam), and Moshe Moshkovitz (Religious Kibbutz).

20. An eyewitness noted that "most of the attendants came [to the meeting] to voice their opinion. It is for this reason it was convened." Yet the writer complained that "half out of 8 hours of deliberations were taken by the leadership. Many members failed to speak"; *Zot Haaretz* 5, June 21, 1968.

21. Ibid. 1, April 26, 1968.

22. Ibid. 14, November 1, 1968. It was reported that a heated discussion took place during the demonstration between supporters and opponents of withdrawal, *Hatzofeh*, October 24, 1968.

23. Ibid. 38, October 24, 1969.

24. Y.H., "Where is the Architect of the National Unity?" Ibid. 40, November 21, 1969.

25. Even Allon was described as a supporter of the LIM's objectives. In a private conversation with Tzvi Shiloah, Allon conceded that his plan was designed as a partisan strategy to enlist the support of the doves to retain part of the territories; Shiloah interview, June 3, 1984.

26. The LIM praised the NRP MKs who abstained from the vote that led to the breakup of the National Unity Government; *Zot Haaretz* 59, August 14, 1979.

27. Tamir seceded from Herut in 1967 on grounds of personal rivalry with party leader Begin.

28. Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 118.

29. Walter Laqueur (*A History of Zionism* [London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972], p. 121) quotes Theodor Herzl's reply to Joseph Chamberlain: "We shall not go to Egypt [El Arish]; we were already there."

30. Tzvi Shiloah, quoted in Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 63.

31. *Zot Haaretz* 31, August 1, 1969.

32. Shiloah, *A Great Land for a Great Nation*, pp. 109–11.

33. Ezra Zohar, "Israel and the Periphery against Pan Arabism," in Aharon Ben Ami, ed., *The Book of Greater Israel* (Tel Aviv: LIM, 1977), p. 236. (In Hebrew.)

34. Shiloah, *A Great Land for a Great Nation*, p. 225.

35. Aharon Ben-Ami, "A Middle-Eastern Strategy for Israel," in Ben Ami, ed., *The Book of Greater Israel*, p. 252.

36. Eliezer Livneh, "Resolution can no Longer be Postponed," *Zot Harretz* 4, June 7, 1968.

37. Council Plenum, *Zot Haaretz* 30, June 13, 1969.

38. "LIM Answers to Questions," *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, December 2–8, 1968.

39. Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, pp. 280–90.

40. *Zot Haaretz* 99, March 3, 1972.

41. On April 7, 1971 the LIM published a letter to the editor signed by a youngster seeking partners for the purpose of settlement. The response was unimpressive, very few wished to join him, and authorities were not willing to cooperate. See "The Young Settler is Struggling to be Acknowledged," *Zot Haaretz* 79, May 28, 1971.

42. Tzvi Raanan, *Gush Emunim* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1980), pp. 17–38. (In Hebrew.) Another version of the story is that the inception of the Gush occurred in Yad Harav Herzog (a religious institution in Jerusalem) during a meeting held after the Six-Day War that adopted a resolution to settle the land. Interview with Yoel Ben-Noon, January 25, 1984.

43. Several meetings took place during February and March 1974. The first was held in Rabbi Druckman's home; the second (considered to be the official inception of the Gush), in Kfar Etzion on February 4, 1974; the third, in Heichal Shlomo, the residence of the Chief Rabbinate; and the fourth (at which a secretariat was finally chosen), in Yohanan Freid's home.

44. In 1953–54 24.5 percent of the total student population in primary schools belonged to the state religious schools. In 1968–70 the religious share rose to 27.8 percent. The proportion in religious secondary education in 1969–70 was 21.9 percent; *Israel Statistical Abstract* 1982: 631.

45. The stories of the visions of Rabbi Kook are voluminous. One of the best known is the rabbi's statement on Independence Day 1967, a few weeks before the eruption of the war. The rabbi lamented the division of Eretz Israel and fiercely demanded its unification. His students regarded this statement as a prophetic vision. Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side*, pp. 21–22.

46. For a summary of these theories, see Robert H. Salisbury, "Interest Groups," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 4 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). See also David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Robert H. Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (1969): 1–32.

47. *Jerusalem Post*, August 26, 1975.

48. Additional groups, marginal and short-lived, that campaigned against the retreat included the First Circle, consisting of women members of Herut; veterans of Etzel, the prestate underground movement; and Teuza Medinit (Political Daring). One of the individuals who campaigned was Assa Kadmoni, a Yom Kippur hero. He returned his Medal of Valor and resigned his commission as a major in the regular army. See *Jerusalem Post*, August 26, 1975.

49. Two of the big marches calling for more settlements were held on October 20, 1974, and April 4, 1975.

50. The letter (written September 2, 1973) was signed by Hanan Porat, Beni Katzover and Yitzhak Levi; Gush Emunim Archive. There was no reply because of the breakout of the war.

51. A report to the garin recorded that Galili advised the group not to seek governmental approval, but to apply to the defense minister because the issue was within his authority; September 5, 1973, *Gush Emunim Archive.*

52. Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side*, pp. 53–57.

53. The attempts were made on June 5, 1974; July 26, 1974; October 13, 1974; March 11, 1975; March 14, 1975; March 28, 1975; December 1, 1975; and December 5, 1975.

54. *Jerusalem Post*, October 15, 1974.

55. Ibid., November 25, 1975.

56. Ibid., July 30, 1974.

57. A letter was sent to Premier Rabin on May 31, 1974; to Galili on February 2, 1975; and to Minister of Justice Haim Zadok on April 2, 1975. In a letter addressed to Gad Yaakobi, minister of transport, Gush Emunim specified the exact date of the upcoming settlement attempt. See also "Gush Emunim Serves Notice of Major Settlement Bids," *Jerusalem Post*, November 11, 1975, and August 7, 1977; and "The First Decade," *Nkuda* 69, February 3, 1984.

58. Interview with Yehuda Etzion, April 2, 1984.

59. Interview with Beni Katzover, February 6, 1984.

60. Lester A. Milbrath, "The Impact of Lobbying on Governmental Decisions," in Ira Sharkansky, ed., *Policy Analysis in Political Science* (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 370.

61. The Gush has been described as having been highly successful in soliciting funds, both in Israel and abroad. The buildup of Ofra and the settlement bids in Samaria were facilitated by the financial contributions of bankers and contractors and several industrial executives. The group also raised funds from Jewish communities abroad. See *Haaretz*, January 27, 1981.

62. In March 1976, the Gush held a meeting in Kadum. It was attended by members of all the settlement movements (including Mapam's Hakibbutz Hartzi), who came to identify with Gush Emunim. The list of participants and the protocol can be found in the Gush Emunim Archive.

63. Editorial, *Nkuda* 69, February 3, 1984.

64. Group members were urged to voice their views on all the radio programs that had public participation. See Gush Emunim, Information Leaflet 2, March 1975.

65. Yehuda Litani, "The Offensive of Gush Emunim," *Haaretz*, June 12, 1978.

66. Amana instituted a council composed of two to three representatives of each settlement and an eleven-member secretariat elected by the council; Interviews with Uri Elitzur, the former secretary of Amana, on January 18, 1984 and Uri Ariel, the current secretary, on March 12, 1984.

67. *Nkuda* 4, December 19, 1980. The Golan settlements were reluctant to join Yesha because of their close relationship with Labor; Interview with Yisrael Harel, Yesha's secretary, on January 25, 1984.

68. *Haaretz*, April 6, 1980. See also a leaflet put out by the hunger strikers, "Why are we Hunger Striking?" printed in Tzvi Raanan, *Gush Emunim* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1980), Appendix 6.

69. *Haaretz*, April 22, 1980. The strike was also supported by the Laborite settlers in the territories. The meeting at which the decision to strike was adopted was held in the Local Council of the Jordan Valley. See *Nkuda* 4, February 8, 1980.

70. Yehuda Litani, "Yesha's Missa," *Haaretz*, December 26, 1980.

71. Elyakim Haetzni, "Yesha and the Elections," *Nkuda* 25, March 13, 1981.

72. The press reported that Porat and Shafat withdrew from activity, though

not from membership, in Gush Emunim; *Haaretz* July 19, 1979. Porat was granted a third place on Hatehiya's list and was elected to the Knesset. Shafat became the party's general secretary. A third of Hatehiya's secretariat were members of Gush Emunim.

73. The collaboration of Hatehiya and Gush Emunim was partly disrupted in March 1984 upon the resignation of Hanan Porat from the Knesset. Two other Gush Emunim members, however (one of them Shafat), entered the 11th Knesset in 1984 on Hatehiya's slate. Porat joined a former faction of the NRP headed by Haim Druckman, which presented a militant orthodox list to the 11th Knesset.

74. Giora Goldberg and Ephraim Ben-Zadok, "Regionalism and Territorial Cleavage in the Administered Territories," *State, Government and International Relations* 21 (1983): 69–94. (In Hebrew.)

75. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 63.

76. Women with Golda Meir, December 1973, Gush Emunim Archive.

77. A fascinating letter, dated January 1974, delineates the tactics of Gush Emunim. The writer reveals the proposal of Labor MK Mordechai Ben-Porat as follows: "The government itself won't budge, but if you activate MKs to pressure it, it will have no choice but to yield"; Gush Emunim Archive. Beni Katzover also noted that "the notables [MKs] who joined us made sure we won't be kicked around like the Beitar Garinim were"; *Nkuda* 69, February 3, 1984.

78. "Kiryat Arba is Attained with Suffering," *Nkuda* 56, March 28, 1983.

79. William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1975).

80. Vociferous demonstrations were staged by the adherents of Gush Emunim outside the NRP Center. Rabbi Kook, the spiritual leader of the Gush, fiercely opposed the NRP's participation in the coalition and encouraged the group to sever its formal links with the party; Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side*, pp. 47–48.

81. In a statement to the press on February 5, 1974 the settlers publicly denounced the NRP for its procrastination and demanded the fulfillment of the party's pledge; Gush Emunim Archive.

82. On this dilemma, see Asher Wallfish, "Tail of the Tiger," *Jerusalem Post Weekly Magazine*, April 24, 1980.

83. A list of supportive MKs in the Gush archive shows that in 1974 only two out of sixteen were in the NRP.

84. Oral testimonies obtained from interviews with Menahem Felix on March 21, 1984 and Tzvi Slonim on February 14, 1984.

85. Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 16.

86. Among these authorities, Rabbi Kook was the most prominent. For a

summary of his voluminous writings, see Tzvi Yaron, *Mishnato shel Harav Kook* [Rabbi Kook's Teachings] (Jerusalem: WZO, 1974). (In Hebrew.)

87. Abba Eban, *An Autobiography* (New York: Random, 1977), p. 392.

88. The quote is taken from Shabtai Ben-Dov, a little-known author whose writings have served as an oracle for many Gush leaders; Shabtai Ben-Dov, *Medinat Yisrael Bemashber Hageula* [Israel in the Crisis of the Redemption] (Safed: Hamatmid, 1960), p. 184. (In Hebrew.)

89. This is the major theme in Aharon David Gordon's theory. See Yehuda Eges, *Yalkut Aharon David Gordon* [Gordon's Essays] (Jerusalem: The Zionist Federation, 1958). (In Hebrew.)

90. This is the leitmotif of Tabenkin's ideas. See Yitzhak Tabenkin, *Dvarim* [Collected Speeches] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1974). (In Hebrew.)

91. G. Shraga, "Let us Revive the Greatness of our Country," Gush Emunim, Information Leaflets, no. 3, n.d.

92. A. B. Yehoshua, *The Merit of Normality: Five Essays on Zionist Problems* (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1980). (In Hebrew.)

93. Yisrael Ariel, "Weakness as Ideology," *Nkuda* 20, December 5, 1980.

94. Avraham Yitzhak Kook, *Orot Hakodesh* [The Holy Lights], vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1974), pp. 423–24. (In Hebrew.)

95. The titles of the proclamations were *Lemaan Daat* [For the Sake of Knowledge] and *Lo Taguro* [Do not be Scared], printed in Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side*, Appendix.

96. See Amnon Rubinstein, *From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1980) (In Hebrew); Janette Odea, "Gush Emunim: Roots and Ambiguities," *Forum* 24 (1976): 39–50; Lilly Weisbrod, "Gush Emunim Ideology—From Religious Doctrine to Political Action," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1982): 265–75; and Ehud Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model of Political Extremism," *State, Government and International Relations* 17 (1981): 22–49 (In Hebrew.)

97. Eliezer Livneh, *The Road to Elon Moreh: Zionism in the Emunim Path* (Jerusalem: Gush Emunim, 1976). (In Hebrew.)

98. See Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (London: Flamingo, 1983), p. 117.

99. Ibid.

100. Shlomo Aviner, "A Double Crisis," *Nkuda* 14, May 15, 1980.

101. Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East*, p. 114.

102. Dan V. Segre, *A Crisis of Identity: Israel and Zionism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 125–26.

103. Yohanan Freid, "The Ideological Background of the Samaria Redeemers," *Zot Haaretz* 225, March 11, 1977.

104. See Oz, *In the Land of Israel*, p. 114.

105. Yael Yishai, "Hawkish Proletariat: The Case of Israel," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 13 (1985): 53–73.

106. *Nkuda* 1, December 28, 1979. *Nkuda* disputed the assumption that the settlements drained the development towns of their residents. For data, see *Nkuda* 39, February 5, 1982.

107. In mid-1980 a mass squatting action was carried out by young Jerusalem Sephardim, who demanded equality with the Elon Moreh squatters. The event, however, was sporadic and short-lived. See *Maariv*, June 20, 1980.

108. Shlomo Aviner, *Nkuda* 11, June 27, 1980.

109. For Rabbi Kook, there was no distinction between secular and observant when it came to the question of Eretz Israel. One of his students, Rabbi Yohanan Freid, noted that the difference between the two groups was not eradicable, but that instead of building a fence it was necessary to plant "ornamental bushes"; Interview, March 5, 1984.

110. Interviews with Gershon Shafat on February 29, 1984 and Rabbi Moshe Levinger on March 21, 1984.

111. Yisrael Harel, quoted in Oz, *In the Land of Israel*, p. 115.

112. "The Social Tiding of the Mixed Settlement," *Nkuda* 60, June 24, 1983.

113. Tzvi Slonim, "Whereto Our Face?" *Nkuda* 31, July 17, 1981.

114. The group organized on the day the Knesset decided to evacuate the area. One of the goals was to "elevate the spirit of the settlers." It was regretfully admitted that the Rafah settlers were more concerned about their compensations than about the future of the settlements. See "The Power of Atzmona," *Nkuda* 12, July 11, 1980.

115. *Nkuda* 40, February 24, 1982.

116. Ibid. 44, June 11, 1982.

117. Ibid. 41, March 19, 1981.

118. Yoel Ben-Noon, "Do not be Scared," *Nkuda* 42, April 7, 1982.

119. "There is a danger that, in an atmosphere of violence, soldiers may be killed, God forbid. Such a [civil] war would stain the people of Israel to the extent that will not be wiped out"; Itamar Warhaftig, "The Soul should not be Granted," *Nkuda* 41, March 19, 1982.

120. "Maybe we cannot prevent retreat, but one thing absolutely depends on us: We can fix a high price for retreat"; Elyakim Haetzni, "Sinai will not be Surrendered the Fourth Time," *Nkuda* 42, April 7, 1982.

121. Editorial, "To us it will not Happen," *Nkuda* 20, December 5, 1980.

122. "We have a basis to assume that brazen and trustworthy behavior could have changed even written and signed decisions"; ibid.

123. *Haaretz*, April 17, 1979.

124. *Eretz Hagolan* 60, A Special Edition, January 14, 1982.

125. In the 1981 elections the right-wing parties—Likud, NRP, and Hatehiya—secured a total of 44.3 percent of the vote; the Alignment secured 48.6 percent; see Results of the Elections to the 10th Knesset (Jerusalem, 1982): 38.

126. Interview with Nathan Nathanzon, February 15, 1984.

Chapter Five

1. *The Seventh Day: Soldiers' Talk About the Six Day War* (London: Penguin, 1970).

2. Nira Yuval-Davis, *Matzpen, The Socialist Organization in Israel* (Jerusalem: The School of Social Science and Economy, 1977). (In Hebrew.) One of Matzpen's members, Giora Neumann, was the first conscientious objector sentenced to jail for refusing to take an oath of allegiance to the "army of occupation." His act was almost unanimously condemned. See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, July 18–24, 1972.

3. Ehud Sprinzak, *The Buds of Illegitimate Politics in Israel, 1967–1972* (Jerusalem: The School of Social Science, Hebrew University, 1973), pp. 30–37. (In Hebrew.)

4. One example was an ad that appeared in the daily press in February 1968, claiming, "Yes to Peace and Security; No to Annexation." The ad was signed by 200 people. On May 17, 1968, a similar ad appearing in the daily press was signed by only 50 people.

5. The movement held a meeting with Eban and Allon. Allon presented his plan and asked for endorsement; Interview with Gadi Yatziv, September 4, 1984.

6. Only one Jerusalem professor, Yehoshua Arieli, remained active in the movement; ibid.

7. During 1971–72 the Movement for Peace and Security held four public meetings: on July 7, 1971 (calling for a break in the stalemate on the Jarring talks); on January 27, 1972 (calling for immediate resumption of negotiations with Egypt); on March 13, 1972 (protesting against the stalemate on Sinai); and on April 24, 1972 (demanding recognition of the legitimate political and national rights of both Israelis and Palestinians).

8. Yatziv reported that his list was preceded by another attempt to put up a peace front. The attempt was forged by Uri Avneri (Haolam Hazeh), a group of Maki members (a splinter of the Communist Party headed by Moshe Sneh), and some dissident elements in Mapam. The last group was headed by Yaacov Riftin, who withdrew from Mapam after the Alignment approved the platform to the 1969 elections and established Brit Hasmol (Covenant of the Left). The list broke up owing to the rift between the Communists and Haolam Hazeh. Nathan Yelin-Mor (a previous leader in Lehi, the anti-British underground) and Riftin joined the peace list and were accorded the second and third positions, respectively.

9. The students claimed that the ultimate victory of war is peace and that for this kind of victory, weapons are not enough; a peace policy is also necessary.

This letter was not the first one written by high school students. It was preceded by another letter addressed to the minister of defense from students in Kerem Shalom, a kibbutz bordering the Rafah Salient. See *Al Hamishmar,* October 9, 1970.

10. The exchange of letters was printed in *Davar,* January 12, 1972. It is worth noting the counterreaction to the professors' dovish input. A group of five hawkish professors charged their dovish colleagues with national and public irresponsibility. The hawkish group was granted access and allowed to meet with Meir; *Davar,* December 28, 1971.

11. Dan Patenkin, *Yediot Achronot,* January 14, 1972.

12. Amos Shapira, "In the fringes of the Professor's Cable," *Haaretz,* January 14, 1972.

13. The term "attentive publics" is derived from Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

14. On the nature of these demands, see Eva Etzioni-Halevi and M. Livneh, "The response of the Israeli Establishment to the Yom Kippur War Protest," *The Middle East Journal* 3 (1977): 281–96.

15. Three peace rallies were held in 1974 (in April, May, and August). The rallies attracted many people and were joined by political figures, members of Sheli, Haolam Hazeh, and the Movement for Civil Rights. The rallies were reportedly financed by Ratz.

16. There were many professors affiliated with the LIM, but most of them tended to be specialized in geography, archaeology, the natural sciences, and engineering. The professors affiliated with the peace movement tended to be specialized in history and the social sciences. There was also a small group of religious people who fostered the peace option; Rael J. Isaac *Israel Divided* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 79–82.

17. Ibid., p. 225. Brit Shalom was founded in 1925 by Jerusalem intellectuals who desired "an open and clear surrender of the idea of erecting a Jewish state"; Isaac, *Israel Divided,* p. 39. Ichud (formed in 1942) sought Jewish-Arab cooperation in a binational Palestine. Among its chief members were Martin Buber and Yehuda Magnes, the president of the Hebrew University.

18. *The Seventh Day,* p. 162.

19. Ibid., pp. 136–37.

20. Ibid., pp. 307–8.

21. Ibid., p. 38.

22. Ibid, p. 310.

23. Yehoshua Arieli, "Annexation and Democracy," *New Outlook* 12 (June–July–August 1969): 101.

24. "Security and Peace Go Together," *New Outlook* (February 1969): 32.

25. "For Peace and Security; Against Annexation," statement adopted at a

meeting of the Tel Aviv Council for Peace and Security on July 1, 1968. See Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 171.

26. Yaacov Talmon, "An Open Letter to Minister Galili," *Lamerhav*, May 26, 1969.

27. Yehoshua Arieli, "Drift of Mastery," *New Outlook* 12 (October 1969): 15.

28. See Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 171.

29. Arieli, "Annexation and Democracy," pp. 95–101.

30. Talmon, "An Open Letter to Minister Galili," *Lamerhav*, May 26, 1969.

31. Ibid.

32. Shlomo Avineri, "The Palestinians and Israel," *Commentary* 49 (June 1970): 39.

33. *Haaretz*, February 11, 13, and 14, 1970. See also *New Outlook* 13 (September–October 1970).

34. Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 94.

35. At the end of 1969, Nahal, the IDF's settlement unit, introduced a peace song conveying rejection of the very idea of all war. "Sing a song of love and not of war / Don't say a day will come (to make peace), bring the day today." The full text of the song and comments by the IDF's former chief education officer can be found in *New Outlook* 13 (June 1970): 52–56.

36. *The Seventh Day*, p. 91.

37. See Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 93.

38. To be sure, there were dovish MKs and even ministers. These, however, could not be regarded as representatives of the peace movement, even in the loosest sense. Even Yosi Sarid, the arch-dove who was elected to the Knesset in 1973, could hardly be counted as a peace movement representative. Their political milieu and constituency were in no way linked to what remained of the peace movement.

39. Isaac, *Israel Divided*, p. 88.

40. Interview with Amos Arieli, March 5, 1984.

41. *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, August 23–29, 1977.

42. See Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968): 1144–54.

43. Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

44. Interview with Yuval Neriah, May 9, 1979.

45. Interview with Talma Eligon, June 12, 1984.

46. The term "sporadic interventionists" is derived from Robert E. Dowse and John E. Hughes, "Sporadic Interventionists," *Political Studies* 25 (1977): 84–92.

47. The title appeared a few weeks before the Officers' Letter in an ad published by a small group in Tel Aviv, which adopted the slogan suggested by one of its members (Arye Tartakover); Arye Palgi, *Peace and Nothing More* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1979), p. 32. (In Hebrew.) The Jerusalem members rejected the

title Peace Now, apprehending that the emphasis of present demands might indicate impatience and lack of perseverence and therefore be detrimental to the group's expansion. As a compromise, it was decided to add the phrase "Better Peace than Greater Israel" to Peace Now.

48. Interview with Orgad Vardimon, January 18, 1984. See also "Moderates against Extremists in Peace Now Rally—Tomorrow," *Haaretz*, December 4, 1978.

49. See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, April 19–26, 1981.

50. Karl W. Deutsch. *Politics and Government: How People Decide their Fate*, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), p. 147.

51. "By then I did not suffice with putting my conscience inside the bathtub and soaping it"; Dedi Zuker, Interview, March 7, 1984.

52. Interview with Jannette Aviad, February 22, 1984.

53. The activists carried a postcard with 60,000 signatures for peace. The premier's office refused to accept this postcard. See *Haaretz*, April 27, 1978.

54. Ibid., September 3, 1978.

55. In 1982 a group of Jerusalem activists resumed Peace Now activities by mobilizing new members and convening regular meetings. A meeting of activists in Jerusalem on December 18, 1978 discussed the question of "what next" but did not reach any decisions. The renewal of negotiations with Egypt also attenuated Peace Now's voice. On December 26, 1978 the movement decided to cancel a planned rally dubbed "Light to Peace" and refrain from activity; Interview with Naftali Raz, March 5, 1984.

56. Only 50 people participated in the demonstration against the settlers of Elon Moreh, which was staged in stormy rain. *Haaretz*, January 5, 1980. Between April 1978 and March 1979 Peace Now staged nineteen mass demonstrations. Between March 1979 and June 1982 the number of demonstrations declined to six and decreased in size.

57. Peace Now did not develop an organizational set-up for fund raising, but relied instead on the responsiveness of individuals and companies in Israel and abroad; Interview with Galia Golan, February 22, 1984.

58. Interview with Orly Lubin, March 28, 1984.

59. An example of such an activity was the planting of vines on Arab lands due to be confiscated for settlement purposes and the erection of a tall monument resembling a dovecot, designed and built by a famous sculptor, that was erected to protest settlement in Shiloh. See *Jerusalem Post*, International Edition, August 15–21, 1979. Another example is the demonstration on January 5, 1980, against the settlement in Elon Moreh, in which Peace Now activists chained themselves to trucks and blocked the way to the settlement; *Haaretz*, January 6, 1980.

60. On April 19, 1978 ten MKs stated that they supported the Officers' Letter. Seven of these were affiliated with Labor, two with the DMC, and one with Ratz. On November 1, 1979, 20 MKs joined Peace Now's call for a street demonstra-

tion. On February 19, 1979, 30 MKs participated in a forum held by Peace Now in a Jerusalem hotel.

61. Reportedly, there were many Arab respondents to the first wave of press ads who were never contacted by the initiators of Peace Now.

62. Raz recalled that after Shinui defected from the DMC on August 20, 1978, it appealed to Peace Now for closer cooperation. But Peace Now preferred to remain a protest group and rejected Shinui's appeal; Raz interview, March 5, 1984.

63. Mapam rescued Peace Now from bankruptcy more than once. Reportedly, its aid was not tied to any limiting condition, and Mapam did not dominate the peace movement; Interviews with Abu (Avshalom) Vilan, February 22, 1984, and Geri Brener, January 24, 1984.

64. Peace Now's involvement in the Electoral Process and in the Political System, Peace Now pamphlet, 1981.

65. Yitzhak Galnoor, personal communication.

66. *Haaretz*, May 26, 1978.

67. Ibid., May 22, 1978. But in a subsequent meeting between the former premier and Peace Now, Meir papered over her differences with the movement and claimed that "the principles of the movement are acceptable"; ibid., May 28, 1978.

68. Haim Bar-Lev, the Labor Party's general secretary, rejected Peace Now's efforts to influence the party's platform. "Who are you anyway? Who chose you? If you wish to influence, join the party"; Interview with Yitzhak Galnoor, January 30, 1984. Yisrael Galili was also unfavorable to Peace Now. The movement, however, established a "Forum for Responsible Peace Policy," composed of MKs from most opposition parties, to influence their parties' decisions. The Forum was short-lived, holding only two meetings; See Mordechai Bar-On, Peace Now: The Portrait of a Movement (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), p. 44. (In Hebrew.)

69. In a letter addressed to Peres, Peace Now adamantly denounced the Labor Party for supporting the Jerusalem Law and expressed its apprehension about the party's positions on the Golan issue. Peace Now warned that "if the Alignment surrenders itself to such destructive motions [to annex the Golan] a serious rift will emerge between the party and hundreds of thousands of Peace Now's supporters"; Report written by Yitzhak Galnoor and Yael Tamir, July 31, 1980. Peace Now also made a few attempts to meet with representatives of the coalition parties. It compiled a list of the coalition MKs who could be approached by the movement, including Zalman Abramov and Yehezkel Flomin of the Likud and David Glass and Avraham Melamed of the NRP. The religious party criticized Glass for participating in a Peace Now rally (see *Haaretz*, February 22, 1979) and the Liberal Party also manifested no dovish tendencies. Peace Now also made a few attempts to meet with representatives of the coalition parties; the outcome of these meetings was evidently not very impressive.

70. Meetings with politicians were considered to be a prize and a selective benefit. In the absence of more tangible rewards, interaction with national figures was one of the chief benefits conferred on Peace Now's activists; Interview with Tzali Reshef, March 14, 1984.

71. *Haaretz*, April 23, 1978. Peace Now explicitly demanded in a mass demonstration held in March 1980, the resignation of Begin and his cabinet. See *Jerusalem Post*, March 30, 1980.

72. In his memoirs Weizman described the members of Peace Now as "just the type of young men into whose eyes I wanted to be able to look with a clear conscience should I ever have to order them to go to war." In the same breath, however, he conceded that he did not like "demonstrations—whether 'for' or 'against.' I consider them valueless. Neither did I like the eagerness with which Peace Now advocated that we give up our bargaining counters"; Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Bantam, 1981), p. 306.

73. See *Maariv*, July 5, 1978.

74. Ibid., January 25, 1980. On February 6, 1980, the Knesset debated Ambassador Rosen's attack on Peace Now.

75. Peace Now pamphlet, n.d.

76. "An Open Letter to Menahem Begin," *Haaretz*, March 1, 1980.

77. Peace Now pamphlet, n.d.

78. Ibid.

79. See Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (London: Flamingo, 1983), p. 146.

80. Peace Now pamphlet, n.d.

81. Officers' Letter, *Jerusalem Post*, March 8, 1978.

82. Et Shalom [A Time for Peace], pamphlet, n.d.

83. In October 1978 four Peace Now members went to the United States to attempt to secure the support of American Jewry. Many other trips followed. Peace Now also met with international leaders, including Anwar Sadat (in October 1978), Yup Den Oil (Holland's ex-premier), and Pierre Mendès-France.

84. See Roman Friester, "The Inception of a Protest," *Haaretz*, Supplement, July 18, 1978.

85. An interview with David Glass that portrayed his dovish opinions appeared in *Haaretz*, May 26, 1978.

86. Uriel Simon, Letter to Rabbi Simha Cot, April 24, 1981, *Yedion* 29, April–May 1981.

87. The platform of Oz Veshalom, The Ideological-Political Circle of Religious Zionism.

88. Report on the National Council, *Yedion* 30, June 1981.

89. Interview with Shulamit Hareven, January 30, 1984.

90. Peace Now pamphlet, n.d.

91. Ibid.

92. A poll conducted by Peace Now in March 1980 indicated that of the 1,227 respondents, 21 percent supported the movement's principles, 36.5 percent were indifferent, and 37.7 percent outrightly objected to it and its tactics; Bar-Ov, *Peace Now*, p. 92.

Chapter Six

1. *The Public's Response after the War: A Concluding Report* (Israel Institute for Applied Social Research [IIASR]: Jerusalem, June 25, 1967).

2. See *Yediot Achronot*, December 18, 1981. Another poll indicated that the prime minister's popularity rose after the Golan law was passed. See *Haaretz*, December 18, 1981.

3. A poll conducted after the treaty was signed indicated a comeback for the Likud. The party's potential election mandate increased from 35 to 44. See *Jerusalem Post*, April 29, 1979.

4. Ira Kahanman and Hanna Levinson, *The Israeli Public's Assessments and Positions Regarding Political Issues in the Period July 1978–April 1979* (IIASR, June 1979), (s)HL/740/H.

5. The poll also reveals that a vast majority (78 percent) accepted the concessions made by Israel for the sake of peace. See *Yediot Achronot*, October 17, 1978.

6. See also Russell A. Stone, *Social Change in Israel: Attitudes and Events, 1967–79* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 54–55.

7. The annexation of the Golan Heights and the withdrawal from Sinai in 1980–82 made public attitudes toward these areas irrelevant.

8. Zeev Ben-Sira, "The Current Situation in the Public's Views: Analysis of Social Indicators in the period October–November 1971," *The Current Survey* (Social Institute for Applied Social Research and the Communication Institute of the Hebrew University: Jerusalem, March 1973), (s) ZBS/346/R(H), p. 89.

9. Hanna Levinson, *Public Positions Regarding the Issues of Settlement and the Autonomy* (IIASR: Jerusalem, August 13, 1979), (S)HL/747/H, p. 3.

10. Hanna Levinson, *Public's Assessments and Positions Regarding Settlements Beyond the Green Line* (IIASR: Jerusalem, March 1980), (S)HL/776/H, p. 10.

11. *The Continuing Survey* (IIASR: Jerusalem).

12. Levinson, *Public Positions Regarding Settlement and Autonomy*, p. 10.

13. Shlomit Levi and Eliyahu L. Guttman, *The Potential Voters of Hatehiya* (IIASR: Jerusalem, May 1981), (S)SL/825/H, p. n-2.

14. Kahanman and Levinson, *Israel: Public's Assessments and Positions, July 1978–April 1979*, p. 23.

15. Prior to 1974 the question appeared on surveys in a slightly different form: "(a) What is your opinion regarding each of the territories? Should the West Bank be retained/not be retained/I do not know the place; (b) What is the biggest

concession you would be ready to make in order to arrive at a peace treaty with the Arabs? In the West Bank—to return everything/most/a portion/a small part/none."

16. Joseph LaPalombara, *Politics within Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 444–45.

17. Interview with Daniella Weiss, February 6, 1984.

18. *Nkuda* 48, The High Holidays Issue, 1982.

19. Asher Arian, *The Choosing People* (Ramat-Gan: Massada, 1973), p. 42. (In Hebrew.)

20. A poll conducted for Asher Arian by Dahaf, Tel Aviv.

21. KM, September 5, 1949, 2: 1569.

22. Lesley Hazelton, *Israel, Women: The Reality Behind the Myths* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 110.

23. Yael Yishai, "Women and War: The Case of Israel," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 10 (1985): 195–214.

24. In 1969 the proportion of young voters (24 and under) opting for the Likud was 36 percent (compared to 40 percent for the Alignment). In 1973 the proportions changed to 44 percent and 39 percent, respectively. In 1977 the difference increased in favor of Likud supporters; more than half (51 percent) of the younger electorate cast their vote for the Likud, in comparison to only 20 percent for the Alignment. See Asher Arian, "The Israeli Electorate, 1977," in Asher Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel, 1977* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1980), p. 269.

25. Edelman N. Phillips, "Militarism and Grass-Roots Involvement in the Military-Industrial Complex," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17 (1973): 625–55.

26. David Brady and Leon Rappaport, "Violence and Vietnam: A Comparison between Attitudes of Civilians and Veterans," *Human Relations* 26 (1973): 735–72; and Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and James L. Regens, "Military Experience and Foreign Policy Belief System," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 6 (1978): 29–47.

27. Central Bureau of Statistics, *Survey of Income, 1979*, Special Series no. 661 (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 48–49.

28. Levinson, *Public's Assessments and Positions Regarding Settlements Beyond the Green Line*, p. 10.

29. Levinson, *Public Positions Regarding Settlement and Autonomy*, p. 10.

30. Arian, *The Elections in Israel, 1977*, p. 275.

31. Louis Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 118–20.

32. *Israel Statistical Abstract 1982*, pp. 95–96.

33. An elaboration of this issue can be found in Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

34. Judith Bernstein and Aharon Antonovsky, "The Integration of Ethnic Groups in Israel," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 23 (1981): 5–23.

35. Parts of the study from which the data were derived were published in Sammy Smooha and Don Peretz, "The Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26 (1982): 451–84.

36. See, for example, Asher Arian, "Elections 1981: Competitiveness and Polarization," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 21 (1981): 1–28.

37. Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, "An Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Election," *State, Government and International Relations* 19–20 (1982): 88–103. (In Hebrew.)

38. Yael Yishai, "Hawkish Proletariat: The Case of Israel," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 13 (1985): 53–73.

39. Yohanan Peres, "Ethnic Relations in Israel," *American Journal of Sociology* 76 (1971): 1021–47.

40. See *Israel Statistical Abstract 1973*, p. 334 and ibid., *1983*, p. 37. The proportion for Ashkenazi was 3.9 percent in 1972 and 3.2 percent in 1982; ibid.

41. The number of Arabs from Gaza, Judea, and Samaria in the labor force was 20.6 thousand in 1970. By 1981 their number had increased to 215.8 thousand. Of these, 24 percent were employed as unskilled workers and 63.7 percent were employed in agriculture and construction; ibid., p. 754.

42. Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (London: Flamingo, 1983), p. 36.

43. Ofira Seliktar, "Ethnic Stratification and Foreign Policy in Israel: The Attitudes Towards the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *The Middle East Journal* 38 (1984): 34–50.

44. Yohanan Peres, *Ethnic Relations in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1976), pp. 89–97. (In Hebrew.)

45. See Harvey Goldberg, "Ethnic Groups in Israeli Society," *Ethnic Groups* 1 (1977): 163–86 and Walter P. Zenner, "Ambivalence and Self-Image Among Oriental Jews in Israel," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 5 (1963): 215–23.

46. Seliktar, "Ethnic Stratification and Foreign Policy," p. 38.

47. George R. Tamarin, *The Israeli Dilemma: Essays on a Wartime State* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1973), p. 43.

48. Ira Kahanman and Hanna Levinson, *Public Attitudes toward Israel-Egypt Relations*, (IIASR: Jerusalem, November 1979). IIASR S/IK/756/H.

49. Adi Pesach, "The Likud and the Alignment in the Voters' Views," *IIASR Newsletter* 54 (1981): 19. (In Hebrew.)

50. Shamir and Arian, "Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Election."

51. Yohanan Peres and Sarah Shemer, "The Ethnic Factor in the Elections to the Tenth Knesset," in Emanuel Gutmann, Dan Kaspi, and Avraham Diskin, eds., *The Roots of Begin's Success* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

52. Smooha and Peretz, "The Arabs in Israel," p. 457.

53. Ibid., p. 479.

54. Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, and Scott C. Flanagan, "Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies," in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 21.

Chapter Seven

1. Yigal Allon, Speech at the Labor Party's first convention, August 4, 1969, LP Archives, File 21/69.

2. Uri Elizur, *Knuda*, 53, January 14, 1984.

3. In 1970 Meir remarked, "Since 1948 nobody has ever heard about a Palestinian entity. Where have they been?" *Haaretz*, February 10, 1970.

4. Avram Schweitzer, *Upheavals* (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1984). (In Hebrew.)

5. Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 155–56.

6. *The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk About the Six Day War* (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 206.

7. Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel* (London: Flamingo, 1983), p. 93.

8. *The Seventh Day: Soldiers' Talk About the Six Day War* (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 211–12.

9. *Israel Statistical Abstract 1982*, p. 54.

10. Gadi Wolfesfeld, "Collective Political Action and Media Strategy: The Case of Yamit," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (1984): 363–81.

11. B. Michael, "PAXOPHOBIA," *Haaretz*, December 2, 1984.

Postscript

1. Asher Arian, "What the Israeli Election Portends," *Public Opinion* (August/September 1984) pp. 54–56.

2. The chief purpose of the meeting was to pressure the Labor Party to include members of the Palestinian Council in future peace talks. See *Haaretz*, July 14, 1985.

3. Ibid., July 16, 1985.

4. Ibid., September 23, 1985. Adherence to the Allon Plan was emphasized by Rabin, who declared while visiting the city of Efrat in the West Bank that "Gush Etzion and Kiryat Arba are part of our sovereignty." See ibid., July 18, 1985.

5. The Progressive List for Peace is a radical peace party that supports the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The party is represented by two MKs, an Arab and a Jew.

6. Ezer Weizman, a minister without portfolio in Peres' cabinet, is considered one of the staunchest doves in the Israeli government.

7. The dovish parties cooperate within the framework of an International Center for Peace in the Middle East, headed by Abba Eban. The center enjoys the support of American Jewish groups and actively campaigns for peace in Israel and abroad.

8. In the process of reorganization a wide secretariat, including 50 members, and an active secretariat, including 10 members, were selected. Although the Gush maintained its religious features, a woman—Daniella Weiss—was elected as general secretary.

9. A long report dealing with new developments in Yesha was headlined, "A Settler in Jacuzzi," referring to the new style of Yesha's propaganda techniques. See Avinoam Bar-Yosef, "Yesha with Style," *Maariv*, July 19, 1985.

10. *Nkuda* 74, July 11, 1974.

11. Ibid.

12. Gush representatives met with Premier Peres before his departure to Washington in 1985 and urged him not to negotiate the fate of the West Bank; *Haaretz*, October 15, 1985. Defense Minister Rabin gave the settlers permission to conduct a Jewish religious ritual in the heart of Nablus; *Haaretz*, October 2, 1985.

13. A new association of West Bank settlers has been established, whose defined role is to address the administrative problems of the local council and thereby free Yesha to concentrate on political issues. See ibid., July 17, 1985.

14. Yitzhak Shilat, "To return to the Highway," *Nkuda* 89, July 26, 1985.

15. Jeffrey M. Berry, *Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 7.

16. Eliezer Schweid, "From a National Movement to a Political Pressure Group?" *Nkuda* 89, July 26, 1985.

17. Rafi Veknin, "With Our Own Hands We Prevented Massive Settlement in Yesha," ibid.

18. The most notable of these groups include Yesh Gvul (There is a limit/border) and Parents Against Silence.

19. Lily Galili, "Parliament Now," *Haaretz*, December 12, 1984.

20. Ibid., October, 15, 1985.

21. *Maariv*, June 28, 1983.

22. Ibid., October 2, 1985.

23. Ibid., February 3, 1985.

24. Ibid., October 2, 1985.

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across all sections of Israeli domestic politics. Public opinion, political organizations, and members of governing institutions nearly always separate into "hawks," determined to hold fast to occupied lands, and "doves," who advocate relinquishment of territories in exchange for peace. The author has centered her study not on the motivation of Israel's political leaders, but on those who attempt to influence them. To what degree have they successfully affected policy and decisions? Yishai's analysis of the sources, structures, and operation of the domestic division clarifies many of Israel's past decisions about the disputed territories. It should also enhance our ability to predict and evaluate future developments in Israel's crucial territorial policy.

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